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A STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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A STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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To

The students who elected the courses in the History and Philosophy of Religion at Cornell University, 1913-1916, and the summers of 1915 and 1917.

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to furnish college undergraduates and general readers with the necessary data—facts and arguments—on which they will be able to work out their own philosophy of religion. The book is an outgrowth of lecture courses given at Cornell University from 1913 to 1916. While the majority of the students electing these courses represented the various Protestant denominations, there were a number of Roman Catholics and Jews in each class, and a fair sprinkling of men and women who at any rate believed themselves to be atheists and agnostics. The constituency of the classes led us to be objective and impersonal, to respect one another's opinions and sentiments, and to realize that there are several sides to most religious and philosophical questions. We concentrated our attention upon the philosophical and psychological study of features common to all the three religious confessions represented; by so doing, we believed that we were concerning ourselves with those features of religion that probably are most significant. My endeavor never was to influence any one to change his religious affiliations. Whenever a student consulted me privately, I advised him to continue in the religious faith and associations in which he had been brought up,—unless he had formed deep and rationally grounded convictions that rendered this impossible, which was very rarely the case. Students frequently urged me to publish the lectures, and I promised to do so. The interruptions of the war, and the necessary concentration of time upon my courses in another institution, in which I do not teach the philosophy and psychology of religion, have prevented an earlier fulfilment of this promise.

My experience has been, that when an undergraduate elects a course in the philosophy department bearing on religion it is usually for one or more of the following reasons. Either he wants to make up his mind whether or not there is a God,

and if there is a God, what kind of one; or he is puzzled about the freedom of the will, or the problem of evil; or he wonders if he has a soul, and whether it is immortal. Very likely he is asking himself whether or not he ought, as an intelligent person, desirous of his own mental and moral advancement and conscious of his social obligations, to become or to remain identified with a church or synagogue. Perhaps he is suspicious that the mechanical and evolutionary conceptions taught in the sciences with which he has become acquainted call seriously into question the truth of whatever religious instruction he has had. Very often, too, he is curious to know something about the different religions of the world. In these days, when almost everybody in college elects psychology, he is pretty sure to be curious about what psychology has to say concerning religion.

For one instructor to treat of all these topics in a single course is a rather large undertaking, especially if he has to devote much of his time to teaching other of the philosophical subjects ordinarily included in an undergraduate curriculum. However, the demand for this kind of a course is genuine, deep and earnest, and philosophy departments ought to meet it. So, though painfully conscious of its inadequacies, I venture to submit this book. While not claiming to be a specialist, I have endeavored everywhere to follow the best authorities and to consult sources as freely as possible. I hope that I have not made too many mistakes. My own opinions on the various topics are frankly stated, but I hope not made obtrusive, or put in a way that will prejudice the reader's judgment, or prevent him from making independent conclusions.

The literature to which I am indebted is indicated in the notes, and in lists of references appended to the chapters. Those of my teachers whose influence was greatest in the formation of my philosophical and psychological opinions as an undergraduate and graduate student were Professor James H. Tufts and President James Rowland Angell. Other teachers to whom I owe much are Professors A. W. Moore, G. H. Mead, E. S. Ames, and Warner Fite. My views have since become considerably modified under the influence of Professors J. E. Creighton and William McDougall; and, to a less extent, but substantially, by many others—in degrees not always proportionate to the length or brevity of my personal contact with them. Among these latter must be

mentioned Professors Frank Thilly, E. B. McGilvary, L. T. Hobhouse, Graham Wallas, Irving King, J. H. Leuba, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Dr. R. R. Marett. Most recently my thought has been colored by contact with Professors W. H. Sheldon and W. M. Urban, who have in succession been colleagues at Dartmouth College. I owe much to my wife, for criticisms of lectures and manuscript, and assistance in correcting the proof.

The principal claim that I can make for originality is the arrangement of the material and its adaptation to the needs of students and other readers. However, I may deserve some credit for my definition of religion (Chapter V), and the various applications of this definition in the remainder of Part I, for my interpretation of the religious attitude as a sentiment (Chapters XIV, XV) and for certain ideas in the sections headed "The Author's Opinions" in the chapters of Part III.

I have not thought it necessary to defend my methodology in this volume, as I have treated this subject in an article, "The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Psychology of Religion," published in the *Philosophical Review* in March, 1918. I believe that this book has been written in accordance with the principles advocated in that article. The abundant use of concrete material, especially in the earlier chapters, is the result of my experience as a teacher. I regret the necessity of giving up so much space to illustrations, and the consequently slow movement of thought. But this is inevitable, in view of the increasingly narrow range of cultural information at the command of American undergraduates, especially upon all topics in any way connected with philosophy and religion. It will be practicable for teachers who find it necessary to make omissions to leave out Chapters VII-XIII; or any entire Part could be taken up, and the other two left out. As there is some continuity running through the chapters, there would be something lost in reading them in different order; except that much might be said for the study of Chapter XIV immediately after Chapter I.

A few words in conclusion regarding the value of the study of the subjects treated.

Few disciplines, at least as it appears to me, rival the philosophy of religion in the mental training and breadth of culture afforded. The student has to learn to enter imagina-

tively and sympathetically into the emotional attitudes of the various types of religious experience in order to understand them. At the same time he has to evaluate these experiences cold-bloodedly in a disinterested effort to determine what truth, if any, they contain. He must learn how to weigh evidence where demonstration is impossible, and to determine the amount of probability afforded by arguments based upon analogies. He must learn to be content to suspend his judgment on many points. He must also learn, where a decision has to be made—such as his own personal attitude toward a religious body to which he feels attracted—to form a conclusion in accordance with what, in the absence of certainty, he judges on the whole to be most probable. He must acquire the ability to consider fairly the different sides of a question, and to extract the truth from each. He must gain, not merely tolerance, but also sympathy and respect for those who arrive at different conclusions from himself.

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A STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The time has passed when thinking men and women can either accept or reject religion uncritically. The age of faith, when persons could be led through simple and childlike trust to accept religious teaching unquestioningly, has passed away. No reasonable person now can think it wrong to doubt, or to ask for the reasons why he should believe. And, on the other hand, the time has ceased when anyone who knows anything about the subject tries to explain away religion by attributing its origin to fraud and superstition. A factor that has persisted so long in human history, and influenced society in all ages so profoundly, must hold some integral place in human life and experience. It has had its beginnings in the beliefs and practices of the lowliest savages. From these we can, with some degree of confidence, outline the gradual course of its evolution down to the present time. Religion must be regarded as one of the most important and fascinating subjects for human investigation.

I—*The Two Questions*

The first question that a beginner in the study of religion naturally wishes to ask is, "Is religion true?" A very little thought, however, will convince anyone that this question cannot be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No"; and that before it can be considered at all, it is first necessary to find an answer to the question "What is religion?" For while all of us have general notions as to what we mean by the word, it would be quite impossible for anyone to give an accurate definition of religion without considerable study.

There are two ways of attempting to answer this question, "What is religion?" We shall make use of both of them. In Part I we shall endeavor to trace the course and development

of religion through human history, to find out what characteristics have always belonged to it and so appear to be essential; and what characteristics have appeared only at times and not at others, and so are presumably accidental to it; what are the laws that govern its development; and what influence it has had upon human events.

Part II will be devoted to the second way of answering the question, "What is Religion?" This will be a report of some things that psychologists have learned from a study of the religious experiences of persons most of whom have lived in our own times. These will throw much light on the kinds of religious experience that people now have, and the nature and efficacy of religious awakenings, prayer, and mystical states.

Thus acquainted with the facts of religion, we shall be prepared, in Part III, to take up the fundamental question, "Is Religion true? Does it have a genuine place in a philosophical account of the world, comparable with that occupied by science?" Successive chapters will consider: whether the world can best be regarded as exclusively mechanical (a possibility obviously unfavorable to Religion), or whether it is also in some respects purposive (a possibility that admits of the existence of God); what arguments philosophers now advance in favor of the existence of God; what they believe His nature to be, His relation to evil, to the freedom of the human will, and to human immortality.

The purpose throughout the book will be to help the reader to think out his philosophy of religion for himself. While the author will always conclude by giving his own opinions, the reader should never accept any of them, unless, after criticizing them in every way he can, they appear to him more reasonable than any alternative opinions that occur to him. No educated person can ever acquire any beliefs on the subject of religion that will be of the slightest benefit in his own life or that will increase his effectiveness as a member of society until he has thought them out for himself and made them his very own.

II—*A Word of Counsel*

A word of counsel needs to be given before taking up the body of the book. One reason for devoting so much space to religions in other lands and periods of history in Part I, and for giving so many references and comparisons to other religions than the one immediately under consideration all

through the book, is to widen the range of vision as much as possible. For instance, the best way to understand and appreciate the Founder of Christianity is to know something of the founders of other religions,—especially of Gautama Siddartha, the Buddha, one of the gentlest, wisest and most self-sacrificing of men.

To understand any religion it is not enough to know some of the facts about it, such as its doctrines, ritual, moral precepts, ecclesiastical organization, and the architecture of its temples. These are merely the externals of a religion—at most its foliage. The core of a religion is not easily described. A religion must be *felt*, if it is to be really understood. The reader should always try to put himself in the place of the believers and practicers of the religion under immediate consideration, to imagine himself feeling as they do, suffering as they have often suffered, and experiencing their hopes and joys. He will then be able to understand how the religion has developed,—its ritual, body of doctrine, organization and other manifestations. These will be seen to be the natural expression of its life. With our sympathy must be combined frank criticism. But appreciation should never be lacking. Every attempt of humanity to reach forth to something higher and better than it knows, surely deserves respect. And as a matter of fact we shall see, that religions have usually, at least, been modes by which man really has advanced to higher levels of moral and social insight and attainment.

III—*Definitions*

Preliminary to the subsequent chapters it is necessary for us to become acquainted with a few definitions. By the *Psychology of Religion* is meant, *a scientific description and explanation of the mental states and outward behavior of individual persons, and groups of persons when they have religious experiences.* In Part I these processes will be observed quite untechnically. For instance, we shall observe that custom and tradition influence religious beliefs very largely, that Australian youth at their initiation ceremonies probably have experiences similar to the spontaneous religious awakenings and conversions of Americans at the present time, and so on. In other words, we shall observe simply that mental processes of a religious nature sometimes affect a whole group

or society of people, and that at other times processes go on by which the individual absorbs, and in some sense makes his own, the religious experiences, customs, and beliefs of his group. In Part II, on the other hand, some attempt will be made at a more technical explanation of such processes in the language of modern psychology. The reader should bear in mind, in reading Part I, that more thorough analysis and explanation have been reserved for Part II, where both the data derived from the history of religions and from reports of contemporary religious experience will be available.

In Part III, we shall be studying the philosophy of religion in its *narrower, metaphysical sense.* Thus understood, *the Philosophy of Religion considers the truth of Religion, what is the ultimate significance of its practices and beliefs in an interpretation of the world as a whole,* or, more technically, *the relation of Religion to Reality.* Thus the relationship between religion and science, and whether religion like science is a source of knowledge, are philosophical problems in the narrower sense. The philosophical arguments for a universe in which moral purposes are accomplished, the existence and nature of God, and immortality all belong to this field. The purpose of the book as a whole is primarily, of course, to throw light upon these ultimate philosophical questions.

Theology in the traditional sense of the term is a very different discipline from the philosophy of religion and should not be confused with it. To be sure, it treats of many of the same subjects,—the truth of religion, and arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. But *traditional theology* finds its ultimate source of knowledge in an authoritative revelation or pronouncement of some sort—the sacred scriptures of the religion, or the decretals of councils, or the sayings of the founders of the religion, or special revelations to priests, prophets and saints. The dogmas of theology are believed to be more certain than all other knowledge, and not subject to the tests of human reasoning; they are beyond the power of man's mind to comprehend. This attitude is common to Brahman, Mohammedan, Jewish and Christian dogmatic theology. In recent times there have arisen, chiefly among Protestants and Jews, but also to some extent in other faiths, advocates of what is termed "*liberal theology.*" Such thinkers if they are "liberal" in the extreme, base their

religious doctrines wholly upon reason and experience, precisely as a science would do, or as the philosophy of religion does. Between such *extremely* liberal theology and the philosophy of religion there is only one important difference: liberal theologians are chiefly interested in the study of the particular religion to which they adhere and the beliefs connected with it (such as Christianity, Judaism, etc.), while *the philosophy of religion concerns itself impartially with the more general principles that apply to all or many religions.*

A scientific definition of religion will be given in Chapter V. For the present we must be content simply with a rough working description of part of what a religion does. *A religion is a certain kind of systematic effort to secure the conservation and enhancement of values.* The character of the values depends on the degree of advancement of the religion and of the civilization in which it appears. In lower religions, which we shall call "*natural religions*," the values are all concrete, tangible, practical wants. If food is sometimes scarce, and means of cultivation of the soil or raising flocks and herds are inefficient, there are likely to be religious ceremonials to obtain food, as we shall see is the case among the natives of Central Australia. If water is scarce, as in the Arabian desert, every spring of water may be thought of as sacred,—the habitat of a local spirit or god who must be propitiated to obtain water. If the chief need of man, which he himself cannot supply, is protection from perils of thunder, lightning, earthquake, flood and cataract, as in Central Africa, these become matters of religious attention. Gods and spirits are often consulted for information as to the future, as the oracles of Greece, or for counsel in matters too difficult for men to decide, as when the Hebrews cast lots and supposed that Yahweh decided the outcome. Protection from disease, especially pestilence, and the desire for long life, riches and posterity are values with which natural religions often have been concerned. The attitude of the practicer of the religion is often mechanical or at least quasi-magical. By his performances he thinks that the result will be brought about, either automatically, or through the agency of some supernatural being who will be compelled to assist. Before this stage is left, however, the attitude of man to spirits or gods becomes humble; perhaps he tries to bargain with them, thinking that they will be pleased at his gifts; or more humble

still, he prostrates himself before them in the hope that they will be touched at his meekness and devotion.

In contrast to natural religions are the *ethical religions.* In these, thinking men have come to feel that the fundamental thing to seek through religion is not so much material goods as a pure heart and a noble life. Moral conduct has become the supreme value to be conserved. The greatest evil man has to overcome is his own sinful nature, which curses him now, and threatens to continue to bring harm upon him in a future life. So ethical religions are usually *religions of redemption,* and afford man some way of escape from his sinfulness. This may be provided by a prescribed course of conduct, as in primitive Buddhism, or by devotion to a Saviour God as in the Shin sect of Buddhism, in several of the ancient mystery religions, and above all, in Christianity.

In natural religions the values chiefly sought are those of general concern for the welfare of the family or clan more often than the individual. This is because the individual has little consciousness of himself as a person. Political and economic evolution are tardy; only very slowly does a man acquire rights to private property and personal responsibility for his own acts. So he counts for little as a person. Religious evolution is usually even slower. Explanations of religious matters are made by *myths*—products of the imagination, often full of absurdities which are uncritically accepted and passed down from one generation to another by word of mouth. Personal belief in myths, however, is of less consequence than the faithful observance of *ritualistic acts* (sacrifices, ceremonies of initiation, purification, avoidance of things that are taboo, etc.). Provided one observes the prescriptions of ritual, it matters little whether he believes in the mythical explanations of the ritual.

In ethical religions the individual comes into his own. His soul is now seen to possess inestimable worth. His responsibility to his fellow men, as well as to supernatural beings, becomes personal and immediate. Some of the more plausible myths of earlier periods may be retained, but religious thought becomes more logical, and seeks to justify and explain its prescriptions in *doctrines* that are products of reason rather than imagination. These often develop into *dogmas,* which must be unquestioningly believed as an indispensable condition of salvation.

In connection with the term *subconscious* it will suffice for the present to remember that we are influenced in our thoughts and actions by impulses of which at the time we are unaware. Such impulses are said to be due to the subconscious. An illustration would be the instance of feeling suddenly prompted to turn a street corner in a certain direction without knowing why, and later recalling a forgotten errand that would take one in that direction. Such an incident shows that, somewhere in one's mind or brain the errand was remembered, although it certainly was not present in conscious attention. There are people into whose minds the results of what would ordinarily be the outcome of long and studied deliberation sometimes flash suddenly, as if due to inspiration. Forgotten incidents sometimes are recalled in dreams and waking visions. Great importance was attached in early religions to such experiences, which were often believed to be supernatural revelations. Whether subconscious processes are wholly physiological, or whether they imply mental processes of which one is unaware, will be left undecided until Chapter XIV.

CHAPTER II

RELIGION IN ITS LOWEST TERMS

I—*Reasons for Beginning with the Natives of Australia*

What little is known of the religious beliefs of prehistoric man seems to indicate that his religious beliefs and practices were not greatly different from those that exist in the savage world to-day. By comparing religious beliefs among savages on different planes of development, we can form some idea how religion appeared among men as a separate interest and activity, and what had been the general course of its development among the ancestors of civilized nations prior to the beginning of recorded history.

It will not be profitable to attempt to begin an outline of the evolution of religion with the very lowliest races now in existence, so far as lack of intelligence and social organization are concerned, like the Rock Veddahs of Ceylon, the Fuegians of Tierra del Fuego, and the Negritoes of Central Africa, 1. We do not possess sufficiently accurate and detailed information about these races upon the points of most concern to the student of comparative religion.

It is desirable, however, to begin with folk who are still at a stage of development prior to the emergence of religion as a separate human activity, with distinct institutions. The biologist often finds it desirable to begin an account of some line of animal evolutionary development with the amœba, in which no differentiation of the different functions, such as respiration, circulation, assimilation, execretion, reproduction and locomotion, has yet taken place, but all are still performed by a single cell. Similarly, it is convenient for the student of comparative religion to begin with a people among whom the essential functions of religion exist, but have not yet become differentiated from other activities. Such is the state of religion among certain of the native races of Australia, and this is the primary reason why we shall begin our study with them.

There are four other reasons why the natives of Australia are probably the most important savage races now in existence, for the beginner in the study of religion. First, they seem to be the least developed savage people regarding whose religion we have fairly full and trustworthy reports. The investigations of Spencer and Gillen and of Howitt have been very thorough and painstaking, and have since been confirmed, so far as essentials are concerned, by the independent researches of Strehlow and others, 2. Secondly, these native races have occupied an entire continent. We can certainly feel surer of conclusions based on Australian races than those based on comparatively small and isolated tribes. Thirdly, until comparatively recently, they have been little disturbed by contact with other races. Spencer and Gillen are able to report to us native Australian religion in its pristine purity, uninfluenced by ideas brought in by missionaries and traders. And, finally—a reason of practical importance—many of the recent theories on the origin and nature of religion are based upon these peoples, and cannot be made clear without reference to them.

II—*Australian Ceremonies*

In many respects the natives of Australia are certainly primitive enough. Their economic development is the very lowest. They do not raise flocks or herds, nor, still less, cultivate the soil. The men hunt kangaroos, emus, and other wild animals, and display some skill in stalking their prey, and in using boomerangs. The women gather small game (such as lizards and honey ants), and collect such vegetables as they can find growing wild. Although in winter there are chilly days and frosty nights, they have not learned to make clothes for themselves. They suffer with the cold, and gladly wear any cast off apparel that white people may give them. The native hut is the crudest and most primitive imaginable,—"merely a lean-to of shrubs so placed as to shield the occupants from the prevailing wind," 3. They can readily count up to five; further reckoning is difficult for them, 4. However, they have developed a complicated system of totems, and elaborate regulations governing marriage.

It is surprising that among these peoples we find none of the religious ideas that would at first seem fundamental. There is no notion of prayer or other means of communication with spirits, gods, or supernatural beings of any sort. There are neither priests nor temples. It therefore has sometimes been

said that these peoples belong to the pre-religious stage,—that their rude culture antedates the appearance of religion among mankind. However, it is more accurate to say that religion exists among them in an undifferentiated form, since, as we shall see, they possess, to say the least, some of the germs of religion as it exists among higher races.

Among the Arunta tribe (regarding which the statements in this chapter specifically apply, when other tribes are not mentioned) a boy passes through four initiations. The first of these takes place when he is ten or twelve years old. The men and women assemble at a central spot near the main camp, and the boys who have reached the right age are taken one by one and tossed into the air by the men who catch them as they fall, while the women dance round and round the group, swinging their arms and shouting. The boys are then painted on their chests and backs with simple designs in red or yellow ochre. While this is being done, the boys are told that the ceremony through which they have just passed will promote their growth to manhood, that in future they must not play with the women and girls, nor camp with them, but that hereafter they must go to the men's camp. Whereas hitherto they have been accustomed to go out with the women in their search for vegetable food and smaller animals like lizards and rats, they shall henceforth accompany the men in hunting larger game. They now begin to look forward to the time when they will become fully initiated, and will know all the secrets of the tribe.

The second initiation, that of circumcision, is more elaborate and takes place when the boy is somewhat older. In one witnessed by Spencer and Gillen, and described by them in detail, the boy to be initiated was seized by three loudly shouting young men and carried off to the carefully prepared ceremonial ground, out of sight of the women and children. "The main object of this partial seclusion is to impress him with the fact that he is about to enter the ranks of the men, and to mark the break between his old life and the new one; he has no precise knowledge of what is in store for him, and the sense that something out of the ordinary is about to happen to him—something, moreover, which is of a more or less mysterious nature—helps to impress him strongly with a feeling of the deep importance of compliance with tribal rules, and further still with a strong sense of the superiority of the

older men who know, and are familiar with, all the mysterious rites, some of which he is about to learn the meaning of for the first time," 5. On the fourth day the initiate was brought back to a secluded spot prepared for him near the ceremonial ground, where he was placed under strict guard. During the following four days the boy was kept in seclusion except at stated times when he was brought out to witness for the first time in his life various solemn ceremonies in which, by dance, song, acting, and pantomime, the totemic animals are portrayed, and the ancestors of the tribe are represented as they are supposed to have appeared and acted during life. From the morning of the ninth day ceremonies increased in frequency and excitement until night; at intervals—throughout the latter, with face covered, the initiate heard the singing of the fire song. At the break of the following day, he was rubbed afresh with ochre and made all that day to witness ceremonials and hear shouts and songs. After dusk, while the ceremonial fire was blazing and the bull roarers making a terrific din which the women and children suppose to be the roaring of a great spirit who has come to take the boy away into the bush, the painful operation was performed with a small flint knife. The boy was then congratulated if he had not cried out, various secret emblems were shown him which it was believed would hasten the healing of his wound, and which he must guard and not lose on penalty of death to himself and various relatives.

The initiation over, the boy is kept under more or less strict surveillance for sufficient time to allow his wound to heal—about five or six weeks. He then has to undergo the third initiation, which terminates with another painful mutilation called sub-incision. This is likewise attended by elaborate ceremonials which reveal to him sacred and secret tribal lore and tradition. Somewhat similar but simpler ceremonies are passed through by the girls. These, however, merely have for their purpose the assurance of their physical development into womanhood, and so no tribal lore or secrets are revealed to them.

Some years later, when a man is at least twenty-five or thirty years of age, he passes through the final and most elaborate initiation of all, called the Engwura or "fire" ceremony, from the fact that it terminates with an ordeal in which the initiate has to lie down for four or five minutes upon green boughs placed over a fire of hot embers. This ceremony,

or rather series of ceremonies, lasts for months,—that witnessed by Spencer and Gillen continuing from the middle of September to the middle of January,—during which men and women assemble from all parts of the tribe and even from distant tribes. From one to five or six different ceremonials of an elaborate character were produced every day. Councils of the old men were held frequently, and all the traditions and lore of the tribe were repeated and discussed, kept fresh in memory, and told to the initiates. Sacred objects *(churinga)* were produced and examined. After the native has passed through this initiation he is said to be *Uliara*, that is, a perfectly developed member of the tribe. "The natives themselves say that the ceremony has the effect of strengthening all who pass through it. It imparts courage and wisdom, makes the men more kindly natured and less apt to quarrel. . . . Evidently the main objects of it are, firstly, to bring the young men under the control of the old men, whose commands they have to obey implicitly; secondly, to teach them habits of self-restraint and hardihood; and thirdly, to show to the younger men who have arrived at mature age, the sacred secrets of the tribe which are concerned with the *Churinga* and the totems with which they are associated," 6.

Each native belongs to a *totem*, that is, he or she is mystically united with some plant or animal. The nature of this union is not clearly thought out by the savage himself. Savages do not feel the civilized man's need to explain everything in logical conceptions. They dogmatically say of a given man that "he is a kangaroo," an "emu," or what not, and that, in their minds is the end of the matter. Explanations, when given, vary among different Australian tribes, and among different savage races all over the world. The Arunta believe that each individual in the tribe is the direct reincarnation either of an ancestor of the same totem as he, or else of the spirit part of an animal of the totem. 7.

Except on rare ceremonial occasions an individual must not partake of his totem as food, on account of his mystic union with the totem. The union, however, affords him the power to increase the supply of the totemic plant or animal for the benefit of the members of other totems, and he accordingly goes through elaborate totemic ceremonials for this purpose. These *intichuima* ceremonies, as they are called, in some of which the totemic food, sacred, and for the most part forbidden

to them at other times, is partaken of by the participants, seem in some respects to contain some of the rudiments of the conception of a sacrifice. Totemic food is eaten among the Arunta by those mystically bound together in a common fellowship to ensure a desired result not possible by ordinary human means but achieved by this solemn act. However, the partaking of totemic food is not characteristic of the ceremonies, in some of the other Australian tribes, 8; nor does it seem to be more prominent than other details in the ritual where it does appear.

III—*Why the Australian Ceremonies are Religious*

If we now reflect upon these Australian ceremonies we shall perceive in them some of the characteristics of higher religions. When Jewish youth are confirmed or when Christian youth are confirmed, come to first communion, or make a profession of faith and join the church, or when a Buddhist boy after preliminary religious instruction solemnly takes the three-fold vow "I take my refuge in the Buddha, I take my refuge in the Doctrine, I take my refuge in the Brotherhood of the Elect,"—what is the significance socially and personally of the action? These rites to the young Jew or Buddhist or Christian mean an enlargement and an enhancement of his life,—a deepening, widening, and intensifying in value to him of the precepts and ideals which he first learned at his mother's knee and which have since constantly been impressed upon him by the conduct and precepts of his elders. All the worship which hitherto had been somewhat external to him, which he had merely witnessed, now comes home to him in fuller significance. His intellectual comprehension of it has now for the first time become at all adequate; his emotional reaction toward it has now become intimate and personal. He has taken the law of Moses and the love of Jehovah into his very heart and mind, or the "noble eight-fold path" of the Buddha has become the chart and compass of his life, or he has "put on Christ" and dedicated his soul to His service.

The initiation ceremonials appear to serve similar functions for the Australian blacks. Socially, the ceremonies conserve what is dear and sacred in their past, and pass it down to the coming generation. Individually, they ensure that initiates receive this lore in a proper frame of mind—awe and humility combined with intense emotional excitement and exaltation. The values of higher religions are more moral and more

spiritual; and more refined means than the infliction of physical suffering and insistence upon secrecy and mystery are used to lead the initiate to revere sacred principles and to make them basic in his life. But, when allowance is made for the difference in the level of his civilization, these ceremonials of the Australian native may be said to correspond to those of higher religions. We may therefore conclude that the natives of Australia possess a religion.

IV—*The Supernatural Element in the Ceremonies.*

The effect both of the initiation and the *intichiuma* ceremonies is to cultivate a tremendous awe for tribal tradition and custom. "As amongst all savage tribes the Australian native is bound hand and foot by custom. What his fathers did before him he must do. If during the performance of a ceremony his ancestors painted a white line across the forehead, that line he must paint." Any infringement of custom, within certain limitations, is visited with some and often severe punishment, 9. The most severely punished offenses are breaches of tribal custom. The sufficient explanation for any action is simply that it is customary, that it has always been done. That, as a rule, is absolute and final; no change is to be considered for a moment, and reasons are unnecessary. If reasons are given, they are myths of the origin of the custom, or tales of terrible disasters that have followed upon neglect of its observance. It is therefore logical to suppose, as Durkheim and others have suggested that to the native the might of tribal custom and tradition seems like an actually existing force, something that weighs upon him, not physical to be sure, and not personal, but none the less objective and powerful, 10. He probably dimly feels that some sort of mysterious impersonal force operates in the initiation ceremonies and transforms the boys both physiologically and mentally into men, 11. Some such force must be present and operative in the *intichiuma* ceremonies, and it must be a force common in this case to the men and plants or animals of the totems, something in which they all participate, that has not, to be sure, been intelligently defined, and given a name, something *felt* rather than *thought*, but all the more vivid and potent because uncanny and mysterious.

In a sense, therefore, Australian religion involves a dim, hardly conscious feeling of the presence of something super-

natural, something that is not human and yet is not material, but which is potent in the life of man and which is efficient in working him good if enlisted on his side, and which would work him harm if law and custom were disregarded. However, as has been said, in the case of the Central Australian tribes, this has not assumed a personal form, nor is it attributed to the agency or intervention of gods or spirits of any sort. Yet these people do have notions of supernatural beings. Spirits are believed to exist in definite spots which are known, 12; but spirits are connected in no discernible way with the practices and beliefs that seem more properly to be designated as religious. If Australian tribes can be regarded as throwing light upon the matter, therefore, religious rites and beliefs originated independently of belief in spirits and supernatural personal beings, and only afterward did religion come to make use of these latter conceptions. And this view of the matter is coming to be held by an increasing number of writers on the origins of religion, 13.

In certain tribes in South-Eastern Australia, however, there seem to be the beginnings of a belief in a god, though he is not worshipped. The boys during one of the initiation ceremonies are shown (apparently in good faith) an image or drawing of a supernatural being *(Daramulun, Bunjil)*, who they are told first taught men the initiation ceremony, and who would be angry and punish them if they should reveal it. He is thought once to have lived on earth with his wives, and to have taught men their laws and morals, and then to have left the earth and gone up into the sky where he now resides. He can make himself visible and invisible at pleasure. If visible he has the form of an old Australian man, "a venerable, kindly Headman of a tribe, full of knowledge and tribal wisdom, and powerful in magic of which he is the source, with virtues, failings, and passions, such as the aborigines regard them." "In this being, although supernatural, there is no trace of a divine nature. All that can be said of him is that he is imagined as the ideal of those qualities which are, according to their standard, virtues worthy of being imitated," 14. The belief, however, seems undoubtedly to be an aboriginal development, and may have its origin in the common Australian belief in ancestral ghosts. Dances are sometimes held about the figure of this being, and men invoke his name in magic. Mention of this being affords added sanction and

impressiveness to the ceremonies, and this may be a subconscious reason for the acceptance of him. The tribes which believe in him are a little more advanced in civilization than the others. They have individual marriage, reckon descent in the male line, base their organization on locality, and certain of them make clothes out of dried opossum skins, 15. With better social organization, the psychologist would expect men to become more self-conscious of themselves as individuals. There would then be more of a tendency to connect to some extent the impersonal power of previous religion with a personal agency, and thus give rise to a god. But of course such conjectures are rather speculative.

V—*Values Conserved by Australian Religion*

What functions do the ceremonies which we have decided to call religious play in the social life of the native races of Australia? It is clear that they promote social solidarity. The people from distant localities come together and participate in solemn rites, festal dances and discussion of their history and traditions. This makes undoubtedly for mutual good will, promotes neighborliness and good fellowship, and no doubt as is claimed by the natives, "makes every one better" who participates in the ceremonies. The culture of the past is preserved and handed down to the next generation. It is sad to note that the influence of white men is breaking down this reverence for tribal morality and substituting nothing in its place. Old men are sorrowfully refusing to initiate many of the young men whom they deem unworthy to know the precious secrets of their people, 16. This indicates that these ceremonies have had a very real moral significance in the life of the natives. The *intichiuma* ceremonies, too, imply co-operation and social service. The men of a totem would not themselves be benefited by an increase in the supply of their own totem. But they perform the ceremonies for the benefit of the rest of the tribe, and with the expectation that other tribes will reciprocate to their advantage. Mr. B. Malinowski has pointed out that these ceremonies teach the natives the value of organization, collective effort, and the regular application of energy, performed with forethought and attention, for the accomplishment of a definite aim. None of their other activities involve these characteristics to an equal extent. On this ground he argues very reasonably that these and like ceremonies may be

important forerunners of the rise of industry and economic division of labor which first make their appearance at a higher stage of development, 17.

That the natives do not understand fully the real services that their religious acts perform for them, and that they mistakenly fancy that initiation ceremonies effect physiological changes, and *intichiuma* ceremonies increase the food supply, ought not to blind us to the significance and the importance of these real services. And if these ceremonies, or their like, may be supposed to be the evolutionary forerunners of higher religions, they are of further value in making this evolution possible.

The believer in the truth of the higher religions may claim even more. Through their religious beliefs and practices, he may maintain that the natives are becoming aware, however dimly, of a spiritual power in the universe that is more than human. Vague as may be this feeling of some sort of impersonal power, to which they have not even given a name, through it they are learning that the world is not wholly material or mechanical. The first beginnings of the religious conception of the world are, in other words, present in the confused mind of the Australian savage. And if these notions are crude, they are no more undeveloped than his science, his morality, his law, and his industries. Savage men have dimly felt many of the higher social values, and have conserved them better in their actions than they have been able to explain them rationally.

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CHAPTER III

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF RELIGION

I—*Introduction*

Among savages upon the level of the native tribes of central Australia, as we have seen, religion is not yet differentiated from other human interests and activities. We have chosen to call the initiation and *intichiuma* ceremonies religious, because they serve functions analogous to those performed by religions among higher races. But these ceremonies could quite as properly be classified under the head of education or of magic, if we were tracing the evolution of either of those human activities, and they even bear some connection with the evolution of art, industry, law and social organization. These ceremonies include most if not all the culture that the natives possess in any of these fields. We have come to regard religion as the attempt to conserve socially recognized values through some sort of supernatural agency. We have now, therefore, to consider the question, *How does religion become differentiated from other human interests and efforts?* How does religion develop its own specialized *methods* and *institutions*,—sacrifice and prayer on the one hand, and gods, priests, and temples upon the other? How does the religion of primitive peoples become distinct, so far as it does become distinct, from their magic, animistic beliefs, morality, and industry, and how is it related to them? The present and three following chapters will endeavor to throw some light upon these questions. The reader is warned, however, that upon all of these questions there are the widest differences of opinion among different authorities, and that the author is stating his own opinions rather dogmatically.

II—*The Todas*

One of the greatest difficulties in this field of investigation is, that we find no clear instances of any great amount of transformation going on in a comparatively primitive religion at the time when anthropologists are observing it. We can find

savage religions in what appear to us to be different stages of development, but we do not enjoy the privilege of watching a religion to-day actually passing from one of these stages to another. Consequently the assignment of religions to different stages of development has to be done largely on the basis of the theories advanced by students of religion which appear most reasonable in the light of what we know of savage religions on the one hand, and of psychology upon the other.

Fortunately, however, we have available a careful report of one savage people whose religion has undergone such striking changes that a good deal of light is thrown upon the nature of religious evolution. Students of comparative religion, therefore, are attaching great importance to the religion of the Todas, which has been reported with scientific accuracy by Mr. W. H. R. Rivers of Cambridge University, 1.

The Todas live in the Nilgiri Hills, in Southern India, upon a high plateau which is comparatively isolated. There are now about 800 of them, scattered in numerous small villages. They have some intercourse with the other inhabitants of the plateau, the Kotas and the Bagadas, but maintain a very distinct existence. Their chief food is the milk of the buffalo cow, and the various dairy products made from it. The present religion centers about this food supply,—the value that they are most concerned to conserve. The milk must be abundant and pure, so everything attached to the milk,—the cows, the dairies, the dairymen, dairy utensils, etc., are sacred. Some of the dairies are temples and the dairymen in attendance are virtually priests. Cows differ in sanctity. There are ordinary cows, looked after by the men and boys of the village, concerning whose care there is little ceremony, the milk being churned in front of the dwelling hut with no special ritual and no restrictions on the use of the milk and its products. The men and boys, however, salute the sun before attending to the cows, so that there is a slight employment of religion in the conservation of this value. The sacred cows and sacred dairies are, on the contrary, surrounded by a great deal of ceremony. In the care of the *Ti* dairies, the most ritualistic of all, the dairyman goes through an elaborate ceremonial before entering upon his sacred office, must remain a strict celibate while in office, and must live at the dairy in isolation from the rest of the people.

In many of the sacred dairies the priest must recite a

prescribed prayer while lighting his lamp before attending to the cows in the morning, after milking them, and before leading them out to pasture; and in all of these dairies he must recite the prayer in the evening before and after milking, and when shutting the cows up for the night. A Toda prayer consists of two parts: (1) the "prefaces" *(kwarzam)*—a miscellaneous list of names, each preceded by a preposition which Mr. Rivers translates "for the sake of"; and (2) the main body of the prayer. The *kwarzam* are sacred and secret, and Mr. Rivers had great difficulty in inducing the natives to tell them to him. In the case of the prayer of the Kuudr village dairy, which is typical, the *kwarzam* include the names of the village and clan, of the large dairy and the small dairy, of the lamp at the large dairy, the two buffalo pens of the village, the calf enclosure, the sacred buffaloes, the ordinary buffaloes, the sacred dairy spring of the village, the name of the buffalo whose milk, according to their myths, was the origin of this spring, four hills nearby, some buffaloes believed once to have been given to the tribe by the goddess Teikirzi (an important event in Toda mythology), and the calf that was the ancestor, according to the myths, of some of the present ordinary buffaloes. After the careful repetition of these *kwarzam* in so low a tone of voice that no one nearby can catch these sacred words, the dairyman-priest rattles off the main body of the prayer which may be freely translated as follows: "May it be well with the buffaloes, may they not suffer from disease or die, may they be kept from poisonous animals and from wild beasts and from injury by flood or fire, may there be water and grass in plenty." The prayer then terminates with the names of two of the most important gods or objects of reference followed by the words: "For the sake of them for us may it be well."

The Toda prayers, it will be observed, are quite remarkable in one respect. They are not addressed to any superior beings. Many of them do not contain the names of such beings at all, and when they do, these are mentioned in precisely the same manner as dairy utensils, trees, springs of water, dead calves, and cow bells! No superior being is addressed in the vocative case. This, therefore, raises the question—are these prayers or are they magical spells? or can they be both at the same time? If the conception of religion advocated in the Introduction of this book be accepted, they may rightly be called prayers. They are efforts to conserve a value that is social,

and of the utmost concern to the tribe. And they are efforts to do this, not by ordinary mechanical means, and not through human efforts alone. The invocation or utilization of some impersonal supernatural agency that would be psychical, if the natives were able to distinguish clearly in their thought between psychical and physical, is apparently implied. Such prayers may also be styled magical, since the mere repetition of words seems efficacious, without the intervention of a spirit or personal being of any sort. It may be that the Toda prayers are in a state of degeneration, and that formerly gods were invoked, or it may be that they are undeveloped, primordial prayers that have not yet arrived at the stage at which the invocation of a personal agency would naturally occur to them. If with Professor Frazer, Dr. Marett, Professor Farnell, and many others we think that prayer and religion in general have developed from magic, we shall incline to the latter view; if with Andrew Lang and Dr. F. B. Jevons we think that the spell and magic in general are degenerated religion we shall take the former. The known facts in regard to Toda prayers as reported by Mr. Rivers can be interpreted with equal plausibility upon either view, so far as the author can see.

Among Toda rites that seem clearly to imply the utilization of an impersonal psychical power are three rudimentary sacrifices reported by Mr. Rivers. Fifteen days after the birth of the calf of a sacred buffalo cow, the dairyman priest carefully prepares a mixture of milk, rice, salt and jaggery according to minute ritualistic prescriptions. He solemnly throws a part of this food upon a fire, and portions out the rest among the people gathered before the dairy. Before this ceremony the cow is not milked; henceforth she is milked like the rest of the herd. This ceremonial preparation and partaking of food seems to remove a *taboo*—i.e., an unknown mysterious power, in this case dangerous—from the milk of the cow and to make it safe to use thereafter. A fully developed sacrifice would involve the offering of a portion of ceremonially prepared food to a supernatural being and the consumption of the rest of it by the worshippers, the act cementing their mystical union and assuring social welfare. So we clearly have the rudiments of a sacrifice in this case. Several times a year a young male calf is killed by the priest in accordance with ceremonial prescriptions, roasted by him, and eaten by him and the people for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of the people.

This, too, seems to imply the utilization through the ceremony of mysterious power that will effect the desired end, else there would be no reason for performing it. It therefore may be recorded as a rudimentary sacrifice. Another ceremony is performed to promote the growth of grass and honey. Two priests make a fire, and while it is burning they recite the ordinary prayers of a Ti dairy with this addition to the prayer proper: "May young grass flower; may honey flourish; may food ripen." The Todas feel little interest in this ceremony now, but say that in ancient times their ancestors lived on wild fruits, nuts and honey, and it was then important. Here, it is to be observed, religion loses its interest when it is concerned with values which a tribe no longer is anxious to conserve.

The central features of Toda religion, as it exists to-day have little or nothing to do with the worship of gods. Yet the Todas have a pantheon of deities whose names they seem to be forgetting. Two are more important than the rest, the god Ön and the goddess Teikirzi. The present Todas cannot certainly remember whether these two are father and daughter or brother and sister. Ön and his wife created the buffaloes, and Ön created mankind. There is no longer any public worship of them. The gods seem now chiefly to be used for rather questionable purposes—divination and sorcery.

A sorcerer can bring evil upon an enemy by holding in his hands a bundle consisting of five small stones tied together with some human hair in a piece of cloth and saying: "For the sake of Pithioten, Ön, Teikirzi and Tirshti, (four deities), by the power of the gods if there be power; by the god's country if there be a country; may his calves perish; as birds fly away may his buffaloes go when the calves come to suck; as I drink water, may he also have nothing but water to drink; as I am thirsty may he also be thirsty; as I am hungry, may he also be hungry; as my children cry, so may his children cry; as my wife wears only a ragged cloth, so may his wife wear only a ragged cloth." He then hides the stones and hair secretly in the thatch of his enemy's hut.

If a man has misfortune he will consult a diviner. Diviners correspond to our spiritualistic "mediums" and are shady folk, who doubtless work in collusion with the sorcerers. The diviner falls into a frenzy, and a god speaks through him, and gives the man in trouble information as to the cause of his misfortunes. If these are due to a sorcerer, the man learns what

sorcerer has cursed him, gives him what he asks, and so becomes reconciled with him. The sorcerer then repeats another incantation and so revokes the curse. Such evil practices, obviously having blackmail and the satisfaction of personal enmity as their motives, are no part of the Toda religion. The dairymen priests have nothing to do with them. They are anti-social; instead of conserving socially recognized values, they are antagonistic to such values. They are as clearly magical as they are non-religious. Like religion they involve the invocation of some kind of mysterious, supernatural power; but unlike religion they seem to employ this power in a manner that is not conducive to the general welfare. We may therefore style them instances of non-religious magic.

III—*Lessons from Toda Religion*

What lessons regarding religion may we learn from the Todas? (1) Religion tends to center about the conservation of values of most importance at the present time. (2) If not sufficiently connected with the social values that concern a people, even gods may degenerate, and owe their survival chiefly to non-religious purposes, like sorcery. It is hard to decide whether the dairy religion once was connected with gods, but now has been divorced from them; or whether it is a recent development, instituted to conserve a new value not conserved by the existing gods, and not yet old enough to have developed gods to assist in its conservation. Personally the author is inclined to the latter view; and believes with Professor Irving King that if the Todas remain long enough undisturbed they will develop new gods in connection with the conservation of what is now their most important value, 2. But, however this may be, we may safely conclude (3) that religions evolve and change their objects and purposes of worship as the values in which a tribe is vitally concerned become modified; and (4) that so far as religious ideas, practises, institutions, and even gods fail to grow, and become modified as the vital interests of a people change, they are bound to degenerate, and to become a positive detriment. Our churches and synagogues of to-day may learn a lesson from the Todas in this connection.

The real, vital religion of the Todas to-day, the dairy ritual, is an attempt to conserve their most important values. It actually does this in part, though not as the Todas imagine. The milk of the sacred buffaloes doubtless is kept pure and

sanitary through the prescribed ritual, though probably a great deal of superfluous energy is wasted in accomplishing this. On the other hand, not enough care is probably given to keeping the milk of the ordinary buffalo cows pure. Therefore (5) when religion is employed to conserve a concrete, practical value of a material sort like milk, it ought to be superseded by science whenever the latter is ready to undertake the task. In this sort of instance we shall expect to find that science has been gradually and very properly supplanting religion. On the other hand, however, the dairy religion is probably conserving for the Todas still more important values than any of which they are yet fully conscious. It is making for tribal solidarity. For a priest to be a public servant and to be devoting himself to the welfare of the community, as he and they believe he is doing, is bound to turn their thoughts ultimately to higher and better things. Insistence on ritualistic purity in the case of the Hebrews made possible later on the appreciation of moral purity, while from the notion of the desirability of physical cleanliness about the domestic hearth the Greeks learned to appreciate the moral purity of the home and to venerate the virgin goddess Hestia who conserved this value for them. Therefore (6) a religion may actually be conserving different and higher values for a people than those which they consciously endeavor to attain through it. We must always ask, not only, "What does a people *consciously* seek in their religion?" but also "What benefits, possibly wholly different, are they *actually* receiving from it?" and too, "May the religious rites develop consciousness of higher moral values *in the future*, as a people rises to a higher civilization?" Although the present social value of a religion may not seem to be high, we should inquire, "May it be furnishing the conditions out of which a real appreciation of genuine and great moral values may finally develop?"

IV—*The Melanesians. Mana*

In the religious practises, both of the natives of central Australia and of the Todas, as we have seen, there seems to be implied the belief in some sort of impersonal agency or force that is utilized. A mystical bond must exist between the men and the animals or plants of a totem for the performances of the men to increase the supply of the animals or plants. Some mystical agency must effect the physiological growth of boys

into men in the case of the initiation ceremonies. Some efficacy not of a purely physical sort must be possessed by a prayer recited by a dairyman priest when caring for his cows. In Toda sorcery the names of gods are invoked, but there seems to be lurking in the bundle of stones and hair charmed by the sorcerer some manner of impersonal force that is distinct and separable from the gods whose names are mentioned in the curse. That is, it hardly seems likely that the gods, by any personal thought on their part, cause harm to come to the man that has been cursed; the harm comes automatically as a result of the curse.

In Melanesia this idea of impersonal power or force has been developed much further than among the Australians and Todas, and has received a name,—*mana*. It is impossible to give a logical definition of *mana*, because it is not a logical conception at all. Races who believe in *mana* have not yet learned to think in well developed logical categories, 3; or at any rate, they have not applied strict logic to their notion of *mana*. If a peculiar stone attracts a man's attention, he may think there is *mana* in it. Its shape seems to resemble fruit of a particular kind. He lays it at the root of a fruit tree of this sort. If there is an abundant crop this shows that he was right; there is *mana* in the stone. The point of an arrow is made of a dead man's bone, and tied on with powerful *mana* charms, which makes it sure to hit. Human sacrifices used to be made, and little bits of the flesh were eaten by young men who desired to get fighting *mana*.

Bishop Codrington says, "The Melanesian mind is entirely possessed by the belief in a supernatural power or influence, called almost universally *mana*. This is what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common processes of nature; it is present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to its operation. . . . But this power, though itself impersonal, is always connected with some person who directs it; all spirits have it, ghosts generally, some men. . . . Thus all conspicuous success is a proof that a man has *mana;* his influence depends on the impression made on the people's mind that he has it; he becomes a chief by virtue of it. Hence a man's power, though political or social in its character, is his *mana;* the word is naturally used in accordance with the native conception of the character of all

power and influence as supernatural. If a man has been successful in fighting, it has not been his natural strength of arm, quickness of eye, or readiness of resource that has won success; he has certainly got the *mana* of a spirit or of some deceased warrior to empower him, conveyed in an amulet or a stone around his neck, or a tuft of leaves in his belt, in a tooth hung upon a finger of his bow hand, or in the form of words with which he brings supernatural assistance to his side. If a man's pigs multiply, and his gardens are productive, it is not because he is industrious and looks after his property, but because of the stones full of *mana* for pigs and yams that he possesses. Of course a yam naturally grows when planted, that is well known, but it will not be very large unless *mana* comes into play; a canoe will not be swift unless *mana* be brought to bear upon it, a wind will not catch many fish, nor an arrow inflict a mortal wound," 4.

Of the Melanesians, Bishop Codrington says, "The notion of a Supreme Being is altogether foreign to them, or indeed of any being occupying a very elevated place in their world. . . . There is a belief in a force altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is of the greatest advantage to possess and control. This is mana. . . . It is a power or influence, not physical and in a way supernatural; but it shews itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses. . . . All Melanesian religion consists, in fact, in getting this *mana* for one's self, or getting it used for one's benefit—all religion, that is, as far as religious practices go, prayers and sacrifices."

Any man of influence and power is successful because of *mana*. Men become chiefs because they are credited with having much *mana* themselves, and with being able to secure *mana* from the spirits. A man who was famous for having much *mana* when alive will be worshipped after death by those who hope he will aid them with his *mana*. An ordinary man without much *mana* in life would not thus be honored. In the Solomon Islands the chief objects of worship are the ghosts of deceased men who had much *mana*. Bishop Codrington tells of the origin of the worship of one of these. Ganindo was a great fighting man in Florida. On a head hunting expedition he received injuries from which he afterwards died. His head was carefully preserved and a house built for it. On a subse-

quent head hunting expedition the men felt their canoe rock under them. They said, "Here is a *tindalo*" (i.e., a ghost that is worshipped because he aids with *mana*.) To find out who he was they called successively the names of successive *tindalos*. When Ganindo's name was called the canoe shook again. In the same way they learned what village they were to attack. Retiring successful, they danced about Ganindo's house singing "Our *tindalo* is strong to kill." A finer temple was built for Ganindo, images made of him and his sisters, his relics were reverently preserved, and sacrifices were offered to him for many years, until finally his worship declined on account of the advance of Christian missionary teaching, 5.

Similar conceptions are to be found in other primitive religions on the same plane of development. The Pygmies in Africa have a similar notion of *oudah*. Among North American Indian tribes there are words with similar purport. The Algonkin term is *manitou*. If a man is brave, he possesses much *manitou*. If such a man is killed by his enemies they will eat his heart to reinforce their own *manitou*. A young man at his initiation retires alone for long fasting and meditation, and so obtains *manitou*. Among the Sioux, *wakonda* is the word. Wild animals that are swift, fleety, and cunning have *wakonda*. White men have more *wakonda* than the Sioux; that is why they defeat them in war. Among the Iroquois the word is *orenda;* and so on, 6.

Traces of the conception of *mana* are to be found among higher civilizations. Persons who believe that to carry a rabbit's foot is going to bring them good luck probably do not attribute the good luck to any personal agency nor do they attribute it to physical causation in accordance with natural law. If such persons were to analyze their thoughts (or rather their feelings upon the subject since they are probably too indefinite to be called thoughts) would they not affirm the conviction that some vague sort of force, psychical rather than physical, will operate beneficially on account of the presence of the rabbit's foot? And when the southern European peasant fancies that "luck" will come to him because he is wearing some religious emblem that has been bought at the shrine of a saint (without thinking that God or the saint are directly and consciously operating in his affairs), this is also *mana*. Other and more important instances of the probable influence of the

mana notion in higher religions will be pointed out in later chapters.

V—*Psychological Explanation of* Mana

Mana is thus a very indefinite term. It is associated with human beings and with spirits, and yet is detachable from them. "It leaves in solution the distinction between the personal and impersonal," as Mr. Marett observes, 7. It is not certain whether the term should be used in the singular or plural number, that is, whether there is a single kind of impersonal force in existence, to which the name is given, or an indefinite number of them. From the accounts, the author would suppose the latter more likely. It is quite possible to give a psychological explanation, however, of Melanesian *mana*, and its equivalents among other races.

This explanation, as the author believes, is threefold. (1) Everyone at times feels the presence of *subconscious impulses* that have an influence upon himself and which he cannot understand. These are often due to organic conditions, no doubt. On a fresh spring or autumn day, when the air is bracing and our nervous system responds, we feel that we could do almost anything. New vigor seems to be coming into us that we did not know we possessed. Thoughts flash through our minds that appear like revelations. Knowledge that we did not know we had lies ready for our use. Is this not what the savage often means by "having *mana*"? (2) Ordinary men find that they have increased energy of mind and body when in the society of a leader who has a "strong personality," or "great natural powers of leadership," as they say. Through the influence of such a leader they gain increased confidence in themselves, and can achieve far more than they could alone. The leader's beliefs, sentiments, powers of thinking, and above all, his courage and confidence, spread to his followers. Napoleon is the instance that first occurs to the mind; but any great captain in war or in modern industry will serve as an illustration. Does not the Melanesian probably have such experiences in mind when he says that chiefs are able to impart *mana* to their followers? (3) A group of persons in an enthusiastic meeting engender increased emotion of all sorts in one another. This may well seem to each participant to be energy that he receives from outside of his own mind and body. He could never have worked himself up to such a state of enthusi-

asm and conviction alone. The energy must therefore come to him from without, and be some kind of external force that enters into him on such occasions. War dances, totemic ceremonies, choric festivals, Bacchanalian revels, public mournings, initiation ceremonies, each may well seem to impart its different kinds of *mana* to the individual participants.

Not only do we feel such psychic force at the time, but it may continue to influence us afterward. It remains a secret, invisible force, stimulating us to certain actions, restraining us from others. All primitive men are to a very great extent the slaves of customs. What Spencer and Gillen say of the Australians is true generally: "As amongst all savage tribes the Australian native is bound hand and foot by custom. What his fathers did before him he must do," 8 The most serious offenses in savage morality are those against tribal custom. Often no reason is sought or thought necessary for a prescribed act except that it has always been customary.

If the savage could turn philosopher and analyze his feelings, he would probably say that he feels that custom is itself a manifestation of some actually existing impersonal psychical force that impels him to act in certain ways and that he experiences the pressure of this force, vehemently restraining him, whenever he has any impulse to transgress the laws of custom.

The savage, therefore, feels spiritual force that appears external to his own personal consciousness but which impels him to feel and to act differently from what he would do of his own initiative. He objectifies this force and thinks of it as existing in the external world. He projects it into animals, into inanimate objects, into the ghosts which he has seen in dreams or hallucinations, indeed, into everything that attracts his attention and appears to him to be potent and otherwise unexplainable. He seeks to gain more of this force for himself in order to increase his own efficiency physically and mentally. He avoids objects that are "taboo," i.e., that are charged with a kind of *mana* that would work him evil if he tampered with them. To gain *mana* that will conserve his values becomes the chief end both of his magic and of his religion.

VI—*Is There any Truth in the Mana Conception?*

Is there any truth in the mana conception at all, or is it purely superstition and delusion? Well, that it *contains* much of these latter nobody can question for a moment. But, if

the psychological explanation just offered be correct, it at least serves to call attention to certain profound facts that it is valuable for any folk to take account of and be able to employ in their needs. Savages through *mana* observances learn to draw upon their subconscious powers, to get increased strength from their leaders, living and dead, to respect the force (usually salutary) of social custom and opinion. So certain profoundly valuable principles, which present day psychology is only just beginning to understand, are made to some extent practically available to savages through the *mana* notion. So, mixed with much that is untrue and unwholesome, the *mana* idea crudely calls to the attention, and makes available what is true and useful. Even the agnostic and the atheist must therefore admit that there is some truth, for the savage, in the *mana* conception.

In the opinion of the believer in God, the *mana* idea contains still further truth. For he believes that there actually is a spiritual Being separate from human minds, whose support is available to men through worship. To him, therefore, the *mana* conception may appear to be an early, and therefore necessarily a crude manner in which man began to become conscious of the existence of God, and to learn to gain assistance from Him. To say this, he believes, is not to question the correctness of the psychological explanation of *mana* in the least; for he admits that it is largely through subconscious experiences and through social intercourse that the individual becomes aware of God and gains help from Him.

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CHAPTER IV

RELIGION DIFFERENTIATED

I—*The Baganda*

As representative of savage religion after it has become a fully differentiated human interest with specialized institutions, we may properly select the Baganda for study. This central African tribe, situated in Uganda, just west of Lake Victoria Nyanza, directly upon the Equator, possesses all the different forms of savage religious worship. Sixty years ago the tribe is believed to have had a population of three million people. They had a well developed social and political organization, and were skillful in agriculture, cattle raising, and warfare. They may be regarded as considerably farther advanced in most forms of culture than the Australians, the Todas, and the Melanesian races. We are fortunate in possessing accurate information of the Baganda before their institutions had become modified to any considerable extent by white influence, through the careful anthropological investigation made by the Reverend John Roscoe, 1, who was among them for twenty-five years, and who profited by the counsel of Professors Frazer and Rivers and other Cambridge anthropologists.

The objects of Baganda religious worship belong to four classes: (1) gods, national and local; (2) fetiches; (3) amulets; (4) ghosts, of kings and of ordinary people. As there are different native words for each of these, and they seem quite distinct in the natives' minds, judging from Mr. Roscoe's reports, this may be regarded as the classification of the natives themselves.

II—*Gods*

Each of the national gods had one or more temples attended by priests to carry on the worship, and by mediums to reveal the god's will.

The god of highest rank was Mukasa. He is a benign god who never requires human sacrifices, has nothing to do with war, and seeks to heal the bodies and minds of men. He is the

god of plenty; food, cattle and children come from him. As god of the lake (Victoria Nyanza) he controls storms, grants safe passage to travelers, and gives fish and other products to men. His chief temple was fine and important, and was reserved for the worship of the king and one or two leading priests. Smaller temples to him were numerous, where ordinary people could go for worship. Large gifts and sacrifices were made to him annually by the king in behalf of the state, and by individuals from time to time, and attached to his temples were large and wealthy estates. The legends say that he was the son of Wanema and Nambubi (ordinary people of the tribe apparently). These legends are so detailed that it seems clear that he must have been an actual historical person, who was revered during his lifetime on account of his wisdom and benevolence, and who afterwards developed into a god. The chief wife of Mukasa was the goddess Nalwanga, whose temple stood near his. She was said originally to have been a pythoness, and so we may conjecture that she is a development from totemistic or animistic belief, and not from an actual historical human being. Her chief function was to assist women in childbirth; but, as was the case with the other goddesses, her influence was much less than that of the principal gods. A people may to some extent be measured by their deities. That the Baganda have been capable of divine beings so attractive in many ways as Mukasa and Nalwanga is decidedly to their credit.

The next god in importance to Mukasa was Kibuka, the god of war, who foretold when war would take place, and gave oracles regarding military movements during a campaign. One of his representatives always attended an army, to reveal the god's counsels. Kings and powerful chiefs were continually offering him slaves, and his priesthood was very rich. Prisoners captured in war were sacrificed to him, being speared or clubbed to death. On special occasions, like the dedication of a new temple, if other victims were not available, innocent and inoffensive people might be captured on the highways and sacrificed to him.

It is worth while to mention several of the other national gods, to indicate the wide variety of values which the Baganda sought to conserve through gods. Kaumpuli, the god of plague, dwelt in a deep hole in his temple, which was securely covered to keep him from escaping and leaving the country. This hole

could only be effectually covered by means of wild cat skins, and hundreds of these little animals were needed every year for the purpose. It was the duty of his priests to cleanse houses and gardens where plague had broken out and to treat and nurse the sick. Musisi was responsible for earthquakes. He was said to dwell in the center of the earth and to cause earthquakes when he moved about. When there were earth tremors, those who had his fetiches near, patted them, and asked the god to keep quiet. He was not much consulted by the people, but requested to keep quiet. These two gods are perhaps objects of fear which it is necessary to propitiate; they are hardly objects of reverence and devotion like Mukasa and Kibuka, and there do not seem to be the rich variety of legends connected with them. They are less anthropomorphic, but they clearly represent values of concern to the tribe. There was also Nagawonyi who was thought to be able to end drought or famine by her influence with the gods who controlled the elements and so was appealed to in times of scarcity. Offerings were made by the king at the bidding of the other gods, to Walumba, the god of death, to prevent his killing the people wholesale. The souls of the dead had to go to his residence and give an account of their deeds, after which they were free to return to their own clans and resume their ordinary habitat near the graves where their bodies were. A great variety of other concrete values were associated with various other deities, among whom the god of the chase was perhaps most important. There seem to have been gods connected closely with some of the totems, e.g., the Leopard, Heart, and Grasshopper totems. About Katonda, "the father of the gods," who was said to have created all things, little was known. Offerings of cattle were sometimes made to him, and he had a small temple and a medium who gave oracles, but he received comparatively little honor or attention. As is commonly the case in Africa, attention is given to gods connected with immediate wants or material objects close at hand, and not with a god who probably owes his origin merely to intellectual curiosity about the origin of things.

Besides these national gods there were many local spirits of different kinds. Every river, for instance, had a spirit credited with powers for good and evil. Many hills were thought dangerous, because they were guarded by the ghosts of wild animals

such as lions and leopards. There are also various gods of the forests.

III—*Fetiches*

Fetiches were manufactured objects supposed to possess supernatural powers for averting evil and bringing good to their possessors. Every house would have a supply of them, and offerings of food and drink were regularly made before them. Fetiches were also made to wear upon the person, or carry about with one. Some were entire horns of antelopes or buffaloes, or the tips of horns, filled by the medicine men with herbs and clay, and the open end stopped and sometimes decorated with pieces of brass or iron. "The horns were thought to have become vehicles of the god by whose name they were called, and whose powers they were supposed to convey to those who owned them," and the medicine with which they were filled conveyed "the powers of the god" in addition to their ordinary curative properties as drugs, 2. (In other words, I think we may say, a fetich contains *mana* of the god whose name it bears.) Mere possession of a fetich was thought to ward off evil from a house and bring blessing upon it. There were various kinds of fetiches. The fetich Nambaga insured the recovery of sick persons. Zinga was the fetich of thieves, who would carry it in a leather case with them, and thereby be rendered invisible to the people they meant to rob. Luboa was used by hunters and warriors to cast a spell over wild animals or human enemies and make them powerless to attack, while at the same time it served the owner and made his aim sure. Sometimes the owner of this fetich would make a feast in its honor; a fowl would be killed, the blood of its tongue would be spilled on the fetich, and the bird be cooked and eaten by the warrior and his friends in the presence of the fetich.

The king's fetiches were more elaborate, and some of them were personified, and so were much more like gods than ordinary fetiches. Mbajwe, for instance, had a temple, priest, and female medium, and a woman who was regarded as the fetich's wife. This fetich was made of rope, like a serpent, with clay to imitate the serpent's head. Sometimes the king sent prisoners to this fetich for trial. One prisoner would act as spokesman for the rest, and try to clear himself and his party, but the medium who was possessed by the fetich would reply, "It is so" after the statements of each charge, and the fetich invariably found the prisoners guilty, and they were accordingly

put to death. Nantaba, a gourd stitched in a piece of goat skin and decorated with cowry shells and beads, and Semwina, a stout stick cut with elaborate ceremonial, were prepared at the accession of a king by his paternal grandmother's clan. Both stick and gourd had temples and women guardians, and were used in ceremonies attended by the king's wives. Offerings of food and beer were made to the fetiches and prayers were addressed to them for fertility. Among the king's other fetiches were: Kizinga, which was sent with the army to ensure much spoil in women and cattle; Mbagirangese, which the king handed to any person whom he was about to put to death, since it gave the king power over the ghost of the person about to be killed so that it could not return and haunt the king; and Sekabemba, which the king gave secretly to a man commissioned by him to rob the rich chiefs and share the plunder with him.

The fetiches of the Baganda are not so anthropomorphic as the gods, and have few myths and legends centering about them. It would appear possible, however, that some of these fetiches, which have temples and mediums, are well on the way to become gods. All of them seem clearly to imply the notion of *mana*, and all conserve values that are socially recognized by the natives, morally questionable as certain of these values would be from the point of view of civilized man.

IV—*Amulets*

Amulets were made, as a rule, of wood, and never received offerings or supplications. They were manufactured and sold by the medicine men, to be carried, or worn on the person, and were often made into ornaments. An amulet was efficacious for one purpose only—to heal or prevent some particular disease; or, in the case of women, to effect fecundity. Some amulets were for personal application; they would be rubbed on a stone or scraped with a knife, and the powder thus obtained might be mixed with water or beer and taken internally, or it might be mixed with butter and applied to the skin outwardly.

V—*Ghosts*

Probably in the course of ordinary life the Baganda more often were in intimate relationship with ghosts than with gods. The ghosts of deceased kings were honored by temples where their jaw bones and umbilical cords were carefully preserved, and where through mediums the deceased king made revelations

concerning the State and advised the living king; warning him, for instance, when war was likely to break out. "When the medium was under the influence of the ghost he spoke in the same tone and used the same expressions as those which the late king had been accustomed to use," 3. "It was an exceptionally great day when the reigning king went to visit the temple of his predecessor; thousands of people assembled to witness the sight and to hear the oracle. When the king had left the temple, and was being conducted back, he invariably gave an order to catch everyone who had not passed a certain place which he mentioned; the order was given suddenly, and the body-guard promptly carried it out, capturing and binding all whom they could lay hands on, if they had not passed the spot indicated by the king. The captives were taken back to the temple and slain within its precincts, in order that the ghosts might minister to the late king's ghost," 4.

The ghosts of common people were honored, but in smaller measure. Small shrines were built near the graves of the deceased, where relatives placed offerings of beer or clothing. The majority of ghosts were beneficient and assisted the members of the clan to which they belonged. (Savages have human feelings, and it seems safe to infer from accounts of other African races that the recently bereaved derive real comfort from their belief that their dead are interested in them, and are pleased with their offerings, and can give them counsel and assistance.)

Human sacrifices were common. Kibuka, as we have seen, and several of the other gods and fetiches regularly demanded them, and it was believed that calamities would come upon the nation if they were not offered. There was a sacrificial place where persons guilty of incest or adultery were often clubbed or speared to death. "Those who have taken part in these executions bear witness how seldom a victim, whether man or woman, raised his voice to protest or appeal against the treatment meted out to him. The victims went to death (so they thought) to save their country and race from some calamity, and they laid down their lives without a murmur or a struggle," 5. Here it will be observed, religion seems to be beginning to conserve moral values by demanding the execution of wrong doers in order to prevent national calamity; it also, however, still demands the sacrifice of wholly innocent persons

when others are not available in order to satisfy the gods' thirst for blood. Sacrifices of both sorts are for the public benefit, and so are believed to conserve social welfare.

VI—*Magic*

Medicine men in addition to furnishing amulets for medicinal purposes, were skilful in sorcery and divination. Enemies could be cursed, injured, or killed by the use of magic. For instance, one might "take a fowl, dig a hole in the path leading to the man's house, kill the fowl there, let the blood run into the hole, cut off the fowl's head and bury it with the blood; he would then ask the gods to bless his medicine, and make it work death to his enemy. The enemy, unconscious of the trap, would walk over it, and in a few days' time he would fall ill and die," 6. Sympathetic magic was greatly feared, and if an enemy were to get hold of any of one's cut or loose hairs, nail parings or spittle, it was thought that he could, by means of magic, compass one's death. Pestilence could be averted by the offering of a "scapegoat," viz., by taking a woman and a child together with domestic animals into the country from whence it came, and there breaking their limbs and leaving them to die a lingering death. The disease would thus have been transferred to the country from which it came. Diseases could be magically transferred from individuals to animals, or to other persons, in a similar manner.

In all such practises, can we not perceive the *mana* conception? Some mysterious power can be brought into play upon persons, or be transferred from persons and things through the proper technique. Such practises, when for the public welfare, like the aversion of a plague, may be regarded as both magical and religious; they are cases in which the medicine man or priest is acting on behalf of the public, probably at the king's command. When, however, an individual makes use of magic for his own private advantage or to satisfy a private grudge, his action is not an attempt to conserve a socially recognized value, and is not religious.

VII—*The Conservation of Values in the Religion of the Baganda*

In the case of the Baganda we observe a savage religion which has become a distinctly differentiated interest and activity, with priests, temples, sacrifices, gods, fetiches, amulets,

spirits, and ghosts, through all of which endeavor is made to secure the conservation of socially recognized values. Through the gods, the king's fetiches, and the ghosts of former kings, there are attempts to conserve national values—abundant crops and animal food, victory in war, deliverance from earthquake and pestilence, counsel as to measures for the public safety, and the like.

Nor are the private needs of the individual and the localized needs of the family overlooked in this religion. Individuals may go to Mukasa's temples, and make offerings and prayers for fish, for children, and for the satisfaction of other private wants that are of little or no national concern, yet are *socially recognized values*, *i.e.*, values that the public generally would approve of an individual seeking to conserve. The fetiches kept in the home, and fetiches worn on the person are also employed in the endeavor to conserve socially recognized values that concern the private family or the individual. The same is true of the worship of the ghosts of its own deceased members by the living members of the family.

Objectifications of the religious agency, like gods, fetiches, and ghosts, furnish concrete imagery and serve to fixate the attention. They therefore doubtless strengthen the faith of the worshipper. In this way they clearly represent a psychological advance over the religions of the central Australians and of the Todas. A further advance that is both psychological and moral may be noted in the case of spirits, ghosts and gods. Since these are personal, anthropomorphic beings, it is possible to attribute to them human emotions and sympathies. Through them, therefore, more intimate and personal values can be conserved. Deceased kings can be thought to feel a vital personal interest and sympathy in the nation's welfare. Gods may not be expected to feel so personal an interest as deceased kings; but more power and sublimity can be attached to them; what is lost in personal sympathy is compensated for by increased power and ability to help. In like manner, it is natural to believe that deceased members of the family are interested in its welfare, and conservation is sought of very human values indeed;—comfort to those in bereavement, the opportunity to share a feast with one's dead, and to get advice and assistance from them. It is easy to see why most savage peoples make much of ancestral worship, and why the latter

often persists even in advanced civilizations such as those of China and Japan.

What are the *real* values actually conserved by the Baganda religion? Is there a genuine advance beyond the less developed religions that have been considered in previous chapters? The answer must on the whole be in the affirmative. To be sure, there is nothing, so far as the author knows, in any other savage religion quite so fine in its moral appeal to the growing youth as the Australian initiation ceremonial. But the differentiated religious worship of the Baganda seems undoubtedly to afford a far more effective machine for conserving the values which the nation knows, for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It undoubtedly makes for solidarity, and constitutes a powerful factor in the evolution of social consciousness, both in the nation and in the family. The conduct of all savages when they have reached the warlike stage of the Baganda, appears more repulsive in many ways than the simpler, more humane morality of less developed folk like the Arunta. However, warfare appears to have been a necessary, though stern and cruel, discipline through which every race that has become civilized has had to pass. The lessons of self-sacrifice and obedience, including loyalty to one's clan to the death, if need be, seem an essential preliminary to the development of equitable government, of national public spiritedness and patriotism, of willingness to self-sacrifice and social service. In Borneo travellers find the bloodthirsty head-hunters more hospitable, more brave, energetic, manly, and truthful, more chaste, and kind to women and children, and in other ways more morally attractive than their milder and less warlike but more cowardly, treacherous, dishonest and unchaste neighbors, 7. The Romans in ancient times and the British in modern times, nations descended from mixtures of unusually warlike stocks, have been pre-eminently successful in the development, both of law and government, and also in an impartial love for justice. This is one reason why they have become capable of administering fairer and more sympathetic rule to alien races than the latter could independently obtain for themselves. The Chinese and Hindu races whose ancestors were less warlike or remained less long in the warlike stage, and whose religions of peace have had fuller sway and dominance, have not developed these sides of moral character to an equal extent, fine as has been their moral development in other respects. So we

may well forgive the Baganda their devotion to the war god, Kibuka, and their cruel human sacrifices. British rule now, no doubt, has abolished them. We may trust that they have fulfilled their purpose, and that white administrators have found for the Baganda less inhuman ways by which they now conserve their socially recognized values.

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CHAPTER V

DEFINITION OF RELIGION. RELATION OF RELIGION TO OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITIES

I—*Purpose of the Definition*

The purpose of the present chapter will be to set forth a definition of religion based upon its psychological characteristics. While the preceding chapters and the one immediately following are concerned with primitive religions, it will be best to make the definition of religion, now to be set forth, inclusive both of primitive religions and of higher religions. The definition will thus serve both as a summary of the ground already covered, and as an introduction to that yet to be traversed in the volume as a whole. The definition now to be attempted must be *purely descriptive*— a characterization of religion *as it has been and is.* It will in no sense be normative, or define what religion ought to be, 1. The definition must be broad enough to cover all types of religion, and yet clear cut enough to differentiate religion from related activities liable to be confused with it, such as animism and magic in the case of primitive religions, and morality, art, and science in advanced religions. Later chapters will throw some light upon what religion may be at its best, and what we should seek to make it.

II—*Genus of the Definition*

A logical definition begins by stating some genus or larger class to which the term defined belongs. The genus of which religion is an instance is that of *endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values.*

Let us carefully scrutinize each of the separate expressions in this genus. "Values," as the preceding chapters have taught us, in the case of primitive religions are very concrete, material, practical—such things as food, water, protection from storms, victory in war, posterity, counsel what to do in important crises in human affairs. In the ethical religions, as we shall see in later chapters, man is more self-conscious, and reflective, and possesses deeper moral insight, 2. Ethical religions are

accordingly chiefly concerned with such values as purity of heart, forgiveness of sins, virtue, and other goods of an inner, spiritual nature that refer more to the mental and moral states of the worshipper than to outward physical conditions.

One characteristic applies to all the values of both natural and ethical religions. The values are all "socially recognized." That is, they are either values that are recognized by many persons, if not by all, to concern the welfare as a whole of the social group (family, totem, tribe, nation), or else they are values recognized to be morally right and proper for individuals to seek for their own benefit. Victory in war, deliverance from pestilence or famine, and counsel regarding important decisions that must be made by the group are obviously matters of general public concern, and endeavor may be made to conserve them through religion. The same is true of the efforts of a family to maintain solidarity with its deceased members, leading it to share delicacies of food with them, to seek the repose of their souls, to ask their counsel, and to endeavor to avert their wrath.

The individual is far less conscious of himself as an individual among savages than among civilized nations; for there is less specialization of industries and fewer differences in social position; custom determines the conduct of everyone in most matters and leaves comparatively little room for personal choice. But of course even savages have private wants, a man desires vengeance upon an enemy, or a woman desires to bear a son. Such values may be socially recognized. They are not matters of public concern to any great extent; but the man has been unfairly treated, and his friends would like to see him victorious over the man who wronged him; it is a great happiness for a woman to be a mother, and the barren wife is pitied. Such values are socially recognized in the sense of our definition. So we may readily see how, among the Baganda, for instance, such persons might seek these goods for themselves by making little gifts to their fetiches at home or by bringing larger offerings to the gods at the temples. But if a man's private vengeance would be inimical to the public welfare, if it would promote feuds and dissensions where united action is necessary, he would not be seeking socially recognized values. He could not seek the aid of religion, and would have to go to sorcerers and other shady folk for supernatural assistance in carrying out his anti-social act.

No one can make a religion for himself any more than he can devise a language of his own; religion is a slow development of group life and common experiences. The values which it endeavors to conserve are therefore necessarily values which are socially recognized, although not necessarily values of social concern or importance. In ethical religions prevailing among civilized nations with more pronounced individualism, more private needs are recognized than is the case in the natural religions; but this does not invalidate the definition.

Religion is an "endeavor to secure the *conservation* of socially recognized values." "*Conservation*" is intended in a wide sense of the word. It includes *quantitative increase* of the object that is of value, in the case of food, rain, and other material goods. It also includes *enhancement or intensification* of the value, especially in the case of more spiritual goods—such as bravery, loyalty, purity of heart, social solidarity, sense of divine presence and support, and the like. In this sense, values are often, though the author thinks not always or necessarily, "raised to a higher power of themselves,"—to use a phrase of Professor Coe's, 3. By saying that "religion is an endeavor *to secure* the conservation of socially recognized values, instead of more simply, that it is an endeavor to conserve them, it is implied that the religious act—sacrifice, prayer, or whatever it be—does not endeavor directly, of itself to effect the desired result, but that it seeks to do so through the medium of a particular kind of agency, later to be described.

"Religion is an *endeavor* to secure the conservation of socially recognized values." The "*endeavor*" need not be successful. Often, indeed, especially in savage religions, we perceive it to be wholly futile, as in the case of the Australian ceremonies to secure rain and to increase the food supply. The practise of religion always involves a minimum of faith, or confidence in the efficacy of the religious act, enough to make it seem worth while to try to secure the result in that way.

Religion is primarily a matter of activity of some kind or other; it is volitional in its nature, a conation, the expression of desire for some sort of a value. It is a mistake to overemphasize the significance of the overtly emotional or intellectual phases of religion which are all incidental to the carrying out of this endeavor. Mystic trance and rapture, with their heightened emotional intensity, myth and dogma with their intellectual explanations, law and ritual with their prescrip-

tions regarding conduct, are all manners in which the religious endeavor manifests itself, and must be regarded rather as the fruits or expressions of religion than as fundamental properties in terms of which it can be defined.

III—*The Differentia*

The genus which has just been set forth—"the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values"—is broad enough to include everything that ought properly to be called religion. It is an adequate genus. Under this genus, however, much that is not religion is also included,—some phases, at least, of magic, science, art, morality, and law. The definition must therefore be completed by *a differentia*, which will delimit the field of religion from the other forms of endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values that are not religious.

In the case of religious endeavor the conservation of values is always sought through *a specific and peculiar kind of agency, and the attitude toward this agency is of a definite sort.* In the case of the natives of Australia and of the Toda dairy ritual we have seen that some sort of impersonal agency appears to be implied in their conduct, though the agency has not yet received a name. Melanesians and North American Indians we also saw, have given this agency a name—*mana, manitou*, etc. The Baganda have identified this agency with a variety of objects—with gods, with ancestral ghosts, with nature spirits, with fetiches half animate and half inanimate, and with amulets that are wholly inanimate. The agency in none of these cases is physical. It differs from the operations of ordinary natural objects as they go on of themselves apart from the presence of *mana*, spirits, and other influences which are akin to human mental experiences.

Among primitive religions the agency sought to be evoked may be simply *mana*, attributed to or identified with any of the objects mentioned. In higher religions the agency is more refined than *mana*, and is more moral in its character. It remains some sort of spiritual power that is sometimes thought directly to modify the external world as in the collects for rain and dry weather; but as reflective man becomes more discriminating, it is regarded rather as reinforcing the individual's own personality and so making him more efficient. Professor Leuba's investigations reveal the interesting fact that there

are educated Americans to-day with very deep religious feelings who pray and know that they feel spiritual reinforcement, in consequence, and yet are not at all sure that this is not due wholly to the influx of energy from the sub-conscious mental and physical resources of their own organisms, 4. Even in this case, however, spiritual reinforcement is entering the individual's consciousness from a source that appears to him to be external to his own conscious waking self at that time; it in that sense, at least, comes from without his "ego." In exceptional as well as in typical religious experiences, a *specific action* of some sort is requisite to evoke the agency—sacrifice, spell and incantation, prayer, or meditation. The religious act is a distinct act of the worshipper's consciousness, enlisting in his service an agency other than what at that time he identifies with his "ego," i. e., his conscious self.

While living human beings have fairly often become objects of worship, the most famous instances being Egyptian kings and Roman emperors, such persons have always been regarded as superhuman or supernatural in some sense, or as divinities, 5. Man refuses to worship his fellow man as such.

Moreover the attitude felt by the religious worshipper is unique in some respects. It is as Schleiermacher expressed it, "a feeling of absolute dependence." If the source of the agency is personal,—a deceased ancestor or friend, a nature spirit, a saint, a hero, a god, or God,—this feeling may be one of fear or awe, of love or affection, and will very likely be of all these combined into a sentiment of loyalty and reverence, obligation and aspiration. As religions evolve, the tendency is for the sentiment toward the personal object of religious devotion to become enriched, enlarged, and enhanced. If the *source* of the agency is impersonal, or is not distinguished from the agency itself, it is still possible to discover a mental attitude of dependence quite different from that felt toward purely physical nature. The Australian native has not discriminated between the agency and its source, nor has he given a name to either, yet he feels spiritually impressed and uplifted as a result of initiation or *intichiuma* ceremony, and he can be said to be dependent upon the ceremony in this feeling. Such an attitude is quite different from his feeling toward any merely physical object of value to him. While in the purer forms of the Buddhist religion, the Buddha personally plays no part in the efficacy of the religious exercises through which

man may attain salvation, the attitude toward these exercises is different from that which would be felt toward any physical or mental gymnastics performed in a non-religious way for the good of body or mind. The attitude in this religion implies, a feeling, if not of love or awe, at least of dependence upon the ceremony that affords increase of spiritual power. It implies that the world order is essentially just and moral. It is noteworthy that worshippers often tenderly place flowers before the picture or image of the Buddha, who first revealed to man the way of salvation. The readiness with which this homage to the Buddha has developed in the less pure forms of the religion into downright worship of him as well as of gods and Boddhisattvas, shows that Buddhism in its purely atheistic form fails fully to satisfy the human impulse to develop sentiments of love and loyalty to the source of spiritual power gained through religion.

While it is hard to devise an expression that will apply to all the different religious attitudes that have been manifested in human history, it is safe to say that they all imply a very different feeling than is present in industrial or scientific pursuits or in magical activities of a non-religious sort. In the case of the latter, objects are manipulated or exploited to gain valuable results, but the feeling is certainly not one of dependence in the sense in which the term is here intended. A farmer may feel economically dependent upon the soil and rain for the growth of his crops, just as a clerk may feel dependent on his salary, but this is a different kind of dependence. The feeling of dependence in religion is more akin to the dependence which man feels toward other human beings who may help or harm him, and this feeling is present in religion, even in the cases where the religious agency is not attributed to or identified with a personal being.

Science and industry and the love of knowledge also differ fundamentally from religion in their attitudes and purposes. Science and industry are interested in the mechanical exploitation of nature. Nature is inert and passive; so man may manipulate nature for industrial purposes, or observe it to ascertain the regular succession of phenomena which he may describe in the "laws of natural science." The religious attitude, on the other hand, is always a feeling of dependence toward the agency in a manner that implies love, fear, or other human emotions never manifested in the same way in science

or industry. The love of knowledge for its own sake in the case of the primitive religions gives rise to myths, and in the higher religion to philosophy and theology. These last may be and often are utilized by religion to assist it in carrying out its efforts. But they are always used by religion as means of an incidental sort. So far as they strengthen piety, well and good. But they are only aids to help man to understand what he believes in his religion. The moment a man criticizes them from purely intellectual interest, he is passing from the religious attitude to a distinctly secular and non-religious standpoint. Philosophy and science owe much in their origin to religion; but, before they advance far, they always become independent interests.

The differentia of religion has now been explained. It has been shown how religion differs from other attempts to secure the conservation of socially recognized values. The definition as a whole, including both genus and differentia, is therefore this:—*Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency,* 6.

IV—*Comparative Religion*

This definition suggests two ways in which religions may readily be compared with one another for purposes of study. (1) We may compare their *ends, i. e.*, we may examine the different types of socially recognized values which they endeavor to conserve. How primitive religions differ from ethical religions in this respect has already been indicated. All the ethical religions emphasize much the same moral precepts for the conduct of everyday life,—they are unanimous in enjoining truthfulness, regard for property rights, chastity, honor of parents, forgiveness of enemies, and the like. To this extent the socially recognized values of the ethical religions are similar. But the ethical religions differ greatly in their interpretation of the meaning of life as a whole, of what philosophers would call the highest good. While it is not easy to formulate the highest good taught by each of the higher religions so as to include the views of all of its thoughtful adherents, each in a general sense has a distinctive ethical standpoint. The attitude toward life of the philosophical Brahman is markedly

different from that of the primitive Buddhist, and both are still more unlike the Confucian, the Jew, and the Christian.

(2) We may compare the different *means* employed by the various religions for the purpose of securing these ends, of conserving the values which they esteem. From this standpoint a religion is an instrumentality, a mode of procedure used for various ends. Each religion has its *threefold technique*:— (a) its *ritual* including sacrifices and prayers; (b) its myths and its dogmas and other *intellectual explanations* why this ritual is necessary and how it works; (c) its own *institutional organisation* for carrying on its ritual, teaching its intellectual formulations and for handing both down to the next generation. The comparative study of liturgies, mythologies, theologies, systems of ecclesiastical organisation, of canon law, and of ecclesiastical architecture all come under the head of technique; for they are all products that have developed in the course of endeavoring to secure the conservation of socially recognized values. They must thus be regarded if they are kept in the right perspective. To make comparative religion almost exclusively a study of myths, dogmas, or rituals, is to exaggerate the real significance of these features of religious technique.

V—*Religion and Animism*

The connection between primitive religion and animism has often been misunderstood, and it is necessary to indicate how the two are related from the standpoint of the definition of religion. Animism is a term introduced by the late Professor Tylor in his famous *Primitive Culture*, one of the most important works of the last generation upon the anthropological side of religion. The truth in "animism" seems to be that many savages believe that all objects about them to which their attention is called, are either alive or are inhabited by spirits. A tree, a mountain, a river, the sea, the sky, even a stone or a blade of grass are regarded as animate. Not all of these objects, or the spirits which he believes inhabit them, may be of religious concern to the savage. The Tshi of the west African coast, for instance, pay little attention to spirits of bushes, grasses, and stones, since these are not powerful and could do them little good or harm; but they are deeply concerned with the spirits of rivers and lagoons, of the sea and the mountains. When the spirit is distinguished from the material object, and thought to inhabit it, it

is supposed to be able to leave it temporarily or permanently. The spirits of men wander in their dreams from the places where their bodies lie sleeping. The West African natives think a man's dream soul sometimes becomes lost under such circumstances, and the services of a medicine man are required to effect its recovery, 7. The Australian ghosts remain in the vicinity of their *churinga*, which may be found when the ghost is again to be born a living member of the tribe. The souls of the human dead are thought to pass into the bodies of animals, or to inhabit trees, stones, fetiches or whatever objects may appeal to their fancy. Among the Niger tribes it has been reported that such ancestral ghosts wish to remain with the tribe, and if a tribe is forced to migrate, it carefully takes the fetiches inhabited by ghosts with it, and invites ghosts who dwell in trees, rocks and other immovable objects to enter portable fetiches that the tribe may carry away with them, 8. Savages very often believe both in nature *spirits* which never were human beings, but are the "souls" of various physical objects about them that attract their attention and inspire their awe, and *ghosts*, the souls of deceased human beings and animals. It is convenient to reserve the word "spirits" to designate the nature spirits, and to use "ghosts" to designate the deceased men and animals. Many anthropological writers have adopted this usage.

While animism is a very general, perhaps almost universal belief among savages, few contemporary writers believe that religion originated in animism. The natives of Central Australia, as we have seen, have a good many animistic beliefs and they also have religious practices, but the latter are not connected with the former to any extent. The Toda dairy ritual bears no relation to their animistic beliefs. The Baganda gods are probably all to be regarded as developments from nature spirits and ancestral human or animal ghosts, but not all of their fetiches seem to be animistic. And so one could go on with other savage peoples and find that animism, while often connected with religious beliefs, is by no means universally so connected.

The universal characteristic of religion, as we have seen, is the belief in a peculiar sort of agency that can be utilized to conserve values. This agency may or may not be referred to a personal source. If it is referred to a personal source we shall find animism associated with religion. If spirits or

ghosts are thought to possess *mana* it will be natural for man to seek to get on good terms with them so that they will impart *mana* to him. So we may say that religion may or may not seek to conserve its values through *mana* imparted by spirits or ghosts, and so may or may not be animistic. Likewise animistic beliefs may exist in a tribe quite apart from its religion, or they may be features of the religion. Neither religion nor animism necessarily involves the other. But if animistic beliefs are prominent in the minds of savages we may expect them sooner or later to color their religion. That would be natural enough. If man thinks that there are powerful spirits and ghosts about, he will sooner or later seek to conciliate them. But this is only one of the ways, and apparently not the original way in which man sought to conserve values through religion.

The origin of animistic beliefs needs not greatly to concern us here. Religion and animism have had independent origins. However, a few words may be said upon the subject. The psychology of animism is really very simple, and does not require such elaborate explanations as are often advanced for it. Animals react to men and other animals in a different manner than to inanimate objects, as Professor Leuba has pointed out, 9. The animal does not have animistic beliefs because he possesses few or no free images and ideas and his consciousness is confined to immediate perception; we might say that he has no animistic beliefs because he has no beliefs at all. The minds of savages have developed to the point where free images and ideas are abundant, but they do not have perfect logical control over them, so that the images and ideas which they have derived from animate objects sometimes become fancifully associated with inanimate objects. Whatever appears novel or irregular or unexplanable suggests the ideas of living objects, and hence appears alive. Dreams, hallucinations, hysteria, epilepsy, the departure of the breath at death, and like phenomena may have suggested that what makes a thing alive is something separable from it, and so the notion of souls as distinct from the bodies which they inhabit may well have arisen.

To think that things are alive, or that they have *mana* in them involves very little reflection; to attribute souls to such objects, but separable from them, seems to involve reflection and may be due to inferences based on observation of such

phenomena. There is therefore nothing particularly strange or problematical about the origin of animism. It is the most natural thing in the world for savages as well as children to-day to misapply their categories of the animate and inanimate, and to suppose things to be alive that to their imperfect observation and knowledge do not appear to act with mechanical uniformity. This is not so much due to a confusion of the categories in the sense that the difference between the conceptions of animate and inanimate is unclear, as to lack of experience in bringing objects under these two classes.

VI—*Religion and Magic*

The distinction between religion and magic, and their relation to each other is fundamentally important. We have noticed various religious ceremonies which contain magical elements. The initiation and *intichiuma* ceremonies of Central Australia are magical in that they are supposed to effect physiological changes in the boys, to promote the growth of plants and animals, and to cause rain to fall. The Toda dairy man's prayers, addressed to no one, are clearly magical spells whose efficacy is due to their repetition. It appears to be impossible to formulate a logical definition of magic that will at all give a clear conception of what it means to the savage, because he does not think in logical terms so far as he employs magic. An utterly illogical conception cannot be defined logically. It is better therefore simply to describe different types of magic.

Many instances of magic involve the notion that what is done to an object that has come into some close personal contact with a person, or has been a portion of his body, will affect the person himself. If the sorcerer can get hold of anyone's nail parings or hair clippings he can work injury upon the person himself. If a weapon that has made a wound be heated, the wound will remain inflamed; if the weapon is kept clean, bandaged and poulticed, the wound will rapidly heal without festering. This is called "*sympathetic*" or "*contagious*" magic. Another type is "*imitative*" magic, in which there is in some way an imitation of the effect sought. For instance, many rain making ceremonies all over the world imitate the dropping of water to the ground by pantomime or picture. Many of the Australian *intichiuma* ceremonies are instances of imitative

magic. Men of the kangaroo totem dress themselves up to look like kangaroos, and step like them during the ceremony of their totem; the men of the frog totem imitate frogs in their ceremony; and so on. It is a common belief in the savage world that an enemy can be destroyed by making a wax figure of him and melting it, or sticking pins into it. Many instances of magic cannot be brought under either of these two heads, and can only be said vaguely to involve the notion that powers and influences exist in things and may be made to pass over into other things. Thus sins may be loaded on a scape goat, and driven away with the latter into the wilderness; a tooth-ache can be nailed into a tree; by eating a tiger's heart a man may become brave; a barren fruit tree must be male, and can be made female and productive by putting a woman's petticoat upon it, 10.

All cases of magic involve the notion of *mana*, or some sort of impersonal power that may be manipulated by correct procedure. The psychological explanation of the origin of magic is, the author thinks, three-fold, 11. First, it begins with *natural and spontaneous expressions of emotion.* A man is angry at his distant enemy and hacks at trees or anything that may stand in his way, just as he would hack at the man himself if he could get at him. This is a very human state of emotion which all of us have experienced at times. The women of the Hindu Kush, when the men are on a raid, get together and dance day and night. This may well have begun as a natural expression of emotion. These women were excited, could not work in the fields as usual, and came together, and whiled away the time by dancing. Secondly, by *association of ideas*, a person frequently or habitually performs the action which expresses his emotion when aroused; this seems almost a necessary part of the action. The Hindu Kush women hear the men planning another raid. They think to themselves—"We must get together and dance." A raid has become habitually associated in their minds with a dance. Thirdly, the logical fallacy of *post hoc, ergo hoc* completes the evolution of the magical powers. The women danced while the men went on a raid, and the men were successful. Therefore it is concluded that the men were successful *because* the women danced. Accordingly it becomes an established custom that the women must dance to ensure the success of raids. An Esquimo whose tribe had been unsuccessful in hunting and were on the

verge of starvation started out on a hunt, gnawing at the ham bone of a dog. He was immediately successful in capturing a seal. Thereafter he always took along a hambone of a dog when he went hunting, 12. Such associations of ideas and casual inference, obviously fallacious as they are, none the less are very human, and the superstitions common among civilized people today have originated in much this way. The only reason why all of us are not such firm believers in magic as savages is on account of the influence of logic, philosophy, and, above all, of the natural sciences. These insist on exceptions as carefully as instances that agree with a notion, and critically examine all beliefs and reject those that are grounded merely upon custom, habit, and emotional prejudices. Magic persists longer in religion than in other fields of organized human activity just because man is more reluctant to apply critical reasoning to religion, feeling that it is something sacred and taboo to careful investigation and inquiry.

One reason why magic has had so strong a hold is because it often has really been effective. A man who believes that he will be brave if he eats a tiger's heart doubtless will become braver after having done so. Australian men who believe that an enemy has stolen their kidney fat by magical means while they were asleep have actually died of fright. The Hindu Kush men probably have felt increased confidence in themselves because they knew their women were endeavoring to assist them by dancing. Trials by ordeals probably more often revealed the guilty and cleared the innocent than they failed to do so. The man with a guilty conscience would be more likely to choke when eating bread, and the innocent man would be more likely to be able to swallow it without choking if both believed in the efficacy of such a test of guilt. A knight fighting in the tournament to vindicate his innocence would more likely be successful if he believed himself to be innocent. Of course these are all cases where the power of mental suggestion is sufficient to help bring about the desired effect; but uncivilized men know nothing of the psychology of suggestion, they perceive that magical acts are sometimes successful and so their confidence in magic is strengthened.

The relation of magic to religion for purposes of definition, therefore, is simply this. If magic is employed in the conservation of any socially recognized value, whether of concern to the clan as a whole, to a family, or to an individual, it is

religious. Otherwise it is non-religious. Magic is clearly religious when used in ceremonies for the purpose of ensuring abundant crops, increase of cattle, or victory in war. Black magic, used to work evil on a private enemy in a manner condemned by public opinion, is not religious.

It has sometimes been maintained that magic preceded religion, and that the latter has either developed from it or has supplanted it. Professor Frazer's *Golden Bough*, for instance, maintains that man first sought to control supernatural powers by magic, and when he found he could not do this successfully, became overawed at them, and sought to propitiate them through religion. Of course if religion were so defined as to make belief in and worship of supernatural spirits and gods a necessary criterion of it, such primitives as the Arunta would not be religious at all, while they would be magical, and we should have to suppose that magic did precede religion. The issue here is not one of historical sequence of facts so much as of definition of terms. If the definition set forth in this chapter be accepted, then it can be said that all races of mankind of whom we have knowledge have had religions, but that the religions of the lowest races consist chiefly of magic, while later on religions use magic less and animism more, and seek more personal and reverential attitudes toward the agency used to conserve values. This will be clearer in the next chapter where the evolution of spiritual sacraments and prayer from magical sacrifices and spells will be indicated.

VII—*Religion and Morality*

The relation of religion to morality follows from the definition of religion. Since all values which any religion seeks to conserve are socially recognized values, it may be said that religion always has a moral purpose. But a primitive tribe will not seek to conserve all its socially recognized values through religion. The values which are important, but which they cannot secure adequately by their own efforts are most likely to become for them objects of religious endeavor. Thus food, and protection from, and victory over enemies are primitive religious values when food is scarce and enemies numerous and dangerous. Among savages many moral matters may have nothing to do with religion. Adultery and theft may be morally condemned by the tribe without any one thinking of them as violations of religious obligations in any way. Gods

may even command acts which are contrary to human morality, and are performed only out of fear of their wrath. The sacrifice of human infants by their parents to Moloch, and the sacrifice of their chastity by decent women to avoid the wrath of Isthar, the primitive Semitic mother goddess, are Hebrew and Babylonian instances, 13.

However, as religions evolve, the tendency is for moral values to become objects of religious concern, and for every advance in moral insight and appreciation sooner or later to influence the religious activities of a developing people. One of the great points of superiority of the ancient Hebrew religion was that the prophets were able to ascribe to Yahweh, their God, every new moral attribute as soon as they had conceived it, so that He always stood for all that in their minds was good and righteous. Their religion thus was the most important agency in furthering and conserving Hebrew moral progress. Christianity has likewise been a progressive religion, and new moral values have with very creditable rapidity become matters of religious concern. Religion is always extremely conservative, and while this often makes reformers impatient, it is best on the whole that man has one great institution which clings firmly to the values that have come down from the past and which seeks to assure their preservation.

To sum up the relation of morality to religion we may say, that all religious values are moral in the sense that they are socially recognized; but that not all moral values are religious values. Not even all the values that are morally most important, either from our own standpoint or from that of the worshippers of the religion under consideration, are religious values. However, it must be added that as civilizations and religions develop, the values which religion endeavors to conserve increasingly tend to coincide with the highest moral values that are known at the time; and that this has been conspicuously true in the history of Christianity and Judaism.

VIII—*Religion and Art. Play*

The differences between religion and art are so great that confusion is not likely to occur. Religious endeavor in sacrifice and prayer is never exclusively an end in itself; it is for the sake of future spiritual or material benefits. The aesthetic attitude, on the other hand, is always an end in itself. Interest in beauty, whether of nature or of art, is always for its own

sake; never, so far as it is really and truly artistic or aesthetic, for an ulterior purpose. Such interest is immediate; religious interest is mediate, 14. Religion may make use of art in its worship, but it is only as a means to an end, and it is notorious how works of art that are mediocre from an aesthetic standpoint are often preferred by the religiously devout to the masterpieces in sculpture, painting, and music. Moreover, ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian renaissance have often produced the finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art almost altogether. Of course, both primitive and civilized arts have largely developed in connection with religious activities, but art and religion always present clearly distinguishable attitudes.

Professor A. C. Watson objects to this sharp differentiation between religion and art, 15. For him they are so inextricably interwoven that they cannot be distinguished, except by the fact that artistic expression appears at the culmination of a period of religious development as an appreciation in beautiful forms of its achievement. He also affirms that a religious mood is often an end in itself, rather than a means to further ends, mentioning mystical types of devotion, and the Christian mood of "communion with God" as instances, comparing them in this respect with conjugal felicity and the intercourse of ideal friendship. On the contrary, it can be affirmed that the great mystics have not regarded rapture and divine communion as ends in themselves, to be cultivated for the sake of the enjoyment that they afford. To cultivate ecstacy for its own sake is "spiritual drunkenness" in the words of St. Teresa. Mystical states, according to the best authorities, are to be regarded as means of spiritual enrichment and increased effectiveness in the service of God and men. Conjugal felicity and friendship, too, would be on a lower plane than they normally are, if they were treated as ends in themselves and cultivated for the thrills that they afford, and not as means of mutual helpfulness and the realization of ulterior ends. Religion is a larger thing in human experience than art just because it is not an end in itself, but always looks beyond the present moment, and so is capable of becoming a means to the conservation of the highest values known to man in his personal life and his social relationships.

Professor Seashore has called attention to the relationship between religion and expressions of the play impulse, 16. It must be admitted that religious ceremonies both among savages and civilized nations, are often joyous festivals in which sociability is enhanced. It follows that many persons attend them impelled by the desire to have a good time, as well as by impulses of curiosity and gregariousness. In persons whose attendance is at first due to these impulses, a genuine religious sentiment may ultimately develop. Religious workers in different ages have realized this and have made religious rites appeal to a variety of interests. They have often been willing that a holy day should in some measure be a holiday. None the less, the psychology of religion and play are fundamentally different. Religion is serious; it finds its end in the conservation of values that are external to the religious act itself. Play, on the other hand, like aesthetic enjoyment, is absorbed in itself, and looks to no future or external ends. The interest in play is immediate; the interest in religion, as in all other serious work, is mediate. Something further will be said upon this point in Chapter XIV, 17.

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CHAPTER VI

THE EVOLUTION OF DEITIES SACRIFICE AND PRAYER

I—*The Rise of Ceremonials*

We have seen that savages engage in ceremonials of various kinds in the endeavor to conserve socially recognized values in a manner that may be called religious, in terms of the definition set forth in the preceding chapter. The Australian natives engage in religious ceremonials to transform their boys into men, to increase their food supply, and to bring rain. The Todas engage in religious ceremonials to promote the welfare of the cows, to make it safe to partake of the milk of a cow after a calf has been born, and to increase the supply of grass, fruit and honey. The state religious ceremonials of the Baganda include a wider variety of purposes,—counsel in matters of state, victory in war, sentences upon criminals, the assurance of posterity to the king, deliverance from famine, earthquake, and pestilence, and other matters of national concern; while families and individuals privately seek through gods, fetiches, spirits, ancestral ghosts, and amulets, the conservation of values dear to them. Almost every concrete material value thinkable has been sought through religious means somewhere in the savage world. In general, the values sought through religious means are those that man does not know how to secure adequately for himself, through his ordinary efforts. Anything that involves the unknown, the uncanny, the mysterious is often thought to contain *mana;* and so, if important enough, desire for it will evoke the development of ceremonials. The striking events of life,—birth, the arrival at puberty, marriage, and death,—are matters of vital concern which involve the unknown and mysterious. So ceremonials often develop about them.

The eating of food often seems to the savage to involve the sacred and mysterious. Food may contain *mana* that will do him good or evil. Australian aborigines, as we have seen, never eat the food of their totem except in solemn ceremonials when

the mysterious power thus set into operation is supposed to produce a beneficent effect. Eaten by a man of the totem at other times this power would be uncontrolled and would work disaster. Various kinds of food in Australia and elsewhere are *taboo* to women and children, because if eaten by them the mysterious power in the food would work evil. The flesh of fierce animals or warlike enemies when eaten ceremonially is often believed to reinforce one's own *mana*, and make one strong and brave. Among the primitive Semites all food seems to have been thought to contain *mana*, or its equivalent, and so every family meal became a religious ceremony. The eating of food, therefore, often has had deep religious significance. "It is a means of relieving hunger and of gaining power; it averts danger from mysterious forces, by removing taboos; it is the means of safe intercourse with strangers, with the dead, with the opposite sex; it is the means of returning safely to one's people and to one's normal functions after a journey, a battle, a period of mourning, or other unusual experience," 1.

Water also often is thought to contain mysterious power. The primitive inhabitants of the Arabian desert often feel sorely the lack of abundant water, and at times they see sudden showers transform dry plains into green fields. Baptism, and other forms of ablution important in many religions of Semitic origin, arose in the first place from the notion that the action of water in a ceremonial has magical effect, that through the agency of water socially recognized values may be conserved. Blood, above all, is mysterious from the primitive point of view, and hence is thought to be charged with *mana*. It is so vitally connected with life that it must contain great potency. Men in Africa may become "blood brothers" by drinking a little of each other's blood, or mingling blood by opening their veins. Henceforth they are mystically united, and bound by powerful ties to mutual support and protection. Violations of tribal custom and other sins are often regarded as material, and when religion first becomes ethical, the mysterious evil that sins would otherwise work upon the community may be averted by the slaughter of men and animals. "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins." Fire, likewise, is a great purifying agent and removes evil *mana* and is positively effective in producing beneficent *mana*.

II—*The Evolution of Deities*

The purpose in primitive religions of any ceremonial is to

conserve socially recognized values through the employment of *mana*. The eating of food, the shedding of blood, the use of water, fire, smoke and incense, are all means by which powerful *mana* may be evoked. If the source of this *mana* is distinguished, and is conceived as personal in character, it is thought of either as a spirit, ghost, or god.

In such ceremonials as those of the natives of central Australia the source of mana is not objectified in any way and made external to the ceremonial itself. Nor is this done but very imperfectly in the case of the Toda dairy ritual, though there it might perhaps be said that the various objects mentioned in the *kwarzam* are all sources of *mana*. But in the case of the Baganda the sources of *mana* are external to the ceremonials and take the various forms of gods, fetiches, amulets, spirits, and ghosts. And in most savage religions the sources of mana are thus externalized, and religious ceremonials consciously endeavor to utilize *mana* drawn from these sources.

We have to consider, first,—how the sources become objectified and rendered external to the ceremonials; and secondly, —how they become personified as spirits, ghosts, and gods. These two questions can best be considered together.

The Australian, as we have seen, believes that in some way he and the plants and animals of his totem are one. He has not analyzed the matter further. Much the same condition appears elsewhere in the savage world. The Bororó of Brazil say that they are araras—a species of parrot. Now nothing seems more obvious to us than that a man cannot be a parrot, and of course they know that in many senses they are not parrots. But their logic has not yet developed to a point where they can discriminate, and say in what respects they are and in what respects they are not parrots, 2. In this stage totemic ceremonies may go on quite unreflectively, and the way that *mana* is evoked by the ceremony may raise no problem. Such a problem must force itself ultimately, though, upon any race if it develops in intelligence. Later on, the totem may be personified, it may be a spirit or god that abides somehow in the totemic plants and animals. The ceremony now is thought to effect a mystic union or participation between the men and the god, and so the *mana* of the god becomes available. When this last point is reached, the eating of the totemic plant or animal acquires new significance. If we say in this case, "the

god is eaten," as some writers do, it is necessary to make clear the purport of this rather startling statement. The god is believed somehow to be present in the sacred food of the totem and to eat the food is to become more closely unified with the god and to receive *mana* from him. The god, of course, continues to exist outside of the food that is eaten, and with undiminished power.

If gods may sometimes have developed by externalizing and objectivizing some feature of the ceremonial, like the totemic animal or plant, at other times the source apparently has been found in something previously not connected with the ceremonies in which they have been engaged. The Central Australian aborigines, as we have seen, although they believe in animism, do not make use of it in their religion. Where, however, man believes that he is surrounded by all sorts of powerful spirits and ghosts, it seems inevitable that he will ultimately deem it wise to cultivate friendly relations with them. Several details mentioned by Spencer and Gillen cause one to wonder if this step is not imminent. If an Arunta man and his wife both wish for a child, the man will tie his hair girdle about a certain stone (through which spirits are supposed to pass when they wish to become incarnated in women and become born again into the tribe) at the same time begging the spirits to look upon his wife with favor, 3. This is *almost* a prayer. Furthermore, the Arunta medicine men have the power of communicating with certain spirits *(Iruntarinia)* from whom they receive information regarding totemic ceremonies, 4. As Professor Pratt remarks, "Granted that out of the original feeling for the impersonal *mana*, the belief in personal powers arose, direct appeal to them was surely the most natural thing in the world," 5.

Ancestral worship seems to have developed very naturally where it prevails. Parents love their children while alive, and grant their requests when they can. What more natural than for the children to continue to look to their parents for aid and sympathy after they are dead! The worship of ancestral ghosts readily develops into a regular domestic ceremonial, some food being set aside for them at every meal, which thus becomes a social gathering for the whole family, including its dead as well as its living members. As generations pass, some noteworthy ancestor of numerous families may become a tribal god, and be worshipped not only by his actual descendants, but

also by those whose relationship to him is purely legendary. If, in the evolution of the human race, the family has existed as a coherent social organization longer than the tribe, as Professor Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* has at least shown to be probable, tribal deities must in numerous cases have developed in some such manner.

In some parts of the world a tribal leader or hero, or a medicine man powerful in *mana*, may be worshipped after his death by those who hope that he will assist them with his *mana*. The incident of Ganindo, mentioned in Chapter III, is an illustration. The deceased kings of the Baganda is another. The deceased Roman emperors had temples, and became divinities reverenced by the entire civilized world. Sir James Brooke was believed by the Dyaks of Sarawack, whom he governed, to be endued with magical virtue, and tribes brought to him the seed which they intended to sow that he might endow it with fertility, and they scattered the water in which he bathed on their fields to ensure abundant crops. Will he, too, become a god? 6.

Sometimes animals and often even inanimate objects have become sources of mysterious power with which religious ceremonials are concerned. Mukasa's chief wife, Nalwanga, it will be remembered, was originally a pythoness, 7. Crocodiles are sacred in India, and certain cows were regarded as divine in ancient Egypt. Perhaps such instances are modifications of totemism, though it is not certain that this is necessarily the case. Animals that are either especially dangerous or beneficent may be regarded with veneration, and mysterious power may be attributed to them. Inanimate objects that are conspicuous and inspire awe, like a waterfall or a cataract, a formidable looking mountain or even a peculiar looking rock, may be regarded as alive, and endowed with dreadful powers. When man's thought becomes more abstract he may begin to generalize, and think of the Earth as the universal Mother, who gives birth to all the plants directly, and is the ancestress of animals and men. Where there is a mother there must also be a father, and the universal Father may be identified with the blue Sky which is seen to extend over the entire earth, or with the Sun whose warmth and light seems everywhere to quicken and vivify nature.

Once the source of *mana* in primitive religions is thought of as distinct from the ceremonial, it is on its way to development

into a god. Fetiches, charms and amulets are impersonal, or only imperfectly personified, to be sure, but they are usually associated in some way with a god or a spirit or ghost and the *mana* which they contain comes from this personal agency. To be sure, this may become obscured, and then these objects are almost mechanical in their operations, like the amulets of the Baganda, and efficacious for only a single purpose. If a fetich becomes an independent object of ceremonial attention it is likely to be treated in some respects like a god or ghost, offerings being made to it, and some of the Baganda fetiches seem on the way to become independent gods. A fetich with a priest, temple, and medium is virtually a god. Ghosts were once personal beings, and so they are already anthropomorphic, and to become gods they need only become magnified and exalted in the minds of their worshippers. The difference between a ghost and a god is a matter of degree. The god is more powerful, more sublime, and his worship has become generally recognized, and is not confined to a family or a few scattered admirers. He has, as a rule, his established modes of worship,—a definite form of ceremonial, a temple and a priest. A ghost simply needs to become an institutionalized source of *mana*, and he is a god.

The evolution of gods from sources of *mana* that never were human beings is different in some details. Animals and inanimate objects are not anthropomorphic. They lack personal qualities and attributes. Gods with such an origin sometimes seem vague in their qualities,—not much more than huge and powerful monsters. Such, for instance, are the Baganda gods of earthquake and plague. The earliest gods of the Aryan conquerors of India,—the Rain, the Wind, the Sun, and other natural objects, lacked personal qualities and attributes. Presently, however, the latter were acquired. The Sun as god is no longer just the red ball up in the sky, but a splendid being in human form, yet surpassing man in every way, who drives the physical sun, now a fiery chariot, across the heavens. Myths of various sorts develop about the personal god, and he is celebrated in hymns and epic poems, and often artists portray him in marble or upon temple wall as a sublime and splendidly heroic figure. The development of gods in other Aryan peoples,—Greeks, Romans, and Teutons,—was similar.

The impulse to give gods personal forms and attributes is the consequence of the desire to conserve desirable human

mental and moral qualities. It is possible to think of rain or sunshine as conserved by transcendent material objects. But wisdom, knowledge of the future, bravery, love, pity, and like qualities could only be thought to be conserved and rendered available by gods who possessed these qualities themselves. As man became self-conscious, and knew himself to be an individual with a moral nature, he desired to acquire various moral traits. In consequence, his gods tended to become exalted human beings—his ideals of what he would like to be himself. Later on, to be sure, as the many gods fused into one, religion took different directions, and in some cases the one God or world order finally ceased to be anthropomorphic, or even personal, in many respects. However, such final developments only came after eras in which there were gods with numerous personal and anthropomorphic traits, 8.

III—*The Evolution of Sacrifice*

When the source of the agency through which man seeks to conserve his socially recognized values had been distinguished from the agency and become a ghost, spirit, or god, the chief religious ceremonial developed into a *Sacrifice*. In any *sacrifice*, as the term will be employed in this volume, man seeks *through some sort of act or ceremonial to come into relations with a supernatural being of at least quasi-personal characteristics* (a ghost, a spirit, a god, or the one universal God), *in order to secure the conservation of a socially recognized value.*

Various attitudes may be assumed in a ceremonial toward this supernatural being. (1) The endeavor may be to *control* the being,—to force him to act at the worshipper's behest,—possibly by reason of a magical spell. "In ancient Egypt, for example, the magicians claimed the power of compelling even the highest gods to do their bidding, and actually threatening them with destruction in case of disobedience. Similarly in India at the present time the great Hindoo trinity of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva is subject to the sorcerers, who by means of their spells, exercise such an ascendancy over the mightiest deities that these are bound submissively to execute on earth below, or in heaven above, whatever commands the magicians may please to issue," 9. French peasants used to believe that their priests could control winds, storms and rain, and by a special "mass of the Holy Ghost" could compel God to grant whatever was asked of Him, no matter how rash or importunate

might be the petition, 10. Such confusion between magic and religion in which the functions of priest and sorcerer are not clearly distinguished, represents a very early stage, logically, in the evolution of sacrifice. It may even be questioned, whether this stage is really sacrifice at all, in any proper sense.

(2) Another ambiguous case is that in which the ceremonial serves to *strengthen* the god, and to enable him to do his beneficent work. In India it was once thought that the sacrifices strengthened the Sun, who without their aid would not be able to rise in the morning, and to proceed in his course across the sky. Here also the magical element predominates.

(3) We have unquestionable instances of sacrifice when the attitude is one of *bargaining*. The sacrifice is pleasing to the gods. They enjoy the food and wine, the blood and incense, and will give man what he desires in return. This is more common than either of the two types previously mentioned. As Miss Harrison points out, the formula of Greek religion as orthodoxly conceived in the fifth century, B. C., was *do ut des*. "It is, as Socrates says (in the Euthyphron), a 'business transaction' and one which, because god is greater than man, man on the whole gets the best of it. . . . If man does his part in the friendly transaction, the gods will do theirs," 11. This attitude is common in the Old Testament. Noah's offering of the sacrifice which pleased Yahweh and led him to promise, for man's sake to send no more floods, and the various sacrifices of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, will serve as illustrations.

(4) Another conception of sacrifice chiefly implies *participation* or *communion* with a deity. There may be an attempt to effect some sort of intercourse between a man and a god so that the man may be reinforced and strengthened by divine *mana*. This form of sacrifice may readily develop out of totemism,—where there is some sort of identity between men and their totem that needs to be strengthened. It can also develop from ancestral worship, for a child naturally feels reinforced and sustained when he feels that a beloved parent is supporting him. This form of sacrifice is very crude and barbarous in its lowest forms, and involves slaughter and burning of animals and even of human beings. But immanent within it are noble possibilities, and from it have developed some of the most spiritual attitudes toward God in the higher religions.

(5) Finally, the attitude in sacrifice may be a more serious and systematic effort at *propitiation.* This attitude makes its first appearance on a savage level. The god is angry and seeks blood. He is rampant, perhaps merely out of lustful desire for life—as in some of the Baganda slaughterings mentioned in Chapter IV. On a higher level, though still barbaric, a god may be angry because tribal law or custom has been violated, and it is necessary to propitiate him by human or animal sacrifices. This often involves magical notions. The sins and curses that have afflicted the nation may be magically transferred to the sacrificial victims and be consumed with them in the fire, or loaded upon a scapegoat and driven into the wilderness.

This conception of propitiation is capable of high spiritual development among civilized nations. In the case of Judaism it has led to lofty and inspiring conceptions of atonement and expiation for sin by the sufferings of the nation. In Christianity has developed the sublime idea that God Himself in the person of the Saviour, through his death, made expiation through sacrifice for the sins of mankind. But, on the whole, many and perhaps the majority of thoughtful persons to-day both in Jewish and Christian faiths find the conception of blood atonement repulsive, even in its most refined and spiritualized forms. They prefer to think of sacrifice, not as a mode of satisfying Divine justice, but as a means whereby close personal communion between God and man is established, so that man can identify himself with God in some way and be reinforced by the Divine presence in his soul. This, of course, is along the line of the fourth conception of sacrifice mentioned. A Christian holding this view would say that the entire life, teaching, and death of Jesus was a sacrifice that established communion between God and man. This communion is experienced by each individual in his own life both in his private worship and also in his participation in the public worship of the Church.

IV—*The Evolution of Prayer*

Prayer has had an evolution similar to that of sacrifice. Primitive ceremonies, like those of the natives of Central Australia, do not seem to involve prayer at all. Where words are repeated in a ceremonial act for the conservation of socially recognized values we may consider them to constitute

a prayer. Viewed in this way, we have called prayers the formulae said by the Toda dairymen priests, although they are not addressed to supernatural beings. Prayer at this level is a magical spell. Certain North American Indian rain societies perform a ceremony or sacrifice to bring rain. Upon an altar they place emblems or pictures representing clouds with vertical drops for rain. By the side of these are ears of Indian corn which are sprinkled with water. All this, of course, is imitative magic, 12. During the course of the ceremony, however, prayers are addressed to the ghosts that control the supply of rain. The report of this is not detailed; the prayers may be spells thought to compel the ghosts to send rain, or they may be entreaties. Formulæ of riddance are usually imperious commands or spells rather than petitional prayers, like the Chinese "Let the devil of poverty depart" or the ancient Greek "Go out, hunger," and "To the door, you ghosts." When the buffalo clan of the Sioux decorate themselves with totemic emblems before going on the war-path, and say, "My little grandfather (the buffalo totem) is always dangerous when he makes an attempt," we clearly have suggestive assurances that increase their confidence, and so are of the nature of a spell, while as Professor Farnell opines, "the coaxing and endearing phrase of kinship seems to imply a half-entreaty as well," 13.

In the further evolution of prayer all thought either of coercing supernatural beings by spells or assisting them by magical ceremonies, came to an end. Man learned to realize that spirits and gods must be greater and mightier than he, and that they do not need his aid and cannot be coerced by him. Prayers now become either *petitions* requesting favors for man which the god on account of his superior power is able to grant if he is so disposed, or else they have for their aim *communion* with the divinity, in which case man seeks a larger, fuller life by identifying himself somehow with the divine. Prayers of praise and all prayers of an æsthetic or mystical character are manifestations of the desire for divine communion. Both of these forms of prayer begin to appear comparatively early in religious evolution. As soon as a supernatural being in a religious ceremonial is addressed in words that are not commands but are requests, the petitional type is beginning to emerge. Dr. Charles A. Eastman (Ohiyesa) describes how the Sioux boy solemnly and with due

ceremonial retires in solitude to the mountains in expectation of some vision of the "great mystery" (manitou). This act clearly points in the direction of a prayer of communion, though the "Great Mystery" does not seem to be clearly personified and not more than half become a God, 14. The petitional prayer is found in many of the Hebrew Psalms, while others contain prayers of communion.

In general, as religions advance and as they become more ethical and more deeply thoughtful in tone, the magical sides of prayer and sacrifice either become sloughed off or transmuted into more spiritual attitudes. To seek courage through *communion* with a god by drinking wine as in the Dionysiac worship of Greece, or by drinking soma juice as in an early stage of the evolution of religion in India, is at least higher than eating the hearts of tigers and dead human enemies for the purpose. To seek divine reinforcement through the enhancement afforded by music, as in the Orphic mysteries of Greece, is higher still. And, finally, to effect communion through a purely mental act of meditation or through imaginative address to the Deity, such as has characterized Judaism and Christianity at their best, is highest of all. But the types of prayer as they exist to-day, will be discussed and classified in Chapter XVI. Here it is only necessary to note that prayer, like sacrifice, begins to develop as soon as the source of supernatural power implied in the religious ceremonial becomes differentiated and objectified, and so to be regarded as external to the ceremonial itself. Sacrifice evolves more rapidly at first; less reflective minds are more concerned with acts than with thoughts. But prayer increases in prominence as men become more reflective and spiritually minded.

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CHAPTER VII

BRAHMANISM

I—*Introductory*

In this, and the chapters immediately following, we shall observe ways in which ethical religions (or religions of salvation and redemption) have developed from nature religions. We shall seek to find out what *values* came to be recognized in India, Greece, and Israel, and through what *agency* their conservation was sought. We shall find that in each country there came to be (1) increased discernment in the appreciation of ethical values, and (2) a remarkable advance in conceptions of the conserving agency. There were some differences in the specific values recognized in each land, but on many points there was substantial agreement. Right and wrong really involve, and are usually recognized to involve, much the same conduct and ideals in all lands upon about the same level of culture. But the differences in the agencies through which efforts were made to secure the conservation of these values became very great. To a certain extent, however, the diverse religious experience of India, Greece, and Israel can be said to teach the same lessons.

II—*The Vedic Period*

During a period not more recent than fifteen centuries before Christ, India was invaded from the north by Aryan races, who conquered the Dravidian inhabitants whom they found in the land, 1. As a result of this conquest, four social classes appeared. The priests, warriors, and common people of the Aryans constituted the three upper classes, while the conquered Dravidians became the lowest class. Centuries later these social classes hardened into the four original castes. At the time of the conquest, the Aryans possessed a little culture. They raised sheep and cattle, practised agriculture, and knew how to build fortified towns and to work in metals.

The religion, as well as the general culture of the Aryan conquerors then was probably not much superior to the

Baganda. They worshipped gods, ancestral ghosts, and nature spirits. They sought to placate demons. They sacrificed to useful objects (like the plough, the furrow, the war car, and their own weapons) no doubt either thinking them fetiches or desiring to impart *mana* to them. The mountains and rivers they deemed holy. They gave objective existence to abstract terms like Infinity, Piety, and Abundance, and made them objects of worship. But their chief attention at this period was devoted to the gods and ancestral ghosts. The other objects of worship mentioned had already become less important than is the case with savages like the Baganda.

The chief gods were conspicuous objects of nature, such as the Sun, Sky, Earth, Air, Light, Wind, Rain, and Dawn. At first these objects were simply personified. For instance, the god Surya was simply the sun,—the physical object appearing as a red ball in the sky. Presently, however, animism developed to the point where gods became differentiated from the objects which they inhabited, so that different words were needed to designate the sun itself, and the god of the sun.

Once this differentiation had been effected, between conspicuous objects of nature and gods associated with them, a large variety of myths developed about each important god. These myths were not always consistent with one another. The same functions and attributes were assigned in different myths to different gods. Thus the personalities and characteristics of the gods began to overlap. Several quite different gods often came to be associated with the same object of nature. For instance, there were many deities associated with the sun. These included Surya, the original physical sun (who now not only drives over the firmament but is the author of birth and is petitioned for children); Savitar, the enlivener and vivifier who gives protection, wealth and children; Pushas, god of the herdsmen; Vishnu, who moves so fast that he measures heaven in three strides; Varuna, god of the dead, leader in battle, and a generous giver; and Mitra, "the friend." A large number of values thus became attached to the various sun deities. These gods were sometimes also confused with the sun's daughter, the Dawn (Ushas; cf. Aurora).

As the gods overlapped in functions, there early appeared a tendency to synthesize them. A triad became pre-eminent, formed of the deities of the Fire (Agni), the Rain (Varuna, Indra), and the Sun (Mitra, Varuna, Vishnu, etc.). As a

late verse in the Rig Veda says, "They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni,—to that which is one they give many a title." From the initial letters of a representative of each of these three classes of deities (Agni, Varuna, Mitra) it has been thought, developed the syllable AUM, of which the term "Om" prominent in Indian liturgy, is a further contraction. As the early Aryan conquerors of India were fond of an alcoholic beverage made from the soma plant, it is not strange that Soma became a personified god. Soma was associated with the Moon. Soma juice, on account, no doubt, of its intoxicating qualities, seemed supernatural in its functions, potent to confer health and immortality, and was identified with the vital sap that vivifies the world.

The values sought in this, the Vedic period (lasting perhaps from 1500 B. C. to 800 B. C.) were concrete: health, victory in war, wealth, children, good fortune, and the like. However, before the period closed, thought of a future life had begun, and men desired to enter Heaven, which was conceived materialistically as a sort of Valhalla or Elysium, whose chief delights would be plenty of soma juice, beautiful women, song and fighting, as well as the privileges of returning to earth to enjoy the soma and victuals prepared for them at the sacrifices offered by their earthly descendants. The virtues necessary to attain this Heaven were chiefly piety to gods and ancestors, liberality to priests, truthfulness, and courage.

The worship by which the conservation of these values was sought was simple. A share of food was set aside at each family meal for the gods and ancestral ghosts, in order to obtain their favor, as well perhaps, as from a kindly feeling of fellowship with them. Elaborate public sacrifices were conducted by the priests, which were often of the nature of feasts, and though reverent, were joyous occasions. Food and soma drink were provided in abundance and were believed to be enjoyed by gods and ghosts as well as man. Most of the gods were believed to be very friendly. Still, they were thought to send evil when angry, and the priests knew how to perform expiatory ceremonies to appease them and to free men from guilt, pollution, and disease.

III—*The Brahmanical Period*

A second period, lasting from perhaps 800 to 500 B. C., found the priests in the ascendancy. Religious worship had

become their specialty, and great emphasis was placed upon the exact performance of ritual. So important had this become that the priests gained a prestige second only to the gods themselves. "There are two kinds of gods; for the gods are gods, and priests that are learned in the Veda (the sacred writings) and teach it are human gods," 2. Like sacrifice paid to the gods are the fees paid to the human gods,—the priests.

A striking feature of this period is the fact that the personalities of the different gods become dim. This is due, in part to the outcome of Oriental flattery,—in addressing each god to attribute to him all the virtues and powers of all the other gods. But the chief reason is that the sacrifice has become all important. The ceremonial is of more consequence than the god to whom it is addressed. Through the faithful performance of sacrifices man is strengthened and sustained, and is enabled to achieve immortality in Heaven. Indeed the emphasis on the sacrifice goes so far that it is asserted that the gods themselves obtained Heaven through sacrifice, 3.

The mechanical character of religious worship in this period on first thought seems to be a degeneration. It suggests a lapse from full recognition of personal gods to the magical performances of an earlier stage of religious evolution. In some ways, no doubt, this is true. Morally, too, it appears to be a degeneration. It suggests that the priests are imposing upon the credulity of the people in order to enrich themselves. And this, also, no doubt in a measure is true. Yet, on the whole, this period represents an advance both in the means by which religious values are conserved, and in the moral character of the values recognized. "The sacrifice is indeed represented to be the only door to prosperity on earth and to future bliss; but there is a quiet yet persistent belief that at bottom a moral and religious life is quite as essential as are the ritualistic observances, with which worship is accompanied," 4. Man's debts are fourfold: he owes sacrifices to the gods; to the seers he owes the study of the Vedas; to his ancestors he owes the duty of rearing descendants to preserve the family name and worship; to his fellowmen he owes the duties of hospitality. The gods enjoin truthfulness and the observance of sacred days, while they forbid adultery, murder, theft, abortion, gluttony, anger, and procrastination.

The psychology of the exaltation of the sacrifice in this period, and of the subordination of the gods to it, is fairly

clear if the theory of sacrifices and *mana* set forth in the preceding chapter be accepted. Early forms of religion, such as those of the Central Australians, are not concerned with gods at all, but with ceremonials thought to produce some kind of impersonal power, such as at a later stage of development comes to be known as *mana*. The ceremonial or sacrifice, in other words, is older than the gods. The latter evolved to explain the sacrifice, personifying the agency thought to be operative in it. This being the historical sequence, it was quite natural, in the Brahmanical period in India, as attention became focused on the ceremonial, that it should have been felt that it was the ceremonial that produced the gods, who continued to be dependent upon it. The efficacy which men attach to the actions of the gods, and the influence which gods exert in consequence upon men, are entirely dependent upon the fidelity with which men perform sacrifices to them. In arguing this, the author does not mean to imply that he thinks that gods in the thought of India or elsewhere are purely human creations, as he hopes he has already made clear. But he does believe that the forms that man's conceptions of the gods assume are the outcome of human experiences and practices.

IV—*The Philosophical Period—Brahmanism*

A further development took place between say B. C. 500 and B. C. 100. (1) This development known as "Brahmanism," and found in the Upanishads and the Vedanta, was effected by the *thinkers of India*, the theologians and philosophers. It probably never greatly influenced the masses of the people, who remained on the plane of thought of the earlier periods. Two other general characteristics of this movement must be mentioned. (2) Its interest is primarily *intellectual, rationalistic*,—an expression of the demand of the mind for unity, for the reduction of all facts to one common principle of explanation. (3) Being primarily an intellectual movement, it has comparatively little regard for *moral* antitheses—the effort is always to state the real in opposition to the unreal rather than, as among the Hebrews, the good in opposition to evil, right in opposition to wrong. None the less, Brahmanism in many respects displays a lofty spiritual insight, and has always found enthusiastic admirers among western students of India.

All the gods, for philosophical Brahmanism, are reduced to one Being—Brahmă. This god is impersonal, when rightly

understood; though those who do not fully grasp the doctrine are permitted to think of him as a personal god—Brahmā. The word, Brahmă, literally means *prayer*. Brahmă is the soul of the world, the universal God, who pervades all things, and is all in all. Brahmă is the fundamental, eternal reality of the universe. All else is transitory, illusory, mere appearance.

This Brahmă, the soul of the universe, is, if a man can only realize it, identical with the principle that he feels in his own inner nature, his own inner psychic force. So the great equation of this religious faith is the identity between oneself (Atman) and God. Brahmă=Atman. Suppose now, a man can fully grasp and bring home to himself what this means, that he is one with the force that pervades the universe! Consider how sustaining, how comforting and self-assuring this would be—how close and intimate must be his consciousness of the Divine Presence! To gain this insight is salvation.

"He who is without desire, free from desire, his desire attained, whose desire is set on Self (Atman), his vital breath does not pass out, but Brahman is he, and in Brahman is he absorbed. As the verse says:

> 'When all the passion is at rest
> That lurks within the heart of man,
> Then is the mortal no more mortal,
> But here and now attaineth Brahman.'" 5.

This doctrine is, of course, a form of pantheistic idealism. There is the same spiritual essence in all things, and this alone is eternal, and ultimately real. The universe is not mere matter; on the contrary, it is spiritual, rational, good. What appears to us as matter is Maya (illusion) selfishness, individuality. When I think of myself as distinct from another man, I am actuated by selfishness, and led into error by illusion. We are really all one in Brahmă.

In this period there appears for the first time in the sacred scriptures the doctrine of transmigration of souls. In a simple form this conception is often found among very primitive folk, and the philosophers may have learned it from the Dravidian aborigines, and adapted it in order to explain the problem why the fortunes of men in this life are so often ill proportioned to their deserts. In the form which the doctrine at this time assumed, it affirmed that the soul persists from one life to another. It has existed in human and animal bodies before

this life, and after death it will continue to exist in other bodies —human, animal, or superhuman. A man's present state is the just reward for what he has done in past states of existence. By this period the classes of earlier society had become hardened into castes, and the question had arisen, "Why do some men enjoy the exalted social standing and prestige of the high Brahmin caste, while others are contemptible Sudras?" So on this view the social order then in existence in India was morally defensible; since the order of the universe is perfectly just, whatever a man sows of good or of ill, he must ultimately reap, if not in the same incarnation, then in a later one. The reasoning here, it will be observed, is, in a sense, logical; it is more rational than the earlier and cruder notions of the future life; and it justified the existing order. Thus regarded, Brahmanism is a religion of complacent optimism regarding social questions; the caste is fundamentally just, there is no need of social reform.

The problem of immortality in this system becomes the search for a means by which one will escape unfavorable incarnations in the future. How can one escape them? All men slip and fall. No matter how good one may be in this life, no matter into what state of existence higher than man's one may next pass, temptations are liable to come and one may sin, and in consequence next appear in one of the hells or be reincarnated on earth in a loathsome animal form,—a snake or a toad or what not! Thus conceived, the prospect of immortality is surely dismal enough! Is there any way to escape such a destiny?

The solution is this: Fix firmly in your mind, by rigorous mental discipline, and constantly keep before you, this fundamental truth,—"Brahmă=Atman. Thou art Brahmă." Know this, fully realize it, act on it consistently, and you are saved. You will be freed from all discontent, envy, jealousy, dissatisfaction; you will find eternal quiet and peace in Brahmă. For, as Brahmă, all things are yours; since Brahmă is all and in all. Whom can you envy? All that is, is one with you in Brahmă. As Brahmă is eternal and unchangeable, and ever at rest, all that changes for us is illusion and error to him; so if you really succeed in fully identifying yourself in thought with Brahmă you will be at peace with the world in this life, and will never again be reincarnated in a mortal body. At death you will remain one with Brahmă in a state of eternal blessed-

ness which is indescribable in human thought and language; but, since it is free from all wants and desires, is more like a profound and dreamless sleep, than anything else that we can imagine.

Why did the philosophers seek such a passive state of mind as their highest ambition? Perhaps the hot climate, in which all exertion is painful, had something to do with it. Perhaps they were world weary, tired of the problems and disappointments of an already old and unsatisfactory civilization. Perhaps the thought of an eternal cycle of rebirths filled them with dismay, and some road out of finite existence appeared most desirable. We Westerners have our doubts about immortality; we should like to feel assured of a future existence. But suppose we felt certain enough that we would have future existences without end, yet felt no assurance that each of them would be an improvement on the preceding one, and on the other hand, believed it to be highly probable that inevitably we must some time pass into states far worse than our present one. On such a supposition, should not we, too, regard an unchangeable state of eternal quiet and rest, free from all desires and wants, as blessedness indeed?

Not everyone, of course, could be expected by the Brahmin philosopher to attain his insight. Common folk may well worship according to the light that they have, and they will receive rewards proportionate to their deserts. They will of course be destined to future reincarnations. Those who faithfully worship Brahmā as a personal god, external to themselves, instead of as Brahmă, the impersonal soul of the world, will after death pass through successively advancing states until they reach the domain of Brahmā where they will enjoy an exalted position and the fulfillment of all their desires. There they will remain until the destruction of this world, by which time they will have learned to know Brahmă fully, and be ready for eternal rest. To those who do not even know the lower personal Brahmā, but faithfully adhere to the old-fashioned Vedic sacrifices and precepts, reward is also promised. They will pass to the moon after death, where they will enjoy converse with the gods as a reward for part of their good works, and later they will return to earth and be reincarnated according to their merits in one of the higher castes. Those who have done evil works after death will go to one of the hells, and later be reincarnated in the body of an animal. So everybody

will meet with a reward according to his capacities and merits,—the universe is fundamentally just and right.

The psychology of this evolution is, the author believes, fairly simple. In the Vedic period all the gods were possessors of *mana*. In the Brahmanical period it was discovered that the *mana* possessed by the gods is the result of sacrifice and prayer, that is, activities engaged in by the gods themselves and by men. So the sacrifice itself becomes more important than the gods who are its product. It therefore followed that, attention being largely transferred from the gods to the sacrifice, the gods became confused, and fused into one God. This one God is called Brahmă: as his name implies, he really was the product of prayer and sacrifice. So *all mana* comes from, and in fact constitutes, Brahmă. And as all the gods thus are fused into one, and the different sources of mana have become identified, this common source ceases to be personal; it is simply the impersonal Brahmă,—a vast reservoir of *mana*. The belief in *mana*, as was urged in Chapter III, is due to the awareness of an influx into consciousness of subconscious energy. This influx, and consequent heightening of consciousness, was effected by the sacrifices and prayers. In prehistoric times the cause of this became attributed to personal gods, and in the Vedic period was still attributed to them. In the Brahmanical period, men more clearly saw that, after all, the heightening of consciousness and increased effectiveness gained through the sacrifices was the main thing, rather than the gods to whom the sacrifices were addressed. In the Philosophical period, increased reflection made it evident to thinking men that the sacrifices had the same effects on men, whichever gods they happen to address. The gods, therefore, really are identical. They *are* this heightening of consciousness itself, they *are* one Being, namely Prayer (Brahmā). This stage reached, Prayer soon ceases to be a personal God, and becomes simply the abiding impersonal essence or reality of all things—Brahmă. And, for the reflective man who has come to see this, religious worship has come to be prayer and meditation rather than the performance of magical rites. So Brahmă is spiritual force, to be gained through spiritual means. Only the less intelligent need the physical aid of priestly rites of a half mechanical nature. It is by looking within that one finds Brahmă; for it is in one's own self that Brahmă abides. Men who are not philosophers and cannot

follow out this reasoning may continue to think of Brahmă as the one personal God, or they may still more confusedly believe in the many gods of the Vedas. Let them be guided by the best light they have. They will receive rewards proportionate to that light if they follow it faithfully.

The moral values sought to be conserved by philosophical Brahmanism include all those of the preceding period, and besides, love and good will to all beings in the universe, calmness and serenity of mind, freedom from faults and sins, and a blessed immortality in Brahmă. The agency through which this is sought is evidently a further development from the second period—now more clearly envisaged as the impersonal Brahmă. The means by which this conservation of values is sought is a great advance upon the Brahmanical period. It no longer consists in magical sacrificial rites, but includes meditation, clearness of intellectual and moral insight,—a sort of spiritual communion, in which one realizes one's identity with God.

The merits of Brahmanism have been highly praised by its admirers. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," says Professor Deussen, "because, the Veda here adds in explanation, "thy neighbor is in truth thy very self, and what separates you from him is mere illusion. . . As in this case, so at every point of the system, the New Testament and the Upanishads, these two noblest products of the religious consciousness of mankind, are found when we sound their deepest meaning to be nowhere in irreconcileable contradiction, but in a manner the most attractive serve to elucidate and complete one another," 6. The Brahmin philosophy can claim one point, at least, of excellence. It has always been extremely tolerant of other faiths, and remarkably free from bigotry and persecuting tendencies. It has always gladly recognized some measure of truth and virtue in all religions and in all men.

On the contrary, the defects in Brahminism have been serious enough. It has been only too tolerant. It has for this reason failed to be a reforming religion. It has tolerated magic and all manner of degrading superstitions. Far from attempting to reform the cruel social injustices of the caste system, it has found a moral justification for them. This religion has founded no church; it has developed no social activities; it has cared little to serve humanity. Salvation is to be won by inner meditation by oneself. One is taught to conceive himself in an

intellectual manner to be identical with one's neighbor and love him as oneself, but little motivation is afforded to incite one to go actively to a neighbor's material assistance in any manner.

Nor is this the worst. It is hard for many men to attain to the idealistic insight prescribed by Brahmanism. This philosophy therefore readily became corrupted very early. Two of these corruptions must be noticed, as they had some influence on the Buddha. (1) The Samkya philosophy refused to identify all subjects and objects completely, and to merge them into a world soul. Matter is real, individuals are real in this life. There is no Brahmă. This philosophy is frankly atheistic. It is also pessimistic. Desire is the great evil—how become free from desire, disappointment and sorrow in this life and endless rebirths in the future? (2) The answer was offered by the Yoga school, who attempted to work out a way of salvation through asceticism. Withdraw from your senses and become one with the Atman, conceived as a personal God external to the universe and creator of it. It is hard to do this through meditation. Physical exercises assist. Sit in a peculiar and exhausting position, hold your breath, look at your nose, and meditate on the sacred word "Om" with complete fixation of attention until you pass into an auto-hypnotic trance and feel yourself one with the Atman. After three months of such practice, the faithful disciple will attain to knowledge; after four, to the vision of the gods; after five, to their strength; and after six, to their absolute nature. This practice delivers from all sins, though they are as mountains rising many miles high.

It would be unjust to conclude, however, that Brahmanism totally failed to recognize moral values involving social relationships. The highest ideal, to be sure, was that of the unsocial hermit; but most persons are laymen, living in ordinary social relationships. The code of Manu, which may be taken roughly to represent the moral and social ideals operative in the period that produced philosophical Brahmanism, discloses many merits. The moral superiority of good acts performed without desire for rewards is recognized, as is also the necessity for a spiritual change in one's character, so that a man becomes "twice born"— an expression that reminds one of Jesus' talk with Nicodemus. Confession and repentance of sins are enjoined. The more

social and spiritual view of conduct is everywhere emerging, but it does not succeed in breaking away completely from earlier magical notions which impede its full expression. The "twice born" man is to avoid causing harm to any fellow human being or animal; and among the other virtues recognized are humanity and chivalry in warfare, truthfulness and courtesy, and the avoidance of low occupations and mean methods of gain in private life. But the general tone of moral precepts is largely negative: an enemy is to be ignored,—an advance upon earlier ideas of blood vengeance, to be sure, but not so lofty as a recognition of the duty of forgiveness and reconciliation would have been. And magical conceptions persist regrettably; as, for instance, when it is said that "even he who has stolen gold instantly becomes free from guilt if he once mutters" a certain hymn, 7.

We must credit philosophical Brahmanism with a great advance upon the stages that preceded it. It succeeded in reducing the gods to *a single principle*, and in bringing this principle into *intimate relation with the true self or personality of man.* This is a profound insight; indispensable in some form or other, for every spiritual religion. Man must, if he is to conserve his higher moral values through religion, find in the world order an Agency that will conserve these values, and it must be possible for him completely to identify his own personality with that Agency. There must be some sort of at-onement between the individual soul and the Agency. What man is, and what he has learned to be morally desirable, must in some sense be appreciated and maintained in the world order. The support of the world order must be rendered available to man. Philosophical Brahmanism in some respects succeeded in working out an articulate account of the universe, and how through religion man may gain what he has learned to be morally most valuable.

V—*Modern Hinduism*

Philosophical Brahmanism, as we have seen, was too profound and subtle to win the adherence of the masses of the people of India. The finest product of Indian religious evolution—Buddhism—though popular in some regions for centuries, finally lost its hold, and has long since practically disappeared from India. Each of the various faiths now dominant in India (other than Mohammedanism—a foreign importation

—and minor sects like Jainism) centers about one or the other of two deities,—Shiva and Vishnu. These gods have evolved from early Hindu deities held in popular esteem.

The Shiva and Vishnu religions, when held by intellectuals, are interpreted in ways that show the influence of philosophical Brahmanism. Shiva (or Vishnu, as the case may be) is the one impersonal and all pervading God, the duty of the individual is to realize his identity with Him, and the various gods of the popular religions are imperfect but partially real manifestations (or incarnations) of this one God. The law of Karma prevails, and the universe is governed on principles of absolute justice that are superior to any personal god.

But most Hindus are not intellectuals. For them Shiva and his wife (most frequently known as Kali) Vishnu, and Krishna (the most popular of the various men in whom Vishnu has become incarnate, for the salvation of mankind) and numerous other gods are worshipped, in temples and at home, with the aid of images and emblems of a material sort. The personalities of these gods are not so clear cut in the worshipper's mind, as is the case in most polytheistic religions (possibly as a result of Brahmanism), and to them are attributed quite contradictory characteristics. Shiva, the "destroyer" or "terrible one," is often thought of as gentle and merciful; he controls, or is, the reproductive force in nature; he is a great ascetic, who lives alone in the mountains; he is a destroyer of demons and protector of those who put their faith in him. His wife, when thought of as Parvati or Uma is a model Hindu lady subject to her husband. But in her more popular forms, as Kali, Durga, Devi, she is a bloodthirsty creature who delights in shedding blood and to whom bloody animal sacrifices must be offered; while, on the other hand, she is thought of as the "universal mother," who is not merely the female reproductive force of the universe, but a kind and tender mother, with a place in the love and confidence of her worshippers that can almost be compared with that held by the Blessed Virgin Mary in the hearts of pious Roman Catholics. Vishnu is variously conceived as an anthropomorphic god, dwelling with his wife in a definite locality, and as an infinite spirit present everywhere, and alone real. He is the god of love,—both as conceived in a lofty spiritual sense, and in an erotic manner. The Krishna cult believe that Vishnu becomes incarnated from age to age as a man, when religion is in danger, and men are in

need of his deliverance. In the most important of his numerous incarnations, he was miraculously born of a mortal woman, reared in the lowly home of a cowherd, and known as Krishna. He performed many miracles, had sixteen thousand wives, and was renowned for his irregular amours. Krishna is variously interpreted as basely erotic and as a "God of Love" in such a sense as a Christian might use the term. He is frequently worshipped as a child, and in this form makes an appeal in some ways similar to that of the infant Jesus in Catholic lands. He is known as the "Holy Child," "Gentle Shepherd of the People," "Wise Counsellor," "Blessed Lord," "tender Lover and Saviour," etc.

It is not hard to understand why the masses in India have preferred as agencies for the conservation of their values these personal human gods, rather than the impersonal Brahmă. The man who seeks success in a business transaction or the recovery of his sick child may come to the temple and ask Shiva's help, and feel confident that he will receive it. The sorrowing mother can be comforted with the thought that her dead child is now with the Great Mother (Kali, Durga) as can also the young girl be comforted with a similar hope for herself when she resolutely sacrifices her life to aid her father and further the cause of social reform, 8.

On one side Hinduism is wonderfully successful in finding in gods the means for the conservation of values. The gods apparently are ready to conserve all values sought by all men. On the other side Hinduism appears to be a lamentable failure. It fails to make religion emphatically serve the cause of righteousness. The gods are *unmoral* (not immoral) and unclearly, if at all, serve to teach men to prefer good to evil. On this side it might even be asked if Hinduism is not to be classed with the nature religions rather than the ethical religions. Prostitution is a regular feature in some of the temples. Ideas and practises that involve animism, magic, even fetichism, hardily persist. Images of gods are dressed, fed, bathed and taken for afternoon drives in ways that are inconceivably crude and naïve. The same gods, who for baser folk conserve the values of eroticism and theft, are earnestly worshipped by people of high moral principles who obtain from them aid and support in all the trials of life, and in struggles for the moral and spiritual values recognized by all good men and women of civilized nations. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there is

nothing that anyone (however good or bad he may be) thinks of as a value and desires, that he cannot seek with the aid of a respectable Hindu god or goddess,—from success in theft or seduction to forgiveness of sins, freedom from rebirths and a life of immortal blessedness! In modern Hinduism all values appear to be socially recognized, so far as the gods are concerned. Hinduism thus only too readily recognizes that there is a measure of truth in all religions, from those of wild hill folk whose obscene and bloodthirsty deities can be regarded as manifestations of Shiva to those of Buddhists and Christians, the founders of whose religions are readily acceptable as incarnations of Vishnu,—incarnations inferior, of course, to Krishna, the seducer of countless milkmaids!

Yoga asceticism has been more successful than philosophical Brahmanism in holding the popular attention. India is full of ascetics—five million or more, according to the census of 1901—who engage in all sorts of severe austerities: fasting, keeping the arms perpetually upraised or the face continually turned to the sky until muscles stiffen and no other position remains possible; allowing the nails to grow through clenched hands, unfitting a man for work of any sort; lying upon spikes; refusing to wash the face, comb the hair or bathe, or wear clothes; as well as mechanical means of self-hypnosis for the sake of gaining conquest of self and union with the divine. A few of these ascetics are honestly seeking to cultivate a higher life by these pathetically futile methods. The majority, however, are rascally beggars and impostors who make an easy living by appearing in public where they ostentatiously engage in such austerities and condescend to accept the gifts which the credulously pious bestow upon them.

VI—*Concluding Remarks*

Suggestive as is philosophical Brahmanism to the student, and admirable as it is in many ways as the first attempt to develop a redemptive religion, it is evident why it was bound to fail. Religion is a product of the social life; it cannot thrive unless it can remain an organic part of the life of an entire people. If it becomes the private possession of a highly cultivated class, and is inaccessible in its higher insights to the masses of men, it will be bound ultimately to fail. The masses are in the majority, and the purer faith of the esoteric few will in time become corrupted by the baser notions of the many.

Only through active service to the needs of all can a religion permanently be successful in maintaining itself. And a religion cannot endure in its higher forms, if it idly regards the lower forms of religion in the nation with complacent toleration, and makes no honest missionary effort to enlighten all and bring them up to higher levels. If a lofty religion could anywhere in the world have been maintained uncorrupted as the exclusive possession of a privileged class, this would have been the case in India, where the higher castes are in large measure segregated from the lower castes. But religion is bound under any conditions to be rather democratic; the opinions of the majority are bound in the end to prevail and influence the minority. If a minority wishes to preserve its more enlightened religious conceptions, whether of moral values or of conserving agency, it must share them with the majority.

This is as true in America to-day as it ever was in India. If religious liberals hope to preserve their more scientific conceptions of God and their emphasis upon the moral values of toleration, social service and progress, they cannot permit the masses in church and synagogue to go on unenlightened. The future of religion will never be assured in this country so long as more intelligent worshippers are indifferent to the obligation upon all true Christians and Jews to make their places of worship frequented by all classes and strata of society. Let us not permit enlightened religion, whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, to become a sort of philosophical Brahmanism,—the possession of a cultivated few, who do not care to disturb the cruder notions and simpler faith of their less educated brothers and sisters, and who are indifferent to the great call for social service and juster economic and cultural opportunities for the masses. The fate of philosophical Brahmanism in India should be instructive to us in America to-day.

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CHAPTER VIII
BUDDHISM

I—*Introduction*

Buddhism arose in India about five centuries before the Christian era. Its relation to Brahmanism has been compared with that of Christianity to Judaism or of Protestantism to the medieval Latin church. Buddhism was a movement for deeper moral earnestness and spirituality, for the purification of abuses and the abolishment of legalism and formalism in creed and ritual, for the spiritual equality of all men in opposition to religious distinctions based on caste and rank, and for a general awakening from the spiritual lethargy that had fallen over India.

The historic founder of Buddhism was Prince Siddartha, of the Gautama family, usually referred to as Gautama-Siddartha. He was the son of a rajah of the Sakya clan, who occupied the region at the foot of the Himalyas which is now Nepal, as well as districts of India immediately adjacent. He lived approximately from B. C. 560 to 480. Siddartha was in every sense one of the greatest, wisest, and best of men who have ever lived. He has been loved and revered by more human beings in more lands than any other man, with the exception of Jesus of Nazareth. The followers of Siddartha refer to him by various epithets, as the Buddha (the Enlightened or Awakened One), the Tathagata (one who like his predecessors has come into the world to bring the true doctrine to light), Bhagava (the Blessed Lord), and Sasta (the Teacher, or Master).

To become a Buddhist, in the countries in which the religion retains most of its original purity, requires a public profession of one's faith, by reciting the "Refuge" formula, viz.—"I take my refuge in the Buddha. I take my refuge in the Doctrine *(Dhamma)*. I take my refuge in the Brotherhood *(Sangha)*." We may arrive at some idea of what the earlier Buddhism was by examining in order the facts on which these three articles of faith are based.

II—*The Buddha*

Western scholars are now generally agreed that the Buddha

conception does not owe its origin to a sun myth, but to the historical man, Prince Siddartha. There is little doubt that the main facts of his life and character may be extracted from the sacred scripture *(the Pitakas)*. It is only necessary to discount as legendary the lavish embellishments—such as the miracles, the impossible richness and extravagance of the royal court in which he was reared, and the numbers and rank of the converts gained to the faith during his life time—and the details that remain furnish a sufficiently accurate account. Siddartha was the son of a petty chief, and when young was married to his first cousin, the daughter of a neighboring rajah. When about twenty-nine he passed through severe spiritual struggles, and at last forsook his home and sought some way of salvation. He studied under the best teachers available (probably of the Samkya sect), 1, but got no satisfaction. He then zealously practised Yoga, 1, for six years, but found himself merely physically weakened by excessive fasting and in no way spiritually enlightened. When about thirty-five he passed through another great crisis under a Bodhi tree where he experienced a remarkable conversion. All of his doubts and difficulties disappeared, and he gained great inward peace and contentment of soul. He had found the way of salvation in a manner simpler intellectually than any form of philosophical Brahmanism, more normal physically than the ascetic austerities of Yoga, and on a higher moral and spiritual plane than either. Should he continue to live a quiet and retired life in calmness and serenity, now that at last he had gained happiness? Or should he go out into the world and proclaim the glad tidings of salvation? At first he hesitated, doubting if it would be possible to induce others to believe him, but he decided to make the attempt. He met with immediate success, so convincing was his sincerity, so clear his teachings, and so inspiring his personality. He gathered about him a company of followers whom he organized into a monastic order. For some forty-five successive years he and his brother monks during the dry season went about on foot preaching the faith all over that part of India, while he instructed the monks during the rainy season. He lived to extreme old age, and enjoyed the satisfaction of knowing that his religion had become firmly established, and that his monks perfectly understood and accepted his doctrine and were free from doubts and difficulties concerning it. He died among his disciples,

whom he had taught not to mourn him, but to think of him as having passed into eternal rest and bliss, to which they would ultimately also arrive. Shortly before his death he said to them—"There may be some among you, who will think after I am gone: Our teacher is dead; we have no longer any guide. But it is not thus you should think. The doctrines I have taught you and the rules of the Brotherhood I have laid down for you, these are to be, after I am gone, your teacher and guide." His last words were these: "Brethren, keep in mind those words of mine:—Whatever is born perishes. Strive unceasingly for your deliverance."

Such are the facts of the Buddha's life as modern rationalistic higher critics leave them. Nor need an intelligent Buddhist object greatly to this emasculation. The Pitakas are not regarded by orthodox believers as infallible or inerrant. The truth of the Buddha's teaching is not thought essentially to depend upon the testimony of miracles or the fulfilment of prophecies. So if the miracles and prophetic fulfilments be eliminated from the Buddhist scriptures little harm is done. The serene and lofty personality of the Buddha himself remains, and the doctrine that he taught is, in the opinion of Buddhists, so clear and convincing that it needs only to be thoroughly understood to be accepted.

The place of the Buddha himself is different from that usually occupied by the founder of a religion. He is in no sense a god, nor divine, nor is he a divinely inspired messenger or prophet, nor is he a personal Saviour. He is a man, who by his own exertions attained supreme knowledge and moral perfection for himself, and has made known to the world how any one, if he perseveres faithfully, may ultimately gain the same blessings. No one, not even the Buddha, can do anything to effect the salvation of another man. Each human being must unaided work out his own salvation. The faithful, however, naturally feel gratitude to the Buddha, for having made his way of salvation known to man, and they lovingly and reverently bring flowers and engage in meditation before his statues much as we might do before a statue or picture of a beloved and revered American, like Washington or Lincoln.

The personal character of the Buddha is that of a man first consumed with horror at the vastness of human suffering, and then gladdened and rendered serene, calm and confident when he had discovered, as he believed, the means of deliverance from

sorrow. He appears everywhere after his enlightenment as calm, tender, wise, hospitable and forgiving. He lives in the same simple and unpretentious manner as the monks, clad like them in the humble yellow robes of the order, and starts out every morning begging his food. If he is unemotional, this is because he is so utterly self-possessed that nothing could disturb him, but he is always considerate to the utmost of those about him. In fact, the immediate cause of his death was due to eating dried pork which had been set before the aged man by a kindly but ignorant host who would have been embarrassed had the food been declined. His method of instruction is largely in the dialogue form, reminding one somewhat of Socrates; but he did not enjoy the good fortune of the latter in having a Plato to record the conversations. In some respects he may be said to stand midway between Socrates and Jesus. Like Socrates, he merely professes to be a teacher, and seeks to convince his pupils by argument. He claims for himself (according to the higher critics be it understood) no supernatural origin or authority. Like Jesus, he is the founder of a religion and not primarily a philosopher, and the attitude of his companions is that of disciples rather than pupils. In consequence the sacred writings became embellished, as we have seen, with supernatural events, as was not the case with the accounts of Socrates.

III—*The Doctrine*

What Siddartha sought was the solution of the problem of evil and suffering. He could not be happy in a life in which there is so much sorrow and disappointment, nor in a state in which man is destined to future rebirths which also are certain to contain much misery. He sought some means of mental discipline and some form of spiritual insight that would afford him peace and serenity here and hereafter. The essential outlines of his doctrine of salvation are recorded in the *Dhamma-Kakka-ppavattana-sutta* ("The Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness"), which purports to be the sermon which he delivered near Benares at the beginning of his ministry, to the five mendicants with whom he had earlier practised Yoga, and who were among his first converts.

According to this discourse, all individual finite existence is bound up in sorrow. Hence the "four noble truths." The first of these is the "noble truth concerning suffering." Birth, decay, disease and death are all painful, and so are union with

the unpleasant, separation from the pleasant, and all unsatisfied desires. The five *khandas*, or material and mental aggregates that constitute an individual person, are all painful. (In other words, pain inevitably results from existence as an individual.) The second is the "noble truth concerning the origin of suffering." This is due to craving for the gratification of the passions, for future life (as a finite individual), and for ordinary worldly success in this life. (That is, all desires centered about the self, and consequently more or less tinctured with selfishness, are the causes of human suffering.) The third "noble truth" is that "concerning the destruction of suffering." There must be absolute destruction of every selfish and self-seeking desire in order to encompass the destruction of suffering. The fourth "noble truth" points out "the way which leads to the destruction of suffering." This way is the pursuit of the noble eight-fold path of "right views, aspirations, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and contemplation."

In this particular discourse the eight-fold path is not further described in detail. The Buddha proceeds to explain that these discoveries of his have not been made by studying tradition, but by his own intellectual perception, knowledge, understanding and wisdom. Through his own unaided efforts he has discovered the truth, acted upon it, gained deliverance from all selfish desires, and so now enjoys calmness and rest in this life and is assured that he will escape further rebirths. The right life for a monk who has renounced the world is a middle path between sensuous enjoyments and extreme asceticism and mortification.

Nirvana is the name given to the state of supreme enlightenment and bliss, when all the fetters binding one to the world have been broken, and one is an *Arahat* (saint), free from all desires while living, and destined upon death never again to become incarnated in a mortal body. The fact that *Nirvana* can be attained and enjoyed in this life is thought by many interpreters to make it clear that it is not as is sometimes alleged, a state of utter annihilation. It would seem, since the same term is applied to a state attainable in this life and a state after death, that the two states must be quite similar. Yet the denial of the existence of a substantial soul and the insistence that with the attainment of *Nirvana* the *khandas* that constitute finite individuality are destroyed seem to make

it difficult to see how it can be a state of personal immortality. On the other hand, it cannot be a state in which the individual becomes absorbed in God or the world soul, the goal of philosophical Brahmanism and many forms of western mysticism and pantheism—since primitive Buddhism denies the existence of any such world soul or God. Gautama Siddartha discouraged all speculation about ultimates such as *Nirvana*, the essential nature of the universe, whether or not it had a creator, and its final destiny. The fundamental thing for man is to gain a peaceful state of existence that will be perpetually free from pains and desires and rebirths into finite existence. That for him seemed the one great good,—the permanent release from sorrow,—and attention should not be distracted by idle speculation.

It is therefore impossible to give a precise definition of *Nirvana* that would be accepted by all Buddhists. It can at least be said, however, that it is a state of calmness and serenity of mind attainable in this life in which a person is free from envy, anger, jealousy, and all forms of selfish desires. He is not only imperturbable, he is also full of love and gentleness for all living beings—men, animals, spirits, gods, and even demons. He is assured that he will have no future rebirths. His personal character, of course, is spotless. "The kingdom of heaven that is within a man, the peace that passeth understanding, is the nearest analogy to the Buddhist Nirvana which I know of in Western thought," says Rhys Davids, 2.

The law of *Karma* is similar to that of philosophical Brahmanism. All deeds, good and bad, work out their moral recompense, either in this or in a future state of existence. Good deeds give "merit" and make possible a better state on one's next rebirth; evil deeds condemn one to a worse state. The universe is absolutely governed by laws of moral justice, which for the Buddhist are as inherent in the nature of things as is gravitation for the modern physicist. What a man sows must he also reap, as a matter of natural law. In this respect, at least, Buddhism is not pessimistic. It believes implicitly in the fundamental justice of the world order. This is undoubtedly a moral universe.

Since salvation is worked out by one's own efforts, apart from divine interference, primitive Buddhism is sometimes described as an atheistic religion. There is no place in it for prayers to a deity, or to the Buddha himself. Meditation and

spiritual exercises and faithful practise of moral precepts alone are possible. The existence of beings superior to men (gods and angels as well as demons) is admitted. But none of these, any more than a fellow man, can either further or hinder one's progress in working out one's own salvation. And to attain the peace of *Nirvana* is more blessed than to be a god.

Roughly speaking, Buddhism may be said to have anticipated the position held by most psychologists and philosophers since the time of David Hume (†1776), that there is no soul, if by a soul is meant the *Atman* of Brahmanism, or some sort of spiritual substance that exists independent of the brain and of changing states of consciousness. Hume showed that it is impossible to discover in consciousness any such separate Ego or self or soul different in substance to one's changing states of consciousness, 3. An old man is identical with a child born eighty years ago, not by any tissues in his body nor by any mental states that have persisted unchanged through all the years of his life. The identity is one of function. The relation of an individual in this life to the individual whom his *karma* and desires will next bring into existence is comparable to the relation between a child and the man into whom he grows. There is functional continuity, but not continuity of either physical or mental structures. The denial of the existence of a soul in this technical sense does not lessen the Buddhist's fear of an unfavorable rebirth, nor his desire to accumulate merit and so pass into a higher state of existence next time, and ultimately to attain *Nirvana.*

The Buddha did not teach his doctrines in their fulness to beginners, especially to those who desired to continue in the world as laymen and not become members of the Brotherhood. For the Buddhist layman, who wishes to lead a satisfactory moral life, to acquire merit so as to earn a favorable state of existence in his next rebirth, and to know that after a succession of rebirths he ultimately will reach Nirvana, the chief requirements are acceptance of the triple "Refuge" profession of faith, in which he declares his loyalty to the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the monastic Brotherhood, and obedience to the first five "commandments." The first commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," forbids the taking of all life, even animal life. Buddhists are vegetarians. Originally, at least, hunting and warfare were believed to be wrong, and they are still regarded

with extreme disfavor in southern Buddhist lands. The second commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," forbids all forms of dishonesty and enjoins liberality, even to the extent, in extreme cases, of being willing to give one's life for others. The third commandment, "Thou shalt not be unchaste," forbids fornication and adultery upon the part of laymen, and enjoins celibacy upon monks. The fourth commandment, "Thou shalt not lie," forbids all falsehood, and enjoins saying good of one's neighbor, and what is conducive to harmony. The fifth commandment, "Thou shalt not drink intoxicating liquors," probably originally enjoined complete total abstinence for one's self, and the duty to disapprove of their use by others. The command is sometimes liberally interpreted to permit laymen to use wines and malt liquors in moderation. It is agreed that it forbids the use of distilled liquors absolutely, and that of any drink to a state of approaching intoxication.

To those who will keep three additional commandments "a greater reward will be obtained"—more favorable rebirths and a speedier attainment of Nirvana. The sixth commandment is "Thou shalt not eat food at unseasonable times" (i. e., after the mid-day meal). The seventh commandment is "Thou shalt not wear garlands or use perfumes." The eighth commandment is, "Thou shalt sleep on a mat spread upon the ground." Conformity to these three commandments is optional for the layman, but is praiseworthy, especially upon the weekly holy days. In some respects these three commandments might be compared to Christian observance of Lent. To deny oneself certain not immoral but unnecessary pleasures will give one more time for meditation on religious matters, and will be valuable for one's further religious development. The ten "vows" are similar, and in addition include among the practises optional for laymen, but binding upon the monks, the refusal of gold and silver and the adoption of a life of poverty.

One criticism of the Buddhist body of doctrine may be considered before we pass on to other topics,—its pessimism. As has already been pointed out, the doctrine of *Karma* is not really pessimistic. Without maintaining belief in an omnipotent God of the Jewish, Christian, or Moslem types, Buddhism is not less certain of the fundamental justice and righteousness of the world order. The Buddha on this point was more confident than the writers of Job and Ecclesiastes. However,

it must be admitted that the "four noble truths" are genuinely pessimistic, if they are to be taken literally. If they really mean that "the will to live" (the impulses that bring individual lives into existence and prompt men to seek advancement in the world) is fundamentally bound to lead to sorrow and defeat, and that complete escape can only be gained by renunciation of the world in a convent and discipline for the purpose of gaining a state of ultimate extinction, the teaching of the Buddha is pessimistic to the core. Thus interpreted, the "four noble truths" are as psychologically false as they are ethically unsound. It is not true that all striving and desire are painful. On the contrary, they are only painful when they are checked and impeded. Successful striving is pleasurable. If all striving were to cease, all consciousness would also come to an end; *Nirvana* in this case would have to be absolute extinction of conscious existence. It is true that an ethics which regards the supreme good in life as pleasure is liable to become pessimistic, since pleasant feelings never endure. If you strive for some object and are successful in endeavoring to gain it, you will feel pleasure during the struggle; but after the object has been gained, it will shortly cease to afford you pleasant feelings, because your attention will turn to something else and you will be striving for that. No one is more liable to become thoroughly pessimistic than a man who devotes his whole time to pleasure seeking. If Gautama Siddartha became such a pessimist, the legends must be right in saying that his father placed him in pleasure palaces, and expected him to be contented with nothing to do but amuse himself. No serious minded man or woman can be happy in a life devoted to selfish amusements.

Nor does the real happiness of life come in turning one's back on the world, retiring within the recesses of one's own inner consciousness and remaining in a state of idle contemplation. On the contrary, real happiness or satisfaction is a concomitant of earnest efforts and successful achievements. One sets out to do something, and enjoys the efforts which he makes, and, for the moment, the success which crowns them; then a new ambition arises before him which his previous success has made possible, he achieves this in turn (or something else, for our plans often reshape themselves as our experience continues); and so he keeps on advancing from one goal to another, until his life draws to its close. Such a life

if good from a moral standpoint, as any really successful life must be, always has large satisfactions. Such a life is necessarily a *social* life; for success in anything involves co-operation and service. Gautama Siddartha's own life is a good illustration. He could not long have remained contented if he had tried to live by himself in solitary bliss after he had attained enlightenment under the Bodhi tree. Only by doing as he did—going out into the world, sharing his goodness with others, and building up a great religious community that brought a higher life to countless multitudes of people—could this good man have retained his own inward satisfaction. If the "Four Noble Truths" are pure pessimism, the Buddha certainly practised far better than he preached.

However, the author, at any rate, is not certain that the "Four Noble Truths" are really so pessimistic as they sound. They certainly did not sadden the Buddha's first converts. And for centuries after the Buddha's decease, Buddhism remained an active missionary religion. Buddhism for the first thousand years of its history has only been excelled by Christianity in its active service in various forms of humanitarianism, as well as in promoting the advance of civilization. It was only as it became decadent that it became apathetic. Nor to this day are the people of Buddhist countries sad and pessimistic. They are as calm, cheerful and happy as the adherents of any other religion, more so than the present day adherents of the Hinduism that ultimately supplanted Buddhism in India. The Burmese, who to-day retain Buddhism in as pure a form as any nation, are world famed for their gaiety and light heartedness.

That Buddhism should make its adherents lighthearted is easy to see. It assures men of the absolute justice of the universe, and that one's good works are certain to be rewarded. Most men hope for a future life under better conditions. This Buddhism promises to all who will follow its teachings. It removes all kinds of superstitious fears; there is no need to be afraid of demons, ghosts, angry gods or black magic, one's own salvation rests entirely with oneself. It also frees men from exploitation by a rapacious priesthood; one's salvation can only be worked out by oneself, and the only clergy in the religion are the monks, bound to a life of poverty. The moral teachings are simple and lofty. The Buddha said that to be a "true Brahmin"—as we might say, a "true Christian"—is

not a matter of birth or caste, but of right living, and possible for everyone. "I do not call a man a Brahmin because of his origin or of his mother. . . . Him I call indeed a Brahmin who, though he has committed no offense, endures reproach, stripes, and bonds. . . Him I call indeed a Brahmin who is tolerant with the intolerant, mild with the violent, and free from greed among the greedy. Him I call indeed a Brahmin from whom anger and hatred, pride and hypocrisy have dropped like a mustard seed from the point of a needle," 4. The follower of the Buddha is to follow the ideal goodness resting on universal love. "And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with heart of Love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure," 5. And for those more thoughtful and serious-minded folk, who wish to lead a life devoted to religious thought, and so more speedily to gain Nirvana, a more perfect way is provided by entrance into the Brotherhood. It is no one's duty to sacrifice his life by entering a convent; indeed, for any one to whom such a course would seem a sacrifice and not simply a great privilege, it is not advised. This leads us to specific notice of the Brotherhood.

IV—*The Brotherhood*

One great point of superiority of Buddhism over the religions that preceded it was its monastic organization. The monks devoted their whole time to the study, practise and teaching of the faith. It thus was carefully preserved in the period before it was put into written form. The vows assumed by the monk were understood to be not necessarily for life; and he was free to leave the order and again become a layman at any time he desired.

The discipline was not austere. The prescribed dress was the simple yellow robes of the order, and every monk was expected to go with his begging bowl each morning to receive food from those who chose to offer it, and the one simple daily meal was shared by the monks in common. The monks, it must be understood, were not importunate beggars. To give food to one of them was a pious act for a layman, which would gain him merit. In being offered the opportunity to contribute, the layman was afforded a privilege. He was under no obligation

or under pressure of any kind, whatever, to give if he did not choose to do so. Monks were forbidden to receive money. The life of the monk, though severely simple, was normal and healthful for persons leading such a life,—thus furnishing a favorable contrast to the ascetics of modern Hinduism.

There was no hierarchy in the Brotherhood. The discipline was chiefly self-imposed. Each had his own salvation to work out for himself. When the brothers gathered together, one of the eldest presided, but he exercised no such powers as a Christian abbot. Public confession was expected, at meetings held for the purpose, of any faults a brother had committed. Such confession was for the strengthening of character. Absolution, of course, is impossible on Buddhist principles; the law of *karma* takes its inevitable course.

Women could join the Sisterhood. This was similarly organized, and was subject to the Brotherhood. Primitive Buddhism, like other religions originating in Asia, did not in its inception place women on quite an equal plane with men. Gautama is said to have been reluctant at first to receive them into his order. Though somewhat prejudiced against women by the traditions of the East, the fundamental democracy of Buddhism is really antagonistic to discriminations based on sex. The oft quoted conversation between Ananda and the Tathagata, in the "Book of the Great Decease" appears simply to contain such good natured and half humorous advice as a wise Christian abbot might smilingly give to a brother who asked his counsel: "How are we to conduct ourselves, Lord, with regard to womankind?" "Don't see them, Ananda." "But if we should see them, what are we to do?" "Abstain from speech, Ananda." "But if they should speak to us, Lord, what are we to do?" "Keep wide awake, Ananda." We may feel confident that, so far as it has exercised any influence either way, the coming of Buddhism has raised rather than lowered the position of women in comparison with what it previously had been. Gautama, like Jesus, was always considerate in his treatment of women. On one occasion he did not even hesitate to accept for himself and the brothers the hospitality of a courtesan, which happened to be offered previous to an invitation for the same day from men of aristocratic rank.

The rules for the brotherhood are given in detail in the sacred books, and are such as might be expected for a religious order. In Southern Buddhist countries the severity of these

rules has now become somewhat relaxed. Wealthy monasteries with generous endowments are not now dependent on contributions collected daily in begging bowls. It is the duty of monks to provide religious instruction for the young, and to deliver discourses, especially on sacred days, to those who care to come to hear them. While very willing to explain their religion, to those who come to them, they have long ceased to be aggressive propagandists. Their reputation is, on the whole, good; but many of them are undoubtedly lazy and ignorant.

V—*Events in Buddhist History*

During the centuries immediately following the death of Gautama Siddartha, Buddhism spread rapidly over India. Divisions arose from time to time over various points of doctrine, of the discipline of the Brotherhood, and of the canon of sacred writings. Councils were sometimes held in the endeavor to adjust these disputes. Various sects came into existence. Two main types of Buddhism became differentiated, —the *Hinayana*, or conservative type, which adhered more closely to the primitive faith of Siddartha, and the *Mahayana* in which very great modifications took place (as will be noted later).

The most famous Buddhist king was Asoka, a contemporary of Alexander the Great (about 325 B. C.). Of his reign a Buddhist speaker at the World's Parliament of Religions said: "When Buddhism flourished in India, the arts, sciences and civilization reached their zenith, as witnessed in the edicts and monuments of Asoka's reign. Hospitals were first founded for man and beast. Missionaries were sent to all parts of the world. Literature was encouraged. Wherever Buddhism has gone, the nations have imbibed its spirit, and the people have become gentler and milder. The slaughter of animals and drunkenness ceased, and wars were almost abolished. . . . The monasteries became the seats of learning, and the monks in obedience to their Master's will disseminated knowledge among the people. . . Buddha was the first to establish the brotherhood without distinction of caste and race. . . . The outcast as well as the prince was admitted to this order. Virtue was the passport, not wealth and rank," 6.

During the reign of Asoka, Buddhism became diffused widely over India, and was introduced into Kashmir and Ceylon. To the latter country was brought a branch of the sacred Bodhi

tree under which the Buddha had attained enlightenment. This tree is now over two thousand years old. It has been protected by terraces, and stands twenty feet above the surrounding soil, while pillars of iron and masonry support its outspreading branches. It is carefully watered in times of drought.

Burma was converted to Buddhism about 450 A. D., Java about 650 A. D., and Siam in the seventh century, A. D. Buddhists of these countries, together with Ceylon, adhere to the Hinayana school. Buddhism persisted in India until as late as the twelfth century, but by that time it had lost the simple purity of the original faith. Monasteries had become wealthy, and held themselves aloof from the people. Buddha had become to the popular mind merely a grinning god, and not so interesting a god as Shiva or Krishma. Buddhist theology had become technically metaphysical. The spirit of the founder had become lost. On the other hand, the gods of Hinduism as we have seen, were "human" and "loving" gods in bad as well as good senses, and would conserve all values, good and bad, for every one. And they would accept the caste system, which had grown up in opposition to the spirit of Buddhism. So Buddhism lost out in India because, while it no longer retained its original simplicity and high moral plane, on the other hand, in spite of its decadence, it still maintained moral distinctions and opposed caste. It was no longer good and pure enough to save India, nor depraved enough to be popular.

In the meantime, however, the Mahayana development had taken place in India, and had been transmitted, as well as the rival Hinayana faith, to China during the first four centuries of the Christian era, had reached Korea by 372 A. D., and Japan by 552 A. D. Mahayana Buddhism passed through an extraordinary development into Lamaism in Thibet during the ninth century.

VI—*Merits and Defects of Primitive and Southern Buddhism*

On the positive side, primitive Buddhism is noteworthy in keeping morality foremost. Righteousness of conduct is what the Buddha chiefly emphasized in talking to laymen. That is more important than the details of the new faith itself. Admirers of Buddhism claim that no other religion in the history of the world has ever so completely kept the ethical note to the forefront in its popular appeals. Personal responsibility for

one's own actions is basic in the doctrine of *karma*, as well as the fundamental righteousness of natural law. Self reliance is imperative in a faith that makes no room for the goodness or love of god or saint to take the place of one's own lack of virtue. The ritualism, magic, formalism, and various superstitions, of which even philosophical Brahmanism was unable to purge itself entirely, are all done away with even for the laymen. For the monk, there was too much otherworldliness, to be sure; but the discipline was simple, not given to austerities, with its main emphasis on consecrated living and pure thinking.

So we may say that early Buddhism endeavored to conserve by religious means the *highest* moral values, and these exclusively. The only rewards it offered were the calmness and serenity of mind and freedom from sorrow that attend virtuous living in this life, and the assurance for the life to come either of a more favorable rebirth, or of eternal blessedness in Nirvana.

The chief moral limitation in early Buddhism, the author thinks, is that there is not enough emphasis on social service. The very fact that every one must work out his own salvation unaided tends to make men more or less absorbed in the cultivation of their own characters. While early Buddhist teaching exhorts one to fill the whole world with love, and to be kind and gentle to everybody, it puts no such emphasis on the active service of mankind as is found in Christian and Jewish teaching. To be sure, Gautama's own life was completely devoted to the service of others; and for the first centuries of its history, Buddhism was active in works of humanitarianism and progress at home, and in missionary zeal abroad—as is instanced by the achievements of the reign of Asoka and also the service of Buddhism rendered Japan in giving it its start in civilization (just as Christianity brought civilization to the Franks, Saxons, Goths, *et. al.*).

But even in its purer Southern forms, Buddhism has long ceased to be notably active in missionary effort or social reform. The ethical emphasis, too, is somewhat lessened. In Burmah, more merit can apparently be gained in the interest of a favorable rebirth by erecting a praying-platform than by acts of more social utility such as the erection of hospitals and schools. "The whole of Burmah abounds with the pious erections of its sons and daughters. Quite unexampled is the pomp that reigns in such religious centers as Rangoon,

Mandalay and old Pegue. Shwe Dagon, the golden pagoda of Rangoon, has not its like for splendor in the world, and many a Burman joyously starves himself his life long in order to be able to erect a new praying-hall upon its sacred platform," 7.

VII—*Mahayana Buddhism*

That others before him had from time to time discovered the way to salvation, and that, in future ages, whenever the faith shall become dimmed and obscured, another Buddha will appear and start again the wheel of salvation revolving through the world, was probably believed by Gautama Siddartha himself. At any rate, it soon became the belief of the early church. From this it was only another step to reject as the most worthy goal of human endeavor the endeavor to seek ultimately to become an *Arahat* (saint) and enter *Nirvana* by oneself. That is only the "little road" *(Hinayana)* as the innovators contemptuously called it. There have been many who have not been content in this way quietly to pass out of finite existence into *Nirvana*. They have sought the "great road" (*Mahayana*), and have chosen out of love for their fellow beings and desire to serve them, to remain incarnate until the time and opportunity may come to them also to become Buddhas and gloriously serve all living beings. Those who have thus qualified themselves to become "future Buddhas" *(Bohdisattvas)*, instead of having the dispassionateness and aloofness of *Arahats* are inspired by an active sympathy with suffering and a desire to be of service. Northern temples contain images of many *Bohdisattvas*, and they are worshipped much as the gods of polytheism, and for other values than merely spiritual culture. It even became possible for old Indian gods to be worshipped by Mahayanists as *Bohdisattvas*. Moreover, merit gained by the good works of a *Bohdisattva* may be by him transferred to the credit of his worshippers, out of his love and compassion for them,—a setting aside of the law of *karma*. In practice this has become subject to the same abuses as in later medieval Latin Christianity; "masses" for the dead are said by the priests for money; and the credulity of the laity is exploited to the profit of the clergy.

Another alteration in the early faith made by the *Mahayana* was in its conception of the Buddha. This man whose own claims for himself were so simple, and who, according to a conversation in the "Book of the Great Decease" checked the

ardor of a disciple who wished to give him too exalted a character, was claimed to be superhuman in intellectual and moral perfections. Along with the now practically deified Buddha, the Doctrine and the Brotherhood also became personified as gods and were represented in the temples by statues.

In respect to ceremonial and ecclesiastical organization, the nearest counterpart to medieval Latin Christianity is found in Thibet. On its entrance to this land, Buddhism had to assimilate folk still in the savage state, addicted to magic and charms, a problem similar to that which confronted Christianity when it had to adapt itself to the requirements of the northern barbarians. In the religious ceremonial of Thibet are to be found shaven priests, bells, rosaries, images, pictures, holy water, gorgeous vestments, double choirs, processions, creeds, mystic rites, incense, abbots, monks, nuns, worship of the Virgin, saints, angels, fasts, confessions, Purgatory,—all in huge monasteries and magnificent cathedrals under the direction of a priestly hierarchy governed by cardinals and the Grand Lama (the latter believed to be the human incarnation of a *Bodhisattva*). Endless repetition in a mechanical way of sacred formulæ is thought to be efficacious. Prayers are attached to a wheel or printed upon a flag; as the wheel rotates or the flag is unfurled by the wind the same effects ensue as if the prayer were repeated by a worshipper. This of course is crude magic, devoid of any genuine spirituality.

Another respect in which the development of Mahayana Buddhism is analogous to Christian developments, is in its conception of the incarnation of the Buddha. The Doctrine, or Body of the Law *(Dharmakaya)* came to be thought of as eternal. What Buddhas do is to discover it and proclaim it to men. The Law itself accordingly became a personified God who looks with pity and compassion upon suffering mankind, and from time to time becomes incarnated as a Buddha. There is a slight similarity here to the eternal Logos of the ancient Catholic church, who became incarnate as Jesus, and now reigns in heaven as the triumphant Christ. The parallel is by no means complete. This Buddhist corruption is more similar to the Vishnu-Krishna form of Hinduism, with which it may have developed in competition, than to anything Christian.

VIII—*Buddhism in China and Japan*

Not only has Mahayana Buddhism furnished interesting parallels to Catholic Christianity. Among the various Buddhist sects in China and Japan there are two—the Jodo and the Shin—which remind one in some respects of Protestantism. Amida Buddha, according to these sects, out of love and compassion for mankind, refused to enter *Nirvana*, and rules in a heavenly Paradise in the west. He has promised that whosoever calls upon his name in faith, in a prescribed manner shall on his next incarnation be born in this Paradise, where he shall be made perfect, and later reach *Nirvana*, 8. Neither learning nor contemplation, nor elaborate spiritual exercises are necessary, nor the mediation of priestly ritual and ceremonies. Salvation is free to householders as to monks, to women as men. All that is necessary is "faith in the higher power of Amida." When we reflect that these sects arose in protest against earlier Mahayana Buddhism with its salvation based upon works and merit gained through ritualistic ceremonies and the mediation of Bodhisattvas, we can see that as in the case of Lutheranism, the contention is, that there is a divine Saviour, faith in whom, apart from works and churchly intervention, suffices for salvation. The worship of Amida by the Shin sect is pure and stern. No one but Amida may be worshipped at all—there is none other name under heaven whereby one may be saved,—and prayers should not be addressed to him for earthly goods and to escape earthly ills, all of which are subject to the law of *Karma* (or natural law, as we might say). But prayers of thanksgiving should be addressed to him in gratitude for the eternal salvation he has freely afforded to mankind.

Another parallel to Christianity is found in the development in Japan of *Bushido*, a system of conduct which became the ideal of the aristocratic military class. Buddhism, like Christianity, had originally been a peace loving religion, utterly hostile to warfare and military ideals. But, just as Christianity, when it had the northern barbarians to tame, finding it impossible to induce them to abandon warfare altogether, compromised by means of the institution of chivalry, through which the knight came to feel sacred obligations, so Japanese warriors became tamed and refined by Bushido, the ideal of knightly behaviour.

For the masses Buddhism in Japan is a polytheism. In the temples are images to Amida Buddha (or Amitabha);

Kwannon, the goddess of Mercy; Binzuru, the divine healer; Emma-sama, the king of hell; Jizo, protector of children; and the seven gods of good fortune. "The gorgeous vestments of the priests, the solemn intonation of the service, the clouds of incense in the dimly lighted sanctuary, have reminded many observers of the services in a Christian cathedral." "In all Japanese homes, except those of adherents of the most reactionary Shinto sects, there is a Buddha shelf, on which stand little shrines, often richly ornamented in lacquer, of Buddhist gods; the tablets bearing the posthumous names of the deceased members of the family stand on the same shelf; offerings of food and incense are made before them," 9.

One peculiarity of the religious situation in China, Korea and Japan is that there is nothing to prevent a layman from adhering more or less to several religions. He may go, as he pleases, to make offerings and seek divine assistance from Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian and Shinto sources. He may seek the conservation of his values through whatever combination of agencies he prefers.

Among the various Buddhist countries the impact of Western civilization and the competition of Christian missions have done most to arouse the Buddhism of Japan to activity, especially in the Shin sect. Priests have travelled to Europe and America and got Western ideas. Buddhist services are now conducted in the army, in factories, and among the poor. Buddhists are establishing orphan asylums, deaf and dumb schools, free hospitals, prisoners' aid societies, and free lodging houses. Prison preaching in Japan is mostly done by Buddhists. Schools of all sorts are being established, especially for girls and women, who had been neglected. Buddhists are issuing a great deal of printed literature; almost one-half of the pamphlets of various sorts published in the Japanese empire are Buddhist in tone. Young Japanese students returning from the occident are showing the value of the historical study of Buddhism. Buddhists are imitating Christian methods. There is a "Buddhist Endeavor Society" and a "Young Men's Buddhist Association." Some well known Christian hymns are found readily adaptable to Buddhist worship:— "O for a thousand tongues to sing, My holy Buddha's name." Foreign missionary effort has been engaged in, and Buddhist missionaries have been sent to China, Korea, Siberia, Thibet, the Malay Peninsula, Hawaii, and the United States.

Says Professor Takakusu: "The question whether Buddhism, in a new form, will arise and be welcomed by an ever advancing people whose souls still call for the truth, is yet unsolved. But one thing is certain: Whilst the Buddhism of the continent [of Asia] is dead, the Buddhism of Japan still lives, though somewhat weakened, and if this ancient religion is to come forth into the arena of the twentieth century with fresh vigor and activity, and preach new glad-tidings to the world, it will not be the Buddhism of India, but that of Japan, that will bring this about," 10.

Because Buddhism to-day everywhere in the world appears to be in a state of decline, it does not follow necessarily that it is incapable of resuscitation. There have been periods in the history of Christianity—at the beginning of the sixteenth century for instance—when nowhere in the entire earth did any considerable body of Christians show great spirituality or inward force. In such periods a contemporary might have judged Christianity to be a hopelessly decadent religion. It is the belief of Buddhists that from time to time, when the faith has begun to wane, a new Buddha appears to restore it. The name of the next Buddha to appear will be Maitreya Buddha. He surely ought not to delay his coming!

IX—*Buddhism and Christianity*

Mahayana Buddhism has evidently sought to conserve *a wider range of human values* than primitive Buddhism; and, like most other religions, it has sought to do this through the agency of *personal, loving gods.* The values of active sympathy and service of fellow beings are more recognized. Intimate relations with personal gods are made possible. In these modifications the single minded ethical sincerity and straightforwardness of the early faith have been obscured, magical and animistic corruptions have crept in, and exploitation of the populace by a greedy clergy has taken place, especially in Thibet. In comparison with the primitive faith, Mahayana Buddhism seems to have gained as much as it has lost only in the case of the Shin sect in China and Japan. The beliefs and practices of this sect are similar in many respects to Christianity, especially of the Protestant type. The history of Mahayana Buddhism is instructive to the western student in indicating how similar conditions have to some extent produced

parallel results in the evolution of Buddhism and Christianity, under circumstances where neither faith could have been measurably influenced by the other in its development. However, for its philosophical interest and value, the beginner, at least, has more to learn from the forms of Buddhism that have adhered most closely to Gautama Siddartha.

In all that concerns the *Agency* and means by which values are sought to be conserved, the most suggestive points of contrast to Christianity are furnished by primitive Buddhism,—with its law of *Karma*, its world view that at the same time is in a sense atheistic and yet moral and teleological; with its emphasis on self-sufficiency in attaining salvation, nevertheless accompanied by attacks on selfishness and individuality; with its complete and generous tolerance of other religions without allowing itself to be corrupted by them; with the totally different significance it attached to its historic Founder. These points of contrast are in the highest degree suggestive and instructive.

In respect to the values recognized, the ordinary virtues of daily civilized life are inculcated in the first five commandments, much as they are in Christianity. Siddartha and Jesus both insist on an ethical change of heart or regeneration upon the part of the convert. Both insist upon the purity of inward motives; as is instanced by the Buddhist portrayal of the true Brahmin and the Christian Sermon on the Mount. The stand taken over two thousand years ago by Siddartha against the use of alcoholic intoxicants has only been reached by portions of the Christian church within very recent times. Both religions enjoin gentleness, love and forgiveness. The more positive value of active social service is less clearly recognized by primitive Buddhism. Its view of *Nirvana* is quite different from traditional Christian conceptions of the future life. Superior though the Buddhist organization was to any that existed at the time of its origin, it is decidedly inferior in its coherence and effectiveness to the Christian church. The Buddhist Brotherhood is only an order of monks after all, without a sufficiently organic relation to the laymen. As a bond uniting all the adherents of the faith into a common fellowship it cannot be compared to the churches to whom Paul wrote his epistles.

Are there any respects in which Buddhism may be claimed to be superior to Christianity? Admirers of Buddhism claim its superiority upon several points. (1) They argue that the

place of the Founder of Buddhism rests solely on the intrinsic worth of his message verified in the reason and experience of his followers. It does not rest upon pretentiously supernatural claims based upon miracles and the fulfilment of prohecies,—claims that in the case of Christianity have been exploded by the advance of natural and historical science. In reply to this, the liberal Christian might say that for him, at least, the value of Jesus does not rest upon such claims, but upon Christian experience. Liberal Christianity, like liberal Buddhism, has been purged of such elements. (2) The advocates of Buddhism claim that throughout its history it has nearly always been tolerant and kind in its treatment of other faiths, while the opposite has been true of Christianity. Until very recent times, Christians constantly persecuted Jews, Moslems, and even Christians of other sects than their own. In reply, the Christian will have to admit this shameful blot upon the history of Christianity. But he can urge that the past few centuries prove that Western Christianity, at least, in both Catholic and Protestant forms, has at last learned the lesson of tolerance, and that the western Christian of today is not inferior in this respect to the Buddhist of today. (3) A similar reply can be made, at least by most American Christians, to the claim that Buddhism has taken a more consistent stand against the evils of alcoholic intemperance. (4) The advocate of Southern Buddhism urges that the Buddhist who has kept true to the primitive faith has been taught to be self-reliant and to seek honestly to work out his own salvation, instead of fancying that he can shirk responsibility for his own wrong doing through the merits of some one else (Christ, or, in the case of Catholicism, Christ and the saints). The Christian might reply, that this insistence on self-reliance has not on the whole kept the ethical note consistently uppermost in the case of even Southern Buddhism, in which the building of praying platforms has sometimes been regarded as a substitute for genuine goodness of character. Furthermore, the inspiration that Christians have gained from believing that the love of Christ can transform human lives has been abundantly warranted by the facts, and is a valuable feature of the Christian faith. Mahayana Buddhism in some of its forms has pathetically endeavored to gain something imperfectly approximating the Christian atonement.

So far as the author is able to judge, there are no points

in which the most enlightened Buddhism of today can claim to be superior to the most enlightened Christianity of today. On the other hand, in the conception of the atonement, in its greater emphasis on social service, and in its longer experience with the moral problems of western civilization, present-day Christianity has gained many points of superiority to present-day Buddhism, and is far more competent to assist in securing for the twentieth century the conservation of its socially recognized values. Either Buddhists of Asiatic countries must learn these lessons from Christianity, if they can, or else expect that their religion, even in these lands, must ultimately be supplanted by Christianity. And there is no reason on earth why any occidental Christian should become a Buddhist, although everyone should respect Buddhism, present and past, for its many points of excellence.

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CHAPTER IX

GREECE AND ROME

I—*Introduction*

While the ancient Greeks and Romans were peoples of different racial genius, their religious histories, notwithstanding noteworthy contrasts, present many points in agreement. These common points are those of chief concern to us in the study of religion as an endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values.

Among both Greeks and Romans, religious endeavor, so far as it ever became really effectual, was a function of the family and the city state. It conserved the values of these institutions, and was chiefly of aid to the individual in relation to them. Thus subordinated, religion did not develop as an independent institution. Religious worship never became centralized. Each local shrine had its own ritual, handed down by tradition from one priest to his successor. The priesthood never became a special professional class like the Brahmins. No great order like the Buddhist brotherhood arose. There were no sacred books like the Vedas, and no authoritative body of doctrine.

The Greeks and Romans were brilliantly successful in their religious evolution up to a certain point, beyond which they were unable to advance. They succeeded so long as their problem was the conservation of the social and moral values of their earlier life, chiefly concerned with the family and the city state. This conservation could be effected through the agency of deities conceived in *anthropomorphic* terms, i. e., in the forms of idealized men and women. The Olympian gods and goddesses of the Greeks are the most splendid anthropomorphic deities that the mind of man has ever produced. But the problems of associated life presently became complex and irreducible to the simpler conceptions of life in the earlier family and city state; individuals came to feel spiritual needs too profound to be conserved through anthropomorphic gods and goddesses, no matter how lovely in aesthetic form. The old pagan religions of Greece and Rome were unable to

meet these problems, and collapsed. Their failure was chiefly due to their lack of a satisfactory *Agency* for the conservation of their higher values. Christianity triumphed over paganism because it was able to provide this needed Agency of God who is revealed in Christ, and who is made available through the medium of an independent institution, the Church. The Greek understanding of moral values, on the other hand, was profound and has contributed much on this side to modern culture. The Greeks knew how to analyze and to describe moral principles; they failed to find a satisfactory religious Agency through which to conserve them.

II—*Family Religion*

An important feature of the life of the early Greek home was the worship of the hearth and the fire upon it. This fire was kept perpetually burning; it was thought to be alive. Food was offered to it, and the fact that the fire grew in size when consuming the food indicated that the latter was acceptable. The fire stood for cleanliness. Nothing damp nor dirty might be put on it, nothing unclean brought into its presence. In time, the values conserved by the sacred fire came to include the moral purity of the home. The conservation of moral purity required a personal deity, and thus arose the idea of a goddess of the hearth, Hestia, a beautiful virgin, who stood for moral purity, and protected domestic relations. Later, as the tendency grew to group all the chief deities in one family, Hestia became the daughter of Zeus the supreme God. He too, became a protector of the hearth, as well as his wife Hera. The marriage of the highest god and goddess became symbolical of all marriage, which was regarded as sacred and holy, and probably as sacramental, 1. The altar of Hestia stood in the main room of the house. Just outside the door, as one entered the house, stood the altar of Apollo, the Guardian (against plague and other disasters). The gods of property, good fortune, and trade, as well as the patron god of the city state, were likely to be worshipped in the home, 2. There were impressive ceremonies connected with the important events of family life such as marriage, birth and death.

Each family had its own tomb, where ancestors were buried, and offerings regularly paid and prayers addressed. This tomb, Euripides says, was generally near the house "in order that the sons, in entering and leaving their dwelling, might

always meet their fathers, and might always address them an invocation," 3. The ghosts of the departed were believed to be still living and loving members of the family, and it was often thought to be a duty to marry and to leave posterity to continue the ancestral worship. The Erinyes were spirits who inflicted merciless vengeance on those guilty of shedding the blood of their kindred.

Among the Romans, Vesta was the central figure in the worship of the home. The family was also protected by various spirits,—the *penates* (originally guardians of the store room), the *lares* (perhaps originally spirits protecting the farm) and the *Genius*, or guardian soul, of the head of the house. Ancestral worship was also important, 4.

Greek and Roman family religion was highly successful in binding the members of the family together in fraternal and filial devotion to one another, and to the family traditions. It strengthened and preserved the ties of the home. Professor Farnell says of the Greeks: "Probably no people has ever felt with greater fervour the sacredness of the bond between brother and sister, parent and child, the reverence due to the mother no less than to the father," 5. The vitality of the religion of the family, he says, persisted after other forms of religion had passed into decay, clear down to the final extinction of paganism.

III—*The Religion of the Greek City State*

Early Greek settlements ultimately grew into cities, which became the religious as well as the commercial centers of the adjacent country and of dependent colonies. Greece in the time of its greatest glory consisted of a number of such city states. The individual felt deep loyalty and devotion to his city. He was chiefly aware of his moral and religious obligations and privileges in relation to it. The modern man is likely to feel a certain pride in the city of his birth, patriotic devotion to his native land, and reverent loyalty to the God and church of his fathers. To the Greek such pride, devotion and loyalty were all directed toward one object,—the city state. The city was the political, intellectual and commercial center of his fatherland, and it maintained the worship of the temples for the common good.

In other religions, adolescents experience some kind of spiritual awakening and are initiated or confirmed into the

faith of their fathers. Greek and Roman youth at this age were solemnly received into citizenship with religious rites, 6. Religious awakening with them was a conscious consecration to the service of the state. Loyalty to the city naturally grew out of loyalty to one's family, because the city "with all its various and often heterogeneous elements, was regarded as one family," 7.

Much of the civic ritual was derived from the household. In the ancient Attic feast of the Dipolia, the festival of Zeus the city-god, the citizens partook of the sacred flesh of the sacrificed ox, typical of a sacramental family meal. As there was a sacred fire in each home which conserved the life and welfare of the family, so a perpetual fire was maintained in the town hall before the statue of Hestia, and on this the continuous life of the state depended. When a threatened state consulted the oracle at Delphi, the god was likely to enjoin faithful and zealous maintenance of the traditional rites in honor of the ancestral ghosts.

The Greek city state employed religion in the endeavor to conserve all of its values. Law courts and market places, council chamber and town hall were consecrated, and under the protection of deities. "Important acts of State were accompanied by sacrifice; the religious oath was administered to magistrates, jurymen and other officials; the admission of youth into the ranks of the citizens was a religious ceremony," 8. The incorporation of a small community into a larger state required religious rites. Oracles were always consulted in crises, and whenever an important political decision had to be made. There was always an imposing temple to the deity (usually Zeus, but in the case of Athens, Pallas Athene) who had the city state under special protection, and splendid festivals, processions and feasts were celebrated in his honor. The public worship of all the other deities who conserved values of socially recognized importance was faithfully maintained. Athens and other Greek cities were thronged with altars, shrines and temples.

The city state also made provision for the worship of lesser supernatural beings. Heroes were men, who according to tradition had founded cities or families, or done great deeds. Their bones were carefully preserved, and were revered at their tombs. A hero was usually worshipped exclusively in some particular locality of which he was thought to be a patron.

The Christian saints who ultimately replaced these local heroes, to this day conserve much the same values for the populations of village communities in Mediterranean lands. There was a large variety of malignant spirits, *Keres*, who needed to be placated. In Athens, for instance, during a three days festival in the spring, food and wine were offered to disturbing ghosts in order to induce them to depart peaceably from the city. Similarly there were harvest festivals—whose purpose was to attract troublesome spirits out into the country by means of offerings, so that it would be safe to bring in the new grain. Human beings, probably criminals condemned to death, seem at least in early times to have been sacrificed for this purpose. Disease, disaster, old age and death were all attributed to the actions of *Keres*. The fates, gorgons, sirens, sphinx, harpies and furies were all species of *Keres*, 9.

IV—*The Olympians*

The Olympian deities, whose worship the city states made splendid and beautiful, were an inheritance from earlier times. They were the brilliant achievement of the age that produced the Homeric poems, the ninth and eighth centuries B. C. At a still earlier period the religion of the savage ancestors of the Greeks had been a low form of animism, with brutal and bloody rites. From such crude beginnings there developed, through the agency of the Homeric poems, the Olympian gods and goddesses,—the most sublime beings that the mind of man has ever been able to produce, so long as it has continued to think of the divine in anthropomorphic imagery.

The lays from which the Iliad and Odyssey arose were composed to be recited at the courts of the princes of Ionia, under conditions unusually favorable for the free expression of poetic imagination. The Greeks, then comparatively new comers in Ionia, were there removed from the more fixed traditions of the mother country. So the bard could modify and improve the old tales as he sang them. He could make the stories more artistic, enlarging upon what he could make most pleasing, and leaving out everything that would sound crude and gross to his aristocratic hearers. As his purpose was to entertain, rather than to edify, he gave Greek mythology an aesthetic rather than an ethical form,—a characteristic which it always retained.

The epic poems vividly portray the gods and goddesses as

men and women on a higher scale. They eat, drink and sleep like men. The world is governed by a royal family of which Zeus is head, with a palace on Mount Olympus. His court is much like the courts of the princes to whom the Homeric tales were recited. In it councils and banquets were held, and intrigues of war and love were carried on. Each deity was given a clear cut and striking personality. Zeus, for instance, is "father of gods" and "most exalted of rulers." He controls the elements, and at his nod even Mount Olympus trembles. He is very wise and powerful, but by no means omniscient nor omnipotent. The others sometimes outwit him. Hera, his wife, is somewhat of a scold, and Zeus, who is by no means a faithful husband, is rather afraid of her. He is not above craft and deceit when necessary, though he usually is square and honorable in his dealings. Such a god was greater and wiser than the Ionian princes; they liked and revered him. His morals were as good or better than theirs, and religion had not yet arrived at a strictly ethical stage. There was closeness of contact and sympathy between men and their gods, and the latter conserved the values of that age by idealizing them.

As the Homeric poems constituted an important feature of education in later times, and every school boy was made familiar with them, their portraiture of the gods became firmly fixed in the Greek imagination. This was strengthened by art. For instance, when the sculptor Phidias was asked what type he selected for his masterpiece, the statue of Zeus at Olympia, he is said to have replied with Homer's lines: "The son of Cronos spoke and nodded under his dark brows; and the ambrosial locks of the king fell down from his immortal head, and he shook great Olympus." Five centuries later the orator Dio Chrysostom said of this statue: "Whoever among mankind is wholly weary in soul, whoever has experienced many misfortunes and sorrows in life, and may not find sweet sleep, he, methinks, if he stood before this statue, would forget all the calamities and griefs that come in the life of man." 10. The statues and temples of the gods, made as fine and beautiful as the greatest artists were able to render them, did much to raise the popular conception to the plane of dignity, beauty, moderation and symmetry on which Greek religious ideals stood.

Professor Gilbert Murray regards the creation of the Olympian gods as a great religious reformation. In place of the

world conceived by earlier periods, "as merely subject to incursions of *mana* snakes and bulls and thunder-stones and monsters," it gave the Greek the conception of the world "as governed by an organized body of personal and reasoning rulers, wise and bountiful fathers, like man in mind and shape, only unspeakably higher," 11. It swept away, or at least covered with a decent veil, the gross sexual rites of savagery, and also the superstitions connected with early worship of the dead. It furnished the religious basis for the social order based on the city state. It worked for concord and good will among the different Greek states, by giving them a common religious literature and art.

Yet the anthropomorphic conception of the gods proved to be incapable of development beyond a certain point. Man is limited in his physical and moral possibilities. When the Greeks clothed their gods with human flesh, and celebrated them in art and literature as magnified human beings, they put a limit to their further religious development.

V—*Attempted Reforms by Poets and Philosophers.*

A time came when Greek civilization progressed far beyond its level in Homeric times. Morality advanced with it. Adultery, theft, perjury and deceit came to be clearly recognized as sinful for men. It became difficult for the Greeks to continue to revere the gods, and yet to regard them as occasionally guilty of conduct that would have been blameworthy in men. The old notions of the gods needed to be revised. Unworthy tales must be rejected. The gods must become further idealized according to the insight of a more discerning age.

The great poets of the sixth and fifth centuries attempted this task. Their odes and dramas were presented at the great religious festivals, and must have had considerable publicity and influence. Pindar described the gods as all wise and powerful, just and truthful. Men must remember that they are mortal, and avoid insolence and pride. He believed in rewards and punishments both on earth and in a future life. Aeschylus emphasized the divine punishment that follows sin from one generation to another. Sophocles laid stress upon purity of heart and piety; he believed that the universe is moral throughout. Euripides was more destructive in his criticism of gods, myths, and current religious practises; he exposed their moral inadequacies and intellectual absurdities. This he doubtless

did in the endeavor to give men higher ideals. He constantly raised fundamental problems which set men thinking. But the poets were unable to make a thorough reconstruction of religion. The lineaments of the gods and the tales regarding them did not admit of modification beyond limits, and the poets were not clear in their own minds regarding the details of the reformation that they sought. Moreover, they were primarily artists and not religious specialists.

The philosophers, too, sought to effect changes in religion. At the beginning of the fifth century B. C., Xenophanes had satirized anthropomorphic conceptions. Ethiopians, he pointed out, imagine that the gods have flat noses and swarthy skins, while Thracians give them blue eyes and red hair; and if cattle and horses had hands, they too, would make gods like themselves. Men even ascribe moral weaknesses to the gods,—theft, adultery and deceit. All this is absurd and wicked. There is but one god in the universe, and he is not like a man. It is not certain whether Xenophanes thought the one god to be identical with the universe (pantheism) or whether he believed this god to be an immanent being in it, who directs and controls it by his thought. His contemporary, Heraclitus, believed that the universe has eternally existed, and that it passes through cycles of evolution subject to universal law or reason *(Logos)*. It is uncertain whether for him the Logos is a god that may be worshipped, or simply impersonal law in the sense of modern physical science. He thoroughly disapproved of the anthropomorphic gods of popular religion. Anaxagoras (†428 B. C.) worked out a thoroughly mechanical conception of the universe, except that he found it necessary to posit an initial god or mind *(Nous)* to set the physical elements into motion. Leucippus and Democritus (†370 B. C.) developed the theory of atoms and a complete philosophical materialism. This philosophical movement was more effective in helping to undermine belief in traditional religion than in providing a substitute for it.

By the middle of the fifth century, in Athens at least, another movement in philosophy began. In place of speculation about the nature of the physical universe, attention became directed to political and social inquiry, and in general, to the study of man. The Sophists were disposed to reject traditional morals, which previously had been protected by religion as of divine and sacred ancestral origin and authority. Laws and moral-

ity, according to them, are mere matters of human convention, which may be disregarded whenever it is of advantage to do so. Socrates (†399 B C.) began a more constructive movement. He agreed with the Sophists that morality is subject to revision and criticism, but he maintained that its fundamental principles stand when thus criticized. Virtue is knowledge; honest inquiry both teaches what should be done and arouses the desire to do it. Goodness is the health of the soul; it is better to suffer injustice at the hands of others than to be guilty of it oneself, and it is wrong to return evil for evil. He denounced all views or tales that represented the gods other than wise and good. Probably he believed that there is but one divine being or principle in the universe, who upholds righteousness, but he conformed to customary observances and prayed to the gods like other men. He felt it a duty to accept the decisions of the government of his city as final, and cheerfully submitted to an unjust sentence of death on false charges when he might have escaped by flight.

This conduct of Socrates and the general tenor of his teachings indicate that the conception of the city state was basic in his moral and religious thought. The same was true of his greatest pupil, Plato (†347 B. C.); and, in turn, of Plato's pupil, Aristotle (†322 B. C.). For Plato, the virtue of the individual man is modeled on the plan of justice in the city state; for the state is the individual writ large. In the state there must be wise rulers, courageous defenders, and common citizens who are temperate and obedient. When each class performs its functions faithfully, and all work in harmony, there is justice. Likewise in the individual man. To be governed by reason, to be spirited in action, to exercise self control over passions and appetites, and to combine all in a symmetrical and well ordered life, is to possess the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Aristotle's moral conceptions rest on similar grounds. Man is by nature a political or social animal. Man's virtues as an individual and as a citizen, Aristotle set forth in detail so effectively that his work may be said to form the basis of systematic ethics for subsequent European thought down to the present time.

For these three greatest of Greek philosophers, the moral values, which they understand and which Plato and Aristotle set forth in systematic form, are conceived in terms of citizenship in a free state. They regarded the worship of the gods,

properly purified, as a necessary sanction for moral values in such a state. Their philosophical conception of reality and of the universe led them personally to interpretations of the divine that, to say the least, were much less orthodox; they evidently thought that philosophers might hold whatever religious opinions intellectual speculation led them to accept, that it was their duty to follow an argument wherever it leads. But public worship must be maintained for the benefit of the citizens of a state, in order to support moral institutions. This was less inconsistent from the ancient point of view than it appears to us. The ancients thought that the essential thing about public religious worship was that the ceremonies go on, and that men at times participate in them. The individual was free to put his private interpretation on them, and to accept or reject whatever myths and doctrines he chose. There were no fixed creeds and dogmas in Greek religion, no infallible Bibles, no Church.

Constructive in its recognition of moral values as was the work of the philosophers, and inspiring as it was to their comparatively few students, it failed to find adequate moral and religious sanctions for the life of the citizens. The common man was shrewd enough to know that the philosophers did not believe in morality on traditional grounds. He was aware that they did not believe in the gods of the city in an ordinary sense. That the philosophers advised him to believe in the gods was under these circumstances hardly persuasive. Anthropomorphic religion began to break down for him also; it could no longer conserve his moral values. Losing faith in the traditional religion of the state, many became openly skeptical of religion, and in some cases even of moral obligations as well. Some became credulous dupes of various seemingly new religious fads and cults which were in reality saturated with old superstitutions, just as is often true to-day of whose who forsake traditional Christianity and Judaism.

The situation became still more serious from the latter part of the fourth century on, after the city states had lost their vital significance along with their freedom under Alexander the Great and his successors. The problem of the thoughtful man then became, How might he reconstruct his moral and religious beliefs, his recognition of values and of the agency through which he might conserve them, now that he could no longer think them in terms of citizenship in a free state?

The later philosophers answered this question in different ways. The skeptics said for a man to be wise, he should be as non-committal as possible, believing and trusting nothing and nobody except himself, an attitude of destructive individualism. The Epicureans said that the wise man should lead, so far as he could, a life of refined enjoyment, appreciating the pleasure of a simple and temperate life. He should cultivate friends. The Epicureans adopted the materialism of Democritus. From this they said it followed that man need not fear the gods. If such beings exist at all, they lead a joyous life off in some sheltered region, unconcerned about the doings of men. They simply are of value to men for the enjoyment which their depiction in art and literature affords. Epicureanism was of service in combating the recrudescence of debasing and terrifying superstitions that arose with the decline of the religion of the city state. In Rome it became in some measure the creed of liberally and democratically minded men. Julius Caesar, for instance, was an Epicurean, as was also the poet Horace. But the influence of Epicureanism on the whole tended toward the cultivation of a life of refined selfishness, with little regard for serious social obligations and responsibilities. And its doctrine that pleasure is the highest good was often misinterpreted to sanction a life of sensual indulgence and dissipation.

The most constructive philosophical movement after the decline of the city state was that of the Stoics. They expanded the earlier conceptions of morality and religion that even for Plato and Aristotle had largely been restricted by attachment to the city state, so as to include the universe. Instead of thinking of oneself as a citizen of Athens or Sparta, one should think of oneself as a citizen of the world. For the whole world is one great city of gods and men. In theory, at least, it follows that all men are equal by natural right; by nature there is no just distinction in rights between Greeks and barbarians, slaves and free, men and women. These Stoic conceptions of "natural right" and the "law of nature" ultimately passed over into Roman law and tradition. They were revived in modern times in the struggle for individual and national freedom that began with the Renaissance, and we owe much to the Stoics for the origin of conceptions of liberty that have become basic in modern constitutions, laws, and public opinion. Not only did the Stoics do much to widen the extension of moral rights and duties so as to make them include all men.

They also sought to conserve these values through religion. They spiritualized the Logos doctrine of Heraclitus and taught that there is one God who pervades all the universe, and whom all men may regard as Father. They attacked the problem how there can be evil in a world subject to an all wise Providence, and they worked out most of the answers offered by theists to-day:—much that from our limited point of view appears evil is good from the standpoint of the whole as perceived by God; physical evils are necessary for the discipline of human character; moral evil they explained by saying that if man is free, he is bound to sin; that without evil there could be no good; and so on. The chief good for man is a life in accordance with nature, which means in accordance with the divine principle of nature, that is, God. They felt the need of an ideal historical person who might serve as a model for men to imitate, and made much of Socrates, and other virtuous men for this purpose. The Stoics did not condemn the worship of the gods of popular religion, but sought to interpret them allegorically; they sometimes said that they were names given to the one God as he is manifested in the different departments of nature,—Zeus in the ether, Hera in the air, Poseidon in the sea, and Demeter in the earth. Stoic philosophers went about preaching their philosophy as a religion, and they were listened to respectfully by educated people. The employment of the sermon, tract, and epistle have been said to have been suggested to early Christianity by Stoicism.

VI—*The Greek Mystery Religions*

Even in classical times the religion of the family and city state had not seemed sufficient to everyone. Many had felt the need of closer personal intimacy with the divine, as a reinforcement in the struggles for higher values in this life, and as an assurance of a blessed immortality after death. Attempts to meet these needs were made by the various mysteries, cults into which those who desired might be initiated. The first and crudest of these was the worship of Dionysus (Bacchus),—the Thracian god of the grape and of wine,—which became popular as early as the sixth century B. C. The worshippers gathered in secret meetings where they dramatically presented the mythical events in the life of the god, and engaged in eating and drinking. The mysteries of Orpheus are supposed by some to have been the result of a reform movement within the

Dionysiac cult. In these the divine presence was identified with the heightening of a consciousness afforded by aesthetic pleasures, especially music,—a great advance in spirituality over alcoholic stimulation. The Orphic movement was spread by missionaries and gathered its converts into societies, which celebrated initiatory rites and sacraments, and were guided by inspired scriptures. It was, in its way, a religion of redemption, offering a more spiritual life to its adherents, through their worship of the god who would sustain and support them by his presence within them, and afford to them a share in his immortality. The Dionysiac and Orphic societies were independent of state control.

The mysteries of Eleusis, on the contrary, were a recognized part of the established religion of the Athenian city state. They made use of the myth that Persephone, the daughter of Demeter, had been snatched away and taken down into Hades, from whence, as a result of her mother's efforts she was permitted to return to earth with the awakening life of the spring. Those who were initiated into this worship, were assured a participation in her resurrection and immortality. These mysteries, under state regulation, were freer from excesses than those of Dionysus and Orpheus. For the same reason, it was longer before they admitted any but Athenian citizens, but in the course of time, they became open to all Greeks, and finally to Romans.

The mystery religions, being more emotional in character, had a wider appeal than Stoic philosophy. On the other hand, their moral and spiritual tone was much lower. Prior to their conquest by the Romans, therefore, the Greeks must be said on the whole to have failed to find a way to conserve on a high moral plane, personal values, like a warm consciousness of divine presence and hope for immortality, through religious worship.

VII—*Religion in the Roman Republic*

The life of the ancestors of the Romans was pastoral and agricultural. When the little city state of Rome began its career, it adopted prescribed forms of worship for the conservation of its values, and established the requisite shrines, festivals, priesthoods and rituals. The early kings exercised some priestly functions themselves and appointed priests to attend to the rest. When the republic was established a

pontifical college was appointed to look after these matters. The Roman conception of religion was unimaginative and thoroughly practical. Whenever a value was seen to require religious conservation, the appropriate gods and rites were determined, and what was believed requisite was carefully carried out. Little time was wasted in speculation about the nature of any of the gods, whether in the form of myth or philosophy, and the early Roman gods remained shadowy *numina*. They were by no means clearly defined anthropomorphic deities like those of Greece. Religion, however, was simple, straightforward, comparatively free from savage grossness, and it effectively conserved the simple and stern virtue of the times. Roman family worship and the religious side of the induction of Roman youth into citizenship have already been noticed.

As the Roman state expanded and the other states in Italy became successively incorporated within it, the Roman state took over such of their deities, ceremonies and priesthoods as seemed necessary to conserve the newly acquired territory and population for the Romans. Such religious worship was continued in the name of the Roman people, either on the conquered territory or transferred to Rome itself. Southern Italy was Greek in culture and religion, and when this region was conquered by the Romans, the latter came into contact with the Greek gods. The worship of these was gradually adopted in Rome, and in many cases Greek gods were identified with old Roman deities who thus took on the anthropomorphic characteristics of the Olympians. The Greek conceptions were so much richer in every way that they gradually supplanted the few notions the Romans originally had regarding the gods. In times of distress—plague, famine, threatened war, or strange portents—it was decided what new deity and ritual should be imported in order to avert disaster and promote the public welfare. This process continued throughout pagan times, and deities and rites from all over the world became established in Rome.

In the case of the Romans, no less than of the Greeks, the religion of the city state ultimately gave way. Though Rome conquered the world, instead of being subdued by a foreign power, her republican institutions broke down in the process of expansion. The citizens lost their freedom. Morality and religion could no longer be defined for the Roman in terms of

the republican state of earlier times. The last century of the republic was a time of deplorable political and social corruption and decay. The state was the victim of a succession of demagogues, military dictators, and political adventurers. Private morality also was in a state of decline. The old respect for ancestral customs had disappeared. Family life was breaking down. Divorces, hardly heard of in the olden time, had become scandalously common. All forms of sexual vice were practised. The influence of Stoicism and other forms of Greek philosophy did not avail to arrest the downward tendencies, though they helped a little to retard them among the cultivated classes.

VIII—*Religion and the Roman Emperors*

So, with the establishment of order in imperial times, Augustus and his successors had to do more than simply maintain discipline in the army and peace in the provinces. They had to provide efficient executives and courts for the city of Rome and for the world. They had to pass, and, as well as they could, enforce laws calculated to reform civic and domestic morals. In the effort to effect these reforms they recognized the need of religion. Augustus and Tiberius revived as many religious features of earlier and purer times as they could. They built many temples and revived many forms of worship, naturally associating them with the imperial house so as to strengthen its authority and prestige.

One serious religious problem confronted this age. In earlier times there had been a single god who, above all others, protected the state,—Jupiter Stator. Now, everywhere in the the empire, people knew of such a god as Jupiter or Zeus; but they conceived him quite diversely, and there was no recognized ritual or Bible or church or system of dogma that could bind the world in common loyalty to Jupiter or any other god as protector of the state. The attempted solution was to revere the emperor himself as such a god. So, during his lifetime in the provinces, and after his death in both Rome and the provinces, Augustus became a god *(divus)* and loyal citizens and subjects did him reverence as such. Several of his successors during the first century A. D. also became reverenced as gods; and, later on, every emperor as a matter of course became divine. To be sure, none of the emperors were perfect in their private or public conduct. But neither were any of

the gods of mythology, for that matter. Augustus, Vespasian and Trajan were truly great men, who labored wisely and well for the good of the world; they were certainly as good and heroic as any of the gods of mythology. And they were historical characters of whom all men knew, and whom all respected. So soldiers reverently swore to obey the emperor as a god, and every good citizen was expected to show his loyalty and obedience to the government by revering the statues of the emperor, which were erected everywhere.

Roman lawyers and jurists found much inspiration in Stoic conceptions of a universal law and reason, and succeeded in working out many of the principles of natural law and natural right that underlie modern political justice. Stoic philosophers went about teaching people, and addressing them in public gatherings. Neo-platonic philosophers sought through mystical trances to gain closer and more intimate union with God, and so to gain spiritual and moral reinforcement for daily duties. Philosophy to some extent took the place of religion for the more cultivated classes. It lacked, however, the warmth and intimacy of the old anthropomorphic gods whom their less educated ancestors had been able to worship with joyous confidence.

IX—*Mystery Religions in the Roman Empire*

The masses of people in Roman imperial times, as well as the classes, had lost much of the earlier faith in the old gods of family and state religion. And they were not intellectual enough to gain help from philosophy. So they turned to the extravagant and imposing religious cults that came into the Graeco-Roman world from Egypt and the Orient.

The Romans of the empire were attracted to mystery religions through much the same motives that had influenced Greeks in the same direction from an earlier time—desire for personal immortality and for some assurance of divine favor and support in this life. Three mystery religions had wide popularity and influence. In order of increasing importance these were: the cult of Cybele and her son Attis, which had originated in Phrygia; that of Isis and her son Osiris, two Egyptian deities; and that of Mithra, which was probably of Persian origin. In each of the two first mentioned the central idea is this: the goddess had lost her son by death, and had succeeded in effecting his resurrection; those who are

properly initiated into the mysteries and celebrate the anniversary of the god's death with mourning and that of his resurrection with rejoicing thereby become partakers of his divine nature and his immortality. The ceremonies connected with the Phrygian religion were imposing and emotionally exciting; unfortunately they retained gross features of their savage origin. The religion of Isis was more refined, coming as it did from an older civilization. Its ritual was beautiful and impressive, its temples imposing; the secrecy of the ceremonies aroused the awe of the initiates; there were elements of spirituality in the worship.

From the second to the fourth century, A. D., the most vigorous rival of Christianity was probably the religion of Mithra. Though older than Christianity, it became an actively growing religion, only half a century earlier (about the middle of the first century, B. C.).

The mysteries of Mithra appealed primarily to soldiers. Legions were doubtless often recruited in the east, where the religion had its home, and wherever these legions were later sent, the disciples of Mithra in them became active propagandists. So ruins of ancient Mithraeums are bound to-day all along the former frontiers of the Roman empire (where there were military camps), as well as in the city and seaport of ancient Rome itself. Only men were initiated into these mysteries. It was a kind of free masonry; there were seven different orders into which the worshipper might successively be initiated. After passing severe tests of endurance, and taking oaths of devotion to the god and order and receiving a sacrament, the mysteries would be revealed to a candidate. The fact that ruins of temples of the Great Mother are often found in proximity to those of Mithra has led to the supposition that the wives and daughters of the followers of Mithra worshipped Cybele and Attis.

Mithra was a mythological deity who sprang miraculously into life from a rock and performed all sorts of heroic deeds, such as would appeal to the admiration of soldiers. He overcame the sun god and made him his faithful vassal and ally. His chief exploit was a painful journey to kill a bull that was working great destruction to mankind. From the body of the slain bull came useful herbs and plants; from the spinal cord wheat came into existence and from the blood came the wine. (Hence bread and wine were used in a sacrament.) In

the course of his exploits he struck a rock with arrows and water gushed forth. Later on, there came a flood, from which one man, secretly advised by the gods, built a boat and escaped with his cattle. Mithra celebrated a Last Supper with the Sun God and other companions, after which he ascended into the heavens. When a man dies, his soul goes to face Mithra after death, and he is judged according to his deserts. At the end of the world, Mithra shall summon the dead from their graves and hold a Last Judgment. The wicked shall be consumed in fire, while the faithful shall reign with Mithra forever.

If in the second or third century A. D., a visitor had entered a place devoted to the worship of Mithra, and then one devoted to the worship of Christ, he would have found many similar features. In each case, the place of worship would have been likely to have been underground. There would have been a nave and side aisles, and an upraised place where stood the altar. Behind the altar, or above it, there would probably have been a work of art depicting the suffering on the part of a god in human form, suffering through which it was thought salvation comes to men. For on the countenance of Mithra in the act of slaying the bull, the sculptors depicted extreme agony, almost comparable to that of a Christian crucifix or *pietà*. On entering either Mithraeum or Christian church, worshippers dipped their fingers into holy water. Initiates to both religions were baptized, and partook of the bloodless sacrifice of bread and wine. The sign of the cross was made upon the foreheads of Mithra initiates with a red hot iron, testing their courage and leaving an indelible reminder of their vows. The twenty-fifth day of December was a holiday for the worshippers of Mithra, on which they celebrated the birth of the sun (the days began perceptibly to lengthen then); and on that day families feasted and exchanged gifts.

The values conserved by Mithraism included loyalty to one's fellow members, and to Mithra their saviour. It seems to have upheld the ordinary principles of morality taught by all ethical religions. It probably differed chiefly from Christianity in putting more emphasis on physical courage and other masculine virtues, and less upon more feminine virtues like love, meekness, pity, and endurance. It was a spiritual religion, however, and through prayer and sacraments gave men a feeling of divine presence and help, and a hope of immortality. It also differed from Christianity in making more of loyalty and devotion to

the empire and emperor. Above all, it differed in emphasizing the military virtues, whereas the Christians of those times were often pacifists and thought all warfare wrong. Since Mithraism tolerated the other forms of religious worship, it could readily be accepted by those who desired its spiritual support, and yet did not want to turn their backs upon the faith of their fathers. So Mithraism gained general favor far more rapidly than Christianity.

But the very tolerance of Mithraism prevented it from developing into a completely spiritual religion. It could not free itself wholly from primitive superstitions. With no room for women to participate in its worship, it lacked the support of those who always have been the mainstay of Christianity ("last at the cross and first at the tomb"). This lack forced Mithraism to provide for the womenfolk of its members by associating itself with the worship of Attis, full of superstitions and degrading practises. By its intolerance of everything pagan, Christianity kept absolutely free from debasing contacts with other faiths. Its communion included women as well as men. Instead of a mythical hero, Christianity had the advantage of an historic man, who had led a blameless life in recent times, as its Founder. It was thus able to exalt the moral values in absolute purity, and to conserve them through a sublime Saviour God and a consecrated Church. Christianity won a complete victory over its rivals, the mystery religions, because of its moral and spiritual superiority.

X—*The Debt of Modern Religion to Greece and Rome*

In many respects the religious history of Greece and Rome was one of failure. This was not owing to the lack of intellectual recognition and appreciation of the higher moral values. On this side the Greeks and Romans were more successful, on the whole, than the Hebrews. But they could not find an adequate Agency through whom they might seek the conservation of their values. No conception of God took root in the sentiments of the people generally that was both intellectually and morally adequate. The Stoic conception though in many ways intellectually and morally sublime, did not furnish a strong enough emotional appeal to incite men to do their best, and to afford them a sense of strength and support in their endeavors. The mystery religions were more potent emotionally, but they were never quite convincing intellectually, and they

never reached a sufficiently pure moral plane. And neither philosophical school nor mystery cult developed into a highly organized church, with strong ties of love binding its members together in common loyalty to one another and to God. So we may say that the ultimate failure of Greek and Roman religions was one of inadequacy in finding an Agency through which to seek the conservation of their socially recognized values.

Nevertheless, the present-day religions of the west, both Christian and Jewish, owe a very great deal to the Greeks and Romans.

First, on the side of the *recognition* of values. The Old Testament and the New, taken literally, contain no such clearly developed conceptions of social and political justice as are to be found in the teaching of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. These conceptions are quite in the spirit of Christianity and Judaism as we know them, of course, and the latter religions long ago so thoroughly assimilated the Greek teachings that ministers and rabbis unconsciously read them into Scripture texts in a manner that accrues to the moral benefit of their listeners almost as much as if preachers and congregations knew the real sources of this particular side of their moral convictions. Almost all of our understanding of civic rights and obligations is derived from Greece and Rome. Realization of the fact that morality cannot adequately take root in individuals if social and political relations are neglected is chiefly due to the Greeks. Regard for law and consciousness of responsibility for making the laws what they are, and for their enforcement, come under this head. The conception of God as our heavenly Father and of all men as our brothers was far more clearly and emphatically stated by the Stoics than by any Hebrew predecessors of Jesus and Paul. Reverence for family ties, the duty to honor one's father and mother, were equally taught by Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans.

Certain moral principles were even more clearly recognized in pre-Christian Greek and Roman times than they have been by the modern world until the last century or two. These principles are now, of course, taught by Christians and Jews alike. But they owe their origin in our moral consciousness to the Greeks and Romans. Among these are the wrongfulness of slavery (which the Stoics sharply denounced and succeeded in mitigating). The civic rights of woman were more

generously recognized by the Romans of imperial times than at any subsequent period of European history prior to the nineteenth century. The recognition of the principle that sovereignty comes from the people, not from the divine authority of rulers, owes much to modern Christians, especially to Calvinists; but this is a Roman conception not found in either the Old or the New Testament, and it was rejected by the Christian world until the Renaissance. All attempts to formulate principles of justice, equity, wisdom, courage, temperance, and other virtues, rights and duties,—in short to work out a science of ethics, law, or jurisprudence,—owe their original impetus to Greece and Rome. That medieval and modern Christian and Jewish thought contain these elements is one of their obligations to Greece and Rome—notably to Aristotle. Finally, though the Old Testament praises wisdom highly, recognition of the importance of free intellectual inquiry—freedom of thought, speech and publication—on religious and other matters, and the value of free and disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake are Greek values of which Christianity and Judaism remained profoundly unappreciative until well into modern times. So it is not too much to say that a very large portion of the judgments of right and wrong which are now commonplace Christian and Jewish teaching originated in the minds and consciences of ancient Greeks and Romans.

Our modern religions owe much to the ancient religions of Greece and Rome on the side of Agency, including theology, ritual, and ecclesiastical organization. The Jews possessed little or nothing in the way of systematic philosophy and theology until their contact with the Greeks began after the conquests of Alexander the Great. The Christian church possessed little theology in New Testament times, and that little came chiefly from Hellenistic sources. The subsequent ancient, medieval, and modern Christian and Jewish attempts to prove the existence of God, to describe His attributes, and to explain His relation to mankind, the problem of evil, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul are built upon the foundations of Greek philosophy, and, for the most part, are adaptations of Greek ideas and arguments.

On the side of ritual, the Christian sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper are strikingly similar to the mystery religions. The sermon, as has been remarked, may owe its

origin to the Stoics. Christmas and Easter were both pagan festivals which became Christianized. Many details in the ceremonial of the Catholic churches,—both Roman and Eastern —can be traced to Greek and Roman sources.

On the side of organization, Christianity owes a tremendous debt to Rome. While to the Jewish synagogue the first Christian congregations owed their origin,—little groups coming together for common worship,—the later development of ecclesiastical organization is chiefly indebted to the Romans. The great political administrators of antiquity were the Romans. As Christianity grew, some form of ecclesiastical organization became necessary. The parishes and dioceses of ancient and modern Catholic Christianity, together with presbyters, bishops, archbishops, and patriarchs, are imitative of Roman imperial administration. The same, to a less extent, is true of all Protestant forms of Church government, whether presbyterian, congregational, or episcopal. To the ancient Roman practical spirit, occidental Christianity, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, owes the selection of workable theology and ritual from the *mélange* of doctrines and ceremonies that arose in the East. To a combination and adaptation of Greek and Roman ideas is due the conception of the Christian church as the City of God, composed on earth of the church militant and in Heaven of the church triumphant with Christ at its head.

To what extent modern Judaism is indebted to Greek and Roman sources on the sides of ritual and ecclesiastical organization, the author does not feel competent to express an opinion. The indebtedness is undoubtedly much less than in the case of Christianity. On the side of theology the indebtedness is certainly considerable, and it must be remembered that it began as early as the conquests of Alexander.

The modern believer in either Catholicism, Protestantism or Judaism has of course no ground for distress in admitting that the God of his faith has revealed Himself to a great extent through the Greeks and Romans. Religious truths and practises are precious, whatever their source. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

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CHAPTER X

JUDAISM

I—*Introduction*

The evolution of the Jewish religion furnishes a contrast to that of the Greeks and Romans. To a large extent the Jews succeeded where the Greeks and Romans failed, and failed where they succeeded. For the conspicuous success of Jewish religious development was on the side of the Agency through which conservation of values was sought. By the time of the great pre-exilic prophets, Israel had attained an anthropomorphic conception of the national God (Yahweh), that, though cruder and less artistic than the Homeric gods, was clear cut and vivid, and presented more decided moral aspects. In the later evolution, the conception of God became purified of its anthropomorphic characteristics. The early crudities, both sensuous and moral, vanished. The God of modern Jewish theism emerged—eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, supremely just, merciful, righteous, and holy. However, in contrast to Greek and Indian evolution, in the process of deanthropomorphization, the Hebrew God did not tend to become an abstraction, intelligible only to philosophical thinkers and incapable of appealing to the understanding and emotions of the plain man. On the contrary, the religiously desirable features of the earlier anthropomorphism were preserved. Worshippers could continue reverently and lovingly to address Him as "Our Father" and "Our King," to feel assured of His presence among them, of His sympathy, love and guidance.

On the institutional side, the Jews were also brilliantly successful. In the Law and other sacred scriptures, and in the worship of the synagogue and the home, they formed ties that have bound them so firmly to one another and to their God that the loss of their country and the persecutions of two thousand years have not availed to undermine their religion, or to impair its efficacy in the conservation of the values dear to them.

When, on the other hand, we turn to Judaism for light upon the definition and systematic organization of values we are disappointed. Though passionate in their love of justice, righteousness, wisdom and truth, the Jews have contributed little to the intellectual comprehension of these values, either like the Greeks in philosophy, or like the Romans in law and jurisprudence. To be sure, like the Christians, they learned to appreciate ancient pagan culture, and to assimilate some of it in their religion. Maimonides (†1204) has been their greatest philosopher, 1. The Jewish religion has never been able to expand beyond national limits, and to attain the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics. Yet it has furnished the nucleus for two international religions. To its conception of God, its sacred scriptures, and its synagogue, Christianity and Mohammedanism both owe their origin.

II—*Historical Outline*

The history of Israel, in the strict sense of the word, can hardly be said to begin until the reign of David, in the tenth century before Christ. However, some of the main facts of earlier periods are fairly clear. The Israelites of David's time were descended from a fusion that had taken place during the three centuries previous, between nomadic tribes who had invaded Palestine from the Arabian desert, and the earlier inhabitants of the land. The nomads brought into Palestine with them a chest (the "ark"), associated with the worship of their war-god, Yahweh. According to traditions, which most historians believe must have a basis in fact, the ancestors of some of them under the leadership of Moses had entered into a sort of covenant with Yahweh by which they agreed to obey him, and he to give them victory in war. In token of their allegiance to Yahweh, they practised circumcision, and celebrated the Passover, a sacrificial meal in which they entered into communion with him. There was thus a note of moral obligation and a sense of personal relationship in Yahweh religion from the start.

Both the nomads and the Canaanites whom they conquered worshipped spirits inhabiting trees, rocks, and springs of water. Whether they worshipped ancestral ghosts is disputed. There were portable objects of religious devotion (teraphim) which may have been fetiches. Ephods which may have been wooden or stone images or fetiches, were used in the worship of Yahweh.

The nomads were a simple pastoral people, whose chief food was probably the milk of sheep and goats. The Canaanites were an agricultural people, with more elaborate religious ceremonies containing rites suggestive of fertility, and attended by morally debasing sexual practises. As the nomads were strangers in the land, they united in the worship of the local Canaanite nature spirits (Baalim) who were thought to give the products of the land,—the corn, wine, oil, and flax. Yahweh, the war god of the conquerors, naturally became the god of the newly formed nation. To some extent, he gradually displaced the Baalim in the local shrines ("high places") and in addition to his other functions, became a conservor of agricultural values. Some of the grosser features of Canaanite worship were retained in the ritual of Yahweh at these shrines.

As the disorganized condition of the Israelite tribes described in the book of *Judges* gave place to the centralized monarchy, the worship of Yahweh, the national god, gained in prestige. David, and his son and successor Solomon, did what they could to conserve national unity by centralizing Yahweh worship in their capital, Jerusalem, where Solomon built a magnificent temple in which the "ark" was placed. After the death of Solomon, the tribes inhabiting the northern part of the country refused to accept his son Rehaboam as their king, and set up an independent kingdom. The northern tribes thereafter worshipped Yahweh in sanctuaries of their own at Bethel and Dan. But in both kingdoms the grosser worship of Yahweh at local country shrines grew into disfavor in comparison with the ritual at the central sanctuaries, which was more imposing and meticulous, and most of the time at least, on a higher ethical plane.

In both kingdoms economic development was attended by unequal distribution of wealth, exploitation of the poor, and political corruption. At the same time the rise of powerful and hostile nations to the east, the Assyrians and Babylonians, threatened the future existence of Israel. Various reformers, the pre-exilic prophets, insisted that Yahweh demanded a large measure of social justice in the land, and that, in case his command was not obeyed, he would in punishment allow the nation to be conquered by their enemies. The result of the work of these prophets was to give the nation a conception of Yahweh purged from the crude sensuous imagery and unmoral features which it had previously had. The prophets met with

opposition, however, and, except for a short-lived attempt by King Josiah (about B. C. 621) the reforms which they advocated were not put into effect until after the exile. Both kingdoms were conquered,—the northern one by the Assyrians in 722 B. C., the southern by the Babylonians in 586 B. C. In the latter year Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, took numerous members of the royal and noble Jewish families back with him in exile to Babylon. This is what is known as "the exile," and thus began the residence in considerable numbers of Jews outside of Palestine and their "dispersion" throughout the civilized world. Babylonia in turn, together with Palestine, came under the rule of Persia in 538 B. C.

The Persian rulers were more kindly in their treatment of the Jews, and permitted some of the exiles in Babylon to return to Jerusalem—"the return from the exile," from which dates "the post-exilic period." They succeeded in rebuilding the temple at Jerusalem under the governor Zerubbabel. The experience of the exile had impressed upon the national consciousness the teachings of the pre-exilic prophets. Henceforth Jews worshipped no god but Yahweh, whom they now believed to be the only God. They put into written form the ritual for his worship, in which the use of images of all kinds was strictly forbidden, as well as the legislation in the interests of social justice which the prophets had enjoined. Ezra played an important part in this work. The various codes of law and ritual became ultimately combined into the law (the *Pentateuch* or *Torah*) the supremely inspired authority of Judaism ever since. Synagogues were established wherever there were Jews, in which they assembled to hear the Law read and expounded, as well as to engage in prayer and hymns of praise. In the home, too, from then till now, it has been the duty of the father to teach the more fundamental religious precepts to his children and to observe family worship, especially the Passover.

When Palestine came under the dominion of Alexander the Great (B. C. 332) and his Egyptian successors, the Ptolemies, conditions changed little, except that many Jews emigrated and formed large colonies in Alexandria and elsewhere; so from that time on more Jews have lived outside of Palestine than within it. The Seleucid dynasty, who got control of Palestine in B. C. 200, were less tactful in their treatment of the Jews than the Persians and Ptolemies had been. One of them, Antiochus Epiphanes, fell into a bitter quarrel with the Jews.

In B. C. 168 he partly destroyed the temple at Jerusalem and inaugurated the worship of Zeus Olympios on the great altar of Yahweh. The devout Jews successfully resisted, under the leadership of the Maccabees, and were able to rededicate the temple to Yahweh in B. C. 165. Simon succeeded in founding a comparatively independent Jewish dynasty, which he strengthened by a treaty with the Romans in B. C. 143. Under Alexander Jannaeus (B. C. 102-75) the kingdom compared in territorial extent with what it had been under David. This period of Maccabean independence and greatness strengthened the faith of the Jews in their religion. Yahweh clearly was their sustainer; and they began to dream that he would ultimately give them the rule of the world.

But the Jewish kingdom did not long prosper. Jerusalem was captured in B. C. 63 by Pompey, and Judea became dependent on the Roman province of Syria. The nationalistic and imperialistic dreams of Jewish enthusiasts made them difficult for the Romans to govern, either through the Jewish royal family, the Herods, or through imperial procurators like Pontius Pilate. Visionaries kept proclaiming the coming of a Messiah whom Yahweh would establish as their king and enable to expel the Romans, conquer all nations, and make them tributary to the Jews. The inscription placed over Jesus on the cross indicates that he was condemned (wrongly, of course) on the charge of being such a revolutionist. An unusually fierce rebellion started by the Zealots, the leading revolutionary party, was put down by Titus in 70 A. D., who destroyed the temple. A last futile Jewish struggle in 135 A. D. was put down, and the emperor Hadrian erected a temple to Jupiter Capitolinus on the site of the temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem and renamed the city Aelia Capitolina.

The priestly cultus of the temple perished with the Jewish state. Only the worship of the synagogue and the home remained. These, however, became purified and strengthened, and the study of the Law continued. The codification of the oral Law and its promulgation in the Mishna were effected in the third century, A. D. For centuries later, further interpretation of the Mishna continued. This had become in turn codified in the rival Talmuds of the Palestinian and Babylonian schools by the end of the fifth century. The Babylonian Talmud ultimately became authoritative everywhere. The devout study and interpretation of the Law have continued ever

since, but with no essential changes until the close of the eighteenth century. Since then there have been movements to liberalize the religion and to bring it into conformity with natural science, Biblical higher criticism, and modern conditions in general. Jews in the United States at the present time are accordingly either "orthodox" or "reform" (conservative or liberal) as they oppose or favor these movements. They have formed independent religious societies along the line of this distinction.

III—*The Prophets Before the Exile*

The development of the conception of Yahweh into that of an effective Agency for the conservation of the higher moral values, as has been said, was largely the work of the prophets. These prophets were men who through reflection, prayer, and visions felt themselves guided by a power not themselves. This power they identified with Yahweh, or the "spirit of Yahweh." Psychologically speaking, this power must have been similar to what we have known in earlier chapters as *mana*. It was principally due to the subconsciousness. The content of the teaching of the prophets was the ideas that they were able to think out for themselves in the light of their moral convictions, their knowledge of the times, and of the history and traditions of their religion. These they publicly proclaimed with absolute sincerity as the words of Yahweh. It seemed to them that they were delivering messages from him to the people. Predictions of future events were often made by them as incidental to their main purpose of inducing Israel to obey the commands of Yahweh which they announced. Later, the more important addresses of these prophets were put into written form, either by themselves or by others. So far as the modern Jew or Christian believes that these messages of the prophets constitute a genuine advance in the evolution of religion, he may regard them as indeed divinely inspired.

The conception of Yahweh that had come down from the early nomadic invaders was simple. He was an idealization of the sheiks with whom they were familiar, whose attitude toward his tribesmen showed rough kindly affection and justice, but who was at times impulsive, angry, and jealous. Yahweh stood for the social solidarity of the tribes whom he ruled; he maintained among them the sacred duty to avenge the wrongs done to kinsmen, and to be kind in the treatment of the

unfortunate members of Israel,—the poor, the fatherless, the widow, the slave, and the concubine. He expected men to keep their word; to violate an oath made in his name was a serious matter. His justice was that of collective responsibility; he would send defeat upon the whole nation because one man stole some of the spoil that had been consecrated to himself, 2. He punished children down to the fourth generation for the sins of their fathers, 3. Though the blood feud and collective responsibility seem barbaric to us, they constitute a genuine advance in moral and social evolution in comparison with the eras that preceded their appearance. To be sure, Yahweh had many traits that would appear to us to be moral imperfections. For instance, Moses had to deter him from destroying Israel in a momentary fit of anger by reminding him what the Egyptians would think of him, 4: Jael is "most blessed among women" for the treacherous murder, in the national interest, of a trusting friend who was at peace with her husband and herself, 5; and David is prompted by Yahweh to take a census of the land, and then he and the people are punished by a pestilence, 6. But, for all these faults, Yahweh was doubtless more nearly morally perfect than any human Semitic father or ruler, and they attributed to him in idealized form those characteristics of a king and a father which they knew.

The crudeness and *naïveté* of the early conception of Yahweh are shown in the myths of Genesis. Yahweh walks in the garden of Eden in the cool of the day, while Adam and Eve try to hide from him behind trees, just as naughty children might hide from a parent, 7. Noah offers him a sacrifice, and the sweet savor tickles his nostrils, and he goodnaturedly declares that for man's sake he will never again send a destructive curse upon the earth, 8. He eats a meal with Abraham, 9. That a folk who thought of their national god so simply and childishly could have endowed him with such clear cut moral attributes is significant. The myths are serious; their intention is to explain his goodness in creating the world, and in instituting the sabbath as a day for rest; his stern punishment of sin; his call of their ancestors and his protecting care over them; and so on. There is nothing of the artistic genius of the Iliad and the Odyssey, or the pre-scientific attempts at cosmic explanation of Hesiod. The Genesis myths never involve Yahweh in murder, adultery nor theft. They are reverent, and they move on a high moral plane. Though undoubtedly myths,

the modern Jew may rightfully regard them as inspired myths, displaying a moral dignity and earnestness not to be found, probably, in any other myths produced by a people on the same level of culture.

So the prophets had a solid foundation upon which to build their morally advanced conception of God. The evils attacked by the prophets before the exile come chiefly under two heads. First, with increase of wealth and material prosperity sharp economic inequalities had appeared. The rich had grown richer and the poor poorer. The rulers were corrupt; the judges took bribes. According to Amos, a poor debtor would be sold into slavery because he could not pay for a pair of shoes, 10. The women urge the men to oppression to obtain the means for indulgence in strong drink, 11. Hosea laments that there is no true knowledge of Yahweh in the land; "nought but swearing and breaking faith, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery," 12. Micah accuses the nobles of seizing unlawfully the fields and homes of the poor, plundering travelers on the highway, evicting women from their homes and selling children into slavery, 13. Isaiah makes similar charges, 14. Secondly, in place of the simple worship of the nomads, who probably lived chiefly upon milk, and to whom the annual eating of the Passover lamb was a joyous as well as a reverent sacrificial rite, had succeeded lavish offerings of animals slain by the wholesale, and attended in some cases by sexual and alcoholic orgies which had crept into the worship from the Canaanites. Even sacrifices of children seem to have occurred in rites of deities that were popularly confused with Yahweh if not officially identified with him. The prophets sternly denounce these immoral elaborations of ritual which they insist Yahweh hates and despises, 15.

The perversion of the worship of Yahweh and the prevailing social injustice are attributed by the prophets to the same cause,—infidelity to Yahweh's commands. The rich think that by their costly offerings they will please Yahweh and he will condone their offenses. But this is not the case. Yahweh demands deep repentance for social wrongs and personal sins, and, for the future, complete reformation. "Seek good and not evil, and so Yahweh, God of Israel will be with you as you say. . . . Hate the evil and love the good, and establish justice in the gate. . . . Let justice flow on like a river, and righteousness like a perennial stream," 16. If this is not done, Amos warns that Yahweh will presently destroy Israel.

Hosea puts a more personal note into his plea. Israel's infidelity to Yahweh is like the infidelity of an erring wife to her husband, and she is reproached sadly but affectionately; she must speedily repent and return or it will be too late. Yahweh, like a husband, demands the exclusive love of Israel. Hosea repudiates the use of the golden bulls of Bethel and Dan in the worship of Yahweh, and begins the campaign continued by subsequent prophets against any use of images in worship. Micah similarly insists that righteous living rather than sacrifices is what Yahweh demands, and gives the famous summary of the whole requirement of Yahweh:—"What doth Yahweh require of thee but to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?" 17.

Isaiah, a prophet of the southern kingdom, thinks of the temple of Jerusalem as the supreme home of Yahweh where he has his throne and is attended by seraphim. To approach him one must be clean ethically as well as ceremonially. His message is a demand for righteousness: "Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from before my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, take up the cause of the widow," 18. Yahweh will forgive Israel if she repents. But Israel must do righteousness and trust in him, and not in foreign alliances. The worship of Yahweh with the golden bulls in the northern kingdom, and at the country shrines, threatened to become discredited during Isaiah's time by their failure to protect the land from successful invasion by the Assyrian armies. However, the Assyrian Sennacherib was forced to retire in defeat without capturing Jerusalem. Thus a great victory was won for the now imageless worship of Yahweh at Jerusalem (for King Hezekiah had destroyed the golden serpent there). The conviction became strengthened that he dwelt in a peculiar sense at the temple in Jerusalem where alone sacrifices should be offered. This was a movement in the direction of monotheism; for location of God in a particular place where he must be worshipped without images of any kind strengthened the tendency to think of him as one, and to think of him in spiritual and not sensuous terms. (A sharp contrast is thus furnished to the many shrines where different images of Zeus and Jupiter were worshipped with different titles, and practically were different gods.)

In earlier times Yahweh had simply been the national god of

Israel. The other nations each had its own national god. And there were local deities as well, as we have seen. Gradually the worship of Yahweh had supplanted that of the Baalim at local shrines, and the local shrines gave way to the centralized worship at Jerusalem, 19. Since the time of Isaiah and Sennacherib it had become a common belief that the powerful Yahweh would never permit Jerusalem, and certainly not its temple where he dwelt, to be captured by a foreign enemy. But Jeremiah insisted that precisely this would occur. A potter does not hesitate to destroy an unworthy vessel and begin his work over again. So Yahweh will utterly destroy Israel for her wrong doing. The outcome proved that Jeremiah was right. Did this mean that Marduk, the god of Babylon, was mightier than Yahweh, the god of Israel? Such would have been the conclusion of an earlier age. But, no, the prophets ever since Amos had been gradually working out a different conception of Yahweh. When the historical outcome justified the predictions of Jeremiah, the prophetic conception became established for later Jewish thought. Yahweh is independent of time, place, and people; he is the one God of the entire earth, and there is no other god.

To Jeremiah, too, belongs the credit for introducing more personal conceptions into morality and into the relations between man and God. Jeremiah and his younger contemporary Ezekiel repudiate the old doctrine of collective responsibility; Yahweh holds every man personally responsible for his own sins, 20. Jeremiah enters into close personal relationship with Yahweh, whom he constantly addresses in terms of vivid though reverent intimacy. Jeremiah taught the Jews the possibility and efficacy of personal prayer to a loving and wise, and absolutely just God. We have seen that the Greeks and Romans with the loss of the city state sought in vain to find a God no longer connected with a particular state, but of the world, and who yet would be in personal and intimate relations with the individual worshipper. Judaism succeeded in attaining just this. No longer connected with an independent Jewish state, Yahweh became the personal guardian of his scattered followers, the loving personal King and Father of each one of them. This sense of personal intimacy with God, which thus began with Jeremiah, ultimately found its finest expression in many of the Psalms, 21.

It has been impossible to indicate all the steps in the evolution

of the conception of Yahweh effected by the prophets down to the exile. But we have seen that they ultimately succeeded in giving the Jews the conception of a personal, righteous, merciful and loving God free from all the grosser features of the earlier anthropomorphism. This God is conceived as spiritual, and this spirituality is assured by the prohibition of the use of images in his worship. There were few myths, and these few, though crude, far from having markedly antimoral features were on a high moral plane, and have always been capable of use for moral edification by the Jewish and Christian ministry. While political incidents facilitated the evolution of Jewish monotheism, they alone were not responsible for it. The spiritual genius of the Jewish nation, as expressed by these lofty minded,—and, if you please, inspired—prophets alone made possible such an interpretation of the significance of Yahweh. Other contemporary Semitic nations believed in national war gods and met with political disasters, but none of them had the spiritual genius to give the world an effective conception of God as independent of place and nation, upholder of social justice and individual morality, and accessible in terms of personal intimacy to individual worshippers.

IV—*The Law and the Synagogue*

Pure and lofty as was the conception of God attained in the finest passages of the later prophets and the Psalms, this could have had no abiding influence upon the nation as a whole or effected social reforms, much less contributed to the religion of future ages, had it not become embodied in institutions,—the temple, the synagogue and the family. A religion cannot persist as merely the private experience of detached individuals. Few such persons can preserve their spiritual strength without association with fellow believers in common worship. And in no case can a religion be preserved and propagated apart from institutions. The pre-exilic prophets did not realize this. They saw the evils in the ritual of Yahweh in their times, and wished to do away with organized religious institutions altogether, a mistake that has often since been made by over hasty reformers.

In this respect the priests were wiser. Even before the exile they seem to have begun to purify the ritual, purging it of objectionable features, and to codify the law, introducing provisions to guard against the social injustices denounced by

the prophets. Among the group of exiles living in Babylon, who needed some means of preserving their religious and racial identity in a foreign land, was the priestly prophet Ezekiel. Though denouncing social injustice as severely as the earlier prophets, and insisting on personal moral responsibility like Jeremiah, Ezekiel realized the supreme importance for Israel of the faithful observance of a purified ritual. He was the first to perceive that the priest must also be a faithful pastor, a watchman of the spiritual welfare of the people, 22. Through the worship of Yahweh, the dry bones of a dead Israel will again come to life. Stony hearts shall become hearts of flesh—a sort of conversion—and Yahweh will put his own spirit within them, 23.

After the return from exile, the evolution of the purified religion proceeded rapidly. The central figure in this development was undoubtedly Ezra, probably the greatest religious statesman in the entire history of Israel, with the exception of Moses. What features of the work of reconstruction were directly accomplished by Ezra himself, and how much by the later participants in the movement, is uncertain. In time the various codes of the law became formulated in writing and were read to the people. Of these codes, the Deuteronomic, with its humanitarian legislation and its strong ethical emphasis, may have come down from the last century before the exile; while the more ritualistic Levitical and Holiness codes are the fruition of the tendencies which Ezekiel did much to bring into prominence. Presently all the codes were combined in the *Law* (the *Torah* or *Pentateuch*, the first five books of our Bible). As it was necessary for the people to know the Law, it became the duty of the father to teach the simpler and more fundamental principles, like the Shema (24) and the Decalogue (25) to the children in the home. Schools arose where boys were sent to learn to read the Law and the other sacred books. The sacrifices (other than the Passover, a family meal) could only be performed at Jerusalem by the official priests. Elsewhere Yahweh had to be worshipped by prayer and psalm and by the reading and study of his Law and Prophets. Thus synagogues arose in which this simple, spiritual worship was performed. They were established everywhere. The ritualistic observance of the Sabbath and of the preparation of food were obligatory upon Jews everywhere. For those living outside of Palestine whose number was constantly upon the increase,

the ritual of the home and synagogue became the essential part of the religion.

Not all of the Law was put into writing in the time of Ezra and the generations immediately following. The oral tradition was also regarded as inspired and authoritative. Scholars devoted their lives to the study of the oral as well as the written Law. The observance and study of the Law bound the nation together. Their earnestness gave the Law an increasingly deep and spiritual interpretation, which kept their lives on a higher plane than the nations by whose lands Palestine was surrounded, to whom it was successively subject, and among whom all the Jews ultimately were destined to live after they no longer had a country of their own. Those who are prejudiced against the Law, and think Judaism necessarily a religion of dead legalism and formalism should read what Jews have written about it in all ages including our own. The deep reverence they have for it, and the spiritual uplift which it to-day exerts for them, seem to be as genuine and profound as we find expressed in the Psalms, 26.

V—*The Messianic Hope*

The early traditions told how Yahweh had chosen Israel for his people, delivered them out of Egyptian bondage, and won for them the land of Canaan. Their ancestors appeared to have violated the covenant by serving other gods and committing social injustice and personal sins. Since the exile, however, Israel was faithful to Him as the one God, and obeyed the Law with scrupulous care. So the hope grew strong that He would ultimately restore the nation to the glory and independence which they imagined that it had enjoyed in the time of David and Solomon, or even to something still more magnificent. Ezekiel, living in exile, portrayed a future commonwealth in which Yahweh would dwell, to which Israelites in other lands would be restored, and which would be victorious over hostile powers. Haggai and Zechariah hoped that Yahweh would cause these dreams to be realized through Zerubbabel, the governor, who was a prince of the House of David, 27. Malachi expected that after having first sent Elijah as his messenger, Yahweh would shortly appear, punish the wicked, and reward the faithful.

The prophecy of a post-exilic writer that has been incorporated into the book of Jeremiah (28) gives a complete outline

of what by his time was expected by some to occur. Yahweh will restore the exiles to the fatherland. Israel will regain its independence, and the other nations will be filled with dismay. A second David will rule over the land. Yahweh will write his Law in their inward parts, and all of them will know him from the least to the greatest; he will forgive their sins. All will be joy and happiness. A passage in Micah declares that this future ruler of Israel will be born in Bethlehem, 29. Passages in the first Isaiah, promising deliverance were later thought to refer to this future Prince of the house of David whom Yahweh would set upon the throne of Israel, and other passages of similar tenor crept into the book, 30. The prophet or prophets who contributed the second half of the present book of Isaiah are full of the expectation that Yahweh will restore Israel, 31.

What is the place of Gentile nations in the divine plan of Yahweh? In pre-exilic times, for such a prophet as Amos, they had served for little more than instruments by which Yahweh punished Israel. The more narrow-minded saw no need of according to Gentiles a positive place in the plans of Yahweh. This is even the case with Ezekiel. The broader minded, however, realized that Gentiles are human beings, and that Yahweh has them under his care. The book of Ruth calls attention to the fact that one of the ancestors of David was a Moabitess. The book of Jonah teaches the lesson that God is willing to spare a heathen city that repents of wrong doing. In the later chapters of the book of Isaiah the thought is suggested that through Israel Yahweh will bring salvation to the Gentiles:—"It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my deliverance unto the end of the earth," 32.

In the first century of the Christian era, and in the century immediately preceding, Judaism showed some promise of becoming a missionary religion. Numerous proselytes were won to it in Alexandria, Rome, and elsewhere. Full conformity to the Jewish Law with respect to circumcision and other rites was exacted of Gentile converts. After, however, Christianity, under the leadership of Paul adopted the policy of accepting Gentile converts without expecting them to conform to the onerous requirements of the Law, the older religion became

unable to compete successfully with its new rival in missionary efforts. Presently missionary activity was given up by Judaism. It was concluded that in His own good time Yahweh will cause all nations of their own accord to seek inclusion within the Jewish religion, accepting all its requirements. Until that time shall come, it is the duty of the Jewish people to preserve the religion pure and undefiled. In so doing they are of service to mankind as a sort of national priesthood. This is the view held, by liberal Jews at least, at the present time. They admit that there is much that is good in other religions besides their own. Christians who are true to God as they understand Him will be recognized and rewarded by Him.

In times of prosperity Messianic dreams have had little hold; when hardship and oppression have come to the Jew they have revived. The period when Antiochus Epiphanes persecuted the Jewish nation and endeavored to force them to become apostates was such a time of extreme oppression. It accordingly produced a remarkable apocalyptic literature in which startling visions are described, and the date of the deliverance of Yahweh attended in some cases by the coming of the Messiah, is calculated to be very close at hand. The book of Daniel, which is of this type, is thought to have appeared close upon the first successes of the Maccabean resistance to Antiochus Epiphanes. With the decline of Jewish prosperity and independence after the Maccabean revival, apocalyptic hopes again flamed up. A large literature of predictions appeared, foretelling numerous wars between the nations, and the time of the coming of Yahweh and his Messiah. These were published under the names of Enoch, Moses, Baruch, the twelve patriarchs, and others. In the book of Enoch the Messiah is described as eternally pre-existing in the heavens, and destined to descend upon the earth in human form at the time appointed by God. The Enoch conceptions of an eternal and spiritual Messiah are thought by some to have exerted considerable influence upon early Christianity.

From what has been said it will be seen that the Jewish conceptions of the coming of Yahweh have always been diverse and inconsistent. Some of them have associated the appearance of a Messiah with the coming of Yahweh and some have not. The whole idea has always been visionary and fantastic. Possibly it has been of value to hold faithful Jews together in times of persecution, and so to help to preserve the religion.

But on the whole the notion at least in its apocalyptic forms, seems chiefly to have been conducive to unwholesome otherworldliness, indifference to orderly progress, bitterness toward Gentiles and dreams of cruel vengeance on them for the wrongs of Israel; and, at the worst, to fanatical revolts such as finally brought Jerusalem to its ruin. From Jewish apocalyptic notions developed those of Christianity, such as we find expressed in the book of Revelation, and which deserve as little commendation.

VI—*Conclusions*

The contrasts between the successes and failures of Judaism as compared with the religions of Greece and Rome were indicated at the beginning of the chapter. It remains necessary to draw a few conclusions and make certain comparisons between Judaism and Christianity.

The great strength of Judaism, as we have seen, is on the side of Agency; its conception of God is at once sublime and yet humanly intimate and accessible. The religion has been preserved through its Law and other sacred scriptures which have been taught in the synagogue and home and have become ingrained in the affections of Jewish children. The observance of Sabbath and other ritual, especially that connected with the preparation of food, has kept the Jews a distinct and peculiar people. Before the rise of Christianity there was no other religion in the Roman empire that effectively conserved individual and social values, and this was one of the reasons for the decay of civilization. Their law and ritual preserved for the Jews the ideal of a higher and purer moral and social life than they otherwise could have attained, and enabled them to seek and find the support of the God that they needed in order to lead such a life. Judaism commands high admiration for the purity and tenderness of its family life; and the worship of the home, especially the Passover, conserves the values of the family more effectively than is done, probably, by any other religion, not excepting Christianity.

The festivals observed by the Synagogue, such as the Day of Atonement, the New Year's Day and the Feast of Weeks now including for reform Jews the confirmation service, still retain their impressiveness, and deepen and strengthen the faith of the worshippers; while even the most important days of the Christian year, like Easter and Christmas, regrettably

have for most Christians lost their spiritual significance and become merely holidays.

A point of supreme excellence in Judaism is its conception of God—for the purposes of religion the finest that the world had known up to the time of its development by the prophets. This conception, with its further development during the Middle Ages, is today very much like ordinary Christian theism, more so than many Jewish writers are willing to admit. For the Jew, as for the Christian, there is but one God. He is eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient, absolutely just, righteous, and holy; of long compassion and tender mercy. Jewish writers often claim that their religion maintains the essential unity of God unequivocally, in superiority to Christianity, which even in its Protestant forms tends to obscure the unity of God with its Trinity of three Persons (one of whom has been a human being); while, for all adherents of Christianity during most of the centuries of its existence and for the majority of them still, the adoration of the Virgin Mary and the invocation of the saints are a veiled polytheism. This, of course, is a misunderstanding of Christianity. It is an equal misunderstanding of Judaism, however, for Christians to imagine since Jews do not rely on the mediation of Jesus as their Saviour, that God seems to them remote and inaccessible. On the contrary, the pious Jew directly approaches his God with the same loving and reverent sense of intimacy as the earnest Christian.

Jewish writers sometimes claim that Judaism puts more emphasis on the justice of God, while Christianity speaks mostly of His love, and hence that Judaism has a more consistently ethical character and is more effective in conserving social and political justice. The more constant study of the prophets by the Jew may have made a difference here. Each religion may bring out more clearly truths that the other has not seen so well. However, the love of God is equally important with His justice. Each religion, as a matter of fact, teaches that God is both just and loving, and that He expects men to be both also. Whatever difference there may be is simply in emphasis. While Judaism, as has been said, did not originally achieve the intellectual analysis of ethical values which the Greeks attained, the contributions of the Greeks to civilization have been as accessible to Jews in medieval and modern times as to Christians. With respect to moral philosophy, theology,

and the philosophy of religion as well as all other products of modern thought, including of course the natural sciences, neither religion possesses any advantage over the other.

There is, however, one profound difference between the two religions. Judaism maintains its integrity through study of a Book, and conformity to ritualistic observance. The Jew learns to love the Law, and through it he often attains a close and tender intimacy with God and is thereby enabled to lead a saintly life. The Christian attaches his affections to a human being, whom, if orthodox, he believes to be very God of very God, and in any event, whom he reveres as his Master, and through whom he learns to love and know God. "The love and loyalty of the Jew are directed toward the Law of God, of the Christian toward the Son of God." Now, to the Gentile races of the world loyalty to a person is more satisfying and uplifting than loyalty to a ceremonial law. The Messianic hope of the Jews is impossible of fulfillment, if it means that the time will ever come when Christians will forsake Jesus in order to become circumcised and subject in other respects to Jewish ritual. The Christian can learn to be tolerant, and to recognize that the Law is dear and sacred to the Jew, and that through conformity to it the Jew can and often does lead a beautiful and holy life. But for him to consent to conform to any such meticulous ritual himself will forever be entirely out of the question. Paul understood Gentile (or at least Aryan) psychology in this matter perfectly, and was correct in realizing that no religion of Jewish origin could ever make headway among the Gentiles of Europe that had not become emancipated from the Law.

Jewish students have sometimes privately asked the author if he believes that the study of comparative religion should force them to admit the superiority of Christianity and become adherents to it. That is a matter that the Jews must decide for themselves. The religion of their fathers is sublime; it has many tender associations which they cannot lightly disregard. It is not easy for most persons to change from one religion to another after adolescence, and to gain much comfort from the new religion. The religious habits and emotional set that have developed since childhood, if broken, are liable not to be replaced by new sentiments that are profound and lasting, 33. So it seems very doubtful if an individual Jew under

ordinary circumstances will benefit morally and religiously by adopting a different faith.

The question, however, is sometimes raised whether Judaism as a religion has not now really performed its mission. The unity of God has been generally accepted. There is little danger that Christianity will ever again lapse into conditions of moral degradation, as it did in Arabia before the rise of Mohammedanism and in Europe just before the Reformation. It is asked precisely what values Judaism is conserving today for society in general that would not be conserved as well without it. And, by isolating themselves from the rest of the world in an exclusive endogamous caste, the Jewish people lose many of the contacts and cultural opportunities that the rest of society enjoys. They suffer, too, from misunderstandings and prejudices that are not easier to bear because they are acknowledged by all intelligent Christians to be cruel and unjust.

However, on the whole, the author rather hopes that the Jews will remain true to the faith of their fathers, liberalizing and modernizing it where necessary, but not so wholly abandoning the ritualistic observances as to threaten their racial and religious integrity. It is wholesome for Christians to realize that social and moral values can be effectively conserved by another religion. Christianity has often tended to put undue emphasis on intellectual assent to creeds and doctrines. The presence of a rival religion, which has always been free from this fault, and which rightly centers religion on the life and conduct of the home and religious community, will help to keep Christianity from being one sided. There may, after all, be some truth in the notion that the Jews have a priestly mission in the world, that they keep before mankind ideals of true religion that otherwise might be obscured. Intelligent Christians respect the right of Jews to decide this question for themselves; they gladly welcome with the right hand of fellowship any Jews who may care to unite with them, and they regard with equal respect and good will those who choose to remain faithful to the Law and the Prophets.

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The closing pages of this chapter, especially the paragraph in the middle of page 148, do not do full justice to the attitude of liberal Jews who support the modernistic standpoint in religious questions. This type of Judaism is often known as Reform Judaism (see page 136). Liberal Jews do not conform to a meticulous ritual; for them the Law (Torah) is spiritual and not literal in its import. Many of them agree with Dr. C. G. Montefiore that Jesus should be regarded as "one of the greatest religious heroes and teachers whom the world has seen," and that the religion of the future, which will be "a developed and purified Judaism," will not exclude the record of Jesus who is "perhaps its greatest" as certainly its "most potent and influential teacher" (*Synoptic Gospels,* vol. II, p. 594). Liberal Jews differ chiefly from extremely liberal Christians (such as the Unitarians) in not putting central emphasis on Jesus. Moreover, they believe that Judaism has a moral and spiritual message to the world which Christianity and other non-Jewish religions have not yet fully learned. In making this correction, the author desires to express his gratitude to his good friend, Mr. Myron W. Jacobs, as well as to other Jewish correspondents.

CHAPTER XI

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY

Christianity, following the model of the definition of religion set forth in Chapter V, may be defined as the *endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through the agency of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.* Christians of different ages and communions have held and still hold various doctrines regarding the manner in which God is revealed in Jesus Christ, and so made available to the believer. But this general formula applies to them all. The common Christian conviction is that the believer in some manner gains divine power through the personality and leadership of Christ. Variations in doctrines and creeds are to be regarded as so many different attempts to explain the nature of the experience on which this conviction rests; and differences in ritual and ecclesiastical organization are alternative methods of procedure in obtaining the experience for oneself, communicating it to contemporary fellow men, and transmitting it to future generations.

I—*Jesus of Nazareth*

As in the case of Buddhism, nearly all the knowledge that has come down to us regarding the Founder of Christianity is contained in literature written by adherents of the religion a considerable time after his death. In both cases, however, the personal characteristics of the Founder are so clearly delineated, and the general spirit of his teachings stands forth so sharply, that opinion is all but unanimous that he actually lived, and that an accurate impression of what he said and did is obtainable from the study of the sacred accounts, 1. Conservative scholars are disposed to accept practically everything in the scriptures regarding the Founder as authentic; while radicals not only reject all incidents that cannot be shown to be possible in accordance with the natural sciences of our own times, but various other details that do not accord with their own particular theories regarding the manner in which the religion originated. The radicals, naturally, vary considerably among themselves in what they accept as historic.

It will not be necessary to give an outline of the life of Jesus as set forth by the conservatives. To ascertain this, the reader needs merely to consult the Gospels themselves, or a good *Harmony* in which the four Gospel accounts are printed in parallel columns. The following statements, the author believes, belong within the minimum that most radicals accept; they of course are agreed to by all conservatives.

Jesus of Nazareth was born within a decade of the traditional year of our calendars. He grew up in Galilee, the northern province of the Palestine of those times, probably in the village of Nazareth, and he was probably educated to the trade of a carpenter. The discourses attributed to him reveal familiarity with the Jewish Scriptures, which he doubtless heard read and discussed in the local synagogue in the dialect of the country (Aramaic). He may have learned to read them in Hebrew in the village school. His recorded utterances make little employment of the interpretations of the Pharisees and other scholars of the time. The age in which he lived—to put it mildly—was one in which the Jewish religion was not at its best. The intellectual classes (chiefly scribes and Pharisees) who knew the profundities of rabbinical interpretation, were as a class, indifferent to the common people, and did not do as much as they ought to have done to share their knowledge with them. Some of the scholars were men of deep piety and religious insight; others had become absorbed in the technicalities of the Law, and seemed to the common people (perhaps justly) to have lost sight of its true spirit. Getting little religious instruction from the intellectual leaders, the masses were unduly influenced by apocalyptic literature, which had wide circulation among them. Impatient of the oppression of their Jewish and Roman rulers, they ardently awaited the coming of Yahweh and the Messiah. Visionaries, who imagined themselves divinely sent prophets or Messiahs, kept appearing and causing popular uprisings which gave the government a good deal of trouble.

Not far from the year 30 A. D., an ascetic from the desert, known to history as John the Baptist, came preaching through the countryside. He denounced the evils of the times with vigor but justice, exhorting the people to repent from their sins and to be baptized by him in preparation for the coming of Yahweh, which he announced to be at hand. Among those

who came to listen to him and be baptized was Jesus, then a young man possibly thirty years of age.

Subsequent to his baptism Jesus went through a profound spiritual experience. He retired into the desert to fast and to pray. He returned with the consciousness of a mission. He went from place to place, exhorting people to repent, and to prepare themselves for a new religious era. He interpreted to them the significance of religious truths with depth of feeling, clarity of insight, and force of conviction, such as they had not heard from the scribes in the synagogues. His magnetic personality made a deep impression. Many experienced spiritual awakenings, at least for the time; while enough of the significance of his teachings penetrated the minds of a few to induce them to forsake all and follow him. Out of pity for their sufferings, he healed many sick folk who had faith in him—miraculously, according to conservatives, by mental suggestion as radical critics think. After a while the novelty of his preaching subsided, and many fell away. A few, however, remained faithful. To them he explained his teachings more fully, developing the import of the parables which he employed in his public addresses, according to the custom of the times. A chosen band of twelve men were associated more intimately with him, and three of them (Peter, James and John) were with him constantly. Among these it was understood in secrecy that he was the Messiah.

He decided that it was necessary to call attention to himself and his work by going to Jerusalem at the time of the Passover, when the city would be thronged with pilgrims. He rode into the city on an ass, in dramatic fulfilment of an ancient prophecy, 2; an act, which must have been interpreted by many observers to imply Messianic claims. He addressed the crowds in the streets. He went into the temple, and drove out a gang of money changers and sellers of offerings who were cheating the worshippers and profaning the sanctity of the place. He denounced the Pharisees vehemently. All this won for him considerable notice. Few in the listening crowds, however, could have gained any adequate idea of the spiritual greatness of Jesus, and the lofty character of his teaching. The Jewish hierarchy were irritated at his attacks upon them; they may also have been afraid that his followers would create a tumult in the crowded city that would bring down the wrath of the Roman governor. They thought it imprudent to apprehend

Jesus publicly, on account of the excitement it would cause in the streets thronged with Passover visitors. So they bribed one of his disciples (Judas Iscariot) to take them to Jesus at night, and possibly, to give them positive proof that he claimed to be the Messiah. Jesus was accordingly arrested at night, and brought before the Jewish council for a preliminary hearing. The council were shocked at what in their minds was his blasphemy in pretending to be the Messiah. They delivered him over to the Roman governor, (Pontius Pilate), on the charge that he was guilty of treason against the Roman government, in that he claimed as Messiah to be the rightful political king of the Jews. On this charge he was found guilty, and put to death by crucifixion, 3.

Before long the followers of Jesus had visions of him, both individually and collectively. They became firmly convinced that he had risen from the dead, and that he was truly the Messiah and had ascended into heaven. He would again return to the earth in human form. The dead should then arise, he would judge the living and the dead, and the present world order should come to an end. Only those who repented of their sins and accepted Jesus as the Messiah could hope for salvation in this day of judgment. They made an impressive public demonstration in Jerusalem (Pentecost) in which they "spoke with tongues" and won numerous converts.

II—*The Apostolic Age*

The followers of Jesus continued to attend the worship of the temple, like other Jews, and to conform to Jewish ritual. In addition they held private worship in their homes, which included prayer and the breaking of bread. Peter and the other apostles were able publicly to effect the cure of sick folk and accomplish "many wonders and signs" in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth. They made addresses in public places at every opportunity. Numerous converts repented of their sins, were baptized, and became members of the new religious society. The Hebrew scriptures were studied by them, and found to contain numerous prophecies of the coming of the Messiah, which were interpreted to be predictions of the death and resurrection of Jesus, as well as of events in his life. It is not remarkable that the arguments of the apostles did not convert the Jewish people as a whole. The career of Jesus certainly had not fulfilled Jewish expectations of the com-

ing of the Messiah. Jesus had not become the king of a restored Jewish nation; he had not brought universal peace to the world; nor were all nations flocking to Jerusalem to worship at the temple. As time went on, some champions of the new faith sought to prove the descent of Jesus from David through his father Joseph, and produced two apparently conflicting genealogies to prove this claim; while others said that he was miraculously born of a virgin and had no earthly father at all, 4. It is true that the Jewish expectations of the Messiah were by no means consistent or coherent themselves, 5; but it is not strange that the interpretations of the Hebrew prophets in the interests of the new faith were not convincing to most of the orthodox Jewish scholars of the times.

However, enough Jews were won at Jerusalem to constitute a community of followers, filled with fervent faith and missionary zeal. The movement spread beyond the boundaries of Palestine, where it met with more success. The Hellenistic Jews had not been accustomed to take the Scriptures so literally as the Palestinian Jews; allegorical interpretations were common among them. Nor did they observe the details of the Law with Palestinian minuteness. So they were prepared to accept the claim that in a profoundly spiritual sense Jesus had more than fulfilled the Messianic expectation; that he had put religion on a higher and more personal plane. The claims of the followers of Jesus also appealed to many "devout persons," *i. e.*, Gentiles who attended the synagogues, kept the Sabbath, and worshipped the God of Judaism without becoming full Jewish proselytes and submitting to circumcision and other ritualistic requirements.

The orthodox Jews regarded the movement of the followers of Jesus with horror. To them the claim that he was the Messiah appeared to be downright blasphemy of the worst kind. So they persecuted the blasphemers as vigorously as they could. Among the persecutors was one Saul of Tarsus, a city in Cilicia (outside of Palestine), an orthodox Jew who had received a thorough rabbinical training, partly in his native city and partly under the renowned Pharisee Gamaliel at Jerusalem. He probably had become slightly acquainted with the mystery religions which were strong in his native city, as well as with Stoicism and contemporary Platonism. Saul, while assistant in the stoning of Stephen, an Hellenistic Jewish Christian, became impressed with the piety of this martyr and of other

followers of Jesus. While upon a journey to Damascus made with the intention of prosecuting the followers of Jesus there, he experienced a remarkable conversion, including a vision of the risen Jesus, 6. He became an adherent to the new faith, changed his name to Paul, and is known to history as the renowned Apostle to the Gentiles.

For Paul acceptance of Jesus was the consequence of his personal experience (a "conversion" in the psychological sense, as will be seen in Chapter XV). He felt a tremendous reinforcement of his entire spiritual nature, a peace of soul and confidence that his previous fidelity to the Jewish Law had not afforded. He felt himself aware of the constant presence and support of Jesus, 7. The great desire of his life was to win others, particularly Gentiles, to the worship of Jesus, so that they, too, might gain the blessed experience that meant so much to him, 8.

However students of psychology may interpret the religious experience that Paul enjoyed, and that he earnestly sought to share with others, there can be no question of its efficacy in transforming his own life as well as the lives of those whom he succeeded in fully converting. His own experience convinced him that conformity to Jewish ritual was not requisite in order to gain these results, and he realized that few Gentiles would consent to become Jewish proselytes in the strict sense, including submission to circumcision and all the detailed requirements of the Law. So he insisted that Gentiles might accept the faith of Jesus without becoming Jews. Paul succeeded after earnest discussion with the more conservative disciples of Jesus in Jerusalem, in establishing his contention, 9. He engaged in active missionary efforts, and succeeded in establishing congregations in many of the principal cities of the eastern half of the Roman Empire. In his earlier epistles he seems to have thought that the end of the age was near, and that the second coming of Jesus was imminent. Later on in his career the end did not seem so close, and he became reconciled to the thought that it might not occur during his lifetime, 10.

Presently the Gentile followers of Jesus outnumbered the Jewish followers. The center of gravity in the new faith shifted; Christianity became a Gentile religion. The Gentiles, to be sure, believed Jesus to be the Christ (the Messiah), whose coming had been predicted in the Jewish scriptures. They accordingly accepted the latter as authoritative; but they

interpreted them wholly in the light of the new faith. They believed that the details of the Jewish law were abrogated by the coming of Jesus. Jesus, as "Lord," "Christ" and "Saviour" was conceived by them very differently, thinking and speaking in Greek and Latin, than by his Palestinian Jewish followers who thought of him as the "Messiah" in Hebrew and Aramaic terms. What the Gentiles sought and found in the religion of Jesus was a spiritual reinforcement through a personal God who had been a man in historic times, and through whom they could gain consciousness of forgiveness of sins, intimate communion with God in worship, and assurance of a blessed immortality. Accustomed to the mystery religions, they expected to be initiated into this religion with a solemn ceremony, and to engage in a common worship that would afford communion with God by a sacred meal. Influenced by Stoic and other philosophic thought, they believed that all men are brothers, children of the one God, in whose sight there are no distinctions between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, male and female, slave and freeman. All these points were contained in the teaching of Paul, along with more technical theological and mystical interpretations in which they were probably less interested.

III—*The Ancient Catholic Church*

So long as numerous witnesses remained who had known Jesus in the flesh, the spirit of his teaching and the memory of his life and example maintained the church on a high level of spirituality. But, as time elapsed, and the majority of the adherents of the religion were persons whose environment prior to their conversion had been pagan, a serious problem arose. How could the purity of the new religion, and its fidelity to the spirit and teachings of Jesus be preserved? Christianity did not interpret the Law with Jewish minuteness; in fact, it had come to regard it for the most part as abrogated. So the Law could not preserve the integrity of the new religion as it did that of Judaism. The ministry of Jesus, terminated by his death after a duration of not more than three years, had been too short to enable him to leave his church organized, and in possession of a coherent body of doctrine, as Buddha was able to do after a ministry of nearly half a century.

The problem was met in several ways, and the process of its solution was the evolution of the ancient Catholic Church. It

is impossible to set a date for the transition from the primitive Apostolic Church to the ancient Catholic Church. The process was very gradual. It had its beginnings before the close of the first century, at latest. It was certainly complete by the pontificate of Gregory the Great (590-604 A. D.), if not much earlier.

The original twelve apostles, with Peter as their leader, naturally exercised a certain authority as the trusted interpreters of Jesus. We know that James, a younger brother (or cousin?) of Jesus—on account of his relationship as he was not one of the original twelve apostles—also took a prominent part at a conference at Jerusalem about 50 A. D., when questions of moment were decided, 11. The great missionaries, of whom Paul was most renowned, exercised apostolic authority over the churches which they established, visiting them from time to time, and writing them epistles. In due course each congregation had as its head an *episkopos* (overseer? bishop?) who exercised considerable influence and authority in the immediate locality, and over whatever mission churches might have been established in the surrounding country. Associated with the *episkopos* in the conduct of the principal church, and in subordinate charge of smaller congregations were *presbuteroi* ("presbyters"? elders? priests?); and there were also *deacons*, who originally were perhaps chiefly charged with the assistance of the poor. Writing about the beginning of the second century Ignatius exhorted local churches to obey their *episkopoi*. Ultimately the *episkopoi* (bishops) in charge of churches in the larger cities who naturally would be men of greater eminence, both as scholars and administrators, were deferred to quite generally. After Christianity became a recognized and tolerated religion in the reign of the emperor Constantine (306-337) general councils were from time to time assembled to decide upon disputed questions that concerned the entire Church. The decisions of these councils were believed to be formed under divine guidance; and, in the opinion of historians not committed to Roman Catholicism, they were the supreme authority. The Roman Catholic view is that the decisions of the councils had to be accepted by the bishop of Rome.

In the west, Rome overshadowed other cities, and its bishop other prelates. The popes usually had the practical Roman genius of getting at the heart of a question, and avoiding superfluities. Disputes all over the Christian world were

referred to them for adjudication. By the end of the ancient period, the bishop of Rome was widely regarded in the west as the legal head of the Christian Church, in apostolic succession from St. Peter.

How slowly or how rapidly this evolution of ecclesiastical organization proceeded is in great dispute. Most conservative Protestants think that it came very gradually and that it was a degeneration from the simpler and more democratic organization of the primitive church, which was like that of the Jewish synagogue. Episcopalians, on the other hand, usually maintain that Christ founded the church with the three essential orders of bishops, priests and deacons; he meant that priestly authority should descend upon those ordained by bishops whose consecration has been at the hands of other bishops in lineal succession from the twelve apostles. Roman Catholic writers include within this doctrine of "apostolic succession" the claim that Christ gave a special commission to Peter as head of the church on earth, that Peter was first bishop of Rome, and that papal authority descends from him. The essential features in the organization of the Roman Catholic Church are either explicitly or implicitly stated in the New Testament itself; later development was a mere unfolding of what was divinely given from the start. Modern liberal scholars are usually skeptical as to the existence of three orders in the early church, and the few verses in the New Testament on which the claims of the primacy of Peter are based (12) they think to be late insertions; but they usually affirm that the evolution of ecclesiastical organization was a practical necessity of the times, that it proceeded with great rapidity, and that if it had not done so, Christianity would have become a cult of mad visionaries, would have absorbed pagan practises by the wholesale and would ultimately have lost everything of the spirit and personality of Jesus. The authority of the bishops checked the visionaries (who fancied that they were "inspired by the spirit" to preach and to practise all sorts of vagaries and immoralities) and kept the worship and discipline of the church restrained and reasonable.

IV—*The Canon*

Another way in which the spirit of Jesus was preserved in the church was by the writings left by apostles and those who had been associated with them. Paul and others had written

epistles from time to time in which they set forth practical applications of the spirit of Jesus, as they understood it, to the problems of the local congregations. Most New Testament critics now believe that reports of the words and deeds of Jesus were carefully collected about a generation after his death, by at least two independent investigators. One of these collections furnished the bulk of the present Gospel of Mark. The Gospels of Matthew and Luke consist chiefly of compilations from these two collections, to which a little material from other sources was added in each case. These are the three "synoptic" gospels. The Fourth Gospel, of later origin, is thought to be less accurate in its report of details, but that it better reveals in some respects what he had come to mean in the lives of Christians, at the end of the first century or the beginning of the second, when the spiritual scope and significance of the man and his mission had become clearer.

In due course, the scriptures that were agreed to have come down from the age of the apostles, and to have been written either by apostles (including such workers as Paul among the apostles) or by others associated with them, acquired great authority for the guidance of the church. The precise list of books now constituting our New Testament was not officially decided upon and established by a council of the whole Catholic Church until comparatively late. But, since at least 200 A. D. there has been substantial agreement on most of them. When comparison is made between the books of which the Church constituted the New Testament and such of the rejected books that have come down to us, no one can doubt the wisdom of the selection, at least on the whole, 13.

V—*The Sacraments*

The significance of the teachings of Jesus, and of the life that is open to those who follow him faithfully was impressed upon his worshippers by means of the church service, especially the *sacraments*. Two ceremonies are specifically mentioned in the Gospels—that of *Baptism* which Jesus received at the beginning of his ministry from John the Baptist and the *Lord's Supper* ("Holy Communion," "Eucharist," etc.) which the Gospels report that Jesus on the last night of his life commanded his followers to observe in perpetual remembrance of him. From the start, Baptism was expected to be attended by a genuine repentance of sins, and a changed life. The

Lord's Supper, too, was a deeply spiritual act of worship, which, at least since the time of Paul, must not be participated in thoughtlessly, 14. Modern historical scholars are as little agreed as theologians of former times whether baptism was originally supposed by Christians to effect a physical as well as a spiritual transformation in its sincerely repentant recipients, and whether the various New Testament passages in which the bread and wine of the Supper are referred to as the "body and blood" of Christ were understood literally. Protestants have usually taken both of these sacraments to be symbolical in meaning; they are impressive and dramatic ceremonies calling attention to the changes that take place in the mind of a believer when he becomes a Christian, in the case of baptism; and, in the Lord's Supper, the increased spiritual strength which he receives when, in company with fellow Christians, he celebrates this service in commemoration of the great love and sacrifice of Christ for men. Roman Catholics no less than Protestants insist on the spiritual experiences that attend the celebration of these sacraments, when received sincerely; but they add that these experiences are made possible by reason of the grace imparted through physical miracles. Whatever the belief of the first Christians in the matter may have been, the evidence appears conclusive that these sacraments were understood to be miraculous as early as the beginning of the second century.

Other sacraments were also observed by the ancient Catholic church. Ultimately, during the middle ages, the Latin Church definitely fixed the number of sacraments as seven. These sacraments are outward signs believed to have been instituted, either explicitly or implicitly by Christ to give grace. *Confirmation* is a sacrament in which the bishop extends his hands over those to be received into the fellowship of the Church, prays that they may receive the Holy Ghost, and anoints the head of each with holy chrism in the form of a cross. It had gradually, during the ancient period, become the custom to baptize infants. The psychological justification of a ceremony to impress upon parents and guardians their responsibility for the religious upbringing of a child is clear; it is no less clear that, once the initiatory rite of admission into the Christian faith became celebrated in infancy, another sacrament had to become differentiated to mark the conscious assumption by

adolescent or adult of the responsibilities and privileges of membership in the Church.

A person's character was supposed to become permanently transformed when he accepted for himself the Christian faith; he was "born again" in the words of the conversation between Christ and Nicodemus given in the Fourth Gospel. But practical experience revealed that even professing Christians sometimes lapsed. This particularly proved to be the case during the severe persecutions; men would fall away, and later on repent and wish to be received again by the Church. So it was believed that such persons must demonstrate their sincerity by avowed repentance and willingness to accept suitable discipline. This is the sacrament of *Penance*. As finally developed, it now involves that a person honestly call to mind his sins, have whole hearted contrition for them, including the honest resolution to commit them no more, confess them to a priest, and accept such punishment as he may impose. It by no means implies in the minds of Catholics that confession to a priest is a substitute for confession to God; on the contrary, it is claimed to assure that such repentance and confession to God actually does take place, which would not at all be certain if these important steps were left wholly to the unguided initiative of the individual in his private devotions, as is the Protestant custom.

Extreme Unction is a sacrament in which the priest anoints the believer who is in danger of death from sickness, and prays for him. It is believed to fortify his soul in the crisis, and when God wills, to strengthen his body also. Marriage ties had become very loosely regarded in the ancient pagan world; the Church emphasized the sacredness of marriage, so strongly taught by Jesus, by teaching that the ceremony of *Marriage*, when performed by Christian rites, is a sacrament. The performance of miraculous sacraments evidently implies the possession of divine power and grace; so *Holy Orders*, the ceremony by which the clergy are ordained, is a sacrament.

Various other "holy usages" became general practices in the ancient Church. These have since become designated by the Roman Church as "sacramentals," and are regarded as acts or objects set apart or blessed by the Church "to excite good thoughts and to increase devotion, and through these movements of the heart to remit venial sin." Sacramentals include the sign of the cross, holy water, blessed candles, ashes,

palms, crucifixes, images of the Blessed Virgin and of the saints, rosaries, and scapulars. It is clear to the historian that most of the sacramentals were adopted under the influence of the pagan practices in which Christians had engaged before they became converted; this does not, however, diminish their helpfulness in worship when adopted by the Church and given a Christian significance.

Christians of all ages have requested fellow Christians, especially those whom they have esteemed for their piety, to pray for them. In a world where prayers to the dead were a common practice it is not strange that ancient Christians asked the venerated dead to pray for them; and in regions where the worship of a divine Mother and her Son had been the practice from time immemorial, it was natural that the prayers of the Mother of Jesus should have been requested of her after her death. Prayers were properly addressed to God only (the three persons of the Trinity), and to Him alone were altars and churches erected; although the mediation of the Blessed Virgin and the saints was asked for, and altars and chapels erected in their honor. Objects associated with them during their lifetime are always precious to people, who have lost through death those whom they have loved and revered. The respect paid to relics of saints was perfectly natural and inevitable. In the orthodox Church of ancient times the more intelligent, at least, did not confuse the respect paid to relics and the adoration of Virgin and saints with the worship of God. The influence of paganism strengthened these practices of course; but Jewish and Protestant critics are wrong in accusing either ancient or modern Catholics, when intelligent and orthodox, of tendencies in the direction of polytheism. Had ancient Catholics been addicted to such tendencies they would not have accepted martyrdom, as so many did, rather than do reverence to the statues of the emperors and the official deities believed by pagans to conserve the values of the state.

VI—*Creeds*

The faith of Jesus spread in a world by no means devoid of philosophical and theological ideas. It was inevitable that Gentile converts should interpret their new religion in the light of these conceptions. In fact, the Christian experience needed such interpretation in order to make it more intelligible, and

to harmonize it with the rest of human knowledge. Through Jesus men everywhere experienced a closer contact with God; their ideals became purer, and they received strength to be true to them. The fears and superstitions of pagan religions were escaped, not by skepticism, but by divine support and assurance of a blessed immortality. How should one understand these experiences and this assurance? So the thinkers of the Church worked out theories of the nature of God of how God became incarnate in the man Jesus (the incarnation); and how through his life and death Jesus has made it possible for sinful men to become acceptable to God (the atonement); how God the Father is related to His Son, Jesus Christ, and both to the Holy Ghost, who is present in the lives of believers (the Trinity). Not all of the theories first advanced upon these subjects permanently proved satisfactory. Many of them contained pagan conceptions fundamentally in contradiction with the spirit of Christianity. This is not surprising in view of the rapidity with which Christianity spread, and the hosts of Gentile converts who had been educated in environments alien to Christian ideals, and in view of the fact that there was little philosophy in the Judaism from which Christianity had sprung that could be drawn upon to meet these problems. So, out of all the confused philosophies that were first advanced, the Fathers of the Church gradually developed systems of doctrine that were suited to the needs of those times. Space does not permit an outline of these doctrines, nor of the heresies against which they had to contend. A few of the more important Fathers were Clement of Rome (†about 97), Ignatius (†about 117), Justin Martyr (†165), Irenaeus of Lyons (†200), Tertullian (†220), Cyprian (†258), Clement of Alexandria (†215), Origen (†about 251), Athanasius (†373), Basil (†379), Gregory of Nyssa (†394), Gregory of Nazianzus (†389), Ambrose (†397), Jerome (†420), and Augustine of Hippo (†430).

From the second century on, short statements of faith were repeated by adults receiving baptism and confirmation. From these developed the Apostles' Creed, in the form we know it. When Christianity became a recognized religion in the Roman empire, it was found necessary, in the interests of order and harmony, to summon councils to settle various disputed doctrines, and to set forth their conclusions in creeds. As the outcome of such deliberations on the part of councils the Nicene

(fourth century) and Athanasian (sixth century) creeds are the best known and most important.

VII—*The Function of the Ancient Catholic Church*

The development of the Ancient Catholic Church from the primitive church was inevitable. In the condition of the times, the spirit of Jesus could not otherwise have remained effective. There had to be bishops to maintain order, check extravagances and immorality, and to administer the churches, together with Christian schools and charitable institutions, and to interpret the meaning of Christianity in doubtful cases. Questions of moment that concerned the whole church necessitated councils. The rulers of the church had to have a generally accepted Bible to guide them; and they had to assume the responsibility of interpreting it to laymen; for in the case of newly converted pagans it was impossible that scripture should be of private interpretation. The fundamentals of the Christian faith, as it was understood in those times, had to be formulated in creeds, worked out by experts, and adopted by regular authority. And there had to be sacraments through which the different aspects of the Christian life might become vivid and real to the worshippers, so that they might gain consciousness of the spiritual presence of Jesus in their own lives. Without the institutions of the Catholic church, the ancient Christian converts would have degraded Christianity into a polytheism no better than the paganism that it succeeded. Visionaries would have led Christian worshippers into all kinds of fanatical and even immoral orgies, as indeed they sometimes attempted to do. The ancient Catholic Church conserved the message of Jesus and made it effective in the lives of mankind.

The work of the ancient church has been attacked on two sides. On the one hand it has been urged that since many of its beliefs and practices came from the outside world, and were neither of Jewish nor apostolic origin, they cannot be true. Cardinal Newman has eloquently replied to this objection from a modern Roman Catholic standpoint: the Church was divinely inspired and directed in assimilating the rites and doctrines that she needed. "So far then from her creed being of doubtful credit because it resembles foreign theologies, we even hold that one special way in which Providence has imparted divine knowledge to us has been by enabling her to draw and collect it together out of the world, and in this sense, as in others, to

'suck the milk of the Gentiles and to suck the breast of kings,' " 15. The other line of attack has been to point out the ever lower spiritual levels to which Christianity descended from the beginning of the second century on. There were endless quarrels and squabbles within the church; increasing numbers sought salvation not by leading a useful life in the world, but by withdrawing as hermits or monks into the desert; and, no sooner did Christians gain control of the imperial government than they began to persecute the pagans and massacre them with greater fury than had ever been employed upon Christians. It must be confessed that the later history of the ancient Christian church is sad and disappointing when contrasted with its beginning in the time of Jesus and his apostles. It can be pointed out, however, that no movement has ever become world wide without losing much of the fervor and pure vision of its originators. The marvel is, not that the Church lost so much of the spirit of Jesus, but rather that it retained any of it at all. As an institution the ancient Church ultimately brought the gospel to everyone; through its discipline it preserved its purity as much as was possible; without its bishops, sacraments, and creeds, there would have been no gospel left at all. The Gospels themselves and their preservation in the canon together with the rest of the New Testament, we owe to the initiative of the ancient Church.

The reader should observe that we have not been considering how far the twentieth century should accept without modification the ancient ecclesiastical form of Christianity, with its bishops, councils and popes, with its infallible Bible, with its numerous sacraments that to the modern mind are not wholly free from magical notions, and with its subtle creeds expressed in the language of a period in the history of science and philosophy that has long since been superseded. The only conclusion on which the writer at this point wishes to insist, is that *for the ancient world*, the ancient Catholic Church conserved the fundamental moral values more effectively than any pagan philosophy or mystery religion was able to do, or than the primitive Apostolic Church could have done if it had persisted in an unaltered form after the first century, refusing to adapt itself to the conditions of its environment.

VIII—*The Medieval Latin Church*

When the Roman empire fell in the west, the Church, alone

of ancient institutions to endure, became stronger than ever. This is a striking instance of the plasticity of Christianity, and its adaptability to changed conditions. St. Augustine of Hippo (†430) foresaw the impending doom of the empire, and worked out the philosophical basis for the Latin church of the middle ages. St. Gregory the Great (†604) was the most brilliant of the Christian statesmen who laid the foundations of the medieval Church.

The theology of St. Augustine, like that of St. Paul, owed much to his own personal Christian experience. A pagan in youth, and a believer in the semi-pagan semi-Christian Manichaean heresy in his young manhood, he experienced in 386 a remarkable conversion of the "sense of sin" type (described in Chapter XV), as a result of the preaching of St. Ambrose. He won as a consequence a complete victory over the moral temptations that had previously beset him, and gained great inward strength and peace of mind. Since his own conversion and subsequent spiritual happiness were the consequence of Catholic preaching and the acceptance of the sacraments, St. Augustine believed implicitly in the authority of the Catholic Church, that salvation can be gained only through her sacraments, and that earthly rulers should be subject to her. The empire, as he saw after Alaric and his Goths captured the city of Rome in 410, must soon pass away. Its mission, however, had been accomplished. By subduing the nations and bringing them under a common rule, and in other ways, it had made possible the spread and triumph of the Christian faith. It must now give way to the Church,—the City of God—which henceforth must more and more rule the world. The Stoics had sought to ground religion in a world order which they conceived as the city of God; it was the achievement of Augustine to find this conception embodied in a living institution,—the Holy Catholic Church.

There were two sides to Augustine's philosophy of religion. His faith had grown out of his own inner experience; on the inner life of the indivdiual he accordingly bases proofs of the existence of God, and conceives of the relation between God and the individual as intimate and personal, 16. On the other hand he finds the Christian experience incorporated in the Church, and made available to the individual only through her instrumentality. The second side of St. Augustine was the more immediately influential; it furnished firm grounds for

churchly authority, and made vital and clear for western minds the subtle doctrines of the Church, such as the Trinity, the incarnation, and the freedom of the will. The significance of St. Augustine's emphasis on the inner life of the individual was scarcely appreciated until over a thousand years later, when it had a great influence on the Protestant reformers, as well as on Descartes (†1650) who initiated the first great secular philosophical movement in modern times with a philosophy based on the Augustinian doctrine of the certainty and immediacy of self-consciousness, 17.

Through the statesmanship of a number of able bishops, the see of Rome had gradually won, and, on the whole wisely administered its ecclesiastical supremacy in the West. By the end of the pontificate of Gregory the Great (604) this evolution had become in large measure completed. The primacy of the pope of Rome had become largely accepted in the West; though not recognized in the East, the latter was destined to go its own way with slight connection with the West, although the final separation between the Latin and Greek churches is usually not dated until four centuries later. The missions to the barbarians thrived; important races like the Anglo-Saxons and the Lombards had been won for the Catholic Church, others would ultimately enter her fold. The doctrine of Purgatory (an intermediate state in which those who are to be ultimately saved are purged of their sins and made ready for Heaven, a process which can be hastened by the sacrifices and prayers of the living) had become accepted. In doctrine, ritual, and organization the foundations of the Medieval Latin Church had been laid.

The problem of the Latin Church in the Middle Ages can be simply stated. The western world had been overrun by ignorant barbarians whose primitive nature religions readily gave way to the more impressive rites, higher moral ideals and superior culture of the Catholic Church. When all other institutions fell, the Church survived, thanks to the philosophical interpretation of St. Augustine and the constructive work of the popes and other Christian statesmen, and, above all, to the inherent excellence of her spiritual ideals. She was ready to assist the barbarians to conserve values, and to appreciate values more fully.

What the untamed barbarians needed most of all from a religion was discipline. This the Church afforded, through her

sacraments, especially penance and the confessional. The sacraments and liturgy were further defined. Some discipline was even maintained over kings and emperors, who were not allowed to forget that they had consciences. The pacificism of early Christianity was obviously impossible for these warlike men who were still half savages. So the Church did what she could to mitigate the evils of warfare. During a portion of the year, at least, men should obey the "Truce of God" and refrain from fighting. The warrior was enthused with the ideals of Chivalry; his investiture as a knight became a solemn religious ceremony in which he vowed to defend women, widows, orphans, clergy, and pilgrims, and to combat all forms of oppression and injustice. A finer life than one given to the shedding of blood was to be found in the complete devotion of one's self to Christ as a monk or nun. Within the shelter of cloister and cathedral there was opportunity for prayer, pious acts, and cultivation of learning. Monks copied and preserved ancient manuscripts, so that classical learning was not lost forever. They preached to the people, gave them spiritual counsel, and heard their confessions. They maintained hospitals and orphanages. In connection with abbeys and churches there were schools. When religion declined, new orders arose and vitalized it, of which that initiated by St. Dominic (†1221) was most noteworthy for teaching and scholarship, while that of St. Francis of Assisi (†1226) was famous for simple piety and work among the poor.

As new learning came in from the East, or was revived by the study of manuscripts that had been preserved in the convents, it was interpreted in the light of the Christian religion. Theological questions were debated at length, and the doctrines of Christianity were interpreted, and supported by philosophical arguments. This was on the whole done reverently. For St. Anselm (†1109) the province of theology was to enable one to understand what one believed, and he set forth arguments for the existence of God, and the incarnation and atonement of Christ. After Abelard (†1142) (to whom education owes much for the great impetus which he gave to university studies) had marshalled the Fathers in parallel columns and indicated apparent contradictions in them, St. Thomas Aquinas (†1274) showed how, by honestly facing and reconciling such seeming inconsistencies, it was possible to develop coherence and system, and with them, profounder understanding. In his

Summa he worked out the principles of Christian philosophy, and succeeded in giving in the light of the knowledge of his age, a systematic interpretation of the world as a whole, and the place of man and human institutions in it. This philosophy, which still furnishes the basis for the brilliant Neo-Scholasticism of our own time, did not long remain a technical abstraction. Dante (†1321) gave it warmth and vitality as well as æsthetic expression in his *Divine Comedy.* Mystics had personal experiences of union with God, and inspired men to live close to Him. Eckhart (†1327), Tauler (†1361), Suso (†1366) and John of Ruysbroeck (†1381) are among the most important besides Thomas à Kempis (†1471) or whoever was the author of the *Imitation of Christ*—a favorite manual of devotion among both Roman Catholics and Protestants down to the present time, 18.

Medieval civilization had its faults. What civilization has not? But we moderns must not forget that there *was* a brilliant medieval civilization, great in intellectual achievements, notably in philosophy, theology, literature, and architecture, and that this was chiefly due to the medieval Latin Church. This civilization, too, was cosmopolitan. Latin was the universal language of the learned occident; there was free interchange of scholarship between the nations. And there was a common religious worship which bound men together as members of the terrestrial portion of the City of God, and made them feel in close intimacy, too, with the saints of Heaven. Consideration of the other world, with its ideals of purgation from sin for the repentant, condemnation for the unrepentant, and eternal blessedness for the redeemed, was vivid, and did much to inspire men to livelier faith and more devotion to pious works. In no other period in history has organized Christianity been so dominant in human life; in the ancient world it had to compete with paganism; in the modern world its coherence and internationalism have been sundered by sects and it has had to compete with scientific and other secular interests.

After the thirteenth century, the medieval Latin church passed into a state of decay from which it was only rescued by the Catholic and Protestant Reformations of the sixteenth century. The very head of the church, who should have been faithful to his duties as "vicar of Christ" and "servant of the servants of God," was sometimes either a moral profligate, or

the intriguing prince of a petty Italian state with no conception of his apostolic responsibilities, or so extravagant a lover of luxury and the advancement of the fine arts that he connived at the sale of indulgences in a morally vicious way for the sake of revenues. With such examples in the see of St. Peter itself, nunneries sometimes became little better than brothels, monasteries centers of sloth and vice, and cathedrals places of corruption. The discipline of the sacraments, which had earlier done much to tame barbarians and to turn their thoughts to spiritual ideals, became the tool by which the credulities and superstitions of the laity could be exploited to the pecuniary benefit of the clergy. By the beginning of the sixteenth century western Christianity had sunk to the lowest depths that it has ever reached.

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CHAPTER XII

MODERN CHRISTIANITY

The modern occidental world contains two principal types of Christianity:—the modern Roman Catholic church which preserves the main features of the ancient Catholic and the medieval Latin churches, with abuses removed and doctrine and discipline perfected, and is international in its scope; and the various Protestant churches, most of which began as attempts to restore the Christian faith to what it was believed to have been in New Testament times, and which are confined within national boundaries either as state churches or independent denominations. The Roman Catholic church has changed comparatively little since the reforms of the sixteenth century; the Protestant viewpoints have undergone considerable modification in each century. Each type of Christianity has met the problems and conserved the socially recognized values of the modern world in its own way. In separation each has been able to develop according to its own genius, while it has lost something that the other might have given it, had there been more co-operation between them.

I—*The Modern Roman Catholic Church*

The reform of the Latin Church was not completed until after half of Europe had broken away from it as a result of the Protestant Reformation. However, the movement had already begun in Spain in the closing years of the fifteenth century, where, under Queen Isabella and her confessor Ximines, there had been a thorough reform of the monasteries, and provision made for the better education of the clergy and the study of the Bible.

The reformed spiritual environment of Spain produced St. Ignatius Loyola (†1556) the founder of the Jesuit order. Stirred as a young man by reading the lives of Christ, St. Dominic and St. Francis, and accounts of chivalry, he resolved to become a knight in a spiritual sense, devoted to the Blessed Virgin Mary. He gathered about him a group of

ardent university students and organized a religious society. The members were made loyal and efficient by a discipline modeled after that of soldiers. In place of military drill they conscientiously followed the directions given in Loyola's manual of *Spiritual Exercises*. The systematic cultivation of religious experience according to written directions and under the supervision of a trained spiritual adviser has afforded to members of the Society of Jesus a vital and aggressive Christian life in conformity to the rule of the order and in service of the Church. Through preaching, the confessional, and foreign missions, the Jesuits deepened and purified the spiritual life of Catholic Europe during the sixteenth century.

The chief faults of the Jesuits were the defects of their qualities. Zeal for the advancement of the Church sometimes led them to political intrigues; absolute submission to superiors occasionally led to a deadening of individual conscience, and a mechanical performance of actions that were not always right; rigorous orthodoxy often made them merciless bigots and persecutors. After a while they became a pest in Roman Catholic countries, and governments were obliged to expel them. Finally the pope had to suppress the order altogether in 1773. It was again revived in 1814. The period of adversity has taught them their lesson; and nothing but praise is due to the Jesuits of today for the thoroughness of their scholarship, the depth of their piety, and the spirit of service with which they devote themselves to the advancement of religion.

The awakened conscience of Catholic Europe finally forced the calling of a Council at Trent in 1545. Its sessions continued, with interruptions, until 1563. It gave formulation to the developments of Catholic doctrines during the Middle Ages, and made definite the demarcation between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The name Roman Catholic, properly begins at this time. The deposit of truth vouchsafed by God at the time of the coming of Christ has been preserved partly in the Bible and partly in tradition, and has been interpreted by the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The abuses of previous centuries were removed. Discipline was restored in monasteries. The abuse of indulgences was stopped. The morality of the clergy was reformed. The confessional was restored to its proper function as the medium through which true contrition finds its reward in merited absolution and is effective as a means of spiritual counsel and guidance. Popes

and clergy again became men of Christian piety and consecration. The reformation of the church was followed by manifestations of a deepened spirituality, first of which was the Spanish mystical movement led by Saint Teresa (†1582) and St. John of the Cross (†1591).

Another Council, called by Pope Pius IX in 1870, settled definitely two dogmas, the infallibility of the pope and the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The former dogma maintains "that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is to say, when in exercise of the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole church, by the divine assistance promised him in blessed Peter, he has that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed that his Church should possess in defining doctrine concerning faith and morals; and hence, that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves and not from the consent of the Church, irreformable." The effect of this doctrine is to establish the authority of the pope over that of councils. Moreover his decisions are infallible. There still seems to be the greatest diversity of opinions among Roman Catholic writers just which of the recorded utterances of the popes must be regarded as *ex cathedra* in this infallible sense; and even whether they are very many or extremely few in number; no list of them has ever been officially announced.

According to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, the Blessed Virgin Mary was conceived by her own mother St. Anne, free from all taint of original sin; she conceived her Son by the miraculous action of the Holy Ghost, and she remained a virgin her life long, free from sin. To her, accordingly, special honors *(hyperdouleia)* are due, exceeding those of the saints *(douleia)*; yet prayer *(latreia)* is not offered to her, but to God above.

The Roman Catholic systems of doctrine and of ecclesiastical organization are fairly fixed, but are not absolutely rigid. The various creeds and decisions of councils and pronouncements of popes furnish a divinely directed and infallible interpretation of the original deposit of truth. But, just as our American federal Constitution will always require new interpretations as new conditions arise, and as points now doubtful will some time probably need to be settled by

the Supreme Court; so future popes will render new decisions, 1. Considerable flexibility is allowed by the admission that presentations of unchangeable truths must differ with the ages, just as dress changes; in future generations it is conceivable that popes may decide that much is "dress" which most Catholics now suppose to be infallible truth itself. It is safe to predict that Roman Catholic dogma will have no serious difficulty in adjusting itself to any future scientific or historical discoveries that will ever be made, much as the theologians will always contend against such new theories as at first appear to be in conflict with the old faith. Very great changes could be made in ecclesiastical organization, and in general policies, should they ever be required. Future clergymen might be permitted to marry; mass might be said in vernacular tongues.

The Roman Catholic church is quick to adapt itself to changed political and social conditions. In the United States, for instance, its conscience is thoroughly aroused to the social and industrial evils of the times. The program of *Social Reconstruction*, by contemporary bishops, is on the desk of every reformer. The work of active laymen in such organizations as the Knights of Columbus reveals a splendid spirit of Christian service, and shows that a Church that once inspired her young laymen to higher ideals by the institution of chivalry has not lost her resourcefulness in attracting young men.

The hasty attempts of impetuous radicals to introduce new scientific, historical, and philosophical views into the faith of the Church before they had become properly assimilated led to the condemnation of Modernism by Pius X. The theology of the Church is in an orthodox manner becoming interpreted and adapted to the knowledge of our age by the brilliant school of Neo-Scholasticism. The University of Louvain and Cardinal Mercier have been prominent in this work.

II—*The Earlier Protestantism*

The great Protestant revolts which permanently separated the peoples of northern and a part of central Europe, from the Latin church, though foreshadowed by earlier movements such as those led by Wyclif (†1384) and Huss (†1416), began in 1517 with Martin Luther (†1546), and took place during the course of the sixteenth century. Roughly speaking, each movement may be said to have passed through four phases. (1) Abuses in the Church (like the sale of indulgences in the

case of Luther) led to vigorous protests, and a call that the church authorities correct these evils. This was not done promptly, and the reformer proceeded to insist upon further changes in discipline, doctrine, or ritual in order to render such abuses impossible. (2) These further changes were not made, and the reformer soon found himself rejecting the absolute authority of the Church, and appealing to his countrymen to examine the merits of the issue for themselves. (3) The result, when the movement was successful, was the organization of a new religious society, independent of the Latin church. (4) When still more radical innovators appeared, often with fantastic and extravagant proposals, the earlier reformers found it necessary to perfect standards of authority for the guidance of their own churches. These standards proved to be almost as dogmatic as those of the old church had been.

Several general characteristics hold for nearly all Protestants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their ultimate source of authority was the Bible which, as emphatically as the Church of Rome itself, they affirmed to be infallible. They insisted, however, that their own interpretations of the Bible were correct; and that the Roman interpretation was wrong in affirming the authority of church traditions, and of the pronouncements of Fathers, councils, and popes. They rejected the Latin translation of the Bible made by St. Jerome from the viewpoint of the ancient Catholic Church of his time. They construed the original Hebrew and Greek texts in their own fashion. Whether they actually got any nearer to the spirit of the original Scriptures is a question on which critical scholars still disagree almost as much as conservative Catholic and Protestant theologians.

The Protestant reformers, at any rate, succeeded in rendering the Bible messages more suggestive and helpful to the men of their own age, nations, and temperament. Protestantism then, and ever since, has been organized in churches that are confined within a single state, and so reflect national characteristics more completely,—an undoubted advantage for the Germanic and Scandinavian races, whose psychology is markedly different from the Latin races who adhered to the old Church. The Protestant churches all asserted the value of the experience of the individual in his personal and private relation to God. So Protestantism is highly *individualistic;* each man gains salvation by the grace of God afforded to him directly. Five of

the sacraments and all of the sacramentals were abolished as unscriptural and unnecessary; only Baptism and the Lord's Supper were retained. These last two were variously interpreted; but the notion of a physical miracle was usually abandoned, and their significance made purely spiritual. The Quakers eliminated sacraments altogether, insisting that no material media should be employed in the purely spiritual worship of God. In brief, in opposition to the Latin church, which insisted that the individual could only be saved through the reception of miraculous sacraments administered by priests in apostolic succession in a universal and infallible church, Protestants claimed that salvation is vouchsafed by the individual in direct, personal relation to God.

Having put the individual entirely upon his own responsibility before God, instead of allowing him in some measure to share it with his confessor, Protestantism had to afford elementary education in the Bible and in the doctrines of their churches to everyone. So Protestantism did much to make elementary education universal in the countries where it prevailed. Roman Catholicism was comparatively more neglectful of education for the masses of the people, but more thorough in its provision of education for the clergy.

Very few Protestants had any notion of religious toleration, except for their own sects when they happened to be in the minority, until the eighteenth century. The ambition of nearly every sect was to gain control of the government, make their own the official religion, and to proscribe other forms of worship. This was because, as John Cotton, a New England Puritan, explained, "There is a vast difference between men's inventions and God's institutions." Since each sect believed their own faith to be God's institution, it was their duty therefore to try to compel other men to conform to the will of God.

III—*Continental Movements*

Lutheranism became the state religion in northern Germany and the Scandinavian countries. It remained more like the Latin church in its interpretation of the sacraments than other forms of Protestantism. In the Lord's Supper, for instance, Luther believed that Christ is physically present, along with the ordinary elements of the bread and wine (*consubstantiation*, a slightly different view from the orthodox Latin doctrine, of *transubstantiation*, according to which the underlying sub-

stance of the bread and wine becomes transformed into the body and blood of Christ). In close alliance with the political rulers of Protestant Germany, Lutheranism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and even later, looked with disfavor upon the efforts of the peasants, then practically serfs, to gain political and civil rights and to better their economic condition. Lutheranism has always done much to further the cause of education, and to develop sturdiness of character and independent convictions among its adherents, as well as loyal support of law and order.

Though the Reformation began in Switzerland, with Zwingli (†1531) the movement there ultimately took its name from John Calvin (†1564) who was long its leader, and who was the most brilliant theologian of the Protestant Reformation. Like Lutheranism, Calvinism affirms *justification by faith*, that the individual's personal faith alone renders him acceptable to God, (and not his performance of penance and other pious acts under the direction of a priest). Calvinism is built upon the dogma of the absolute *sovereignty of God*, including omnipotence, omniscience and eternal justice—a common Christian doctrine, but developed by Calvinists with relentless logic to extreme conclusions. Calvinism is often summarized in five points. (1) Every human being, as a descendant of Adam (whom all Christians in those times supposed to be an historical character) is guilty from his birth of *original sin*, in addition to later sins committed in his own lifetime. A man can do nothing to remove his own sin and guilt; that can only be done by the grace of God, mercifully vouchsafed to him through the atonement of Christ, and without any merit whatever on his own part. (2) So only those certain persons can be saved *(particular redemption)* (3) to whom God gives an *effectual calling*, strengthening their wills, and enabling them to accept salvation. (4) Who shall, and who shall not be saved is thus a matter of divine *election*, or *predestination*. (5) God will never fail those who are his elect; they shall never fall from ultimate salvation *(perseverance of the saints)*. Calvinists insisted with great heat, and endeavored with much subtilty to demonstrate, that their doctrine fully provides for human freedom, and that God is in no way responsible for human sin.

Calvinism did not seem harsh to its adherents in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were looking for a theology that would assure their independence of the authority of

Rome and of the medieval system of sacraments. This doctrine was satisfactory on this score; since one's predestination is in the hands of God alone, one does not need a fellow man for confessor. Calvin dispensed with a separate order of bishops, maintaining that in the New Testament "bishop," "presbyter" and "deacon" are synonymous terms, and refer to officers voluntarily chosen by the members of the local church. Calvinism carried this idea of self-government over to political institutions, repudiating the divine right of the king as well as that of the bishop. It did much to develop conceptions of popular government in both church and state in Switzerland, Holland, and Great Britain, countries in which it became the dominant theology. It also had many followers in France (the Huguenots) and in parts of Germany, (where it was known as the "reformed" faith in opposition to "evangelical" Lutheranism).

Calvinism did much for education, both of the ministry and the laity. Its subtle theology furnished inexhaustible themes for discussion in sermons and prayer meetings. To it the Scotch owe much of their famous skill in metaphysics; the same is true of American divines prior to the Revolution. Calvinism had remarkable influence in developing extreme independence of thought and self-reliance; its adherents, confident of themselves as the elect of God, were bold and courageous fighters for liberty. Independent toward his fellowmen, including his rulers, the Calvinist was humble and grateful in his attitude toward God, believing in his own sinfulness and unworthiness, and his complete dependence on divine love and mercy. Professor Mecklin has shown that Calvinism is responsible for many American characteristics, including individualism in religion, politics, and business, as well as conscientiousness and ethical idealism, and unfortunately, the defects of these qualities, 2.

Three other Protestant movements on the continent of Europe require notice. The Arminians (named from one of the earlier leaders of the movement Jacobus Arminius †1609, professor in the University of Leyden) published a "Remonstrance" against the rigors of Calvinism. While they admitted that men can do nothing good of themselves apart from divine grace, they thought that God has left men free to accept or reject the atonement of Christ. It is only by reason of this omniscience that God can be said to have known when He created mankind who would choose to accept Christ. Armin-

ianism laid less stress on systematic theology and more upon Christianity as a force for moral transformation. It was a heartening faith to those who could not feel sure that they were of the elect; every one is free to choose whether he will accept Christ and be saved. In abandoning predestination, it had to relinquish full confidence in the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints; men who have accepted grace may later lose it. So the Arminian was less self-reliant than the Calvinist, to whom he seemed weak, emotional, and instable; while to him the Calvinist appeared harsh and inhuman. Both, as a matter of fact, were usually good Christian men. In the sixteenth century Arminianism had its chief vogue in the Netherlands. In the eighteenth century it gained a large following in England, both in the state Church, and among the Wesleyans. It has in America been the avowed doctrine of the Methodists, and has been held by many individuals in all the Protestant churches, even those nominally Calvinistic.

The Anabaptists were in some respects the most consistent of the sixteenth century reformers in their extreme individualism, 3. They knew no authority except the Bible, and sought to restore the primitive church of the New Testament, as they understood it. To be saved an adult should (1) hear the preaching of the Word, become "regenerated" (that is experience a conscious change of heart and adopt a severely simple life of strict Sabbath observance and abandonment of all worldly amusements), (2) make a public confession of faith, (3) be baptized by immersion, and (4) become a member of one of their churches. Only those members would be saved whose conduct was strictly righteous according to their standards. They discarded infant baptism as unscriptural, and would not unite in the communion service with other Christians. Each of their local congregations governed itself, in complete independence from the rest. They thought it wrong to take oaths, bear arms, or take any part in civil government, thus interpreting New Testament passages quite literally. This movement started in Switzerland, chiefly in Zurich, perhaps a little earlier than the Lutheran reformation in Germany. In 1526 the Protestant Zurich government ordered them drowned, and several suffered martyrdom in this manner. Those who escaped became dispersed in Germany and the Netherlands, where they won many converts, in spite of persecution by Catholics, who usually burned them, and by Protest-

ants, who usually banished them. In some respects they are the spiritual ancestors of English speaking Baptists, Congregationalists, and Friends.

The Socinians pushed certain Protestant principles further than any of their contemporaries. They were regarded with horror by all other Protestants as heretics. Their founder was Fausto Sozzini (†1604), an Italian who found refuge during the latter portion of his life in Transylvania and Poland, where his views were then more tolerated than elsewhere. The Socinians believed in the supreme authority of the Bible, which they affirmed to be rational in all that it teaches, and which they endeavored at the same time to interpret literally. They rejected predestination and original sin. Men are able of their own free will to accept divine salvation. God gave men the Bible and the life of Christ. The mission of Christ is not to satisfy divine justice but to serve as an example to other men. The Socinians rejected the doctrine of the Trinity. They rejected the deity of Christ, along with his incarnation and atonement; but they accepted the scriptural accounts of his miracles and resurrection, and they observed Baptism and the Lord's Supper in obedience to his commands, without believing them to be supernatural in their operations, but merely symbolical and commemorative. Socinianism was crushed out in Poland, but still survives in Transylvania. Socinians found comparative freedom from persecution in Holland and England, where, though few in number, their writings stimulated critical interpretation of the Bible, and not only ultimately gave birth (toward the close of the eighteenth century) to Unitarianism, but to more liberal thinking in the traditional Protestant churches.

The following facts about all of these movements stand out clearly. Sincere Christians in every one of them succeeded in the conservation of values through the dynamic power of Christ. All ultimately found discipline and authority necessary to prevent extravagances. None knew how to find a stable basis of authority without assuming the literal infallibility of the Bible, and dogmatically declaring their own interpretation of it alone to be correct. Nobody appreciated the merits of other sects and the defects of his own.

IV—*The English Reformation*

The Protestant reformation in England had as its primary

cause the national love of independence combined with resentment at abuses in the Church. The English people desired the independence of their national church from the rule of the papacy, and believed that their own government could and should undertake its reformation. By appealing to these motives Henry VIII induced Parliament in 1534 with general approval of the nation, to pass an act declaring the king and his successors "the only supreme head on earth of the Church of England" with power to redress heresies and abuses. While by provoking this revolt Henry was able to gain ecclesiastical sanction for the divorce of his wife and for confiscation of the property of the monasteries, these motives at most constitute the reason why the break with Rome came just at that time; entirely apart from them, a rupture before long would have been inevitable.

In breaking with Rome and asserting the independence of the state Church of England, the royal house was conservative and wished to make no more alterations in doctrine, ritual and organization than would meet with general approval. Under the long reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) the Church of England gradually assumed the main characteristics that it has permanently retained. The Church is organized under the rule of bishops who claim apostolic succession. The ritual, as outlined in the Prayer Book, retains and emphasizes the more spiritual portions of the Roman liturgy,—yet, in the opinion of most Anglicans, it gives them a distinctly Protestant interpretation. As is believed, the service has lost none of its former beauty and impressiveness by being given in English, while it has gained in helpfulness by being intelligible to all. The statement of the doctrines of the church was formulated in Thirty-Nine Articles, which emphasize points common to Calvinists and Lutherans, including justification by faith and predestination, and avoiding the points most in controversy among Protestants in the sixteenth century. The attempt was to allow for reasonable differences of opinion within the national church, so far as practicable, and thus to prevent dissent, and to command the general cordial support and adherence of all. This attempt was in so far forth successful that it has always held a large portion,—at times the vast majority, and perhaps still a slight majority—of the population in conformity to a single church. After the Revolution, the

American portion of the Church separated, and became the Protestant Episcopal Church.

The attempt to retain all Englishmen within one Church was by no means wholly successful. While few in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries objected to the doctrines of the Church of England, a considerable number disliked its ritual and form of government. The more moderate of these remained within the Church, where they agitated for the removal of what they believed to be unscriptural features of the ritual, such as the use of vestments, marriage rings, the sign of the cross, kneeling at communion, and the like. These were the original Puritans who in these respects aspired to "purify" the Church. Under the leadership of Thomas Cartwright (†1603) they called for the election of pastors by the people of the parish, the appointment of elders, and the essential parity of the clergy (Presbyterianism). They were Calvinists in matters of doctrine.

There were also radicals who were impatient for the immediate reformation of the Church of England "without tarrying." Under the leadership of Robert Browne (†1633) and others, these radicals became "Separatists" from the national Church, and organized independent societies. Each of these local churches was a unit in itself, choosing its own pastor, and other officers, and forming its own articles of belief and order of worship. No church had any authority over the other churches; but all co-operated for common interests. This is Congregationalism. In doctrine they were Calvinistic. Both Puritans and Separatists met with a good deal of persecution under Elizabeth and James I. Some of them, especially Separatists, found it necessary to leave England and took refuge in Holland. In 1620, a group of members of this church at Leyden set sail for America in the Mayflower and established Congregationalism in New England,—the Pilgrim Fathers. The Puritans, who had remained in the Church of England, found the process of winning others to their side slower than they had anticipated. Charles I was very unfriendly to them; he gave preference to Arminians over Calvinists in church appointments; and he reissued the *Declaration of Sports* of his father, James I, which commended the old Sunday games and dances. Some of the Puritans became impatient, emigrated to America under the leadership of John Winthrop (†1649) and others, and founded

the colony of Massachusetts Bay. Like the Pilgrims, they organized their churches in the Congregational manner.

More radical still was John Smyth (†1612) a Separatist minister who went to Holland, came into contact with the Mennonites, and became convinced that infant baptism was unscriptural, and so taught his congregation there. Two of its members, Thomas Helwys and John Morton led a group of the others back to England, where about 1612 they established a Baptist church. The Baptists multiplied; they ultimately adopted baptism by immersion and refused to participate in the communion service with other Christians. They acclaimed the congregational form of church organization, and usually were Calvinists. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in America, they became almost as renowned as the Methodists for their evangelical revivals.

In Scotland the Reformation was also a movement for national independence. Against Mary, Queen of Scots, who was French in her sympathies, as well as a determined Roman Catholic, John Knox (†1572) led the cause of liberty under the aegis of Calvinism, and organized the national church on Presbyterian lines, with a minister and lay elders selected by the local congregation to govern its affairs. As the Presbyterian system ultimately developed, the churches in a locality became organized, and their representatives met for conference in "presbyteries"; over these were "synods"; and over all the "General Assembly," the supreme governing body of the whole denomination. Such is also the Presbyterian system in the United States.

When the Puritans succeeded for a time in gaining control of England, they could not agree among themselves. The Westminster Assembly, composed of one hundred and twenty clergymen and thirty laymen, was called by Parliament to plan for the reorganization of the national church. It prepared the Westminster *Confession of Faith* and *Catechisms* along Calvinistic lines, which were then accepted by Congregationalists and Baptists as well as by Presbyterians. On the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660, the state churches, both in England and Scotland were again made Episcopal in organization. Since the Revolution of 1688, the Church of England has remained Episcopalian, while the Church of Scotland has been Presbyterian.

During the stormy civil wars in England arose a sect that

regard all participation by Christians in warfare as wrong—the *Society of Friends* ("Quakers"). Founded by George Fox (†1691), they believe that Christianity is an inner spiritual experience, that requires little outward formalism. Sacraments are spiritual; outward elements should be dispensed with. Slavery is wrong. Christians should keep their word; oaths are superflous. Dress and manners and speech should be simple and unaffected; artificial titles should be abolished. William Penn gained for them the grant of the colony of Pennsylvania in 1681. It is fortunate for America that this colony soon became well established; for the Quakers obtained freedom of worship in England in 1689. Though never numerous, they have exercised a deep influence in the direction of simplicity and spirituality in religion, and in aversion to warfare, slavery, and social cruelties of all kinds.

V—*The Enlightenment*

Down almost to the beginning of the eighteenth century, Protestantism continued to be largely medieval in its outlook. To be sure, it was modern in its assertion of the personal relationship of the individual to God, of nationalism and, in most of its forms, of political liberty. But it knew little or nothing of religious tolerance. The great Protestant creeds of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were written by men who rejected the Copernican astronomy as unscriptural, and with no notion of the uniformity of natural laws, thought that physical miracles due to the activities of good and bad angels and witches were constantly occurring around them. They firmly believed in the literal infallibility of the Scriptures from cover to cover; their whole theology was based on their belief that God had created the earth about six thousand years ago, and that Adam and Eve had disobeyed him by eating fruit contrary to His express command, and that in consequence of this disobedience no human being can escape an eternity in fire and brimstone except through acceptance of the atonement of Christ in satisfaction of divine justice. Their conceptions were sublimely and beautifully expressed in Milton's *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained.* Those who today read these poems as they read Homer and Virgil, as poetical expressions of religious mythology, must remember that to our ancestors they portrayed historic facts.

Contemporaneous with the rise of the Protestant creeds,

however, there was developing in science and philosophy a changed view of the world and of human life which became dominant in European thought in the course of the eighteenth century, and has since gradually given to Protestantism a changed outlook. The period of the Enlightenment is usually dated from the publication of Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* in 1690 to that of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781. The movement, however, could not have taken place if it had not been for earlier scientific and philosophical developments. As an outcome of the researches of Copernicus (†1543) Tycho Brahe (†1601), Galileo Galilei (†1642), and Isaac Newton (†1727) a mechanical conception of the physical world became accepted by scientists; the bodies of our solar system move about the sun, and those of other systems about other suns; these movements are subject to the law of gravitation, stated in a mathematical formula. In such a universe Heaven and Hell and the throne of God cannot be put in definite places; the course of physical events is not interfered with by angels, devils, and witches; even the bodies of animals and men, as William Harvey (†1658) and Réné Descartes (†1650) showed, are subject to the same mechanical laws as other matter.

The rapid progress of the sciences had led the philosophers of the seventeenth century to attempt to interpret the world as a whole and the significance of human life along lines suggested by the sciences. Not giving more than lip service to the teachings of the churches, as a rule, with characteristic modern individualism, they struck out for themselves to work out methods of investigation and to erect elaborate philosophical systems. The empirical method of Francis Bacon (†1626) bases all knowledge on experiment and observation. The rationalism of Descartes, in imitation of mathematics, began with simple propositions, whose apparent clearness and distinctness made them appear self-evident, and proceeded to demonstrate their logical consequences. Neither method made use of Biblical revelation and church authority in establishing conclusions. In their own way, though, the great seventeenth century philosophers were almost as dogmatic as their theological contemporaries. Without first testing the powers of the human understanding, they boldly proceeded to work out elaborate systems, in which they thought that they proved and explained the nature of the universe, including God, the soul

of man, and everything else. Some of these systems are still of greatest importance; no one can go far in the understanding of twentieth century philosophy who is not at least acquainted with the thought of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

By the last decade of the seventeenth century, thinking people in England, at least, were ready for a change. With the Revolution of 1688 and the coming of William and Mary to the throne, a new era developed in politics, religion, and philosophy. The authority of the new sovereigns rested frankly on the will of the people and Parliament; the principle of divine right was abandoned. In religion the government sought to make the Church of England broad enough so that the great majority would be satisfied with it; they succeeded so well that at least nine-tenths of the population soon adhered to it; dissenters on the other hand enjoyed wide liberties. Only the handful of Romanists, atheists, and Socinians had much cause for discontent with the existing order.

The philosophical interpreter of this era was John Locke (†1704). His *Essay on the Human Understanding* (1690) proclaims the necessity of examining the sources of human knowledge before attempting to theorize on ultimate questions. All ordinary human knowledge comes from simple ideas afforded in the mental processes of sensation and reflection; there are no innate ideas. Locke thought it possible to prove the existence of God, and he based moral principles upon the commandments of God, although he believed them capable of rational demonstration. He believed in revelation and the miracles of the Bible. In a later work he affirmed that Christianity is essentially reasonable; for nothing in it is contrary to reason, although some truths could not have been known by reason alone, unaided by revelation. In making Christianity reasonable, he discarded much theology, and reduced its fundamentals to acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah and practice of the virtues which Jesus proclaimed; this is all that is requisite for salvation. It follows that wide toleration should be permitted. He was willing to tolerate Jews and Mohammedans. Locke's philosophy exercised wide influence during the next hundred years.

Other philosophers soon pushed the philosophy of reason and experience further than Locke had done. Shaftesbury (†1713) removed morality from a theological foundation and based it on the fundamental constitution of human nature, and made it consist of a proper balancing of selfish and social motives.

Since his time it has gradually become recognized that to know and to act upon principles of right and wrong are not dependent on the acceptance of any kind of religious beliefs; although, of course, religion furnishes an additional sanction to right conduct. A government can leave all its subjects free to practise any form of religious belief, or none whatever, as they choose; provided only they live within the limits of moral decency and are not military revolutionists. The Deists, following Locke's doctrine that Christianity is essentially reasonable, proceeded to eliminate miracles and revelation, and to reduce Christianity to belief in God and a few broad principles that are common to all religions and have always been accepted by thinking men. Hence the titles of Deistic books: *Christianity not Mysterious* by John Toland (†1722), *Christianity as Old as the Creation* by Mathew Tindal (†1733), and a *Discourse on Free Thinking* by Anthony Collins (†1729). The Deists enjoyed little prestige in England, and numerous theologians thought that they successfully refuted them. However, the refutations, most famous among which is the *Analogy of Religion* by Joseph Butler (†1752), had to combat Deistic arguments by reasoning, not by appeals to the authority and revelation of infallible scriptures; and in this sense liberal Protestantism ever since has had a fundamentally different attitude from the dogmatic Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Spinoza, in the previous century, had attacked miracles as impossible in a world governed by uniform laws; his attack had been ignored, however. The assaults of the Deists were supposed to have been disposed of by Butler. But David Hume (†1776) while exercising Enlightment caution regarding the limits of human knowledge and the impossibility of making absolute assertions, pointed out that the reports of the occurrence of miracles furnished by witnesses must always appear unlikely to any one who candidly examines them, since experience finds the uniformity of nature much more dependable than the accuracy of human testimony. To Hume also belongs the credit, in his *Natural History of Religions*, of showing that religion has passed through periods of development, polytheism having preceded monotheism. Edward Gibbon (†1794) endeavored to account for the spread of Christianity in the ancient world by natural causes. Crude as many of Hume's and Gibbon's explanations now appear, they in some measure

foreshadow the comparative and psychological methods now employed in the study of the history of religions.

Since the time of Hume, liberal Protestants have defended Christianity on the grounds of its reasonableness and its corroboration by the experience of religious people of the dynamic power of Christ in their lives. So far as they have continued to defend physical miracles and miraculous revelation at all, it has been as corollaries from the general standpoint of liberal Christian doctrines; and it is probable that belief in neither would today be insisted upon by any liberal Protestant minister as a necessary qualification for lay membership in his church. What is regarded as more important for church membership is faith in God, and some personal experience of the dynamic power of Jesus Christ in one's life.

The permanent contributions of the Enlightenment to the progress of religion were tolerance and intellectual honesty, and the elimination of superstitions like witchcraft. There must be utmost freedom of discussion in religion, and what in it is true will stand fearless analysis. The immediate influence of the movement, however, was destructive rather than constructive. It tended to undermine faith in the religious belief of the times without offering anything in its place. Its influence was chiefly confined to the more highly educated classes, and it hardly reached the masses of the people anywhere.

VI—*The Evangelical Movement*

It was probably inevitable that the Enlightenment should have lacked religious fervor. The religious wars on the Continent and the Puritan disorders in England during the seventeenth century led the men of the early eighteenth century to regard all religious emotionalism with stern disfavor. Deep religious feelings appeared inevitably to result in bigotry and fanaticism, and attempts to impose one's religion forcibly upon others. So even divines in the churches vigorously denounced the wickedness and folly of "enthusiasm," 4. Tolerance could only come with clear thinking, and men cannot think clearly when their emotions are unduly aroused. A period of religious apathy was probably necessary until the spirit of toleration might become established; but it can only be defended as a temporary necessity in a time of transition, 5.

Many of the intellectual classes in England had become indifferent to religion by the end of the first quarter of the

eighteenth century. Even ministers preached coldly intellectual sermons on the moral virtues, which lacked the dynamic warmth and power of Christianity at its best. Large numbers of the poorer classes were not reached by the churches at all. Their moral condition was wretched; their amusements were coarse; drunkenness was the chronic condition of many.

In 1729 a little club of students was formed at Oxford of which John Wesley (†1791), his brother Charles (†1788), and George Whitefield (†1770) afterwards became famous. They were nicknamed the "Methodists" from their systematic cultivation of religious practices. They visited the prisoners in jails, which then were in a frightful condition, and did what other philanthropic work they could. The Wesley brothers and Whitefield presently went upon missionary tours to America. Each of the Wesleys, under Moravian influence, experienced "conversions" of the extreme type (see Chapter XV). They became convinced that this was the normal mode of becoming Christians. The Wesleys developed the methods of *evangelicalism* (so called because persons were "converted to the Gospel") and perfected a technique of revivalism. The Wesleyan movement began and long remained within the Church of England; but as time went on and the societies of Wesleyan converts multiplied, it became difficult to obtain ordained clergymen to administer the sacraments to them all, particularly in America. So John Wesley and his friend, Thomas Coke (†1814) though only Anglican priests, assumed the rôle of bishops and ordained clergymen for America in 1784. They thus broke with the Church of England, and Methodism has ever since been an independent denomination in both countries. The revival methods were effective in converting many people who could not have been reached by any other means then available. The organization of the Methodist churches continues to be very effective for reaching large numbers of people in mass movements, and the spirit of the denomination has always been extremely simple and democratic. More Protestants today in the United States belong to the Methodist denominations than to any other group.

The evangelical movement was by no means confined to those who ultimately formed the Methodist church. The evangelical methods were imitated in a more conservative manner by ministers who remained within the Church of England. They were also copied by the various dissenting denominations—Baptists,

Congregationalists and Presbyterians. These three denominations made wide use of them in America, where most accessions to Protestant non-ritualistic churches were long chiefly made in this manner.

The evangelical movement though little interested in theological questions, was none the less conservative. It did not go beyond Locke in radicalism. It insisted on literal acceptance of scriptural passages; among Methodists and Disciples it was ultra Protestant in believing that any layman can sufficiently interpret and understand the Bible for his needs. Evangelical ministers even, especially in America, often possessed more piety than erudition. The destructive criticism of the Enlightenment was little understood, and intolerantly denounced as "infidelity"; Puritan opinions on the wrongfulness of dancing, theater going, card playing, and all Sunday amusements were retained.

With all its limitations, however, evangelicism probably saved the day for Protestantism in England and America in the eighteenth century. The viewpoints of earlier Protestantism were no longer appealing to the masses; the Enlightenment was weakening the hold of religion on the intellectual classes. A simple, popular emotional movement was a necessity of the age. Similar movements occurred in the Protestant portions of continental Europe, and began even earlier with the rise of such sects as the Pietists and Moravians.

VII—*Constructive Tendencies in Philosophy*

The influence of science and philosophy upon religion during the Enlightenment, as we have seen, was clarifying and promoted tolerance, but lacked warmth and devotion. The evangelical movement rekindled the fires of devotion, but was reactionary from an intellectual standpoint. The problem of liberal Protestantism ever since, therefore, has been how to gain light and heat at the same time, how to face the truth with Enlightenment candor and yet to conserve evangelical fervor. Various philosophical movements have helped to solve the problem. These can here only briefly be sketched.

The Enlightenment view of religion itself proved capable of acquiring warmth during the latter half of the eighteenth century. This is notably true in the case of Rousseau (†1778), who represents the transition from the Enlightenment to the

Romantic movement. Though Rousseau's "Confession of the Savoyard Vicar" in *Èmile* is a form of Deism not greatly different from the views of Voltaire, it is set forth with fervor that showed that liberal religious views can be expressions of the heart as well as the head and so have dynamic power.

In reaction against the skepticism of Hume, there appeared in Scotland the philosophy of "common sense," or "intuitionism," which maintained that intellectual and moral principles disclosed by introspection must be true and correspond to real objects in the outer world. This philosophy was not profound, but it appeared to be sensible, and seemed to place moral and religious principles on a solid foundation. It was more intellectual and tolerant than evangelicalism, but did not antagonize it. It was long the prevailing philosophy in Scotland, and America. Among its most noted Scottish exponents were Thomas Reid (†1796), founder of the movement; Dugald Stewart (†1828) and Thomas Brown (†1820). In the United States, the names of James McCosh (†1894) and Noah Porter (†1892) are still remembered. This form of philosophy has now been generally superseded.

The Romantic movement in literature and art had as one of its phases a revival of interest in the Middle Ages. The poetry of Scott and Tennyson and the pre-Raphaelite school of art are illustrations of this tendency. Conservatives in the Church of England became alarmed at the rapid spread of destructive Enlightenment conceptions, as well as the increase in numbers and influence of non-conformists, the gain in political power of the laboring classes and the increasing strength of democracy and other disturbing tendencies of the times. Aesthetic charm and fear of innovations thus combined to attract Anglicans of a certain type to the rites and beliefs of the English church in pre-reformation times. A few of the more extreme participants in this, which is known as the "Oxford Movement" under the leadership of John Henry Newman (†1890) became adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, which gained new vitality in England, and has been growing there ever since. The others,—notably John Keble (†1866) and Edward Bouverie Pusey (†1882)—remained within the Church of England, of which they and their successors have been the High Church or Anglo-Catholic party. They have done much to beautify the ritual of the Church, and have been active in helping the poor and neglected classes and in bringing them

into active communion with the Church. They have to some extent revived Catholic usages, such as penance and confession. A similar movement has been going on in the American Protestant Episcopal Church. In the matter of enrichment of church worship—but not in doctrine and discipline—the non-ritualistic denominations of Great Britain and America have followed this movement at a distance. Organs, chants, stained glass windows, written prayers, responsive readings, recitations of creeds, and various other embellishments of worship that would have been condemned by our Puritan and evangelical fathers as popish and unscriptural have been found to be not only aesthetically pleasing, but also spiritually helpful.

More constructive on the intellectual side have been the movements in philosophy, theology, and historical criticism, which had their origin in Germany and at first appeared distintegrating, but now seem to liberals to have put Protestant Christianity on firmer ground than it ever stood before.

Immanuel Kant (†1804) is usually believed by philosophers to have shown that intellectual demonstrations of the ultimate character of the universe, the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, are impossible. The world as we experience it in space and time, subject to the laws of mathematics and physics, has no place for such conceptions. But the world of science is not the whole world. It is, in fact, in a profound sense, the construction of our own minds; and what the world may appear to be to minds differently constituted than we, is unknowable to us. However, the world in itself may very well be a world in which God, freedom and immortality prevail. This is at least a theoretical possibility. But much more than this can be said. The principles of morality, which are self-evident when morality is subjected to rational criticism, and which are presupposed in all our judgments of right and wrong, imply our presence in a world of freedom, immortality and God. Thus what on merely intellectual grounds remains uncertain though possible must on moral grounds be assumed to be true. Thus Kant has, as he said, "destroyed [intellectually certain] knowledge to make room for faith" (based on moral experience and logical reasoning.) Tennyson's philosophy of religion is very largely Kantian in spirit and so, in less measure, are those of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Through them Anglo-Saxon Protestants

have probably assimilated more of Kant than through study of him directly.

J. G. Fichte (†1814) who began as an ardent disciple of Kant, but subsequently developed an idealistic system of his own, in which knowledge of the moral nature of the universe and the existence of God are more positively affirmed, has exercised a considerable influence on literary men in England and America, especially Carlyle and Emerson, and through them, upon religious thinkers.

G. W. F. Hegel (†1831) taught that the universe is the expression of the Absolute (usually interpreted as God) through struggle and effort in accordance with logical principles. God thus comes to self-expression in the various stages of the world order. The duty of finite beings is to realize their relationship to God; this is religion. Every religion is in some measure an attempt to gain this relationship, and is true in some degree; Christianity is the most complete religion. In all religions the Absolute is presented figuratively and symbolically; philosophy furnishes a more adequate interpretation for intellectual purposes. Hegel's philosophy had considerable influence on some of the German theological scholars of the next generation, by reason of its suggestion that all religions, including Christianity, are subject to laws of development that are logical and rational. He also has had large influence on philosophy in England and America, where the neo-Hegelians were in the great majority for the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and where they still exert wide influence. The Hegelian philosophy is not easily susceptible of literary expression; but the poetry of Robert Browning is largely Hegelian in its point of view, and has had wide influence on ministers, and through them on their congregations, 7.

Most important of all in his influence on Protestant theology is Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (†1834). He took much from the other great German philosophers and, being as a minister and professor of theology primarily interested in religion as they were not, his adaptation of German idealism to the requirements of religion is more satisfactory. God is absolute and eternal, but immanent in the world; man in his finitude and mortality is dependent on Him. Man in all religions seeks and partially succeeds in finding union with God. The Christian religion is most successful in this endeavor. In Christ is effected the union between the temporal and the

eternal, between God and man, and through him it is imparted to others. Doctrines are intellectual attempts to state more fundamental religious truths and experiences; they may continue to change from time to time, and at most are of secondary importance. Religion is an aid to the moral life, which involves man in social relationships.

Out of the earlier German idealistic philosophy grew the critical interpretation of the development of the Bible and of the origin and growth of Christianity which have, for those who accept it, revolutionized the whole Protestant position. The truth of religion no longer is believed to rest on any absolute authority—not even an infallible Bible. God is revealed to men in the Bible and in the life and personality of Jesus Christ, and He guides all who in churches worship Him in spirit and in truth. The religious experience of the individual verifies for him in his own life the faith of his fellow Christians. No doctrines are unchangeable dogmas. With increasing insight afforded by the sciences a broader view of the world is made accessible to man, and larger religious conceptions will interpret this world so that men in it may be of service to the Christ.

VIII—*Recent Tendencies in Protestantism*

As a result of the Enlightenment, Socinianism took new form and vigor in England, and became known as Unitarianism, largely under the influence of Theophilus Lindsey (†1808) and Joseph Priestley (†1804). Unitarians reject the doctrines of the Trinity, the deity of Christ, and usually also miracles, and all that appears unscientific or irrational. The movement spread to New England, where its first great protagonist was William Ellery Channing (†1847). In opposition to the rigorous and unfeeling view of the relation between God and man for which the older New England Calvinism had stood, the American Unitarians have insisted on the moral greatness of man. Through good men, chief among whom is Jesus, we come to know God. They have no declaration of faith that is binding upon their members, but a statement that is popular among them affirms belief in "The Fatherhood of God; the Brotherhood of man; the Leadership of Jesus; salvation by character; the progress of mankind onward and upward forever."

Though too highly intellectual to appeal to the masses, and always an extremely small denomination numerically, American Unitarianism has included within its membership a great many

literary men, statesmen, philanthropists, and leaders of social movements. Among these are Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Russell Lowell, William Cullen Bryant, Bayard Taylor, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, William D. Howells, Bret Harte, George Bancroft, William H. Prescott, John L. Motley, Francis Parkman, John Marshall, Daniel Webster, Charles Sumner, Horace Mann, and Peter Cooper. Four presidents of the United States have been Unitarians (John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Millard Fillmore, and William H. Taft), while Thomas Jefferson advocated Unitarianism, and Abraham Lincoln's religious views appear to have been essentially Unitarian. Among famous Unitarian women may be mentioned Margaret Fuller, Julia Ward Howe, Louisa M. Alcott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Dorothea Dix.

The chief service of Unitarianism to religious progress has been its criticism of orthodox beliefs. The conservative Protestant denominations, in order to meet the Unitarian challenge, have been forced to become more tolerant and liberal. They have learned to recognize the love of God as much as His justice, the moral worth and possibilities of man as much as his sinfulness, and to reconcile their beliefs with the rapid strides of modern science. The consequence is, that the advance of liberal views no longer gives rise to new Protestant denominations, but to new movements in the older organizations.

Two such movements deserve special notice. Within the Church of England and the American Episcopal Church there have been a considerable number of "broad churchmen" in each generation since the movement was initiated in the middle of the nineteenth century by Frederick William Robertson (†1853), Charles Kingsley (†1875), Alfred Tennyson (†1892) and others. Great influence at the present time in the English Church is exercised by the group of liberal thinkers who under the leadership of Canon B. H. Streeter have issued a series of suggestive books of which *Foundations* and *Concerning Immortality* are perhaps among the best known. Among American broad churchmen Phillips Brooks (†1893) has probably had widest influence.

Another movement, notable in the advance of liberal Protestantism in this country, arose in the Congregational Church under the leadership of Dr. William Jewett Tucker and

other professors of Andover Theological Seminary, who advocated "progressive orthodoxy," from 1885 to 1892. They succeeded in establishing that progress in theological beliefs may take place within a traditionally orthodox Protestant denomination, 8.

Within the other great Protestant denominations toleration for liberal thinkers has generally been won. It is probably safe to say, that in all of the larger Protestant churches today with the exception of a few of the oldest and most conservative ministers, a clergyman will gladly welcome into the communion of his church any person of good moral character and ideals who desires fellowship in that congregation and who seeks to make Jesus effective in his own life, be his theological beliefs whatever they may.

Protestant churches are today awake to moral and social problems to a lively degree. Never, perhaps, since the Reformation, have Protestants felt so keenly that Christianity ought to touch and uplift every aspect of social, political, and private life; that, to express the matter in the terminology of this book, *all* the socially recognized values of the modern world should be conserved through Christian effort reinforced by the dynamic power of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.

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CHAPTER XIII

CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSERVATION OF VALUES

I—*The Values Which Christianity Has Conserved*

THE great ethical service which Christianity has rendered has been in the deepening of moral convictions, in making the moral life a concern of the heart as well as of the head, and so imparting dynamic force to moral principles. The means by which this has been done has been through bringing men into contact with God through the matchless personality of Jesus Christ.

Already in the synoptic Gospels, Jesus is presented in all his simplicity and sublimity, in his love, faith, courage, sympathy, humor, 1, and above all, his nearness to God, and his ability to impart to others something of his own strength and insight. The most important moral point in these Gospels is the necessity for *ethical inwardness*, 2. Sinfulness has its roots in wrong desires and impulses; it is unbridled anger that causes murder, lustful thoughts and looks that lead to adultery, light and idle boasting that occasion false swearing and profanity. One must keep his heart pure, be meek, merciful, humble in spirit, a lover of peace and a peace maker; he should fairly hunger and thirst after righteousness; he should love his enemies and pray for them. If a person has right impulses and desires, and if the sentiments that direct their expression are right, his conduct will be sure to be right.

Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel show that such ethical inwardness can only come through an *ethical change of heart*, 3, which can be had if a person identifies himself in mind and spirit with Jesus Christ. "As therefore ye received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in him, rooted and builded up in him," 4. For Paul the essential thing is to be "in Christ," or to have Christ formed in oneself, 5. "Ye must be born anew," 6. Jesus is reported to have said to Nicodemus, while he tells the women of Samaria, "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give

him shall become in him a well of water springing up unto eternal life," 7. Later on in this, the Fourth Gospel, Jesus is the true vine, in whom the believer must abide, in order to be fruitful in the Christian life, 8, and Jesus prays that his followers may all be one in him and God the Father, 9.

Ethical inwardness, then, is the supreme Christian value; to attain it involves some sort of ethical change of life; and this can be gained through the personality of Jesus Christ. That this is the central contribution of Christianity to the moral advancement of Europe cannot too much be emphasized. Men knew what was right and wrong before Christianity came; but the old religions had failed to afford the Gentile world dynamic power upon which to draw for strength and resolution in putting this knowledge into practice. The Jews gained this dynamic power through their religion; but not in a manner suited to the needs of Gentiles. Christianity supplied this want for the Gentile world, and it has been supplying it ever since.

In both the synoptic Gospels and the Pauline epistles, the social character of religion is recognized. In the former the "kingdom of heaven" is a phrase constantly upon the lips of Jesus, which, whatever else he meant by it, implied the association of believers for mutual helpfulness in their religious life; in the latter, this association has already become embodied in an institution,—*the Church.* The private experience of the individual and the common experience of the Church for securing and imparting the dynamic power of Jesus are both fundamental notes in Christianity.

In what particular respects has the moral life of the peoples of western Europe and America been bettered by the conservation of values through the Christian religion? In nearly all respects. Through teaching and worship in Christian churches, schools and homes, each generation has had its attention called to moral values, and has learned in worship to draw on God through Christ for moral reinforcement and consecration in the realization of these values in life and conduct.

However, it is possible to indicate some details in which the influence of Christianity has been especially noteworthy.

First, it has stood emphatically for the *purification of home life, and of the relations between the sexes.* In the ancient pagan world family life had become seriously demoralized. It seems almost to have become the rule rather than the exception in Rome for married people in the course of their lives to divorce

and remarry. Among the Jews in the first century a man could divorce his wife for the most trifling causes. Scarcely any one in the pre-Christian world regarded continence for a single man and fidelity to his wife for a married man as moral obligations; the "single standard" for man was hardly even thought of. Unnatural sexual relations were very common among Gentiles, and met with little protest. Christianity, with its respect for the body as sacred—the "temple of the Holy Ghost" in Paul's language—has always stood resolutely for the purification of home life, and for either great diminution of divorces or their abolition altogether. It has brought about general moral and legal condemnation of abortion, infanticide, and unnatural sexual relations, and has made measurable progress in the effort to extirpate these practices. It has made chastity the general practice of womankind, and has succeeded in inducing all men in theory to recognize it as a moral obligation, most men to obey this moral obligation most of the time, and a good many men to obey it all of their lives. Of course great reforms yet need to be made and prostitution is still the scandal of Christendom. But would it be possible to discover any period in the history of any non-Christian Gentile nation that has been as clean in sexual morality as the most degraded period in the history of any Christian nation?

Secondly, Christianity has been zealous in all forms of *humanitarianism.* From ancient times it has been active in the preaching and practice of private charities and alms giving, as well as in the establishment of hospitals, schools, and other benevolent institutions. The monasteries and nunneries largely did this work during the Middle Ages. During modern times, especially in Protestant countries, where the church income was largely confiscated at the time of the Reformation, poor relief and other benevolent and educational activities have been largely assumed by the state; but Christian sentiment has supported large expenditures of public money for such purposes, and Christian philanthropy has done much to meet needs not yet provided for by the state. The support for social settlements and other forms of private secular humanitarianism in recent times has always chiefly come from persons who owe their philanthropic sentiments to the teaching and influence of Christian churches and homes.

Thirdly, Christianity has usually stood for *social justice.* To be sure, this is not true of the early Church—a small and

persecuted sect which was destitute of pecuniary means and political influence; and which, moreover, supposed that the end of the world was about to arrive. Consequently we find very little thought of social reform in this world expressed in the New Testament or the early Fathers; love rather than justice necessarily had to be their theme. But when Christians gained control in the Roman Empire they mitigated the conditions of slavery, abolished the gladiatorial combats, effected the codification of Roman law, and recognized the moral responsibility of rulers for the welfare of the people. During the Middle Ages, chivalry and monasticism were agencies of social amelioration, and justice was recognized by the school men as one of the chief virtues. In modern times the churches have usually been awake to the necessity of reforming the social injustices which the conscience of the times recognized to be such. This is certainly true today. Almost all Protestants, as well as Catholics, in the opening years of the twentieth century are keenly interested in political and social reformation; in fact, the present danger seems rather to be that concentration on these questions will too greatly divert attention from cultivation of the spiritual life, which after all, is the chief business of an ethical religion.

It sometimes is charged against Christianity that it retarded the growth of free institutions by upholding the divine authority of rulers. The duty to obey the powers that be as ordained by God was simply common sense for the humble little Christian congregations of the first century. By the time, certainly, that the Christian church had influence in the ancient world, the imperial authority needed and usually deserved the sanction of religion; moreover churchmen like St. Chrysostom and St. Ambrose did not hesitate to rebuke even emperors when they did wrong. The Middle Ages needed government on an authoritative basis; the schoolmen were right so far as their political philosophy was of that character. In early modern times the Lutherans, and (owing to their Episcopal institutions which had taken shape under monarchical conditions) Roman Catholics and Anglicans sometimes were political reactionaries. However, Calvinists, Arminians, and Socinians, at any rate, were consistent fighters for political freedom, and Anglo-Saxon liberty owes an incalculable debt to them. Grotius, the great founder of international law, was influenced by all three of the sects last mentioned. All forms

of occidental Christianity have long since taken the side of liberty.

Another charge against Christianity is that, during most of its history, partly as an outcome of teaching contained in the New Testament itself, 10, it made for the degradation of woman. She lost the civil rights that she had enjoyed under the Roman empire, and only regained them in the nineteenth century, while political rights have only come to her during the present generation. It is true that Paul, like most Orientals, did not have as much esteem for women as the Romans of his generation. This was not true of Jesus, whose practical regard and consideration of women and their devotion to him are certainly stronger evidence than two or three obscure and probably inaccurately reported gospel passages, or the fact that he never married. But it must be remembered that only Roman married women enjoyed any civil rights under the empire; no other women did. And, in purifying home life, and in preaching the single standard to men, Christianity did much to afford to woman the security that means most to her after all. As to the objection that ancient and modern Roman Catholic Christianity taught that celibacy is a more perfect state than matrimony: has this teaching really in any sense degraded the position of women? If a woman marry she is in the holy and sacramental state of matrimony; why is she degraded if other women choose to be nuns? There have been very many female saints, married as well as single, and the adoration of the Mother of Jesus has done much to foster respect for motherhood in general. Think of the Madonnas and children in ecclesiastical art; have they not inevitably had the psychological effect of making people regard all mothers and their little children with tenderness? Whether the interests of humanity are better served in the modern world by celibate orders within the Christian church is a debatable question on which Catholics and Protestants will probably never agree. But the value of convents during the conditions of the Middle Ages cannot reasonably be questioned, and to say that the presence of celibate orders has ever caused married women in Christendom not to be respected is absurd, 11.

There are two criticisms of Christianity as a conserver of moral values that have more foundation. As early as the time of St. Jerome and St. Augustine, Christians had become indifferent to secular learning, believing that "the wisdom of this

world is foolishness with God." Even in modern times both Catholics and Protestants have fought the progress of the sciences whenever new discoveries have threatened the security of dogmas. This chapter in the history of Christianity has been set forth in Andrew D. White's famous *History of the Warfare Between Science and Theology.* However, as is therein pointed out, the opposition was not due to the Christian religion itself, of which Mr. White was a loyal adherent, but to *theologians.*

The other criticism is, that Christians have been bitterly intolerant of one another,—an attitude that began as early as the epistle of Jude and culminated in the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition, the massacre of St. Bartholemew, and the persecutions of Catholics in England by Elizabeth and in Ireland by Cromwell and William and Mary. In mitigation of this indictment it can be said that such persecutions were chiefly actuated by political motives and were the work of politicians more often than churchmen. But this is by no means a complete answer. The persecutions were not wholly the work of politicians; and, even if they had been, it would still be necessary for Christian apologists to explain why the Christian faith has been open to such manipulation.

The intolerance by Christian orthodoxy of scientific and religious differences of opinion has been chiefly due to what was long a good and necessary characteristic of the religion. Had Christianity been a tolerant religion in ancient times, it would have been absorbed by the pagan mystery religions. Christians then knew no way to preserve the purity of their faith and make it possible for it to perform its mission except by refusing to compromise with, or even to tolerate, rival beliefs and practices. The same was true in early modern times in the case of the Roman Catholics and the various Protestant denominations.

Christian intolerance was due to confusion of thought. The Enlightenment inaugurated clearer thinking and made it possible for Christians to learn to be more tolerant of one another and of scientific research. Today the victory for tolerance is practically complete. It is probably safe to predict that never again will any religious sect in the Occident suffer persecution provided it preaches and practises the ordinary standards of moral decency; and that, never again, will scientific scholarship in any field of investigation meet with persecution on religious grounds, 12. The young man or young woman of today need

have no prejudice against any form of Christianity now prominent in the United States on the question of tolerance.

The clearer understanding of the psychological basis of Christian experience which has now been attained will render intolerance forever impossible, in the future. The intolerance of the past was always due to a confusion between *means* and *ends*, in the performance of the *function* of the religion.

II—*The Function of the Christian Religion.*

This leads to a statement of what the *function* of the Christian religion, psychologically considered, really is, and has always been; that is, *to set before men the matchless personality of Jesus Christ, a personality from whom men may gain a fuller appreciation of moral values, and a reinforcement of their wills so that they may be able to realize these values in their lives.* The whole history of Christianity may be interpreted as a record of the different ways in which men of different ages have worshipped God through Christ, and so have learned to live on a higher spiritual level. To live on this level is the experience which they have called an assurance of salvation or redemption. The various forms of Christian worship—ritualistic and non-ritualistic—are the different ways in which men of different races and periods have sought to gain this experience.

Christian intolerance in the past was owing to the failure to realize that this function can be effectively achieved in different ways—by different modes of worship, by different forms of ecclesiastical organization and by the acceptance of different creeds. Now it is common knowledge that primitive Christians, Catholics of all ages, and Protestants of all types ranging from Episcopalians to Friends in ritual, and from Presbyterians to Unitarians in creed and ecclesiastical organization, all are able by their own methods to conserve their socially recognized values through Jesus Christ. It is also common knowledge that none of these confessions can either demonstrate the absolute infallibility of its faith for modern conditions or that it is either the original or the metaphysically valid form of Christianity. For if demonstration were possible, after all these centuries of research and controversy, the truth would be generally agreed upon. So, since all Christians must walk by faith and not by demonstration, and since they all

gain much the same benefits from their religion, it is possible for each to tolerate the rest.

It perhaps hardly needs to be remarked that while people can get the benefits of the Christian experience by participating in the worship of various churches, that no one can have an adequate Christian experience unless he participates in one of them. There is this much truth in the dogma that there is no salvation out of the church; no one can obtain and preserve a rich Christian experience by himself; it will be bound to be either narrow, shallow or transient—or possibly all—unless he avails himself of *some* form of Christian fellowship.

It is not of course asserted that the values recognized by the different forms of Christianity are precisely the same in all respects. These have varied in different periods of history, according to the development of civilization and the recognized moral standards of the times. To-day, however, in America, it is beyond question that all prominent Christian churches recognize the important moral values of our age, and that they do much to promote ethical inwardness in them through the dynamic power of Jesus Christ. Any man or woman will be happier individually and more useful socially by becoming identified with one of them.

III—*Differences Between Christian Denominations*

The differences in values recognized and in the means by which the dynamic power of Christ is rendered available, are greatest between Roman Catholics and Protestants. Modern Roman Catholicism emphasizes loyalty and submissiveness to authority; it is doing a splendid work along these lines in America today—in a nation and an age altogether too unrestrained, impulsive and undisciplined. Penance and confession insure, so far as is possible, that an individual will frankly acknowledge his wrong doing, and profit by the advice of an expert in the direction of his religious life. Roman Catholic ritual also has great dignity and aesthetic charm. Protestantism, on the other hand, emphasizes individual initiative and responsibility; for it there is no one on earth who can forgive sins, the individual at his own risk and peril must make his personal confession to his God. This develops higher standards for the truly conscientious layman than an authoritative church can well impose on every one; there are no works of supererogation for the Protestant, no one can possibly do

more than his duty and everyone must seek God's help to do that. The forms of public worship, while less beautiful, are more thought provoking. It is no accident that Roman Catholicism is the faith of the more artistically gifted peoples, and Protestantism of the more intellectual and self-reliant ones.

The Roman Catholic religion is liable to abuse by those who are not sincere, in a tendency to make worship more a matter of routine than a deep inner experience, and to regard penance as complete if the priest is satisfied; in times of low religious ideals it has tended to degenerate into legalism and formalism. Protestantism is liable to abuse by the insincere, who, since they do not confess to a priest, experience no real contrition at all, who never honestly face their own shortcomings and seek to overcome them, and whose consciences are so lax that very low standards of conduct seem sufficient. In times of low religious ideals, Protestantism has sometimes degenerated into an arid intellectualism as in Germany and England in the first half of the eighteenth century. At other times it has degenerated into an effervescent emotionalism, in which people "got religion" in revivals without its having any lasting effect upon their characters or bearing any discernible relation to moral conduct. The conclusion clearly is, that an intelligent and sincere seeker after a larger spiritual life can find it in either Roman Catholic or Protestant communions; but that neither is able to prevent the insincere or careless from failing to do so. Neither can be maintained on a high spiritual level except by the constant efforts of its gifted and devout leaders, who must keep in close touch with the dynamic power of Christ, and who, for it, are "the salt of the earth."

Roman Catholicism and Protestantism thus contain differences in their conceptions of values and of the means by which they are conserved. Each is strong and weak on a different side. Happy is that country where both are represented in large numbers, and engaged in lively but tolerant rivalry. Each is thus stimulated to emulate the good features of the other, and neither can become decadent.

The differences between the various Protestant confessions respecting values recognized and methods by which the dynamic power of Christ is made available in conserving them are less profound. In some cases they are indeed genuine; the silent worship of the Quaker, the spontaneity of the Methodist, the beautiful liturgy and impressive sacramentalism of

the Episcopalian, and the intellectual sermons of the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians and the Unitarians, though all valuable and effective, do not appeal equally to persons of different native temperaments and educational environments.

Protestants undoubtedly lose much in effectiveness by being divided into a multiplicity of sects. In small places many congregations are unable to employ ministers regularly, and salaries are so pitifully small that talented young men often refuse to go into the ministry or to remain in it. Happily movements toward federation of Protestant churches are proceeding rapidly. In Canada the union in a single denomination of Presbyterians, Methodists and Congregationalists seems assured. Various denominations are uniting in Scotland. No union of rival denominations on so large a scale seems likely to occur in the United States in the immediate future, but the Protestant denominations are learning to co-operate for common ends through the Federation of the Churches in America, the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, and other organizations. How far Protestant denominations should permanently remain separate depends in the last analysis upon how far each is conserving unique values that could not be conserved as well or better in a United Protestant Church, and whether these values really outweigh the price—in the narrower range of outlook and the more restricted form of Christian experience—which sects always have to pay for their separateness. The ideal would be the reunion of all the Protestant denominations into a single church in which none of the valuable features of any distinct sect would be lost, but all of these become common property. In view of the extremely individualistic and divisive tendencies of the earlier Protestantism this ideal might appear impossible; but it must be remembered that Protestantism has changed its characteristics in considerable measure in each century, and what would have been impossible in the seventeenth century may conceivably come about before the end of the twentieth.

IV—*The Finality of the Christian Religion*

In the religions of India, Greece and Rome, as well as in Judaism and Christianity, we have observed large agreement in the recognition of moral values, of what is right and wrong. Truth telling and keeping of contracts; chastity; temperance

in food and drink; control of temper and other impulses; honesty regarding property; loyalty to kin, friends, and fellow countrymen; wisdom; physical and moral courage; justice; reverence;—all these were early recognized to be desirable. Differences in climate and other features of the physical environment as well as in race psychology, and in the intellectual speculations of individual thinkers have naturally led to some differences of emphasis. There is also large agreement on more spiritual values:—calmness of mind and imperturbability; recognition of all mankind as having something in common with one (such as Stoics and Christians expressed in terms of divine fatherhood and human brotherhood); love and forgiveness; fidelity to duty; a clear conscience; and communion with the supernatural Agency both in this life and beyond the grave (differently as all these would be stated in the languages of the different religions). To be sure, ethical values were more clearly analyzed and stated by the Greeks than any of the others. But to a surprisingly large extent there is agreement on *what values* should be sought.

On the other hand, there are large differences as to the nature of the *Agency* conceived, and the *means* by which the Agency is to be made effective. Here, too, the teaching of history points fairly clearly in one direction. The Agency must both be *human,* anthropomorphic,—like Yahweh and still more like Jesus—and the Agency must be *superhuman,* divine. The Greek and Roman attempts to effect the combination are instructive and pitiful—neither Dionysus or Orpheus, nor foreign importations like Attis, Osiris, and Mithra, nor deified Roman emperors, answered. None were human enough, nor good enough, to effect human intimacy and to incorporate the values sought. Brahmă was too impersonal; and every other Hindu deity, like the old Greek gods, embodied too many human frailties. Buddhism in its original form was too narrow, pessimistic and otherworldly, in the range of moral values that it recognized, and it afforded insufficient aid to the individual worshipper in his endeavor to gain them. Yet such an Agency—at once human and divine—was everywhere sought.

It is easy to be prejudiced in favor of one's own religion. But in Christianity have we not, in the personality of Jesus Christ such an Agency as all the other religions noticed (except perhaps modern Judaism) have less successfully sought? Jesus of Nazareth is human, thoroughly human, in

complete contact with human weaknesses and needs, and yet personally free from guilt and sin, so that he can stand forth as a model of what all men would like to be, and so can gladly imitate. In order to accept this assertion, the reader need not be orthodox. The orthodox Christian believes that Jesus Christ was absolutely sinless, and that in Him was embodied every human perfection. A liberal Christian is not troubled by alleged imperfections in the character of the historic Jesus, —that he was inferior to Buddha in unruffled serenity of spirit; that he was intolerant in his attitude toward the Pharisees; that he was inferior to Socrates in his appreciation of the virtues of citizenship and social justice; that he did not realize so clearly as Buddha and Mohammed the harmfulness of all indulgence in intoxicating liquors; that he overemphasized the feminine virtues; that he was too much preoccupied with ideas of a supernatural intervention by God in his behalf to realize the necessity of moral and social evolution in this world. These and other criticisms have been urged against Jesus. It is not necessary to defend Jesus here. These charges and others have been fairly considered by Dr. Hastings Rashdall, to whose *Conscience and Christ* anyone interested is referred. Even if all such criticisms were to be accepted without protest, the character of Jesus would still remain superior to that of any other historical or mythical founder, hero, or saint of any other religion known to man. What such figure does not reveal greater faults? It therefore follows that Christianity has a tremendous advantage over its rivals in the personality of its Founder—who more fully expresses and embodies the moral values recognized by all ethical religions than any other historical or mythological personality, 13.

For this reason it is probably safe to predict that through the personality of Jesus, Gentiles will in the future chiefly seek to come into contact with the divine. Through him they will secure the conservation of their moral values.

It can be frankly admitted that other religions have recognized a few values more adequately than Christianity has yet done. That has always been true of Christianity. From the very outset it has had to assimilate valuable features from other religions. It got most of its theological conceptions from Greek philosophy. In part it got its sacraments and much of its conception of divine communion from the ancient mystery religions. It got its form of government from the Roman

Empire. Its contact with the Barbarians taught it to idealize relations of war and love in terms of chivalry, romantic love and sacramental marriage. From the Jew, it still has to learn to appreciate more fully family loyalty and devotion, and from him it may yet be able to borrow the Passover as a sacrament of family worship, modified to meet modern conditions. From the Confucian, Christian youth must learn reverence to their elders,—a virtue sadly lacking in Western lands, and very inadequately conserved at present by the Christian religion. From Buddhism, Christianity probably must learn to find the good and evil consequences of conduct automatically working themselves out in human life without the interposition of a theistic God external to life itself; although in assimilating this, Christianity must not lose its own idea of atonement. From Greek philosophers and modern life Christianity must learn to think out moral problems in terms of citizenship, social service, and democracy. Its very God must cease to be a king, and become a democrat. But all these and other lessons Christianity will be able to learn far more quickly and completely than any of its rivals can do. It already knows more values than any of them. In the personality of Jesus Christ and in the fellowship of the Church it has a central core that is sound and firm, and that makes possible indefinite assimilation and growth. It has for nearly twenty centuries been the faith of most of the progressive and forward looking nations; as their civilizations have advanced, organized Christianity has advanced with them, and though not without defects, it has *on the whole* been the strongest factor for the conservation of their recognized moral values, 14. It now has a vast heritage of moral insight and experience, which it knows how to pass down to succeeding ages.

Here, too, we find the justification for Christian missions. The oriental nations and the nature races of the world are rapidly assimilating occidental civilization. This forces upon them a multitude of moral problems with which their own religions are unprepared to grapple. It therefore is the duty of Christian nations to send representatives of our religion along with the commercial agents who introduce to them our commodities, and the financial agents who seek concessions for the exploitation (in a good, let us hope, as well as a bad sense) of their countries. There can be little doubt that nature folk and outcastes will be greatly benefited by becoming Christians,

provided, of course, that Christianity is presented in a simple form to them, suited to their understanding and needs. Both in the recognition of values and in the means for conserving them it will be bound to raise their condition immeasurably. It is less certain that cultivated adherents of the higher religions of the East will decide to abandon their own faiths for that of Christ. But even if they should determine to persist in the religions of their fathers they will need to learn much from the experience of Christian churches in order to adapt themselves to the problems which Western civilization is forcing upon them. It is therefore our duty to send missionaries to them in order to give them the opportunity, either to accept Christianity or to adopt from it such features as they need for the adaptation of their own religions to new conditions.

But is Christianity ultimately *true?* In a strictly metaphysical sense, the author supposes that it must be said that no religion can claim ultimate truth. All try to express by means of symbols what is infinite and unknowable, as well as what is knowable, but has not yet become scientific knowledge. But the symbols of Christianity have proved their adaptability to twenty centuries of more varying conditions than ever confronted any other religion (except the Jewish), and they have grown and become enriched in the process. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that Christianity, which symbolizes more truth for more races and more environments than any other, is the closest approximation to absolute truth which can be attained by the mind of man through the instrumentality of a religion. With the experience of future ages Christianity will become further advanced. There may be greater changes in future doctrines, ritual, and ecclesiastical organization than even the past has known. We can feel sure that the revelation of God in the personality of Jesus Christ, with the ever enlarging interpretations which the succeeding generations will continue to give to it, shall continue to be the means through which men will endeavor to secure the conservation of their socially recognized values.

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PART II

RELIGION AND THE SELF

CHAPTER XIV

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS

I—*Introductory*

The supreme concern of a spiritual religion is the conservation of moral values in human personalities through a religious agency. In the course of a man's religious experience he gains these values, and makes them a part of his self, through what he believes to be divine aid. If a modern man were to give an account of his religious experience, this would be sure to include a description of the manner in which in youth he came to appreciate personally the higher moral values praised by parents, teachers, clergymen and rabbis, so that desire for them became an integral part of character, and membership in church or synagogue a real privilege.

The first business of the psychology of contemporary religion is, therefore, to explain how, *through the development of the religious sentiment*, such an enlargement and enrichment of the self takes place, ordinarily in the years of adolescence, in connection with the worship of God and the fellowship of the church. (Chapter XV). A related problem will be the interpretation of *Prayer*, the process by which individuals and groups seek aid from and communion with God, whom they believe to be the supreme Agency through whom such conservation of socially recognized values is afforded. (Chapter XVI). A third topic will be the analysis of *Mysticism*, a name applied to the procedure and experience of persons who seek, and as they at least believe, succeed in obtaining consciousness of the divine presence. (Chapter XVII). Preliminary to all of these psychological interpretations, however, it will be needful to refresh the reader's memory regarding certain psychological conceptions. To this task the present chapter will be devoted, 1.

II—*The Subconscious*

Before attempting a definition of the Subconscious, it will be convenient to give some illustrations. Many persons are able, if they fix the idea in their minds, when they retire at night, that they are going to arise at a certain hour in the morning, to awaken at precisely that hour. All of us like to defer making an immediate decision upon matters of some consequence that are suddenly proposed to us; we say that we will "sleep over the matter, and decide to-morrow." When the following day arrives, we often find, though we have given the question little or no conscious attention, in the meantime, that we clearly perceive the merits of the case, and that our minds are fully decided. A student often finds that a theorem or a paradigm scanned just before retiring will be perfectly recalled on awakening in the morning, and that a few moments then spent in fixing it in the memory will assure permanent mastery of it. A person may meet someone on the street whose face is familiar, whose name he cannot recall; without further thought, the forgotten name may suddenly flash into his consciousness a few hours later. A public speaker may agree to deliver an address upon some subject two weeks hence. Though able to give the matter little or no attention in the meantime, when the occasion arrives he delivers "extemporaneously" an excellent speech. Yet he would not have been able to speak at all effectively if he had not had the fortnight's notice. Romances sometimes turn on the point that the heroine does not know her own mind; she really loves the hero, as is perfectly obvious to the reader, but she is unaware of the fact, and all sorts of difficulties ensue; until some crucial situation reveals her love to herself, and she and her lover are happy ever after.

Cases that at least border on the pathological are still more striking. A person sees in a crystal incidents that he had completely forgotten, and only the evidence furnished by others can convince him that he has recalled facts that he once knew, and that the crystal has not been a source of supernatural or miraculous information. In a similar fashion, a person's hand may automatically write down incidents that were once known but cannot be recalled by conscious effort. In dreams or in visions facts forgotten by the waking consciousness may be brought to light. Severe nervous disorders, extreme phobias

even, have been reported in which the patient is quite unaware of having been frightened, but which the psychiatrist is able, through the employment of abstraction or hypnotism, or through study of the patient's dreams, to trace to some forgotten shock, often of a really trifling character,—a fact which the patient often needs only to realize consciously, in order to be put well on the road to recovery.

We all know that at the time when a particular object is in the center of our attention, we are more or less dimly aware of the presence of various other objects. When absorbed in an interesting lecture, a student does not attend to the sounds coming in from the open window, or from the next room, nor the sensations of bodily contact with his chair; and yet if asked, he would often be able to recall, as a matter of conscious memory, that he had previously been aware of these circumstances. Dr. Morton Prince believes that perceptions of the environment which have never even entered the fringe of consciousness, of which the individual has never even dimly been aware, may be retained and recalled. Certain of his patients remember through hypnosis, and automatic writing, paragraphs in newspapers which they must have read in casual glances without being aware that they were reading them, 2.

Now for the interpretation of such cases, and a definition of the Subconscious. The evidence is overwhelming, and so far as the author is aware, all psychologists now concede, that *neural* processes go in the brain and other nerve centers that are unattended by consciousness at the time, but which either then or later may affect the contents of consciousness. Neural processes of some kind must have been taking place while the person was asleep in order to ensure his awaking at a certain hour, and his mastery of the theorems or paradigms; the brain must have been active to effect the recall of the forgotten name while the person's attention was upon other topics; the forgotten experiences seen in the crystal must have been in some way registered in the tissues of the brain.

We are now ready for a definition. By the term *subconscious,* as it will be employed in this book, will be meant those *brain or other neural processes which are not attended by consciousness, but which modify the contents of consciousness. If* these neural processes *had* been attended by consciousness while they were taking place, they would be typical instances of perception, imagination, memory, reasoning, volition, etc.;

but they were *not* so attended, and so they are styled subconscious.

A disputed question is, whether or not *some* subconscious processes, using the term as just defined, are accompanied by *mental* processes of which consciousness is at the time unaware. Such subconscious processes, *with both neural and mental sides*, would be *co-conscious*. It seems to many psychologists and psychiatrists that mental processes of this sort do take place. Instances of alternating personality, in particular, suggest such an hypothesis. For instance in Morton Prince's famous case, reported in *The Dissociation of a Personality* a young woman called Miss Beauchamp, feels unaccountable impulses to take a walk on a rainy day, and to do various other things that she does not wish to do, but is compelled to perform in order to regain her peace of mind. When the lady was hypnotized, a personality called "Sally" emerged. Sally averred that she had wanted to take the walk, and to do the other things, and accordingly had put these ideas into Miss Beauchamp's consciousness. The simplest explanation of such phenomena, apparently, would be to take Sally at her word, and to assume that she existed in the mind of Miss Beauchamp as a co-conscious personality when Miss Beauchamp felt these unaccountable impulses. If we reject the hypothesis of the co-conscious we must assume that purely neural processes unattended by mental process of any kind impelled Miss Beauchamp, and that, afterwards, in the hypnotic state, these neural processes produced conscious states called Sally; but that there was no mental Sally in existence at the time that Miss Beauchamp took the walk. If we accept the doctrine of the co-conscious to explain pathological cases like Sally, it is but another step, and seemingly a reasonable one, to assume the presence of the co-conscious in normal human beings, whenever novel results appear in consciousness that are not the outcome of previous conscious mental processes. We need not suppose that such co-conscious processes would become organized into a separate and competing personality, except under abnormal conditions. Co-conscious processes, however, would be believed to exist in normal human minds, in subordination to the self, and to be of service to it in working out problems for which conscious attention cannot always be spared, as in the illustrations of the public speaker, the student, and the person who has forgotten a name, or who defers his decision upon some matter until the following day.

The chief arguments against the assumption of co-conscious processes are: (1) we are not aware of them, therefore they are mere assumptions, and it is scientifically more conservative not to assume them; (2) while the continued existence of our brains and nervous systems along with the external world is certain, mental life is often arrested by sleep and in other ways, and there is no sufficient reason for assuming its continued existence. In favor of the theory of the co-consciousness, it is often urged: (1) it is thoroughly scientific to assume the existence of something not directly perceived when to do so offers the simplest explanation of what we do perceive (just as physicists assume the existence of atoms, ether, electrons, etc., though these never can be perceived by anyone); (2) unless we assume that mental life is parallel with the nervous system we shall have to assume that neural activity actually calls into existence states of consciousness that are utterly different in character. As consciousness is not a form of energy, to assume this would appear to violate the law of the conservation of energy. The whole question of the relation between mind and matter thus becomes involved in the dispute over the existence of the co-consciousness. There is no need for the reader of this book to decide whether or not he shall accept the doctrine of co-conscious mental processes. In any event, there are *subconscious* neural processes, (understanding "subconscious" as it has been defined above) and these processes frequently modify the contents of consciousness, either at the time or later on, 3.

III—*Instincts*

No baby, of course, brings into the world a fully developed personality. The infant consciousness for the first few weeks consists of sensations and feelings. We can very well accept James' characterization of it as a "blooming, buzzing confusion" if we remember that this describes it as it would seem to us if *we* could enter into the baby's mind and observe its contents. The very little baby itself does not know that its mind is a confusion; it would be more accurate to compare the infant's mental state to homogeneous and undifferentiated protoplasm, which later on will develop into distinguishable structures and processes. In due course, certainly before the fourth year is over, nearly all of the great racial impulses make their appearance. During *childhood* (from four to ten) and *adolescence* (from eleven to twenty) the more important of these

impulses—the principal primary instincts and emotions and the innate non-specific tendencies to action—become organized into sentiments, and these sentiments become more systematized, harmonious and stable, so that the individual acquires a definite character and personality of his own. Primary teachers will testify that even little boys and girls of five or six have personalities of their own, each different from the others. However, great enrichments of personality come during later childhood and adolescence, and these are of chief consequence for the psychology of religion.

Let us take notice of the nature of these great racial impulses, and of the sentiments to which they give rise.

The principal primary instincts, common to man and the higher mammals, and each with its distinct mental pathology, include fear, anger, curiosity, tenderness, gregariousness, acquisitiveness, constructiveness, hunger, disgust, self-assertiveness, self-abasement, sex, and perhaps a few others, 4. All of these, except sex, make their first appearance in infancy. All become greatly widened in their scope during adolescence. Each is *psycho-physical*, i. e. it has a mental and a physical side.

The *physical* side consists of co-ordinations in the brain and central nervous and sympathetic systems which are inherited and which persist throughout life, though subject to certain modifications on the afferent and efferent sides. When stimulated, the instinct, either consciously or subconsciously is set into activity. At other times the instinct exists on the *physical* side, as a *tendency* or *disposition* to certain forms of activity. Our eyes exist as organic structures, not only when they are functioning in vision, but also when they are closed and asleep. A better analogy would be that of a habit. Habits are believed to be co-ordinations of brain cells that exist both when one is performing the habit and when one is not acting upon it. Indeed, habits are nourished and grow to some extent even when they are not being exercised. So it has been said that we learn to skate in summer and to swim in winter. An instinct is not a separate organ in the brain, as an eye is an organ; like a habit, it is a functional unit, an organization of nerve cells in a certain way so that in the future they will react toward stimulation as they have in the past. Habits, however, are not inherited co-ordinations; they are acquired during the individual's lifetime. Instincts, on the contrary, are inherited. Man has the

same instincts as the mammals most related to him. Every human being possesses the same instincts as any other. Individuals differ as to the relative strength of different instincts; but it is doubtful if even idiots lack any of the instincts altogether, and nobody possesses a different instinct from those of his fellow men.

When an instinct is in *conscious* activity, it is also in part *mental.* Conscious fear is not only a state of the brain and nervous system, it is a conscious emotion, normally prompted by a consciously perceived object, and normally attended by a conscious impulse to action of some sort. That is, the consciously operative instinct involves the *knowing, feeling* and *willing* sides of the human mind, or more technically, the *cognitive, affective,* and *conative* sides.

Instincts sometimes are *sub-consciously* active. The instincts of sex and tender emotion are operative when a person is in love without knowing it. An angry person often does not at the time know that he is angry. Pathological fears, as has been said, sometimes cause serious mental and bodily experience although the patient is consciously unaware of this existence. When an instinct is sub-consciously active, has it a mental side? Are subconscious emotions of sex, tenderness, anger, and fear *co-conscious?* Or are they exclusively physiological? This is a disputed question. And when an instinct is inactive, and persists only as a disposition, is it then purely an affair of tendencies in the nerve cells, or is it also a *psychical* disposition? We need not decide. All that the reader is asked to believe is that *an instinct is a part of our bodily constitutions which exists, both when it is in either conscious or subconscious activity and also when it is in quiescence. At least when in conscious activity, the instinct also has a psychical side.* It may therefore be regarded *as an innate psycho-physical disposition.*

IV—*Habits and Sentiments*

Modifications of instincts, often take place, and constitute *habits.* A most important form of habit is the *Sentiment. A sentiment is an organization of instinctive tendencies in response to a given object that calls them into activity.* A stray dog may evoke a momentary caress, or a bit of food, and be speedily forgotten. This is an instance in which an instinct (tender emotion) has been aroused. This instinct may be momentarily aroused many times in the course of a

day in the case of anyone who is fond of animals. But suppose the same dog attracts the notice of such a person frequently and is repeatedly caressed by him. Ere the person realizes it, the dog will have permanently established itself in his affections and become a pet; to feel tender emotion toward this particular animal will have become a habit. Manifestations of this habit of tenderness toward the pet dog will thereafter be accompanied by additional emotions. One feels anger if a larger dog annoys one's own dog; one feels curiosity to know the dog's tastes, and self-assertion in exhibiting his accomplishments, self-abasement (or even shame) if the dog sometime exhibits the traits of a cur. A youth's attention is called to many pretty faces in the course of a day; for sex is a readily aroused instinct. But suppose one particular face comes habitually to evoke the youth's attention. Ere he knows it, a habit of feeling attracted to this particular girl has been established. Tender emotion is at once added to sex attraction, and in various ways most of the other emotions become organized in the system of this sentiment. This one girl is the only one (while the sentiment lasts) that can powerfully arouse these emotions in him. He is in love. The formation of sentiments of hate is similar in principle, beginning with habitual anger toward some particular object. Sentiments of respect are also likewise formed, with self assertion and self abasement as the central nuclei instead of tender emotion, sex, or anger. Sentiments of love, hate and respect are formed toward *individual* objects (a dog, a woman, a man, one's self) or *classes* of objects (dogs, or children, or pretty girls; or German Junkers; or excellent men in general) or *abstract conceptions* (liberty, justice, science, truth, God).

While the sentiment is a kind of habit, it will be observed that sentiments differ very materially from other habits. Many habits are easily acquired, and, if not so readily broken as formed, they are, at any rate, far more easily broken than sentiments. Many habits are performed automatically, their chief function being to economize attention and afford efficiency—for instance, learning to put on one's clothes, to hold one's knife and fork, to write, and, later in life, to drive a motor car or operate a typewriter. There are even said to be persons who have acquired the capacity to select food and eating utensils at a cafeteria without awkwardness! In contrast to such habits, a deepseated sentiment is a fundamental organization

of many of one's deepest feelings and impulses about objects of supreme value to him. The various sentiments, taken together, constitute the character of a man. If we can ascertain what a man loves, hates, and respects, we know what sort of a man he really is.

V—*The Religious Sentiment*

The presence of religion of some sort, as we have seen in Part I, is universal among the races of mankind. Following loose, popular usage, ministers are perhaps justified in speaking of a "religious instinct." Has it not become traditional to say that man differs from animals in his ability to use language, make tools, and employ a religion? However, in the more strictly scientific sense, it cannot be said that man possesses a religious instinct similar to fear, anger, curiosity and the others. Nor has he a religious tendency of the innate non-specific type, like play, imitation, sympathy and suggestion. We cannot even credit him with an innate tendency toward religion in the vaguer sense in which it might perhaps be maintained that there are such tendencies toward art, morality and science. For beauty, goodness and truth, after all, are fairly specific values. As Part I has taught us, religion has endeavored to conserve all sorts of values; it has no very specific and characteristic value of its own, as have art, morality and science.

On the other hand it is equally inaccurate to say that the religious impulse in man is merely an ordinary habit or attitude formed in response to the environment. The striking fact that all races, and the majority of individual men of all races, have found religion an indispensable mode of conserving their socially recognized values, indicates that there is something about religion that makes it an inevitable mode of expression of human nature. What, then, is the religious impulse, since it is neither an innate tendency nor an ordinary acquired habit? The answer is, it is a *sentiment*.

The religious sentiment has for its primary object, the Agency through which the conservation of socially recognized values is sought. For the civilized European and American this Agency is God. Associated with God, develop subsidiary objects, dependent for their sanction, upon Him. Such subsidiary objects, for the Christian, are Jesus, the Bible, the Church, the Sacraments, and also, for Roman Catholics, the

Blessed Virgin Mary and the saints. Other subsidiary objects exist for the Jew, such as the Law, the synagogue, the feasts, fasts, and other sacred days and observances. For the civilized European and American, the primary instincts and emotions directed toward God and the subsidiary objects of the religious sentiment include tender emotion, fear, intellectual curiosity, and gregariousness. The last manifests itself in the desires for divine companionship and for sociability with one's fellow communicants. The non-specific tendencies,—imitation, suggestion and sympathy,—also obviously contribute to the strengthening of the sentiment, since child and youth desire to act, feel, and think as their elders do. Complex emotions are present in the worship of God,—particularly, as Professor McDougall thinks, admiration, awe, gratitude, and reverence. Among other sentiments, that of love is certainly of great importance. As conservation of the higher moral values is sought through God, all the emotions and sentiments connected with them also unite with the religious sentiment. Among these would be included the sentiments felt toward goodness, purity of heart, wisdom, self-control, physical and moral courage, justice, and all the other virtues to which one aspires. Impulses connected with the desire for forgiveness of sins and the eradication from one's personality of all that is morally painful to contemplate, also enter into this sentiment.

The religious sentiment, therefore, includes within its system a very large number of the strongest impulses that a man has. If his childhood and early adolescence are passed in religious surroundings, an individual is likely to learn to seek the conservation of the values attached to all the impulses, just enumerated, through the objects of the religious sentiment. Under these circumstances the sentiment has a rapid and extensive development in the mind of an individual and becomes one, at least, of the strongest in his personality. The religious sentiment has its origin in childhood, in the simple teachings of home and Sunday school. It receives a considerable enlargement during adolescence, as an outcome of modifications that come in part subconsciously. Later the youth experiences a religious awakening, and enters into conscious possession of this enlarged sentiment.

VI—*The Innate but Non-Specific Tendencies*

Man is a gregarious animal. In consequence of this fact,

each of his instincts is liable to be called into operation if the corresponding instincts of other human beings about him have been aroused. The degree to which this is true varies with different individuals, some being more susceptible to the social environment than others. Some instincts like fear, anger, sex, and curiosity, are more susceptible to such influences than weaker instincts. Not every manifestation of an instinct serves to effect its arousal in other individuals. A sheep is frightened if other sheep are frightened; it does not scratch its ear because others do, 5. A college student is aroused to joy or sorrow as those about him feel these emotions in connection with athletic prospects; the sight of other students absorbed in study does not so invariably produce in him a consuming thirst for knowledge.

This principle is responsible for the *innate non-specific emotional tendencies*, so called because the mode of behavior which they express is more variable and less specific than is the case with instincts. These are *suggestion*, *sympathy*, *imitation*, and *play*. The first three of these are extremely closely related.

Suggestion is the tendency for a man to accept as his own opinion some idea simply because it has been conveyed to him by another person, without any critical, logical examination on his own part of the evidence for and against it. The idea may be true, or it may be false; the person who influences him to believe it may actually hold it himself or be duping him; but the man adopts the idea without exercising his independent judgment upon it. Man is an extremely suggestible animal. He is, of course, most liable to adopt thus the opinions of those who for some reason possess *prestige* for him. As a gregarious animal, he is greatly influenced by the opinions of his neighbors. If the majority of persons in one's community hold certain opinions, it is very difficult to exercise one's independent judgment, and not passively to agree with them. *Contra suggestion* is no remedy. Some persons of a "contrary" frame of mind are led to hold opinions precisely the opposite to those which they hear expressed, especially if asserted by persons whom they dislike. This, also, is a case of adopting opinions as a result of the influence of others, without exercising independent judgment.

Although this susceptibility to suggestion often makes man the victim of his unscrupulous fellows—notoriously, for instance, in his voting by demagogic orators, and in his purchases

by unscrupulous advertisements—it has on the whole been a valuable trait in human nature. Most of our beliefs as adults have been adopted by us as a result of suggestion. Our moral, political, and social as well as religious convictions have chiefly come to us in this way. How many Americans to-day know why they believe so strongly in a republican form of government, in monogamous marriage, and in Christianity? How many of us could intelligently defend any of these convictions, if we were to fall into an argument with a highly educated Mohammedan? How many of us, for that matter, could argue effectively against beliefs in witchcraft and slavery, both of which were firmly held by our ancestors? Nor is our inability to defend our beliefs on such matters greatly to be regretted. Those beliefs which in our day appear established and apparently do not require modification on account of changed conditions, had best be accepted by the general public through suggestion. Specialists of course know why our civilization contains the beliefs mentioned. All of them were considered carefully in past ages, and there is no serious reason to question the wisdom with which they were decided. We need to give our attention to the formation of opinions on the unsettled political, moral, social and religious problems of our time,—of which there are surely enough to keep us busy. To help decide as many of them as we can, so that still richer traditions may be transmitted to those who come after us is our principal duty.

So far as the normal acceptance of traditional beliefs through suggestion is concerned, religion stands on the same basis as other activities. Civilization and progress are only possible because we have so large an heritage of beliefs to build upon. It would be foolish to criticize any of them needlessly. However, in our time, new knowledge requires that an unusually large number of traditional beliefs undergo critical revision and reconstruction. Every liberally educated man and woman ought to form intelligent opinions upon them. The general public will never have leisure nor education to examine many of them; it will ultimately accept through prestige suggestion whatever the intelligent classes decide to be probably true. All the greater responsibility rests upon us in consequence.

The fact, therefore, that the majority of adolescents develop religious sentiments which rest upon beliefs that they have adopted from their religious environments without much conscious reflection is normal and inevitable. The same is true of

their beliefs on morality, politics and other subjects. The half-hypnotic use of suggestion in revivals is, however, quite another matter, and open to serious criticism, as will be indicated in the following chapter.

Sympathy in the psychological sense signifies the tendency to feel an emotion that is felt by others, without critical reflection upon the grounds for the emotion. One sheep bleats because it is frightened at some object; the other sheep at once become frightened without knowing why. Similarly fear and anger are contagious among human beings and cause panics and riots. Laughter is similarly infectious, and if even a poor joke be told at a dinner everyone will catch the emotion of its narrator and heartily laugh with him. It is hard to remain depressed among joyful companions, or to remain cheerful among those who are despondent. If one stays long in a community that is passing through a boom it is difficult not to catch the hopeful confidence of the citizens, however ill founded are the logical grounds of their enthusiasm; nor can one in a period of financial depression or panic fully retain the confidence in the ultimate security of good investments that calm reflection warrants.

Sympathy, in the technical sense here intended, must not be confused with the popular usage, in which it is employed more or less interchangeably with tender emotion and pity. We can feel tenderness toward those whose emotions we do not share. This is true of the competent physician and nurse, for example; to feel the emotions of their patients would often render them incompetent to afford the relief to which tender emotion prompts. On the other hand, we may feel no pity for those whose emotions we involuntarily share. The priest and the Levite may have felt great sympathy with the poor man who fell among the thieves, in the parable of the Good Samaritan; it may be that the very sight of his suffering so affected them that it made them sick; what they lacked was tender emotion for him, and so they found it convenient to hasten away and forget him, 6.

The rôle of sympathy in the religious life is important. God must be supposed to share the emotions of His worshippers as well as to love them. Thus only could men confidently turn to Him for aid. Mutual sympathy is part of the tie that binds members of church or synagogue together. Sympathy makes possible the growth of common sentiments of love and loyalty. The desire to share the religious emotions of adults—in

other words, the desire to be able to sympathize—is one of the motives that helps to effect religious awakenings in adolescence.

Unreflective imitation is the tendency for a person to act in a certain manner simply because others act in that manner, without critical logical examination on his own part of the reasons for such conduct. One person in a room coughs or yawns; presently others do so, and the contagion soon becomes quite general. Many adults find themselves keeping time with feet or fingers to the music of a passing brass band. An Englishman with a pure Oxford pronunciation cannot spend many years in an American community, without to some extent acquiring the nasal twang with which all Americans habitually and unconsciously speak.

In the illustrations just given, it is apparent that imitation is subconscious and involuntary, as well as unreflective. There are numerous cases in which persons imitate those who have *prestige*, adopting their modes of action more or less *consciously and voluntarily, but without critical reasoning* on the matter. Thus fashions spread, and rational considerations regarding economy, comfort, æsthetic beauty and even modesty have insufficient influence to prevent modes of dress that are absurd from every reflective standpoint coming for a time into very general usage. Absurd fads in home furnishings, music, dancing, and even architecture are likewise contagious. The practises of aristocracies are imitated by all the other classes of a country, because of their prestige. To the influence of prestige is due in large measure the imitation of each European country, by its colonies. For this reason, "trade follows the flag," and American customs are rapidly supplanting Spanish customs in Porto Rico and the Philippines.

Quite different from imitation that is subconscious and involuntary, and imitation that is conscious and voluntary but unreflective, is *reflective imitation.* To copy a model because of features that have been found as a result of critical examination to be suited to one's needs is wholly different. Of late years Japanese imitation of occidental civilization has largely been of this critical type; the relative merits of the leading western nations in different departments of civilization have been carefully weighed, and the Japanese have selected and adapted to their wants what, in their judgment, they can best utilize.

All three forms of imitation, of course, have their value. Attention can and should only be given to the more important details of conduct, and if the right models are reflectively chosen for imitation, details and routine can well be absorbed inattentively, and even subconsciously. Select Tours as a place to learn French, and Hanover to learn German, and choose well educated natives as your associates after you arrive, and you will profitably assimilate even more from them by these methods than by critical imitation. Both, however, are needful. Young men probably learned most about railroading in the employ of James J. Hill, about the steel industry under Andrew Carnegie, and journalism under Charles A. Dana, by the unreflective forms of imitation. Yet, in these instances, as in all others, only those who did their very best consciously and reflectively, profiting by rational imitation, ever rose above mediocrity. While subconscious and conscious but uncritical imitation assist in the process, they do not suffice to make successful men.

For the small child imitation is mostly unreflective, though even he often criticises his models to the extent of his mental capacity. When adolescence is attained, and reasoning powers increase, reflective imitation becomes more prominent. This holds true of the manner in which the child and adolescent learn all forms of conduct from their elders, morals as truly as speech, deportment, dress, and athletic sports. The same principles hold in religion. The little child prays because he is told to do so, and sees others doing so; he continues attendance at public worship because of admiration and respect for his elders, as well as in obedience to their commands. The adolescent not only feels the inward necessity of gaining their adult religious point of view; he critically and reflectively weighs, as well as he can, the reasons and the evidence for following the Christian life. In the religious life of adults all three forms of imitation continue. Probably every manual of devotion that has had the *Imitation of Christ* for its theme, from the great book of that title by Thomas à Kempis, to such works of our own time as Dr. Charles Sheldon's *In His Steps*, prompts the disciple to imitate his Master in all these ways.

In religion, as in other fields of human activity, these innate non-specific activities are a conservative agency, leading the youth of each generation to adopt the beliefs, emotions, and practices of their elders. The fact that the religious sentiment

develops so largely in childhood and youth and receives its set early in life, makes religion one of the most conservative forces in human society. On the whole, this is good. What needs to be handed down in the fields of moral and religious values from past generations at any given time is vastly greater than what needs modification. On the other hand, these three innate non-specific tendencies are not wholly conservative in their influence. Prestige operates in behalf of a revered religious leader. The founders of new religions and great religious reformers have led their disciples to implicit acceptance of their beliefs, emotions, sentiments, and practices. Suggestion, sympathy and imitation have done as much as critical reflection to insure the triumph of new religious movements.

As was said above, suggestion, sympathy, and imitation are very closely related. Strictly speaking, they may really be regarded as different names for the same process, according to which aspect of it is most prominent. Instincts always involve cognition, affection and conation; no one can take place without the others. In consequence, the illustrations of any one of them imply the presence of the others.

In play occurs the release of nervous energy, not required for immediate tasks. The play of infants is merely this,—just running about in random movements which give expression to their buoyant spirits. The plays of older children involve something more. Consciously or unconsciously they are imitative of the activities of their elders. Boys play policemen or fireman, while girls act the rôle of little mothers in the care of their dolls. All of the primary instincts may receive expression in play during childhood and youth as well as in the recreation of adults; their distinguishing feature as play, at least during youth and adult life, is found in the fact that they are not serious, that they are exercised spontaneously with no ulterior purpose in view. Much of sport involves competition, and is a modification of the instinct of anger or pugnacity by which this is deprived of its animus, and so becomes play.

The play impulse no doubt attracts youngsters to the Sunday schools especially when the times of Christmas festivals and summer picnics draw near; adolescents often find sociables more attractive than Endeavor consecration meetings; many adults are more faithful in their attendance at church suppers than at prayer meetings and communion services. The same conditions prevail, no doubt, in primitive religions. This being the

case, the church and corresponding organizations in other religions have always found it expedient to appeal to this impulse in order to induce individuals to attend religious services. However, so far as the author can see, neither the play impulse, nor the æsthetic impulses that are similar and in some degree derivative, ever form an integral element in the religious sentiment. Religious endeavor is always serious, it is always an endeavor to conserve socially recognized values through the religious Agency. Like work, its interest is extrinsic, for benefits to be experienced at other times than during the performance of the ceremonial itself. The play impulse may lead a person into an environment favorable for the growth of the religious sentiment, and it may aid to keep him there. Some persons their lives long remain in a church chiefly because of its function as a social club. We all know such people. They are not deeply religious, and either possess no religious sentiment at all, or more probably, a slight but inadequate one.

VII—*The Development of the Self*

An infant does not possess a personality. If it be said that he has a self, this simply means that his consciousness is in some sense a whole, although as yet largely an undifferentiated whole. The undifferentiated self of the infant gradually develops through childhood and adolescence into the personality of the adult. Some phases of this development, in connection with the religious sentiment, will be noted in the following chapters. At present it will suffice to note three psychological points of a general character, 7.

(1) *The self develops through intercourse with others.* A baby imitates his elders consciously and subconsciously. Though walking and talking consist chiefly of co-ordinations of inherited reflexes, imitation of others facilitates the consummation of these processes. The boy in his play imitates his father, the policeman, the fireman, and other heroes of his imagination as well as he can, and so learns to some extent the import of their actions. The little girl reproduces faithfully with her dolls all the doings of her mother. Children practise upon younger children what they have learned from those older than themselves. They also learn very much in social intercourse with those of their own age, in displaying to one another their knowledge and accomplishments, in the mutual co-opera-

tion required in play. Boys, too, learn much of manliness and fair play in openly conducted fights in spite of the bloody noses and soiled raiment that shock their female relatives.

Nearly all of the child's ideas of what it is commendable to do and not to do come from his social environment. It would be as impossible for any person apart from social intercourse to build up the contents of his conscience, telling him what is right and wrong, as it would be to invent a language for himself. And as most of our private thinking is carried on in words which we think to ourselves, it, too, is semi-social in nature. We are constantly reasoning with ourselves, debating with ourselves, commending or condemning ourselves; in short, assuming toward ourselves the attitudes that we have learned in our social relationships.

Since our ideas and ideals are acquired chiefly through social intercourse, it is not difficult to perceive that if we believe in the supreme Agency of the religious sentiment, our relations toward Him will have the same general features as our relations with others. This principle will have its specific application in our study of prayer.

(2) *The self develops in the choices it makes.* The character of any one is the outcome of his decisions. We are constantly choosing between one possibility and another. Thus habits are formed. Thus, too, sentiments developed from attitudes formed toward certain objects that first became habitual, and later built up an instructive and emotional system. Thus, too, the religious sentiment gets its setting in childhood and early adolescence, in the repeated choices made with reference to God and religious worship. Whether this sentiment is to exist at all, and how prominent a place it is to occupy are usually decided before one is twenty, 8. Another momentous decision involving the personality as a whole is the choice of one's vocation in life, and this, too, is usually made before one is of legal age. Such decisions are largely made subconsciously. The little actions and thoughts of each day gradually are shaping the turn of one's interests and desires, so that when a *conscious* decision is called for, this often is merely a registering of the decision that has already been subconsciously made in past acts and thoughts.

(3) *The self as a whole is determined in its constitution by its dominant sentiments.* An adult's character consists of his instincts and emotions as they have become organized into

sentiments. A person with a strong character is one whose sentiments have become unified in a coherent whole, with a few dominant and harmonious sentiments ruling his life. One man's ruling sentiments are love of wealth, luxury and self-display, and fear of poverty. These guided him in his choice of his vocation and they now direct his conduct in it. These sentiments influenced him in his selection of a wife, and they are now responsible for the manner in which he is bringing up his children. The ruling sentiments of another successful business man have been desire for efficiency as an executive, for competence in directing large undertakings, and the consciousness of power successfully employed. He cares nothing at all for ostentatious display of wealth, or for luxurious living, and leads a life of extreme simplicity. His chief satisfaction is the knowledge that his name is deservedly honored and respected in commercial and banking circles. These sentiments have determined the decisions he has made throughout his life. The ruling sentiments of a man of extremely different type are love of knowledge for its own sake, and the desire for fame as a discoverer in the fields of pure science. These sentiments determined his choice of a profession, his selection of a wife who would sympathize with his ambitions and be contented with his modest financial resources, and they determine the small number of his children and the manner in which they are being educated. The ruling sentiments of another man are love for his fellowmen and keen desire to serve them in personal ways; so he has become a clergyman or a social worker, and planned his life accordingly. The ruling sentiment of another man is ambition for political distinction, and of another a passion for literary fame. And so on. A woman's sentiments are likely to be more personal in the objects to which they are attached; at least this is true if she marries. For her decision to marry means that her love for some particular man and desire for a home and children are stronger than her interest in a career or profession. Unlike man she cannot usually have both home and a career. She has to make an absolute choice between two rival sentiments. Her choice made, her personality becomes deeper though more restricted in its scope, and her character simpler and more consistent.

Not all persons, unhappily, have strong and coherent characters. Many are fickle, others are irresolute or dissolute. The fickle man's consciousness vacillates and he is unable to make

a selection between rival and conflicting sentiments. He may be attracted greatly by the careers of a philosopher and a lady killer, he may want to be a banker and a writer of sentimental poetry, or to be a gentleman of fashion and a great business man. The irresolute man may at times be under the guidance of a commendable sentiment, but this sentiment is not strong enough to gain control of various impulses that are antagonistic to it, such as slothfulness and lack of self-confidence, while the dissolute man cannot consistently obey his higher sentiments because of the excessive strength of antagonistic passions inclining him to vices like gambling, drinking, and licentiousness.

The religious sentiment demands a dominant place in the lives of those who possess it. All other sentiments must be compatible with it. God demands single and wholehearted devotion on the part of those who love and revere Him. This sentiment begins its growth in childhood, but does not then play a conspicuous rôle. It normally gains prominence in the personal consciousness sometime during adolescence. If this dominance over the self is gained without serious conflict on the part of other sentiments, the adolescent awakening of the religious sentiment is gradual, peaceful, and harmonious, and is known as a case of *continuous religious growth;* if the awakening involves a sharp and bitter but successful conflict with other tendencies in the self, it is a *conversion.*

In its intercourse with other persons, in its choices, in its cultivation of sentiments and submission to them, the development of the self to a considerable extent goes on without one's full knowledge. Besides conscious growth, the development to a very large extent is due to subconscious processes. This is particularly true of religious experiences, and especially those of adolescence.

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CHAPTER XV

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

I—*Introductory*

A SENTIMENT, as we have seen, is an organization of instincts and emotions about an object. Unlike instincts, sentiments are not inherited but develop in the course of one's life time. Knowledge of man's more deep seated and comprehensive sentiments discloses what a man desires and loves, what he dislikes and hates, what he respects and reveres, what he despises, what constitute his ambitions and aspirations, his fears and aversions. His sentiments make a man what he is, and determine what it is possible for him to become.

For all who have had a profound religious experience, the religious sentiment has become at least one of the most important sentiments in their personalities. The higher religions insist that the religious sentiment shall be supreme over all other impulses. The Jew is commanded to love the Lord with all his mind, with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his strength. The Christian is enjoined to commit his soul unreservedly to Christ, and to make Him the guide and pattern of his life. The Mohammedan must yield his will in absolute submission to Allah. While the Southern Buddhist does not recognize a personal God, he must take his refuge completely in the Buddha, his system of doctrine, and the guidance of the monastic brotherhood. Perhaps none of the followers of these religions perfectly comply with these commands. But those with deep religious convictions endeavor to do so, and the religious sentiment at any rate becomes one of the strongest influences determining their beliefs, actions, loyalties, and aspirations.

As extensive investigations in the psychology of religious experience have only been made in the case of Protestants of the non-ritualistic denominations, the account in this chapter will be confined to them. Since human nature is always much the same, it would doubtless be safe to conjecture that the

same principles would be found to prevail, at least in the main, among other Protestants, as well as Catholics and Jews.

II—*Religion in Childhood*

By *childhood* will be meant the years from four until ten. The limiting years are rather arbitrary, and differ with individuals. However, by the beginning of the fifth year, some consciousness of personality has been acquired. With the eleventh year, the great oncoming changes of adolescence are already casting their shadows before. The child witnesses, and to the extent of his ability, participates in, the religious observances of the home, Sunday school, and church. He is much more a witness than a participant. Religious worship is normally something that is external to him, that perhaps interests him, but does not inwardly affect him very deeply. When asked what impressions the church services and Sunday school made upon them in childhood, mature persons gave to Professor Ames such replies as these:—"Up to the age of twelve, I know of no definite impression the church service made on me. I took it as a matter of course." "I cannot recall any impression that church and Sunday school made except that I acquired a definite habit of attendance and reverence," 1. Professor Starbuck received similar answers, and concludes: "*religion is distinctively external to the child rather than something which possesses inner significance*," 2.

God seems to the child to be a being external to him,—a man on a larger scale. A child saw workingmen returning from their work. "Mamma," he asked, "is these gods?" "God," retorted the mother, "Why?" "Because they make houses and churches, mamma, just the same as God makes moons and people and ickle dogs." Another child, watching a man repairing telegraph wires on a high pole asked if he was God, 3. A little girl explained thunder as "God rolling barrels up in heaven." Other children have thought of God as a carpenter, a juggler, a preternaturally big man, and so on, 4. John Fiske recalled the God of his childhood as a bookkeeper, leaning over his desk up in the sky, diligently observing the conduct of people and making note in his books of their misdeeds, 5.

The instincts and emotions felt toward God by children appear to be various. Love and childish confidence are common, as also are fear, wonder, and awe. Professor Dawson shows that the conception of God often satisfies intellectual

curiosity as to the origin of persons and things, particularly as the child is liable to attribute causes to persons rather than to mechanical forces, 6. God, being conceived of as a person, much like his parents, is besought to bestow the things that the child desires. "I always asked God for the most trivial things." "I used the most endearing terms to God, thinking that he would be more likely to listen." Like the savage, the child looks to God chiefly for material goods. As Professor Starbuck observes, "The child uses God for its own petty ends, it bargains with Him. God and heaven more frequently exist for the child and not the child for them." Yet the child is by no means devoid of the sense of right and wrong, which "germinates early, and is evidently one of the most potent factors in childhood religion." The following are among the instances which he mentions: "I had no religious training, but prayed a good deal to be made good." "When seven I stole some cookies. I worried over it for three days. I confessed to God, wept and prayed, but felt that something more was necessary. Finally I confessed to mother, and was forgiven," 7.

There can be no doubt that under favorable conditions a rudimentary religious sentiment develops in childhood. God, naïvely conceived, is the object of this sentiment. The values sought to be conserved through Him, trivial though they seem to the adult, are serious in the mind of the child. Though these values are chiefly material, moral values are by no means lacking. Whatever moral values the child is capable of recognizing, he readily learns to seek through God.

It follows that *the religious sentiment normally begins its growth in childhood.* If this sentiment is to become enlarged and deepened during adolescence, and become one of the ruling sentiments in adult years, it should get a start in early childhood. Only those who believe that religion is a bad thing for adults, which ought to be extirpated with advancing civilization, can seriously question the desirability of giving some religious teaching to children. Rousseau was altogether wrong upon this point. The chief cautions to be observed are (1) the child should not be taught stiff theological doctrines no longer held by progressive adults; and (2) no attempt should be made to lead him into "conversion," "conviction of sin," or other emotional states unsuited to his years. "Decision days" in our Sunday schools ought never to be observed in classes below the adolescent stage. It is doubtful if they are justifiable

even for young adolescents. Religious precosity in children is not less unwholesome than sexual precosity. Particularly to be commended are Bible and other religious stories, plays and games with religious information conveyed in them, and the repetition of simple prayers on retiring. The reader who is interested in the educational side of this matter is referred to the standard books on religious pedagogy, among which Professor G. A. Coe's *Education in Religion and Morals* and Professor G. E. Dawson's *The Child and His Religion* may be trusted as scientifically reliable.

The author does not pretend to know much about religious pedagogy. He ventures, however, to offer a suggestion. It has often appeared to him desirable, that no children to-day, however little, should be permitted to fancy that *all* stories in the Bible are "true stories" in the historical sense. Why not teach them frankly that almost everybody now believes that the stories of Adam and Eve, Noah, Jonah, and the like, are not "true stories?" They could at the same time be assured that *all* Bible stories, both those that are "true stories" and those that are not, contain lessons that God intends us to learn,—lessons that usually are the same in the case of any particular story no matter to which class it belongs. Would not a healthy mixture of faith and doubt thus imparted in childhood save many adolescents, later on, from passing through the tortures from which most of us have suffered? Is it not more probable that children, so taught, would when adults be active supporters of the churches than under present conditions?

III—*Adolescence*

By *adolescence* will be meant the years from eleven to twenty-one. The physiological changes that come in the earlier years of this period are well known. Girls on the average gain five inches in height between the ages of eleven and thirteen, and boys make an equal gain between fourteen and sixteen, while rapid increases in weight occur during the same years. The development of the brain and nervous system in many instances is not equally rapid, and an "awkward age" ensues. Important, too, is the accession to puberty, which usually comes about this time, the most frequent age for both sexes in America being fourteen. By the close of the sixteenth year, the more troublesome phases of the transition to young manhood and womanhood are usually over, though the attain-

ment of complete physical maturity may still be some years distant. It is probable that numerous brain cells, in the association areas particularly, first begin to function during adolescence.

The mental changes that take place during adolescence are no less important. The strength of various instincts becomes greatly enhanced. This is noteworthy in the case of the gregarious instinct. During childhood there is comparatively little interest in plays that involve team work or co-operation. In a baseball game each little boy wants to be pitcher. But about the dawn of adolescence youths and maidens of their own initiative organize athletic teams, clubs, secret organizations, and societies of various sorts. Ere long they begin to take a keener interest in the problems and associations of their elders. The youth is eager to form opinions upon the political, religious, social and moral issues of the day. He is likely to be dogmatic, and he makes a strong partisan. For him truth and justice are absolute; anything is either true or false, right or wrong. All is either black or white; there are no grays. He has not yet learned that truth and right are often to be found on both sides of a controverted question, or are only to be arrived at from some larger standpoint more comprehensive than either. Suspense of judgment is difficult, if not impossible. The adolescent is often morbidly conscientious on some points, while still oblivious to other responsibilities.

Besides the intensifying of the gregarious instinct, these changes are caused by the newly acquired ability to make much larger use of abstract reasoning than is possible for a child, a change accompanying the ripening of brain cells. The intensifying of the instincts of anger, self-assertion, and self-abasement furnishes difficult tasks of self-control for both sexes. Adolescent boys and girls in consequence are often irritable and quarrelsome; they are likely to be excessively bashful at times; and at others to be given to self-display and the desire to show off. The awakening of the sexual impulse probably gives to most adolescent boys their hardest battles for self mastery. The choice of a vocation and entrance upon it are necessary for most boys and girls in this period; for those who are able to defer this decision a few years longer the selection of a college has to be made. Youthful love affairs are common, and these first romances are often taken too seriously to heart.

Adolescence is the period when human personality receives

its permanent set. Many of one's peculiar tastes and habits are then fixed, 8. There are numerous fields in which it is practically impossible for one later in life to acquire an interest for the first time. This is true of music, art, literature, and athletic sports and games. It is even hard, later in life, to learn to dress well, to select furniture, to acquire a new language free from accent, or to learn to speak or to write one's own vernacular correctly. The first steps in the various vices are made during adolescence. There is little risk that a man who has made no bad beginnings during adolescence will ever become a victim of incontinence, gambling, or the excessive use of alcohol. A youth who is habitually truthful, honorable, and conscientious in his dealings with others may reasonably be expected to remain so to the end of his days. Since the personal characteristics of the adult become fixed in many other respects, during adolescence, it is not surprising that this is the case with the attitude toward religion. Comparatively few adults are to be found among the communicants of churches who did not become such during adolescence.

IV—*Adolescence and the Religious Sentiment*

The religious sentiment, as has been said, under proper conditions has its origin in childhood. Its chief growth comes during adolescence, when there may occur as great an enlargement of the religious life as of other mental and moral capacities. To the child, God is external,—just a man on a larger scale for him to approach, address, petition, love, and confide in, like any other friend. To the adolescent, with his newly acquired powers of abstract thinking, God is much more profoundly significant. He is the intellectual explanation of the universe, the maintainer of the moral order, the essence of truth, holiness, justice, righteousness, beauty, love, and whatever other abstract attributes and qualities it occurs to the youth to regard as absolute, eternal, infinite, or in any sense ultimate.

With this altered conception of God, come changes in the moral values which the youth seeks through God. He now desires proper harmonization of the instincts that have recently become intense and hard to control—such as temper, self, and sex. He seeks a better understanding of right and wrong. He begins to realize that his parents and other religious minded adults gain help in their moral life through public and private worship of God. The religious observances that he has always

seen going on evidently possess for them an inward meaning that has hitherto escaped him. God, for them, is not just an external Being to be addressed, but a Great Companion with whom they commune inwardly. He is "closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet." Familiar prayers and psalms evidently mean more to them than he had suspected. He has probably long been acquainted with the twenty-third Psalm and the Lord's Prayer. He discovers that to his mother these are helpful and precious, with meaning that has hitherto escaped him. What is true in regard to God is also true of the subordinate objects of the religious sentiment, such as the Bible, the church, and the sacraments. He perceives that they all imply deep inward values that he must learn to appreciate and to make his own.

The problem for the adolescent is therefore to secure for himself an adequate enlargement of the religious sentiment, so that the religion of his elders may truly become his religion, so that he may share in their public worship and get out of it what they do, so that he may privately gain the help from God for his personal struggles that they gain for theirs.

This enlargement in the religious sentiment of the adolescent is the outcome of a gradual growth in which, as youth and maiden pass out of childhood, toward manhood or womanhood, he or she *subconsciously* learns to understand, to appreciate, and to participate in the surrounding religious environment.

The *manner*, however, in which the adolescent *awakens to consciousness* of this gradual enlargement of the religious sentiment that has been taking place within him, and by awakening to consciousness of it, learns to make it fully his own, and to enjoy the benefits of it, varies in different individuals. Hence *there are various types of the awakening of the religious sentiment.*

The simplest type of such awakening is known as *continuous religious growth without conscious transitions.* In this type, adolescents pass gradually, and without points of transition of which they are aware, from the naïve and external attitudes of the child to the deepened religious consciousness of the devout adult. A famous instance of this type is that of Dr. Edward Everett Hale:—"I observe, with profound regret, the religious struggles which come into many biographies, as if almost essential to the formation of the hero. I ought to speak of these, to say that any man has an advantage, not to

be estimated, who is born, as I was, into a family where the religion is simple and rational; who is trained in the theory of this religion, so that he never knows, for an hour, what these religious or irreligious struggles are. I always knew God loved me, and I was always grateful to Him for the world He placed me in. I always liked to tell Him so, and was always glad to receive His suggestions to me." Professor Starbuck cites numerous other instances, 9.

Diametrically opposite are the various types classified together by writers on the psychology of religion as *conversion.* This *technical significance of conversion must not be confused with the broader usage given to the term by many ministers,* who apply it to designate any form whatever by which a satisfactory adult religious sentiment may be attained. The ministerial usage is quite justifiable, in fact indispensable, for those who must interpret to their congregations the outcome of Jesus' conversation with Nicodemus reported in the Fourth Gospel as signifying that every one, if he is to be a Christian, must be "converted." It is quite true that no one can enter fully into the Christian life who has not *in some manner* acquired and become possessed of *an enlarged* sentiment. In this ministerial sense of "conversion," it is true that no one can become a Christian without being converted. But very many, perhaps the majority, of persons become Christians without being converted in the technical sense of the word, as it is employed by writers upon the psychology of religion. And, be it understood, throughout this book the word "conversion" will be employed in the technical sense of the psychologists.

In all cases of *Conversion* (in the technical, psychological sense of the word), *the individual passes through a sharp and painful mental crisis and emerges a changed person.* Before conversion his religious sentiment was that of a child; after conversion it is that of the religiously awakened adolescent or adult.

Numerous types of conversion have been distinguished which frequently overlap. For instance, there are the cases in which, before and during the crisis, the individual has *a feeling of incompleteness,* which is followed, after the crisis is over and the victory won, by a sense of *spiritual illumination.* "I prayed day after day, struggling for light. While struggling in prayer, peace came to me in the darkness." "I prayed and cried to God for help. I wandered for years, seeking rest. I

went to many a priest for comfort. When all outward help failed, a voice came which said, 'There is one, even Christ Jesus, can speak to thy condition'; and when I heard it, my heart did leap for joy," 10. The feeling of incompleteness is one of "uncertainty, unrest, mistiness, a dazed feeling, distress, effort, struggle toward an indefinite something, longing for something out of reach, etc., which is followed by peace, happiness, a sense of harmony, a clearing away, a flash of light, freedom, entrance into the new life, and so on." According to Professor Starbuck, this is the most common adolescent type of conversion, at least six times as frequent as the type opposed to it, that of *a sense of sin followed by escape from it.*

The latter type is a much more acute experience. "In the escape from sin the conflict is between a life that has been lived—a sinful habitual life—and the life of righteousness; while in the other type the conflict is between a life that is not—an incomplete, imperfect, aspiring self—and the life which is to blossom out and be realized. . . . The sense of sin shows itself as a feeling of wretchedness, heaviness, helplessness, weariness, sensitiveness and resistance, separation from friends and God, fear, resentment, and so on—feelings which are followed after the crisis by joy, peace, rest, lightness of heart, oneness with others and God, love, exuberance of spirits, sense of free activity and the like. The feelings are reduced to the last degree of tension, and then recoil; are pent up, and suddenly burst; life appears to force itself to the farthest extreme in a given direction, and then to break into free activity in another," 11.

In the case of adolescent girls who have committed no heinous sins, the evidence indicates depressed organic conditions, due to rapid physiological changes, which are often attended by hysteria and other nervous and circulatory disorders. In the case of boys, the sense of sin is often due to self-reproach for weakness in conflicts with temper and sex. When there has actually been moral waywardness, conversion for adolescents, as for adults, involves a fierce struggle to overcome tendencies antagonistic to the religious sentiment.

The severe struggle in "sense of sin" conversions that involve the suppression of habits and other antagonistic impulses can best be understood psychologically in view of two of the general laws of sentiments laid down by Mr. Alexander F. Shand. He says, "Every sentiment tends to include in its own system all

the thoughts, volitional processes and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are either superfluous or antagonistic," 12. The qualities characteristic of a sentiment often at first develop spontaneously [subconsciously?] for instance, generosity, gentleness, kindliness and sincerity in the case of the sentiments for truth and art. Later, in the case of all sentiments that tend to grow or maintain themselves, a second stage appears in which we become conscious of these qualities, reflect upon them, and strive after them with effort, because we see that they are in danger of not advancing with the growth and needs of the sentiment—so *ideals* are formed, and *duties* as well. Love creates its own virtues, ideals and duties, and a conscience,—in short develops an ethics of its own. Hence the other law follows, namely, "Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own," 13.

What Mr. Shand finds to be generally true of the sentiments of love and respect, can be applied to the religious sentiment, which in Americans to-day consists chiefly of love and respect for God, and for the subordinate objects associated with Him. The awakening religious sentiment recognizes the virtues, ideals and duties which must be conscientiously cultivated; it tends to form a type of character. All in oneself that is antagonistic to this type of character is wrong, and must be uprooted and destroyed. Its existence in one is sinful; being opposed to the ethics of the religious sentiment, it may be thought of as "original sin," "depravity," or the "carnal mind," all of which are fundamentally "at enmity with God." God requires absolute loyalty and devotion. It is impossible to serve both Him and Mammon. So if there exist in an adolescent's personality elements felt by him to be hostile to his awakening religious sentiment, he is forced to undergo a conflict until these unfriendly elements have become subdued. Only then can he enjoy the perfect peace and happiness of oneness with God, i. e., the harmonious organization of his character under the dominance of his religious sentiment.

This view of the religious sentiment explains, also, the two volitional types of conversion distinguished by Professor Starbuck and William James, one involving "effort"; and the other "self surrender." In the former, the struggling adolescent feels the necessity of making a resolute struggle in order to gain the larger life. "I determined to yield my heart and life to

God's service." "One day I made up my mind I would be for Christ always," 14. A fuller account of such an experience is quoted by William James from C. G. Finney's *Memoirs*: "Just at this point the whole question of Gospel salvation opened to my mind in a manner most marvelous to me at the time. I think I then saw, as clearly as I ever have in my life, the reality and fullness of the atonement of Christ. . . After this distinct revelation had stood for some little time before my mind, the question seemed to be put, 'Will you accept it now, today?' I replied, 'Yes, *I will accept it today, or I will die in the attempt*!'" But he found that he could not pray, because his heart was hardened with pride. "I then reproached myself. . . A great sinking and discouragement came over me, and I felt almost too weak to stand on my knees." So the conflict continued for some time, between, as we might put it psychologically, the awakening religious sentiment and the elements in his personality antagonistic to it, 15.

The "self-surrender" type is superficially opposite. In this type the individual must give up struggling. His tendency has been to identify his self with the impulses antagonistic to the religious sentiment. His self, as thus conceived, must now passively submit, and permit the awakening sentiment to dominate consciousness entirely, and automatically to suppress all that is hostile to it. The self or will, composed of antagonistic impulses, must be broken completely. "I had said I would not give up; but when my will was broken it was all over." "I simply said, 'Lord, I have done all I can; I leave the whole matter with Thee,' and immediately there came to me a great peace." "All at once it occurred to me that I might be saved, too, if I would stop trying to do it all myself, and follow Jesus; somehow I lost my load," 16.

Besides the types of awakening of the religious sentiment here designated as those of "continuous growth" and "conversion" there are various *mixed types*, partaking in part of the nature of continuous growth and in part of conversion. For instance, Professor Starbuck describes cases in which there has apparently been continuous religious growth up to a certain point, when quite suddenly and spontaneously "the new life bursts forth without any apparent immediate cause." "For four years I had wanted to be a Christian but could not feel my sins forgiven. One morning sitting in my room reading, peace just seemed to come, and I was happy indeed." Professor

Starbuck also gives accounts of cases in which states of storm and stress, of doubt, and of feelings of alienation from God, are succeeded by the acquisition of the larger self. These cases contain some but not all of the features of conversion, and are accordingly classified by him among "lines of religious growth not involving conversion." They are evidently mixed types, 17. Professor Ames reports similar cases, 18.

Before leaving the subject of the classification of types of religious awakening, attention should be called to the fact that Professor Pratt has recently attacked the traditional classification here given, which has come down from the classical works of James and Professor Starbuck. He believes that with most people the awakening is "a gradual and almost imperceptible process, with an occasional intensification during adolescence. Many, perhaps most, religious adolescents have a number of these emotional experiences which may last for a few moments only or for days and weeks." In churches which lay no special emphasis on conversion as a unique experience, "no great notice is taken of these states of excitement. . . In those denominations on the other hand . . which teach the necessity of a conversion experience, some one of the many emotional stirrings of adolescence is singled out as *the* conversion, and the others are ignored and largely forgotten," 19. Professor Pratt's contentions deserve serious study and fresh examination of the evidence. Until this is done, it is probably more conservative to follow the usual classification.

V—*Rôle of the Subconscious in Adolescent Awakenings*

Children learn largely by subconscious observation of what goes on about them, which later they imitate and so consciously master. This, for instance, is the way that they learn to speak. An adult in a foreign country, in a short time, subconsciously acquires more of the language which he constantly hears spoken about him than he could have gained by years of conscious application to dictionary and grammar at home. He learns the language in the largely subconscious manner that a child learns his mother tongue.

The religious sentiment develops during childhood in a similar way. Through the years when religion has seemed external, and there has been little apparent comprehension of its inward significance, the religious sentiment of the child has been gradually, and for the most part subconsciously, acquiring

appreciation of the practices and beliefs, virtues and ideals, inculcated by the religion of his elders. Love and reverence for God, Christ and church have been gradually growing up within him. If his development has been symmetrical, and there has been little resistance to it by other impulses of his nature, the youth may sometimes find himself in full conscious possession of this enlarged sentiment. In his case this has been the outcome of continuous growth, without any definite periods of transition. If, on the other hand, his gradually awakening religious sentiment progresses less rapidly in the realization of ideals and acquirement of virtues than his conscience dictates, he may suffer from an aching sense of incompleteness, and be compelled to assist the progress of the religious sentiment by conscious volition. And if there are elements in his personality —habits, beliefs, tastes, ideals, not to say vices—that vigorously resist the promptings of his religious sentiment, these elements will appear to him sinful, and loyalty to the religious sentiment will demand of him a heroic struggle for their eradication. In all such cases either conscious effort is needed to assist the subconscious processes at work (the "effort" type), or else he must learn voluntarily to relax, to desist from conscious strivings, and "let go," so that the subconsciousness may automatically complete the ripening of the religious sentiment. In all volitional cases, as Professor Starbuck says, "the function of the will in conversion, seems to be to give point and direction to the unconscious [subconscious] processes of growth, which in turn, work out and give back to clear consciousness the revelation striven after." "Let one do all in his power, and the nervous system will do the rest"; or said in another way, "man's extremity is God's opportunity," 20.

It is easier to characterize the rôle of the subconscious in conversion in language that implies acceptance of the hypothesis of the co-conscious than in language that does not. It will not be difficult for the reader who rejects this hypothesis, however, and who believes that subconscious processes are wholly physiological, to interpret the preceding two paragraphs, as well as all other references to the subconscious in this chapter, in the manner that he prefers.

VI—*Conditions Determining the Types of Adolescent Awakening*

What conditions determine which type of religious awaken-

ing any particular adolescent is most likely to experience? These are furnished in part by his religious environment, and in part by his own personal characteristics.

Some religious denominations and individual churches endeavor to effect awakenings of the conversion types. Through revivals, testimony meetings, and the like, the adolescent's attention is constantly drawn to the experiences of those who have been converted. He is taught to think of conversion as a mark of divine favor. In the not very remote past, he was sometimes led to believe that no one can feel assured that he has been accepted by God unless he undergoes startling experiences of some kind. Professor Coe conducted a careful investigation into the experiences of persons whose religious sentiments evidently took shape in such religious environments. He found that conversions take place in nine out of ten persons who combine these three qualifications: (1) expectation and desire for conversion, (2) temperaments of an emotional and sensitive as opposed to an unemotional and intellectual sort, and (3) passive suggestibility (so as to be devoid of initiative when hypnotized) and with a tendency to automatisms (such as hallucination, striking dreams, visions, violent movements under excitement like hysterical laughing and weeping). If any one of these qualifications is lacking, the probability that the person can experience conversion is reduced. Persons possessing the opposite of all three qualifications are temperamentally and constitutionally incapable of the particular form of awakening called conversion although they may become very earnest Christians, 21.

On the other hand, there are denominations and individual churches that seek to cultivate continuous religious growth rather than conversions among their young people. Confirmation classes and other thoughtful and gradual methods of religious instruction are employed in preference to revivals and missions. In such environments, although no careful inquiry has been made corresponding to Professor Coe's investigation of the conversion type, the evidence seems to indicate that adolescents are much more likely to experience continuous growth than conversion. However, a mild spontaneous awakening at the time of taking first communion is said not to be uncommon among Catholic adolescents, whose faces shine with happiness as they inwardly feel the significance of the sacrament. A similar phenomenon among Lutheran

adolescents is described in the closing stanzas of Tegner's poem, "The Children of the Lord's Supper," translated by Longfellow.

Professor Starbuck believes that conditions are rendered more favorable for continuous religious growth if children are kept reasonably free from dogmas which they are incapable of understanding, if their doubts and other needs are wisely and sympathetically met whenever they arise, and if they have been brought up so as to have a certain healthy mixture of faith and doubt. However, he adds, that at the present time and with the conditions under which we live, growth does not usually come so harmoniously. Physiological development during adolescence is not continuous, for that matter. Some sort of friction and clash is therefore almost sure to arise, "unless the youth is so happily constituted that nature works out the result for him and he wakens up to the fact that he is a full-grown spirit." He concludes with this thought provoking comment: "A few persons seem to have an uneventful development because they do not leave the religion of childhood, perhaps never wake up to an immediate realization of religion. They raise the question whether it would not have been conducive to growth even to have suffered a little on the rack of doubt and storm and stress," 22.

William James eloquently described a religious type of mind free from the doubts and struggles of conversion which he called "the religion of healthy mindedness." Emerson, Theodore Parker, Edward Everett Hale, Walt Whitman, and adherents of various faith cures are cited by him as examples. They are attractive types in many ways. Yet one wonders if there is not much truth in James' comment, "one can but recognize in such writers as these the presence of a temperament organically weighted on the side of cheer and fatally forbidden to linger. . . over the darker respects of the universe. In some individuals optimism may even become quasi-pathological. The capacity for even a transient sadness or a momentary humility seems cut off from them as by a kind of congenital anaesthesia," 23. Perhaps the religion of "healthy mindedness" is not always so healthy after all. He suggests that, since the evil facts are as genuine parts of nature as the good ones, the philosophic presumption should be that they have some rational significance, and that religions of deliverance, like Christianity and Buddhism mani-

fest a higher development in their insistence that man "must die to an unreal life before he can be born into the real life," i. e., be converted, 24.

Possibly race has something to do with the matter. The Latin races, on the whole, James thought more disposed to the religion of healthy-mindedness and the Germanic races to the conversion types, 25. There have been famous conversions among Latins, however; one thinks at once of those of St. Augustine and St. Francis of Assissi. Both of these, however, took place in adult life. There may be some significance in the fact that the Roman Catholic religion has its strongest hold among Latin races. For its training of the young has been on the whole more favorable to continuous growth rather than conversion.

Whatever may be the preferable type of awakening for other adolescents, it can be positively affirmed that those who have actually led vicious or seriously wayward lives ought to undergo the severe crisis of conversion. Such cases do not merely require the completion and bringing to consciousness of an enlarged sentiment in an hitherto incomplete personality, but a sharp break with old habits and a thorough reformation of the character. Where an old self must be uprooted and destroyed, not simply outgrown, conversion is indispensable.

While, on the whole, conversion experiences seem to the author to guarantee a profounder development of character on the religious side, he does not mean unreservedly to favor religious revivals. The trouble with revivals is that in the majority of instances, as we shall see, they do not effect conversions at all, but only pseudo-conversions.

VII—*The Religious Sentiment in Adults*

As in the case of the wayward adolescent, so of hitherto irreligious adults, the acceptance of religion implies that the religious sentiment must triumph over much in the personality that is unfavorable to it. After the character in its main outlines has received its set during adolescence, it is difficult for a new interest to become established. For this to occur means a terrific struggle, and a conversion of the "sense of sin" type. So nearly all cases in which a genuine religious awakening takes place in adult life are conversions of this type. This remark does not apply, of course, to revival pseudo-conversions, nor to cases where considerations of

courtship or business lead a young man to join a church without having really acquired profound religious convictions. Particularly dramatic adult conversions are those of drunkards and other derelicts that are sometimes effected in the work of the Salvation Army and other missionary societies like those described in Harold Begbie's "Twice Born Men."

When an adult changes from one religious faith to another that is radically different—say a Catholic becomes a Protestant or a Jew becomes a Christian,—sweeping changes in beliefs, habits, ideals, and associations are involved. He must therefore ordinarily undergo a conversion of an extreme type; unless again, the change in religious profession is made merely as a matter of expediency, and without any real alteration of convictions. Since such changes in faith imply a victory in heroic struggles that few are willing to undergo, they rarely occur. An adult who forsakes the faith of his fathers generally ceases to profess any religion at all. His religious sentiment becomes gradually dissolved, and the ideals and loyalties that it once contained either are retained in purely moral sentiments devoid of religion or else they are lost altogether. For this reason, it is seldom wise to advise an adult to change his religious faith. As a rule, he had better adhere to the communion of his fathers, and endeavor to do what he can to make it more liberal and enlightened. The religious sentiment normally, as we have seen, begins its growth in childhood, and becomes enlarged and enriched during adolescence. To attempt to uproot it, and substitute a new religious sentiment during adult life is rarely successful. This does not apply, of course, to transferring from one Protestant denomination to another; since to the layman, at least, most Protestant denominations are practically alike, and such transference involves no alteration of the religious sentiment whatever.

After the religious sentiment has normally awakened during adolescence, what is its ordinary growth in later life? Most persons probably experience continuously increasing insight and appreciation throughout life. The Christian constantly grows in grace, and in the knowledge of his Lord and Saviour. To be sure, for many there probably is less emotional turbulence than during adolescence. But this is only because still waters run deep. The religious sentiment has become thoroughly established, and proceeds without opposition in

its guidance of the person's thoughts and feeling and actions. Married folk love each other, not less but more, because they no longer feel the more exciting and ecstatic thrills of courtship days. For them it is no longer necessary every hour to have fresh verbal assurances of constancy and devotion; these are proved in the course of living itself; only the shallow, newly acquired sentiment of love, gains its sustenance in such ways, and needs thus to protect itself against frequent temptations to fickleness. The same principle holds in regard to the love and reverence for God. Downright disloyalty to Him does not occur among His saints, 26.

Among some adults, however, especially those of the temperamental types liable to experience conversion during adolescence, the attainment of new planes of growth and insight dawns upon consciousness in a manner similar to a conversion or spontaneous awakening. For such persons the new life begun at conversion suddenly comes to consciousness in still greater richness after it has been practised for some time. This is known as *Sanctification.* The interested reader is referred to the accounts by Professor Starbuck (27) and William James, 28.

VIII—*Pseudo-Conversions and Revivals*

It is important not to confuse religious conversions, a normal type of awakening of the religious sentiment, with other mental phenomena that present somewhat similar characteristics.

During the course of religious revivals, very many people believe that they are converted and show remarkable outward marks of some sort of mental experience, who later prove not to have been converted at all. Such persons had experienced no awakening of the religious sentiment, either because in their cases there was no religious sentiment present in their subconsciousness that could be awakened, or because the revival did not affect them sincerely and profoundly enough—notwithstanding their possible tears, shouting and hysteria—to awaken the sentiment and make it an integral part of the conscious personality. Such experiences may be known as *pseudo-conversions.*

The revival can easily be understood in the light of two well-known psychological principles: (1) a man is extremely susceptible to the ideas, emotions, and actions of other human

beings. This is what in the preceding chapter was called *suggestion, sympathy* and *imitation.* (2) There is a marked tendency in man for the idea of an action to result in the action itself, unless inhibited by other ideas or impulses. This is the so-called law of *ideo-motor action,* 29. For instance, think hard of raising your hand, but don't raise it. Do you not feel a strong impulse to raise the hand, which, however, is inhibited? Think similarly of walking, of singing a familiar hymn, of eating some favorite food, etc. The secret of successful hypnotism is to give the subject ideas of various actions that the hypnotiser desires him to do, and at the same time to remove the ordinary inhibitory ideas that would prevent him from acting upon them under ordinary conditions.

The successful revivalist may not have studied psychology, but he is always a past master in the employment of these two principles. His purpose is to give members of his audience the idea of coming to the altar, at the same time removing the ordinary inhibitions that would prevent them from doing so. If he can induce this action in the most suggestible of the audience, he can count on the action spreading automatically to those suggestible in the next degree, and then in the next, and so on, until a large number have come to the altar.

A short time afterward, most of the so-called converts of a revival lose all interest in religion, and many of them are quite ready to laugh at the experience, and wonder how the evangelist induced them to make such professions.

The remarkable thing about revivals is not that most of the so-called converts are not converts at all, but only pseudo-converts. This is what we should expect. Conversion, as we have seen, is the awakening in consciousness of a religious sentiment that has been in the course of gradual growth, probably ever since early childhood. Performances induced in a crowded meeting by methods of suggestion are not necessarily awakening of sentiments where subconscious growth is nearly completed. They need not be responses to anything deepseated in character at all. Pseudo-conversions need no further explanation. What does require explanation is that a few—usually only extremely few—revival converts retain a permanent religious interest throughout life, and prove to have experienced genuine conversion.

The explanation clearly is, that the permanent revival converts are nearly always persons who have grown up in

religious surroundings and probably have been in such surroundings recently, so that they have well developed subconscious religious sentiments. Such persons are ready to experience genuine conversion. The revival in such cases sometimes acts as a stimulus, and more quickly effects the awakening of sentiments that would in the normal course of events have become conscious later on. In other cases, it must be admitted that the revival probably gives an extra push that is really indispensable to bring the sentiment to consciousness and so to secure its completion. Therefore the revival probably benefits a few individuals.

But a far greater number of persons are harmed by revivals. The harm done can be summed up under four heads. (1) Revivals unduly excite many adolescents, making them nervous and morbid at what in any event is a period of delicate mental and physical readjustment. (2) Revivals often discourage many persons who are led to look for conversion, but for whom conversion is temperamentally impossible. Such persons often reproach themselves for sinful indifference because they cannot become overwrought like more suggestible folk, and so they fear that they are not Christians. (3) Revivals cheapen religion in the minds of many pseudo-converts. Having themselves passed through what they were told was conversion, they think that all conversions are like their own pitiful pseudo-conversions, and that religious people who fancy that they have passed through some deep experience that has enriched their lives and given them a comforting sense of God's presence and help, are only unusually credulous and simple minded dupes. (4) Revivals impede the advance of liberal religion. Since the revivalist wishes to evoke ideas and emotions that are possessed by all of his audience, he must appeal to the ideas and emotions of their childhood. So his appeal is always to the religion of a generation ago. He thus is nearly always a bigot, narrow and intolerant in his attitude to those who know anything about science,—especially about the conception of evolution and the scientific study of the Bible. In an age when religious doctrines must be thoroughly reconstructed, if religion is not to lose its hold upon college graduates and intelligent people generally, the revivalist blindly and stupidly resists all attempts at progress, 30.

IX—*Non-Religious Awakenings*

Experiences in some respects similar to religious awakenings

take place in connection with other changes in character and personality. A vocation, rightly chosen, is a fundamental expression of one's personality. It therefore is the object of a sentiment. Some young men so gradually grow into preference for a vocation that they cannot say when they first knew that they had made their choice of a life work. Others undergo many painful efforts and struggles, including, perhaps, mistaken experiments, before they consciously reach the right decision. Writers of romances have long made us aware that similar principles hold true of the awakening of the sentiment of love. Awareness of love may be a continuous growth from a childhood friendship. Again, it may be the outcome of a severe crisis, prior to which either the hero or the heroine has been unaware of the love which subconsciously they had for each other. Or the awakening may be one of the mixed types—involving a joyous spontaneous awakening, or a period of doubts or storm and stress. Professor Starbuck furnishes various instances of conversions and spontaneous awakenings that are not of a religious character. Among these are cases in which a study which the adolescent has long been unsuccessfully struggling to understand suddenly becomes clear to him. He and James each furnishes an instance of "falling out of love," in which a sentiment of love that has given the person much trouble and has interfered with his or her best interests has suddenly become eradicated as a result of previous struggles and subconscious development. James also furnishes instances in which the religious sentiment itself has been eradicated in a manner analogous to conversion, as a result of subconscious doubts that spontaneously burst upon consciousness, and the persons after their "conversions" regarded themselves as believers in no religion, 31.

Does this mean that, psychologically considered, continuous growth, conversion, and other forms of religious awakening are in no respect different in principle from certain non-religious experiences? By no means. In cases of religious awakening the chief object of the religious sentiment is God—that is, an Agency, believed to be different from his ordinary ego and yet psychical in character. This Agency is regarded with love and reverence, and the supreme desire is that one's character shall be organized so as to conform to His commands. In the non-religious instances the sentiment has no such object as this. It follows that the awakening of no other sentiment

will give to the individual the means to conserve his moral values through such an Agency. Love of God, love of a woman, and love of a vocation all involve the awakening of sub-conscious processes, they all involve the organization of emotions of loyalty and devotion about an object. However, the emotion of reverence is not present in the same sense in the latter two. While all three normally involve some heightening of ideals and strengthening of the will, the moral values recognized in each case and the changes in character effected are fundamentally different.

X—*The Relation of God to Religious Awakenings*

Religious awakening has thus far been viewed as a psychological process involving the growth of the religious sentiment, largely in the subconsciousness. The manner in which the individual becomes aware of the sentiment, and enters into full conscious possession and enjoyment of it determines whether the experience is one of continuous growth, conversion, or of a mixed type. Does it follow that God is not really involved in religious awakenings at all? Are they purely natural processes?

Atheists, of course, would answer these questions emphatically in the affirmative. Agnostics would either also reply in the affirmative, or regard the problem as incapable of solution. However, the facts do not necessitate such conclusions. The testimony of those who have experienced religious awakenings is unanimous that in their opinion they come from God. Such testimony of course by no means decides the matter; but it is worth something. Perhaps it may fairly be said to put the burden of proof on those who claim that religious awakenings do not come from God, but are purely subjective.

Those who believe that religious awakenings do come from God differ somewhat as to the manner in which they so come. Some writers, like Dr. Cutten, and (with more hesitation) William James, believe that in such experiences *an external God*, apparently outside of us just as we are outside of one another, influences the subconsciousness of the individual. This is quite possibly the case, so far as the known facts go, and is in accordance with the testimony of those who have had such experiences. On this view, it will be observed, the conception of God is necessary on the plane of psychology, in order to explain the facts.

Other students of the question offer a philosophical explanation, and not a psychological one. God, they argue, is not a scientific explanation for a psychological fact any more than for an astronomical or a chemical fact. On the plane of the psychology of religion, just as of any other science, phenomena should be explained on a purely naturalistic basis. For psychology religious awakening is a natural process just as for physics gravitation is a natural process. But *philosophically* considered, God is immanent in *all* natural processes, those described by physics and psychology alike. According to this theory a person experiencing a religious awakening becomes aware of an immanent God, present in all things, but coming to His highest expression in conscious beings, and most of all in profound and enduring religious experiences, 32.

All this will become clearer as we proceed. This question will be considered at greater length at the end of the following chapter, in connection with prayer. The reader may well reserve his decision in regard to it, however, until he has completed Part III, in which the general philosophical question of evidence for the existence of God is taken up. For, if one finds the evidence sufficient to convince him that there is a God, he will have no difficulty in believing that the individual in some sense comes into consciousness of Him in his religious awakening.

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CHAPTER XVI

PRAYER

I—*The Conversational Nature of Thought and Prayer* (1)

As has been shown in Chapter XIV, the self of an individual develops through intercourse with other persons. Now, social intercourse very largely involves the use of language. Imitation of others prompts the infant to employ his vocal cords in speech as soon as the nerve cells are ripened sufficiently to enable the requisite reflexes to function, and he rapidly acquires skill in the use of the language he hears spoken about him. Since language is heard by the infant in the conversation of others before he is able to speak himself, and since his first use of speech is in conversation with others, it follows as a natural consequence that his private thinking also very often assumes a conversational form. Sometimes, as he plays, he unconsciously thinks aloud, and others hear what he says. Such conversational thinking may all be addressed to an imaginary alter, who makes appropriate replies, so that the child carries on a complete dialogue, or it may assume a simpler monologue form, 2.

Adults similarly carry on much of their private thought in conversational form. Perhaps the best illustrations of monologue thinking are cases where one has to go through some routine that requires close attention to each step in the process, such as opening the combination of a safe, or mixing the ingredients of a recipe. In such instances, if the reader will observe himself, he may find that he seems to hear or to move his lips repeating the directions for each step in the process in succession. Or, in recalling something that has been committed to memory, thought naturally falls into this monologue form. The simplest prayers, not greatly different in principle from magical spells, such as those of the Toda dairyman priests, referred to in Chapter III, are of this type, not being addressed to any one.

The thought of adults often assumes the form of a *dialogue.* The individual carries on a conversation in which an *ego* and an *alter* participate. Thus a man may debate with himself as

to whether he had better do this or that, the ego taking one side and the alter the other; or the alter may commend or condemn the ego, or excuse the ego; or, if a person is angry at himself, the alter may even say spiteful things to hurt the feelings of the ego. In such instances one feels that both ego and alter are really to be identified with himself; or if the alter is not himself, it is, at any rate, his conscience. On other occasions, the alter may assume the rôle of another person. The ego is thought to be asking the advice of an absent friend, and the alter is imagined to be saying what the friend would probably reply. Before an interview with some important personage who has little time to give, or who must be approached tactfully, one may imagine his ego suggesting this and that, and the alter making the probable replies that the person approached would be most likely to give. While the reader may think it an exaggeration to claim that *all* our private thinking whatever is conversational in character (though some authorities have maintained this) he will be convinced, if he watches his mental processes for a day or two, that at least a great deal of his own private thinking does assume these conversational forms, of monologue and dialogue.

Prayer, as practised in most religions (3) assumes the dialogue form. The individual who prays identifies himself with the ego, and addresses his prayers to an alter, whom he believes to be superior to himself in power, and thus able to effect what he could not accomplish alone. The alter in the primitive religion might be a fetich, a spirit or a ghost, or one of the gods. In the spiritual religions the Alter is God,—a Being who embodies the highest and loftiest aspirations of the ego.

The self, as we have seen, develops through social intercourse with other persons. We may now add, that *the self also develops through its own private thinking, when the ego holds conversations with alteri.* The Alter of religious prayer embodies some ideal to which the individual aspires in his own life, some value which he seeks; the Alter is in some sense what he would be. The individual through prayer in some measure is strengthened and fortified, and enabled to realize these ideals in his own life and character. This is true, not only in the spiritual religions, but also, sometimes at least, in the higher religions of the naturalistic type. In ancient Greece a family would have its own tomb, generally near the house, where all its ancestors were buried, and offerings were regularly

paid, and prayers addressed. "Thus, the ancestor remained in the midst of his relatives; invisible, but always present, he continued to make a part of the family, and to be its father. Immortal, happy, divine, he was still interested in all of his whom he had left upon the earth. He knew their needs, and sustained their feebleness, and . . . (the man) . . . who still lived, who labored, had near him his guides and supports—his forefathers. In the midst of difficulties, he invoked their ancient wisdom; in grief, he asked consolation of them; in danger, he asked their support, and after a fault, their pardon," 4.

We can readily perceive that ancestral worship of this sort as it existed in ancient Greece and still exists in China and Japan, must be a great source of comfort and strength. Through such prayer the worshipper must become more or less like his ideal of his ancestor. And this ideal, in all probability is superior morally to the ancestor himself. We idealize those whom we love and revere. Still, such an ideal clearly has its limitations. It must be too nearly on the human level. So, when gods are worshipped, who belong on a higher plane altogether than human beings, the possibility of idealisation will be greater and the men who worship such gods as ideals will often receive higher uplift than worship of deceased ancestors could afford. When polytheism gives place to monotheism, instead of the many gods, all representing differing ideals and none standing for absolute perfection by any means, appears the worship of a single God who comprises all socially recognized moral perfection within Himself. The Alter of prayer then for the first time embodies the very highest ideals of which man is able to conceive. The effect upon him who prays will then be to give him a more coherent, unified character, and to inspire him in every way in the highest manner possible. It has been shown in Part I that the general advance in the evolution of religion from the natural religions to the spiritual religions, and, within the latter, from narrower to wider horizons, has largely consisted in constant enlargement, enrichment, and purification of the conceptions of the divine. This evolution has made purer and loftier *Alteri* available for prayer; and, in that way individual worshippers have been able to advance in moral discernment and appreciation. Such sublime Alteri are the God of Judaism and the Christ of Christianity. One reason why these religions continue to live is

because their Alteri have in every age grown with increased Jewish and Christian moral and religious experience, 5.

II—*Types of Prayer*

A classification of different types of prayer will be useful. The distinction between *Monologue* and *Dialogue Prayers* has already been made. Dialogue prayers may be subdivided into *Individual* and *Community* prayers. In the former, *the ego is a single individual praying by himself.* In the latter, *the ego is a group of persons*, e. g., a congregation in a church or synagogue praying together. In the case of community prayer, it is not essential that the group of persons repeat the prayer together; they may do so or a minister or priest may repeat the prayer for them; the prayer may constitute part of a liturgy or it may be an "extemporaneous" prayer composed by the minister upon the spot. All that is necessary to constitute a community prayer is that a group feel that they personally are sharing in a mutual prayer to the *Alter* of their religious faith. If a number of individuals were to pray in different places and at different times of the day for a common purpose, the prayer in most respects would have the psychological characteristics of a *Community* prayer.

Each of these types of prayer, Individual and Community, may be subdivided into *Aesthetic* and *Egoistic* prayers.. *In the Aesthetic prayer, attention is centered upon the Alter; in the Egoistic prayer, attention is centered upon the ego.* In both types the *Alter* is recognized to be superior to the ego in moral worth and in power, and the attitude of the *ego* toward the *Alter* is one of submission, awe, and reverence. But in the *aesthetic* type, attention is centered on the Alter, and the prayer assumes the form of *praise* or *communion.* The familiar hymn, "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty" is a good example. Many of the Hebrew Psalms assume this form—for instance the twenty-fourth, beginning, "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof." Sometimes, aesthetic prayer assumes an extremely *mystical* form, and the ego seeks, not simply communion with the Alter, but complete *identification with* or *absorption in* the Alter. Miss Strong cites a Vedic hymn illustrative of this:

> "Hail to thee, mighty Lord, all potent—Vishnu,
> Soul of the Universe, unchangeable,
> Holy, eternal, always one in nature,
> Whether revealed as Brahma, Hari, S'iva

Creator or Preserver or Destroyer,
.....
I come to Thee for refuge
Renouncing all attachment to the world,
Longing for fulness of felicity,
Extinction of myself, absorption into Thee."6

The well known prayer of Marcus Aurelius is a noble example of this attitude at its best: "Everything harmonizes with me which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring. O Nature, from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return," 7. This type of prayer is called *aesthetic*, because, like all aesthetic contemplation, the individual feels drawn out of himself and his own needs and interests into a larger whole of some sort. If the reader will consider how he feels when in the presence of some painting or sculpture, or of a panorama of natural scenery, or when listening to music that appeals profoundly to him, he will recognize how such an experience for the time being takes one out of oneself into a larger life and is satisfying for that reason. Persons very fond of natural scenery, sometimes treasure the memory of such experiences and find them of help in hours of loneliness and depression, as is illustrated by Wordsworth's *Lines Written Above Tintern Abbey* and *Ode to the Daffodils.*

The *Egoistic* type of prayer is of course not egotistical, nor is it ordinarily selfish in any bad sense of the word. In it the individual seeks some benefit to himself, and his effort is to disclose his needs to the Alter to whom he looks for aid. Prayers of *petition* and *confession* belong here. Egoistic prayers may be *Naturalistic* (i. e., those typical of naturalistic religions as described in Part I), in which *material* goods for the Ego are sought;—rain, crops, posterity, long life, victory in war, omens, oracles, etc.; or they may be *ethical*, in which some *moral benefit* to the ego is sought,—forgiveness of sins, conversion, purity of heart, wisdom, self-control, strength for the day's work, and the like. Naturalistic and ethical prayers are often made for material and moral blessings to other persons for whose benefit the individual who prays is concerned. Such prayer can be regarded as egoistic in the sense that persons whose welfare is a matter of solicitude to the individual virtually constitute a part of his larger self or ego, so that in the mental attitude of prayer they are identified with himself in contrast to the Alter from whom aid is sought. Christian

illustrations of egoistic prayers will readily occur to the reader. The prayer of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* of Plato will serve as a non-Christian example of a highly ethical type: "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry," 8.

As an example of a Community prayer for the most part of the aesthetic type, one might cite the *Te Deum Laudamus* (We Praise Thee O God) which has been called the "greatest hymn of the Christian church." A Jewish community prayer of the ethical type is "Bless our children, O God, and help us so to fashion their souls, by precept and example, that they shall ever love the good, flee from sin, revere Thy word and honor Thy name. May they, planted in the house of the Lord, flourish in the courts of our God; may they guard for future ages the truths revealed to their forefathers," 9.

III—*Merits and Limitations of Each Type of Prayer*

Reserving the full consideration of the efficacy of prayer to a later section in the chapter, it will be convenient at this point to estimate the value of each of these types of prayer. The aesthetic type is calming and comforting. The worshipper is transported from his ordinary life, with its cares, its annoyances and limitations, into the bosom of the Infinite. Keen aesthetic joy is felt. Relaxation is afforded to overwrought nerves and fatigued minds and bodies. The individual gains confidence, as he feels himself supported by power greater than that of his conscious self. God is his refuge, and he feels strong and secure in the everlasting arms.

The naturalistic type of prayer in this age of scientific enlightenment, has almost disappeared, 10. People as a rule know too much of the uniformity of natural law to believe it possible that prayer can change the order of natural events. The ethical type of prayer is of value for the promotion of moral discernment and reformation, as well as for increase of efficiency in all good deeds. Confession of sins forces the individual to realize his shortcomings and sincerely repent of them. At the same time, the reinforcing power of the Alter enables him to overcome like temptations in the future. Discernment of duty, clarification of moral values for which to strive,

and consecration to the call of service are all effected through ethical prayer.

No one of these types of prayer should be used to the exclusion of the others. The aesthetic prayer, employed alone, would lead to inactivity. Absorbed in blissful contemplation of God the worshipper would forget to perform his obligations to his fellow men. The worst example of this perhaps is to be found in Brahmanism, where the individual worshipper may become so absorbed in Brahmă as to be indifferent to actual suffering about him; but all too often Christian mystics have been too intent upon the bliss of private devotion to be of much active service in righting the wrongs of their fellow men. Perhaps the chief danger in the ethical prayer is to be found in the development of a morbid sense of sin. To recognize one's faults, repent of them, and make an honest attempt to overcome them, is a healthful effect of ethical prayer. But to brood over real or fancied wrong doing to the point of sickness of mind and body is hurtful. In these days of activity, however, there are probably more persons who do not take time enough for ethical prayer to know their sins than there are who spend so much time grieving over them that they become morbid. The remedy for the dangers attending the over use of either of these types of prayer is of course to make use of the other type in due proportion.

The great value of the community prayer is found in its development of the social sense in religion. Consciousness of "the tie that binds" is found in public worship in the company of co-religionists. Sanity in moral and religious thought, feeling, and action is gained through public devotions. If private prayer were to be used by anyone to the exclusion of community prayer there would be grave danger that the Alter of such an individual would be narrow and unsymmetrical. Into his conception of God would be projected the narrow prejudices and bigotry of the man himself. Prayer to God, so conceived, might intensify hatred and fanaticism. But community worship is comparatively free from this danger. Common worship loosens the individual's prejudices, and affords him a wider outlook. More virtues are opened before him for cultivation, and more opportunities for active service become known to him. The larger the religious denomination, the longer its history, the wider its dispersion in different lands, the broader and finer is likely to be the ideal Alter of its prayers. This

is one reason why liberals in the present generation should remain in communion with the historic religious bodies in which they have been nurtured. Newly organized religious communions, through their inexperience and almost inevitable absorption in a few limited ideals, are bound to be less broad and catholic in their outlook. Fanaticism is today more often found among the radical than among the conservative religious bodies. This consideration also affords an argument in favor of the federation of religious organizations. When two historic religious denominations can unite, a wider experience in the future will assure them a finer and more helpful conception of God as the Alter of their prayers. What broad and deep conceptions of God will be afforded to the American of a few centuries hence, when the descendants of present Protestants, Catholics, and Jews form an organic union, and bring their various rich heritages of religious experience into common worship of the Father whom they all love and revere!

It goes without saying that private prayer, too, has its claims upon the religious man. Public prayer cannot be specific enough to meet all his private wants. He needs to take the details of his daily living into his closet with his God. It is easy to repeat, "Lord, be merciful to us, miserable sinners," in company with the esteemed people one sees all about one upon their knees; it seems a very fashionable, highly respectable thing to do. But it is a different matter to say, with sincerity, when all by oneself with one's God,—"Lord, be merciful to *me*, a miserable sinner!"

The conclusion, then, with regard to the various types of prayer is, that each has its value. All require cultivation. No one can cultivate his religious life to best advantage without the fellowship and sustaining strength of men and women of like religious profession. On the contrary, no one can thrive religiously without private personal communion with the great Alter of his religious experience. Everyone needs the uplift of aesthetic prayer to rise above the humdrum of every day life with its ordinary routine of details and problems; while every one needs the moral cleansing and spiritual reinforcement that come from contact with his Alter as moral counsellor, whether through his own personal initiative, or with the assistance of his father confessor, as his religious upbringing may dictate.

IV—*Prayer and the Subconscious*

The psychological theory of prayer is chiefly conceived with the relation of the subconsciousness to the conscious self. In prayer, of whatever type, the worshipper feels the presence of power that is greater than himself, made available for him through the Alter. Psychologically speaking, this reinforcement comes from the subconscious.

As William James has shown, 11, *we all possess considerable reserve powers of subconscious energy.* We ordinarily desist from a piece of work when we begin to feel fatigue. But if an unusual necessity drives us on, we continue, and the fatigue passes away, and we feel fresher than before. We have gotten our "second wind." *Stored up in the brain and nervous system, as well as elsewhere in the organism, are large reserve resources of energy of which ordinarily we are unaware.* There are various ways of *tapping these sources.* A new position of responsibility may cause a man to wake up and to achieve great things of which neither he nor anyone else had deemed him capable, as in the case of Cromwell and Grant. Aroused by an emergency at the siege of Delhi, Colonel Baird-Smith, by making free use of brandy and opium, was able to tap his subconscious sources of energy, although he was suffering with scurvy, and had one foot threatened with mortification. He performed almost superhuman feats of courage and kept together a band of devoted soldiers until relief came. Ascetic discipline in Yoga practices and the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola have turned dreamy orientals and discouraged Jesuits into marvelous men of action. A suggestive idea often has the same effect. Such is the case with Fletcher's pupils who keep before their minds the idea that they are chewing and rechewing their food. A slogan or rallying cry may call forth the reserve powers of a nation in a crisis:—"Fatherland," the "Flag," the "Union," "Holy Church," the "Monroe Doctrine," "Truth," "Science," "Liberty," Garibaldi's "Rome or Death," and (at the time) Wilson's "Make the world safe for democracy." These are all keys capable of tapping such powers in hosts of men, and of leading them to achievements of which they had not known themselves capable.

One means of approach to such reserve powers is found through the agency of the Alter, present in dialogue prayer. This is the reason, probably, why as a matter of fact, if

sufficiently hard pressed, we all *do* pray, however great our religious skepticism may be at other times. Here is a source of energy that gives reinforcement in emergencies, to which appeal is always open. The emergency may be a physical crisis, like the picturesque case of Robert Lyde, an imprisoned sailor, who, by the aid of prayer, with an English boy overcame a crew of seven Frenchmen and brought home the ship to England, 11; or it may be of a more spiritual character. Whatever it is, through prayer we often *do* obtain saving experiences. The organism is enabled to react to an emergency for which the powers of which it is conscious are unavailing.

Two difficulties need to be answered in connection with this view of the relation of the subconscious to prayer. (1) Is prayer to be regarded as merely another means of tapping subconscious energy, to be classified with the employment of flags and bands of music and slogans, and even with Fletcherizing one's food, with Yoga practise, and with the use of brandy and opium? The reply is, the author believes, that only *to a certain extent* are the psychological principles similar, while *there is a profound ethical and moral difference* between prayer and the other cases. In every spiritual religion appeal is always to a *higher and more ideal Self*. When the Buddhist takes his refuge in the Buddha and engages in meditation, the Alter is the embodiment of his highest ideals; the God of Jew and Christian is holy, just, wise, and merciful, and the chief end of man is to glorify Him and enjoy Him forever. So the prayers of spiritual religions effect moral reinforcement of character through the action of the Alter, such as would be impossible to the same extent through any other agency. It follows that in some important respects prayer involves unique psychological principles. In effecting such a synthesis of moral sentiments, prayer *psychologically* has a different function from other means of tapping subconscious energy. The influx of energy due to prayer effects a more extensive and permanent co-ordination of springs to action.

(2) The second difficulty to be met is this. On this theory, all prayer in all religions taps subconscious energy. And in all spiritual religions prayer effects a reinforcement of moral character. Does it matter, then, to what Alter one prays? Is the prayer of the Moslem to Allah of equal moral value with the prayers of American Jews and Christians? Well, it is not necessary to say that all Alteri are equally developed

morally, or that all are equally adequate likenesses of the God of the Universe (if the philosophical inquiry in Part III leads us to accept the hypothesis of God). We shall have to admit a measure of truth and moral worth in all religions, and that prayer is answered in them all. But as humanity has advanced, we have found that its conception of God has advanced also. All religions contain *some* measure of goodness and truth; but *those religions that make effective the ethically best and logically most rationally conceived Alter are best and truest.*

V—*Prayer Tends to Become Discriminating*

As people become more thoughtful they cease to pray unhesitatingly for anything whatever that they desire. They begin to discriminate, and to restrict the variety of their petitions. Experience teaches them that prayers for material changes in the external world are unavailing. Rain and dry weather come just the same, whether one prays for them or not. Reflection leads people also to cease praying for some things that might be gained through prayer, but which one feels it is not right to pray for. As the God of religion becomes conceived of as absolutely good and holy, one hesitates to ask Him for something petty and trivial. Miss Strong says that some college girls have admitted to her that they have prayed for success in basketball games or in examinations, but have made the admission somewhat shamefacedly. Such prayers undoubtedly would be likely to be efficacious. Sub-conscious energy would be released, and the person's efficiency would be increased. But to some persons of refinement and high ideals it almost seems like a profanation of the sanctuary of the heart to use its beautiful and intimate relation to God for any but the highest purposes. However, only people of education and spiritual refinement feel such scruples. Professor Coe evidently thinks it well for the child and the uneducated farmer to pray for rain. "A little child, seeing a storm cloud rising, stops his play, kneels on the lawn, and begs God not to let it rain. This is real prayer; . . . because he assumes toward God a personal relation that is appropriate for a little child. . . . Just so, the simple believer who asks that he may have rain for his wheat-field, truly prays. His praying will not alter the order of nature, in which rain has its place, but through his prayer he assumes a relation of conscious dependence and trust toward God, and rightly assumes that God is interested

in wheat. By bringing his daily occupation to God, the farmer attains to something greater than wheat, however—to a spiritual relationship that is of ultimate worth," 12. Saint Teresa is quoted by Miss Strong to similar effect:—"I laugh and grieve at the things people come to ask our prayers for. They should rather beg of God that he would enable them to trample such foolery under their feet." Still, to encourage them to come at all, the convent accepts such prayers and offers them, though, she says, "I am persuaded our Lord never heard me in these matters—for persons even request us to ask His Majesty for money and revenues." Similar reasoning, no doubt, has led the Roman Catholic Church in Southern Europe to preserve unauthenticated relics of saints, and to permit peasants to believe the country lore regarding miracles performed at shrines, although the Church never certifies any relic as genuine, nor that prayers at any shrine actually are efficacious in performing miracles.

How far the religious credulity of children and uneducated people should be allowed to remain undisturbed is of course a serious question. One does not like to take the responsibility of disturbing their faith, and risk removing the source of strength and comfort and stimulation to higher things that their religion affords them. At the same time there always is the danger that such people, disappointed in finding impossible prayers unanswered will presently lose their faith entirely. An American child who had been encouraged to pray for rain in a time of drought was once discovered wrathfully shaking his fist at the sky. When asked the reason he replied, "I am angry at God because He won't give us what we ask for." The bitterest enemies of religion during the past two generations have often been people who were brought up in surroundings of primitive credulity, and taught that to doubt anything is a grievous sin. Such persons if they become emancipated from naïve beliefs are very likely to think that all religion is downright superstition.

Teachers of religion are learning to recognize that when people begin to think, and to discover that prayers of some sorts do not avail, the only sure way to induce them to continue to pray at all is to show them how to discriminate intelligently between the purposes for which prayer is efficacious, and those for which it is not. Moreover, to incite them to appreciate the higher and better things and to pray for them, it is necessary

to lead people to discriminate between the things for which it seems morally right to pray, and those too trivial for prayer. In the main, the author believes that it will be found that the purposes for which prayer is unavailing and those which moral reflection will show are undeserving of prayer coincide. *From a moral standpoint we really could not desire that prayer were efficacious in any respect in which it is not efficacious.*

VI—*The Efficacy of Prayer*

We shall consider in order the efficacy of prayer in its effects (1) upon the mind and character of the person who prays; (2) upon his body; (3) upon the minds and bodies of other persons for whom he prays; and (4) upon the physical environment.

1. The possible effects of prayer upon the mind and character of the person who prays are very great. The only apparent conditions are faith in the process of prayer itself, and persistence. Peace of mind, calmness, cheerfulness, wisdom, courage, selfmastery, fairmindedness in dealing with others, and all other moral virtues are open to him who prays. One may learn to exercise charity to all and malice toward none. One may progress in the pursuit of every ambition that is sanctioned by one's conscience. One may develop into the sort of man morally that it is one's ideal to become. There is no virtue to which man aspires, no vice which he would overcome, for which prayer will not avail. To be sure, a man born with an unusually strong pugnacious instinct may not necessarily become a model of gentleness through prayer, and a man with an unusually imperious sexual instinct may not necessarily find continence easy; though even such achievements through prayer have not infrequently occurred. But the pugnacity of the former man may be taught invariably to blend with his tender emotion to form the complex emotion of moral indignation, and the virtue of courage may consequently become so preeminent in such a man that he will be a leader in every splendid fight for good ends and noble purposes. In the case of the man with apparently too strong erotic desires, sex impulses may become sublimated into artistic activity, and render him gifted in art, literature, or music; or it may endow him with unusual athletic prowess or intellectual acuteness. Any powerful instinct, which, untamed, is liable to lead a man to his ruin, may

through earnest prayer, and consecration to the Alter, become so trained as to become one of his most valuable assets.

2. The possible effects of prayer upon the bodily health of the person who prays are also great. Just how far they extend, and where their limits will be found are questions of therapeutics to be determined in each particular case by the combined experience of physicians and clergymen, 13. Roughly speaking, it is safe to claim that *very many functional diseases can be cured by means of prayer. Functional diseases* may be defined as those in which *no organic tissue has been destroyed,* so that organs remain intact, but in which their activity is *excessive, defective,* or in some way *irregular.* Ordinary headaches, constipation, indigestion, and nervousness would be examples. Even in these cases, however, simple prayer alone would not always suffice. Intense prayer long continued with the assistance of the suggestions induced by a mental healer would be likely to be necessary. Whether such heroic treatment, possibly involving some risk of permanent mental injury, would be advisable would depend upon the circumstances. It would be foolish to treat a temporary case of constipation by such means when some simple drug would be safer and equally or more effective. While Jesus and his apostles cured sick folk through religious means exclusively (i. e., faith and prayer) it must be remembered that the ordinary divine healer of our times lacks their good judgment, and that the scientific understanding of the use of drugs has now made simpler and less dangerous modes of treatment available for many disorders.

While the usefulness of the prayers of the divine healer, even in the treatment of functional disorders, is therefore restricted and should never be resorted to without previous diagnosis by a competent physician, there is of course no reason why a patient suffering from a *functional* disorder should not earnestly pray, together with the members of his family, for his recovery. Such prayers will assist all the more in effecting a recovery if good nursing and competent medical attendance are also employed.

Organic diseases are those in which *organic tissue has been wholly or partly injured or destroyed,* such as tuberculosis, cancer, paresis, and the like. *Acute diseases* include infections, such as typhoid fever and pneumonia. *In cases of these kinds, prayer alone can no more be expected to effect a cure than it can*

to set a broken bone, make a crooked back straight, or restore an arm or leg that has been shot away in battle.

Alleged cases where persons are reported to have been cured of paralysis, tuberculosis, and like diseases by divine healing have never been authenticated. Usually diagnosis may be presumed to have been at fault. Hysterical cases of paralysis where the patient imagines himself unable to move, and so actually cannot move by his own volition, but where no injury to the brain has actually occurred, can be cured, just as they have been caused, by suggestion. However, it is well known that the progress of an incurable disease may be somewhat checked if the patient remains in a cheerful frame of mind, and that his courage and confidence increase his chance of recovery from an infectious fever or a surgical operation. So that *while the power of prayer in such cases is restricted, it may be of assistance in connection with other agencies.*

In cases of incurable disease, prayer can do something for the patient that is really of more moral significance than recovery. Everyone has known invalids whose minds, sustained by religion, have become strong forces for good in every way among those about them. What person condemned to death from sickness would not prefer to meet his end like a man, and to leave tender memories of his last days to those who mourn him! Through prayer, an incurable invalid may overcome irritability and despondency; and, instead of being an affliction, he may become a benediction to those to whom he is dear, and the close of his life may be a stronger influence for good than had been his years of health and strength. The sufferer who does not understand the psychological nature and limitations of prayer, or who has not been told the nature of his disease and is unaware that it is incurable will naturally pray for his recovery. His prayer will not be literally answered; but if it enables him to draw upon the reserve powers of his subconsciousness it may give him calmness and courage and make a moral hero of him. The better informed invalid, who knows the incurable nature of his sickness and who also knows both the power and the limitations of prayer will pray, not for recovery, but that he may have calmness, courage, and cheerful resignation. Such an one will be certain not to lose confidence in prayer, since he understands precisely what he may expect from it, and will not be embittered by disappoint-

ment, but will learn how to rise above his suffering and quit himself bravely and manfully.

3. The possible effects of prayer upon the minds and bodies of other persons will be similar to those described, *provided one of two conditions is met; EITHER that the person who is prayed for knows that he is prayed for, OR that the person who prays comes into social contact with the person for whom he prays.* If a wandering son knows that his mother is praying for him, this thought will touch his sympathies, and may bring to the surface of conscious attention memories that have been dormant, and release long suppressed or forgotten impulses and aspirations that will again make a man of him. Perhaps it ought to be added, that the extent of the influence of this form of prayer depends considerably upon the esteem which the person who is prayed for holds for those who are praying for him. An honest sinner will feel little but contempt for what he believes to be the Pharisaical attitude of those in the village prayer meeting who pray publicly for him, and such prayers may do more harm than good. The value of such intercessory prayer depends upon the character of the person who prays, and officious busybodies who have and deserve to have, no moral influence in other ways upon another person, will not gain such influence over him through prayer.

If the person who prays comes into social contact with those others for whom he prays, his prayers may avail without the others knowing that he is praying for them. In such cases the person who prays will receive through prayer personal strength, wisdom, and self control in dealing with others; and their attitude will change in response to his altered attitude toward them. A good woman, when she heard any member of her family find fault with some one whom he disliked, was in the habit of asking the critic, "Do you pray for him?" It was a just rebuke. It is impossible to pray honestly for any one and not learn to appreciate the good in him, and to adopt a more human attitude toward him. And this cannot fail to have some influence upon the person in question.

The discussion thus far has chiefly been regarding the efficacy of individual prayer. The principles stated hold in a similar manner in each case for *community* prayer. *If a group of persons were sincerely to pray for mental and moral changes in themselves these would follow almost without limit.* A congregation who prayed that they might be filled with charity

and brotherly love for one another would gain that for which they prayed. Two quarreling church factions that could be induced to come together in such a service and pray, not *at* each other, but to God that they might learn to love and respect each other, would speedily learn to dwell together like brethren in unity. Prayers that the church might be consecrated to greater service in the locality, to purer living, and to sincerer devotion to all that is true, good, and beautiful would likewise be certain of fulfilment. If the congregation were to pray for better social and moral conditions in *the city* in which they live, *such prayers would be liable to be effective in some measure if* the people in the city generally knew that the church people were praying thus, and *much more, if* the church people, strengthened and inspired by their prayers, were to increase and make more effective their *points of social contact in the city.*

What is true of a city is true, of course, still more of the *nation as a whole.* Some one has said that the modern man does not know how to repent for the sins of his city or nation. Suppose that in all the churches and synagogues of a city or of a nation one day every week the communicants were to come together and pray after this manner:—"O God, we confess to Thee our remorse and shame at the sins of society for which we as citizens are in large measure to blame. We have permitted little children in this city (or nation) to be deprived of schooling and put to long hours of excessive labor that we might buy cheaper clothing. We have permitted young girls to be led into the horrors of white slavery partly because we were too indifferent to provide decent places of amusement so that their only chance of recreation was in questionable surroundings; partly because we were too greedy to obtain profits from business, or to buy cheap merchandise, to insist that working girls be paid living wages, and partly because we were too indifferent to provide places in our homes where our domestic servants could suitably entertain their friends. We have been bigoted in our hostility to every attempt of workingmen to better their conditions and have uncharitably criticized the mistakes of their unions instead of trying to sympathize with them and to help them. We have been fanatical in our hatred of successful business men and heads of corporations and have failed to appreciate their services to society, or to understand the difficulties under which they work. We have each of us

been concerned with his own personal and family interests and refused to take an interest in elections, or to be candidates for office ourselves, and we have unthinkingly and cruelly abused those who were willing to do so. Lord, we have all erred and strayed from Thy ways in neglect of our obligations to this city (or nation)—have mercy upon us, miserable sinners!" If we could imagine such a confession as this being honestly repeated weekly in every place of worship in any city or in the land as a whole, can we imagine that it would be long before the reserve energies of the city or nation would be brought into action, and that these shameful iniquities would be removed from us! In like manner, if in all the places of worship in the countries involved in the late war, Christian, Jewish and Moslem alike, the worshippers were to pray sincerely in confession of their own shortcomings and in desire to understand the point of view of their enemies, would it be long before international justice and the civic and political rights of all individuals of every race and nation could in some way be assured by universal agreement, and future wars be rendered impossible?

4. Can prayer have any effect upon the *physical environment* whatever? Perhaps many readers who have agreed with the general course of the argument thus far would emphatically say, No. But, *in a sense* we shall see that *even the physical environment may be modified through prayer.* The reported saying of Jesus that through faith his followers might remove mountains has seemed to many to be legendary, or figurative, or Oriental hyperbole. But in our time have not mountains actually been removed through faith? Railways have been built over the great back bone of the continent, so that our Atlantic Coast has become only four days' travel from the Pacific Ocean. The mountains at the Isthmus of Panama have been removed and cast into the sea, so that ships may pass from one ocean to the other. And when one reads of the difficulties which had to be overcome by those who have achieved these great tasks, one marvels at their faith. Wherever man learns the way to overcome the difficulties in his physical environment, prayer, by releasing reserve powers of subconscious energy, will strengthen his faith and courage, and will render him able to carry out his task. Prayer therefore may be of incalculable aid to mankind in the great task of rendering physical nature suited to the needs of an advancing civilization.

This leads us to our practical conclusion in regard to the efficacy of prayer. *Prayer is efficacious, never as a substitute for action, but as a guide and stimulus to action.* This is true of prayer, just as it is true of all forms of consciousness. Our minds, whatever theory we may hold of their relation to our bodies and to the external world, do not of themselves ever change the course of events. Mere thinking cannot ever raise our feet from the ground, much less displace a particle of matter external to our bodies. One might sit in his room all day and think hard of his breakfast, but that would not bring it to him. But his thoughts can very well guide his feet in the direction of the dining room. Likewise *mere* prayer without action on the part of the person who prays will accomplish nothing. The hordes of monks in Constantinople in 1453 who stayed in their cloisters praying that the Blessed Virgin would deliver the city from the Turks did not understand the psychology of prayer, and it was not long before Mohammed II entered the city and the Byzantine Empire was at an end. Had they understood the simple principle just laid down, and with the "Holy Virgin" as their rallying cry, taken their part assisting in the defense of the city, it is possible that they might have been successful. American women used to gather together by themselves on election days and pray all day that God would cause their communities to vote for prohibition, and at that time their prayers were rarely effective. Of recent years such women have learned to do their praying in advance, and to devote themselves during elections, as well as before, to energetic canvassing; and such a tremendous movement has ensued that a prohibition amendment has been added to the federal constitution.

There was a mother whose little boys acted rudely and annoyingly when a visitor was calling. The mother in apology exclaimed, "You have no idea how much I have prayed for those boys!" The visitor replied, "If you used a stick to them occasionally, your prayers might do some good!" The saying, "God helps them that help themselves" is correct psychology. It would be still more accurate to add "God helps them *through* their helping themselves." A man may hope, through appeals to the Alter of his prayers, that his efforts may be so guided and stimulated that they will accomplish the desired end. But he cannot expect that God will plough his fields for him, or take care of his hay when rain threatens, or act as his trained

accountant or efficiency expert, and straighten out his business perplexities. The only way that a person's prayers can be answered at all is *through processes that begin in his own psycho-physical organism,* and through it affect the external world.

The view of prayer that has thus far been outlined in this chapter is claimed to be *scientifically tenable.* It contradicts no known law of nature. It is merely a popular statement and application of generally accepted psychological principles. *This view of prayer is also morally and religiously more helpful and uplifting than less scientific views.* No view of prayer that contradicts well known laws of science, such as are now generally taught in our secondary schools can longer command the confidence of thoughtful people. And many, perhaps the majority of young people, when they discover that the views of prayer taught them by their pastors and Sunday School teachers are scientifically unsound, are not likely to realize the possibility of a corrected scientific conception of prayer. They are more liable to lose confidence in it altogether. Religious workers cannot induce people who are thoughtful to resort to prayer when it is scientifically justifiable to do so, unless they are honest in pointing out the limitations of prayer. If they vaguely dilate on "the power of prayer" and say that "everything" can be accomplished by its agency, if one only has faith enough, their more thoughtful hearers, seeing the falsity of such claims are liable to conclude that all prayer, like some prayer, is mere delusion and superstition.

Furthermore, from a moral standpoint no one who thinks the matter over carefully could really desire that prayer should be effective in any way for which it is not effective. How morally absurd it would be if every one could cause rain to fall or a drought to come because he prayed, or in any other way could suspend the laws of nature for his own private benefit! What a disorderly and chaotic world we should be living in, were that possible! Far preferable is a world of orderly and uniform natural laws such as that in which we do live. And how petty and selfish it really would be for a person to ask that the laws of the universe should be set aside for his sake. Could we respect a God who would show such partiality to people who prayed for such selfish ends! And it would be immoral as well as ridiculous to expect God to solve the problems of business or home for us, while we looked on at

Him doing our duties. We should be parasites in such a case, shirking our own responsibilities. But we may ask God to give us wisdom and courage to solve our own difficulties; we can expect that He will enable us to attain our moral ends through energy made available for us through the Alter of our prayers.

This theory of prayer makes it possible to gain all the moral and spiritual goods that are of supreme value in the world. The getting of much food and fine raiment and great possessions and all the grosser and more material things of life occupy entirely too much of our attention as it is; far better is it that to the Alter of prayer we should look not so much for these, as for purity of heart and soul, integrity, and single minded devotion to all that is good, true and beautiful. For these spiritual goods, the supreme values of life, are available to every one who prays earnestly for them and honestly endeavors to realize them in his life, 14.

VII—*The Objectivity of Prayer*

The problem that next demands our consideration is the question of the *objectivity* of prayer. (a) Granting all that has been claimed for the efficacy of prayer, may not prayer be a purely subjective affair? May not the Alter really be a creation of the imagination, and does not the efficacy of prayer depend upon the unproved assumption that the Alter actually exists, not merely in the mind of the person who prays, but also as God in the external world? Can prayer in any sense be objective? (b) Once convince any intelligent person of the psychological nature of prayer, must he not refuse to stultify himself by pretending to believe what he does not know to be really true, and hence must he not give up praying entirely?

Answering (b) first, the argument of this section will endeavor to show that it is quite reasonable to pray before one has been able to make up his mind upon the problem of the objectivity of prayer. In reply to (a), which will then be considered, two different theories, both of which maintain the objectivity of prayer, will be presented for the reader's consideration.

1. It must be admitted that, in the author's opinion at least, the question of the objective existence of God cannot be settled upon purely psychological grounds. The psycho-

logical facts which we know are inadequate to answer the question. (The grounds for the belief in God are metaphysical, and will be given in Part III.) However, it does not follow that intelligent people who understand something of the psychology of prayer must refuse to pray until philosophers are all agreed upon the nature and existence of God. In primitive times, the author believes that people prayed before the idea of a divine being of any sort had occurred to them. People would continue to pray if that belief were to pass away. The efficacy of prayer is a great fact of human experience. The hypothesis of God is only one way—though the author believes it to be philosophically the best way—to explain that fact.

If we recall what was said regarding the evolution of prayer in Chapter VI., it will be remembered that among primitive peoples sacrifice and prayer probably antedate beliefs in spirits, gods and other personal beings of all sorts. People first repeated spells and prayed; their prayers sometimes were efficacious; one reason for belief in spirits was that this hypothesis explained the facts of their religious experience. Some Buddhists engage in meditation without believing in a God; such meditation is effective in influencing their lives. Comte advised his followers to pray to mental pictures of absent wives and mothers; the Alter would in such a practice be frankly recognized to be imaginary. Wordsworth got moral and religious strength and reinforcement in recalling to his mind natural scenery which he had enjoyed in the past; this, psychologically speaking, was an experience similar in principle to prayer—yet the scenery that served as an alter he could not have thought of as objectively present.

But, most convincing perhaps is the actual testimony of people brought up with Christian traditions who have continued to pray to God after having ceased to be certain that there is a God, or at any rate that he is present to their minds in prayer, and whose prayers have yet been efficacious. Professor Leuba has collected a number of instances of this type in answer to a questionnaire. One is that of a physician in the prime of life: "I pray privately, morning and evening, in the belief that the practice is effective to live the day in piety and I am sure that it is. . . . It has a quieting, pacifying influence on my soul and makes me calm and happy and strong in practical life; it supplies me with patience and

perseverance. . . . I feel also the greatness and power of God in such a way as to admire and praise Him with gratitude and joy. . . . How does He help me and does He at all keep me? I do not know: I sometimes believe that He does. It may be that the very act of praying is the way in which I am assisted by the Divine Power—when I am speaking to God, it is God who speaks in me." Another is a doctor of philosophy about forty years of age, head of an institution of learning, who prays that he may help others as well as himself, e. g., "Help me to get a grip on T.; the fellow has got it in him to be somebody; I don't want him to go to the devil." His thoughts are then likely to run off on the problem in mind. This man believes that it is a personal Divinity who gives him strength, but is not interested in Biblical miracles and does not want to put prayer on that basis, but on some sort of scientific basis.

Another woman, a communicant in a Presbyterian church:—"In my purely emotional experiences, I have no distinct realization of communion with God. This does not, however, prove to me that there is no God, but rather that my development is not sufficiently advanced to realize Him as I wish. Reflectively, I use 'God' as that in reason behind which I cannot go, and I act as if I really believed in Him as a personality in order to satisfy my intellectual and aesthetic needs," 15. A very striking instance has been reported by Miss Amy Eliza Tanner, 16, and others by Dr. Frank Orman Beck, 17.

From such cases it appears to be clear that it is quite possible for a person to remain uncertain in his own mind whether the reinforcement that he receives in prayer is due merely to an Alter of his imagination or to an objective God, and nevertheless to continue the practice of prayer, and to receive benefit from it. *The efficacy of prayer is not dependent on the worshipper's understanding of the philosophy and psychology of the process. The efficacy of prayer is a matter of immediate experience; the existence and nature of God are difficult philosophical questions upon which it is unnecessary for the worshipper to make up his mind in order to receive the benefits of prayer.*

Nor is there any reasonable ground for accusing people of intellectual dishonesty because they pray, although they cannot explain in just what way they believe prayer to be efficacious. Suppose a building were on fire, and one could

easily throw water upon the flames and extinguish them. Would it be wrong for him to do so because he did not understand the chemistry of combustion? When people eat food they ordinarily suppose that the food is digested in their stomachs. Suppose a student of physiology were to come to doubt this, and to suspect that other vital organs possibly play more important parts in digestion than the stomach. Would it be intellectually dishonest for him to continue to eat food until he had definitely decided the question? In any event, food *is* digested, and he needs it to support life—the theoretical question can be solved at his leisure or never at all. So if a person knows he can receive large moral benefits through prayer, and feels the need of these, he should not refrain from praying until he can understand and decide the psychological and philosophical nature of the Alter and know whether it is a subjective creation of his own consciousness or an objectively existing personality. Prayer in either case is efficacious, and that is the main point; the theoretical question cannot affect the actual value and efficacy of prayer.

2. We are now ready to take up the questions raised under (a) above (page 277). These questions raise an issue which psychology is unable at present to settle absolutely. It is this: *Is the process of prayer something that goes on wholly within the psycho-physical organism?* Those who would answer the latter question affirmatively must not forget that in efficacious prayer it always seems to the worshipper that energy *does* enter into him from the external world. The worshipper may be wrong, but such is certainly his impression. *The burden of proof clearly lies with those who maintain that he is wrong.*

In any event it is evident that the reinforcement of the conscious Ego of dialogue prayer is effected through the agency of the Alter, and it also is evident that the Alter is the key by which sub-conscious reserves of energy are tapped. But it is not necessary to conclude that this energy has all been produced within the organism. Some of it may enter the organism from outside when the individual prays. William James suggests such an hypothesis rather tentatively in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* and in his lecture on *Human Immortality;* there may be somewhere in the universe a great reservoir of sub-conscious energy that is tapped and made available for finite beings in prayer and other religious

experiences. This reservoir presumably would either be God, or under the control of God. So the energy really would be supplied to the individual by God in answer to his prayers. This suggestion is accepted by Dr. George Barton Cutten, who thinks that in prayer and conversion and other religious experiences "God directly acts upon the subconsciousness," 18.

This theory is psychologically tenable in the present state of knowledge on the subject. We do not know the precise amount of physical energy stored up in the organism; nor do we know how much "psychical energy" (whatever that may be) constitutes the resources of the subconscious. This theory will in the remainder of this book be referred to as *the hypothesis of an external God, i. e., a God external to the mind and body of the individual person, who acts upon the person through his subconsciousness.* This theory appears to be an application of "theism"; but the latter term is to-day used in so many different senses that it has become highly ambiguous. The expression "theory of an external God" is much less misleading, if it be remembered that by "external" is meant external to the minds and bodies of men. Such a God is conceived of as present and operative in the universe (as opposed to Deism). The chief argument in favor of the hypothesis of an external God as an explanation of prayer is that it agrees with the worshipper's impression that energy comes to him from without.

The theory, however, is open to a serious scientific objection. It introduces the hypothesis of God into the science of psychology, to explain psychological facts. Now the hypothesis of God is no longer employed in any of the more mature natural sciences, though it once had its place in them all. In no authoritative text book in astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology or biology does any one to-day expect to find any phenomenon explained by Divine action—such an explanation would be regarded as utterly unscientific. In psychology itself no one would dream of introducing the conception of God to explain any ordinary mental processes; should we therefore continue to introduce it for the explanation of religious phenomena? To be sure, in our present ignorance it is *possible* that "God acts directly on the sub-consciousness" but to introduce such an hypothesis into the psychology of religion it may be urged, is both unnecessary, and contrary to the scientific spirit. While the reader may decide to accept this hypothesis, and while there are philosophical considerations that favor it, as

will appear in later chapters, he should remember that there is this grave difficulty in so doing.

If, on the contrary, we decide that in prayer the influx from the subconsciousness into consciousness involves nothing either physical or mental except the resources of the organism, what are the consequences? The *Atheist* of course may claim that such a conclusion is in entire agreement with his opinion, that no God exists in the universe at all. The *Agnostic* may assert that this conclusion, indicating that the psychology of prayer does not involve the assumption of an external God, favors his contention that the question whether God exists cannot be known. But if we make this decision are we necessarily committed either to atheism, or to agnosticism?

It seems to the author that another possibility remains. *Prayer may, from a scientific standpoint, be wholly due to organic processes*, mental and neural, and yet *from a religious and philosophical standpoint it may involve the action of God.* Though astronomers do not mention God in their lectures or writings on astronomy, many of them are none the less believers in God, and the same is true of other natural scientists. Astronomers may say that from the standpoint of their science gravitation and not Divine action is the explanation of the reason why planets move in their orbits. Biologists may say that natural selection and not immediate creation is the explanation of the origin of species. Yet neither gravitation nor natural selection nor any other scientific law states the ultimate reason for any event; such laws merely state *how* events go on, not *why* they go on in that way. Gravitation and natural selection are mere generalizations of what has been observed to happen; they are not entities. It would be scientifically as well as logically absurd to say that "gravitation makes things fall," "natural selection makes species arise;" one might as well say like the physician in Molière's play that opium puts people to sleep on account of its "dormative properties." It is quite possible for the natural scientist who is a believer in God to say that gravitation is the way that God acts in keeping particles of matter in their places, that natural selection is the way God acts in bringing new species into existence; that every verified natural law is a statement of how God thinks and acts and that every important scientific hypothesis is a theory about the manner in which God thinks and acts. The entire physical universe is the garment of Deity, and its pro-

cesses are the physical counterparts of expressions of the Divine thoughts. This supposition, to be sure, is not science, and should have no place in scientific books, not because it may not be true, but because it has no bearing upon scientific problems. This is *the hypothesis of an immanent God, i. e. of a* God *present in everything in Nature*, so that *all natural processes are His actions.* One species of this view is called "pantheism"; but this term, like "theism" has been used in so many contradictory senses that it seems best to avoid it altogether. From this hypothesis of an immament God it would follow that prayer, too, involves Divine action when viewed from a philosophical or a religious standpoint, and that it is so to be regarded from the standpoint of the *philosophy* of religion, but that the hypothesis of God has no proper place in the *psychology* of religion any more than in any other science. On this theory, to say that prayer is wholly an affair of the organism, interpreted scientifically, is not to deny that it is the action of God, but to affirm it.

The conception of an immanent God will become clearer to the reader after the discussion of God in the earlier chapters of Part III. Let us conclude the present chapter with a more concrete discussion of the theory of an immanent God in its application to prayer.

Suppose a person prays, who believes in the immanent theory of God just mentioned, and who believes that, from the standpoint of psychology prayer is a process that goes on wholly within his own organism. For such a person is prayer *objective?* The author thinks that we may say, *Yes.* Such a person is convinced that God exists in the universe. The philosophical arguments for the existence of God appear stronger to him than those against it. In prayer, an Alter is present in his consciousness that symbolizes God for him as clearly and definitely as is possible for a person of his intelligence and experience. Such an Alter, he believes, is not a mere fiction of his imagination, but a symbol of a Being that actually exists. In prayer and meditation he is thinking of a real personality. Suppose a son in meditation were to think of an absent mother and carry on an imaginary conversation with her, and that to do this helped him to solve some difficulty. He would be thinking, not of an imaginary person, but of a real person,—his mother. And the influence upon him, we might say, in a sense, really is exerted by his mother; the fact that the idea

of his mother can influence him at such a time is a consequence of the actual relations that he has had with her in the past. So we may say that the mother does exist in the mind of her son when he thinks of her in this way. And, on the immanent theory of prayer, more can be said for its objective validity even than this. For there is another sense, of course, in which the mother is not actually present before her son when he thinks of her; her presence before him is a creation of his mind. *In prayer, however, if we accept the immanent theory of God, we should say that God actually is present in the Alter.* For God, on this view is everywhere, and in all things.

Nor does this mean that God is present to the person who prays merely in the sense that He is equally present in everything whatever, in a stone or a clod, in a worm or a toad. While God is in all things, and all things are expressions of Him, all things are *not equally* expressions of Him. The lowliest organism is a better expression of Him than anything inorganic; animals are more adequate expressions than plants; man, who can reason, is a fuller expression than any other animal; and the good man is a fuller expression than the bad man. The loftiest Alter that has yet been conceived in prayer is the fullest expression of God that has yet become comprehensible to the mind of man on the earth. If, therefore, man would try to find God he must not look without, though God in some sense is everywhere—but he must look within, for in the Alter of his purest and sincerest prayers is God most fully revealed to him. So, in a profound sense, on this theory of an immanent God, the Alter of prayer is the immanent God of the universe of whom a man has become self-conscious in his own personal experience.

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CHAPTER XVII

MYSTICISM

I—*Introductory*

We have seen that the endeavor of religion is always to conserve values through an Agency, and that in Christianity and Judaism this Agency is believed to be personal, is God. In prayer an imaginative social process is carried on with God, who, it is believed, hears, and in accordance with His wisdom, answers human petitions. Now, suppose that a person, when he prays, could somehow become conscious of the presence of God, just as he is aware of the presence of another human being when he converses with him! How comforting and sustaining would such assurance be! How much more effectively would religion conserve moral values for him! If God, who is purely spiritual, is to be perceived in some manner, it obviously cannot be through the senses; for it is impossible to see His face and to hear His voice with human eyes and ears; He must be perceived inwardly. Many have believed this inward perception to be possible; in fact, that they have experienced it.

Consider what it is like to engage in conversation with a very intimate friend, with whom there is perfect understanding. It is often possible for close friends to commune in silent intimacy, not needing to talk for intervals, so perfect is their mutual comprehension. At such times, friends certainly give little thought of each other's physical appearance, or the sounds of their voices. To be sure, these are all of a friend which can be seen and heard with the eyes and ears of sense. What a person is most aware of, as constituting his friend, however, is his personality—his soul, if you please—that of him which is inwardly perceived. So the problem for the mystical worshipper is how he can become inwardly aware of a Person who does not have a physical body, but who, he believes, exists as truly and has even more definite Individuality than any human being, and is more deeply and truly one's Friend—nay, who

loves and understands infinitely more than any fellow human being does or can.

We may accordingly define *Religious Mysticism in general as the endeavor to secure consciousness of the presence of the Agency through Which (or through Whom) the conservation of socially recognized values is sought. For Christianity and Judaism,* religions for which the Agency is God, *mysticism is accordingly the cultivation of the consciousness of the presence of God.*

II—*Milder Forms of Mysticism*

In its milder form, religious mysticism is a fairly common experience to-day, as Professor Pratt has taught us, 1. It is a great mistake to make too much of a mystery of mysticism, or to limit it to the startling forms which it sometimes has assumed in the lives of the saints. Every reader knows good and saintly people—including very likely his own mother and father—who have experienced religious mysticism. In every church and synagogue there are at least a few sincerely religious people who could testify, if modesty did not forbid, that they feel God present at their sides, even at times when they are not consciously engaged in religious worship, and that He constantly guides and sustains them. In their own lives they have known the experiences described in the twenty-third and many other of the Psalms, 2.

Miss Underhill (3) has set forth with careful descriptive analysis, five stages of the "mystic way," as experienced by the great saints and mystics of the various religions of the world. To some extent, as the author believes, it can be maintained that every sincerely religious person treads this "mystic way." The first step, for the ordinary religious person, is the "awakening" of the religious life, which, as we have seen, usually is experienced in adolescence. The significance of religion then first comes home to a person, and he gains an enlargement of his self through continuous growth, spontaneous awakening or conversion. The Alter of prayer becomes a deeper and more meaningful reality to him. He has times of spiritual "illumination" or enhancement, when his religious beliefs are real and vivid, when he feels uplifted, when it is easy to do right, and he has a sense of close communion with the Alter. But on other occasions he sometimes has periods of depression, when he feels painfully conscious of his own short-

comings and imperfections, and he does not feel the presence of the Alter. Old habits and points of view in conflict with the Alter have driven the latter temporarily out of the focus of conscious attention. This may be the consequence of a moral lapse, or it may merely be the result of nervous fatigue and the sheer impossibility of keeping consciously upon an exalted plane to which the person's mind and brain have not yet become habituated. He realizes that if he is to remain true to the Alter, and to retain a sense of His continued presence and favor, there must be removed from his mind, character, and life everything that is in any way in conflict with the Alter. To the modern Protestant layman this means, simply, that he must sincerely repent of his sins, reform his manner of living, and cultivate private and public religious worship. To Christians with different traditions, it has sometimes meant "purgation," to be effected by (1) rigorous "detachment" from every worldly tie that might in any way conflict with whole-hearted devotion to God in the manner taught by the Church (including for monks and nuns poverty, celibacy, and obedience), and (2) "mortification"—the doing of unpleasant things in order to discipline oneself to absolute submission to God.

When once those obstacles have been removed that stood in the way of whole-hearted devotion to the Alter, and concentration of attention upon Him, the sense of the Divine presence becomes more frequent, and requires less effort. Physiologically this means that whatever brain paths furnish the neural side of religious worship have become more firmly fixed, and that conflicting pathways have been suppressed, and rendered impervious to neural stimulation. Such attainment, of course, does not come all at once; perhaps it is never entirely complete during any human lifetime. But, by middle age, a person's habits and points of view are relatively set. The sincerely religious person, by the time he is forty, has usually formed his conceptions of God as they are likely to remain, and has adjusted his activities in accordance with them. Such an one, if a layman of liberal views to-day, may take a mild form of "union" with God for granted; his conscience is fairly clear; he feels assured that God is with him, and watches over him, and that He helps and guides him in knowing and doing what is right, and in recognizing and overcoming temptations. At times his insight into spiritual matters is more than ordinarily

keen, and he feels particularly blest; at other times he is rather depressed and low spirited. But the latter occasions do not unduly discourage him; for such an one it would be exaggeration to describe them as "the dark night of the soul." For he knows that they are temporary, and will presently pass away if he is faithful to God and seeks his help. The vividness with which the presence of God is felt, the intensity of joy which it affords and of sorrow which its absence brings, vary largely with individual temperaments. Level headed phlegmatic people do not experience extreme exaltation and deep despair; avoiding the heights and the depths, they often are more rational and practical religious workers but they sometimes are deficient in enthusiasm and insight.

So much for religious mysticism of the milder forms, with which the majority of the readers of this book are acquainted, either as the result of personal experience or the observation of their religiously minded friends. But what of the more remarkable experiences of the "great mystics" among whose number must be reckoned the Hebrew prophets and the Christian saints, as well as some of the great Protestant reformers?

III—*The Great Mystics*

The great prophets and saints of Christianity and Judaism have all possessed unusually profound grasp of moral and religious principles. This is not to say that they have all been highly educated persons, by any means. But they have known their Bibles thoroughly, and have thought long and earnestly upon religious subjects. For them the Alter is rich in content; God is a term full of meaning. Further, through prayer they have persistently endeavored to make the presence of God real and vivid; it has been their desire, like Enoch, to "walk with God;" like Moses and Jeremiah to converse intimately with Him; like Amos and Isaiah under the impulsion of His Spirit to bring His messages to others; like Ezekiel and Daniel to see something of His glory.

Writers on mysticism sometimes say that St. Paul is the most striking mystical figure in the New Testament. His conversion to Christianity was apparently abrupt, coming as a sudden uprush from the subconsciousness of impressions made upon him by the piety and courage of St. Stephen and the others whom he had persecuted. He could no longer resist these goads upon his conscience, and for several days he was dazed

with visual and auditory automatisms. This "awakening" was followed by a "retreat" in the desert country of Arabia (4) where he sought in quiet to readjust himself to the new faith. Three years later he visited Jerusalem, when, as Miss Underhill suggests, he perhaps experienced his first ecstacy while praying in the Temple, when he "was caught up into the third heaven," "heard unspeakable words," and foresaw his future vocation to the Gentiles, 5. She thinks that he thereafter spent ten or twelve years in humble Christian work, in submission to his ecclesiastical superiors. With ripened powers, he ultimately became prepared for more exalted service. The church at Antioch accordingly sent him with Barnabas out upon missionary service, 6. The responsibility and opportunity then afforded him brought into expression the powers that had been developing during the years of his apprenticeship. He gained "illumination"—i. e., was "filled with the Holy Ghost," and constantly experienced "visions and revelations of the Lord," excelling all others in gifts of suggestion and healing, 7, and "speaking with tongues," 8. He tells the Galatians that he bore branded on his body "the marks of Jesus," 9.

More important than visions, ecstacies, prophesying, and speaking with tongues, in his own judgment as well as ours, were his great faith and his love for God and men, 10. God and Christ were very close to him. "Christ lives in me." God hath "shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." "The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." "For me to live is Christ," 11. Professor Rufus M. Jones says: "Paul's 'Gospel' from beginning to end, whether its sacred word is 'love' or 'faith' presupposes a human person partaking of the Divine Life, which freely gives itself, and it points away to a consummation in which the Spirit and law of this Divine Life become the Spirit and Law of 'a new creature'—a man in whom Christ is relived. His 'new man' is a supernatural inward creation wrought by the Spirit who is identical with Christ—'the Lord is the Spirit'—who enters into the man and becomes in him power, and life, and spiritualizing energy," 12.

The mystical religious experiences of St. Paul were shared with others, and became the common property of the saints of the church. So the profound mystical sacramentalism and philosophy of the Gospel and Epistles of John were rendered

possible, and their author (or authors) could portray Jesus in terms of the closest intimacy with God, on the one hand, and with his followers on the other, 13. "I am in my Father, and ye in Me, and I in you." "I am the Bread of Life." "I am the Door." "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman." "I am the vine and ye are the branches." "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye have no life in yourselves. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life," 14. Jesus is the eternal Logos manifested in the flesh, and is "the life of men," God incarnate and operative in a human being, and through him, in other human beings. These writings could have come only from one who has personally known the mystical experiences of which he wrote. "We speak that we do know, and testify what we have seen." "This is the disciple that beareth witness of these things, and wrote these things, and we know that his witness is true," 15.

As Dr. Loisy says, the Fourth Gospel "is above all a personal work, which bears from one end to the other the mark of the powerful genius who conceived it . . . all the materials which the author has used have passed through the crucible of his powerful intellect and his mystical soul; and they have come forth from it metamorphosed, intimately penetrated and fused together, by the idea of the eternal Christ, the Divine source of light and life," 16.

In almost every age since New Testament times there have been religious geniuses who, more than ordinary men, have been able to grasp the significance of the Christian faith, to feel it inwardly, and to project it into the Alter of their prayers, with Whom they have come into terms of the closest and most loving intimacy. The finest expression of mysticism in the ancient Catholic Church is the *Confessions* of Saint Augustine (†430). "Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise," 17. "And being thence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my inward self. Thou being my Guide; and able I was, for Thou wert become my Helper. And I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul . . the Light Unchangeable. . . He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is, and he that knows It, knows eternity. Love knoweth it. O Truth who art Eternity! and Love who art Truth! and Eternity who art Love! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh night and day," 18.

Early in the fifteenth century was written the *Imitation of Christ*, supposedly by Thomas à Kempis, a book which, as George Eliot said, "works miracles to this day, turning bitter waters into sweetness. And so it remains to all time a lasting record of human needs and human consolations." The words of this book are simple and penetrating. " 'He that followeth me, walketh not in darkness,' said the Lord. . . Let therefore our chiefest endeavor be, to meditate on the life of Jesus Christ." "Seek a convenient time to retire into thyself, and meditate often upon God's loving kindness. Shut thy door upon thee, and call unto thee Jesus, thy Beloved. Stay with Him in thy closet; for thou shalt not find so great peace anywhere else." "When Jesus is present, all is well, and nothing seems difficult; but when Jesus is absent, everything is hard. . . . It is a matter of great skill to know how to hold converse with Jesus; and to know how to keep Jesus a point of great wisdom. Be thou humble and peaceable, and Jesus will be with thee. Be devout and quiet, and Jesus will stay with thee. . . . Love all for Jesus, but Jesus for Himself," 20.

The literature of medieval and modern Christian mysticism is extensive. Attention may be called to the *Revelations of Divine Love* of Mother Julian of Norwich (about 1373) in the modern version of which some of the medieval quaintness of language is charmingly preserved, as well as to the *History and Life of the Reverend John Tauler* and his *Sermons* (about 1340). These are not too mystical to be understood by anyone who is willing to take them up sympathetically. Saint Teresa and St. John of the Cross are among the most penetrating of the great modern mystics. The mystical passages in *The Way of Perfection* and *The History of the Foundations* of the former give much of her spirit and are less difficult (and, of course, less profound) than her *Life* and *Interior Castle*. Among Protestant mystical books John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and George Fox's *Journal* are perhaps best known to English readers, and most worth while.

IV—*Spiritual Exercises*

The most remarkable book of directions for the cultivation of inner religious experience is the *Spiritual Exercises* of Saint Ignatius Loyola (†1556), the founder of the Jesuit order. Written out of his own experience for the help of those who might be seeking under Divine guidance to know their voca-

tion in life, it probably furnishes the most effective means by which any one of similar religious beliefs might attain a keen inward sense and appreciation of God and zeal to serve Him. The exercises are to be carried out in solitude in pursuance of directions given by an experienced Jesuit father, whose duty it is to modify them to meet individual temperaments and needs. The director is in no way to influence the exercitant who will select his vocation for himself, solely in accordance with the Divine guidance which he believes that he receives.

The first exercise consists of (1) a preparatory prayer, in which God's grace is sought that the exercise may be faithfully performed in His service; (2) an attempt to imagine visually Christ or the Virgin in some definite place and time in their lives; (3) to make a petition to God, appropriate to the event visualized (such as that one may be joyful if the person has imagined the Resurrection, that he may feel shame and confusion for his sins if he has imagined the Passion, etc.); (4) to exercise the memory, reason, and will over the fall of the angels, and contrast his own repeated sins with their single sin; (5) similarly to exercise memory, reason and will upon the sins of Adam and Eve; (6) similarly to ponder over how for one single sin better men have been lost forever; (7) to imagine Christ upon the Cross and to make to Him a colloquy, addressing Him "just as one friend speaks to another, or a servant to his master," and reviewing how "He has come to make Himself man . . and so to die for my sins," and "looking at myself" "to consider what I have done for Christ, what I am doing for Christ, what I ought to do for Christ, and so seeing Him in such condition fastened on the Cross, to think over what shall occur."

It is easy to see that such exercises faithfully gone through in privacy for four weeks, reviewing the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ, and the main points in Christian teaching connected with them, making these as vivid as possible in imagination, and emotion, must effect a profound impression upon a person's mind and character for the rest of his life. His religious beliefs and convictions would become tremendously real; they would be woven into the tissues of his memories and aspirations; they would become the dominating force in his personality. The *Alteri* of his devotions (God; Christ; the Blessed Virgin) would become intensely vivid in

his imagination; it would not be difficult to hold intimate colloquies with them as if they were persons bodily present. One can see why the Jesuits were able to reform the Catholic portion of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and why as intrepid missionaries they visited the hitherto inaccessible parts of the earth, overcoming through vital faith and courage what to ordinary men would have been insuperable obstacles.

As a rule, Christian mystics have not followed such precise directions as those given by Saint Ignatius Loyola, but they have all had more or less definite modes of procedure, by which they have endeavored to concentrate their attention upon God and to make His presence vivid and real. Methods have naturally varied with the customs and ideals of different centuries.

Critics of mysticism have claimed that it employs methods of auto-suggestion and self-hypnotism. Continuous concentration of the attention upon a cross or crucifix, or even the imagined figure of God, Christ, or a saint, brings on trance states, comparable to crystal gazing, it is alleged. Professor Coe has claimed that he has gained an understanding of the spiritual states of the great mystics by inducing a semi-hypnotic trance as a result of steadily fixing his eyes and attention upon a moderately bright object, 21. But, although methods in some respects similar to suggestion and hypnotism have often been used by mystics, one outstanding feature of mysticism must not be overlooked. The Christian mystics have always spent much time upon their Bibles and other devotional literature. Much religious lore and aspiration are consciously and subconsciously retained, and for them constitute the Alter. And just as in ordinary prayer but on a more extensive scale, merits and graces attributed to the Alter, are communicable to the ego. The *Imitation of Christ* and the *Pilgrim's Progress* are well named. While travelling on the mystic way the pilgrim makes his progress toward the realization of Heaven in his soul, and this journey is an imitation so far as the weakness of human nature permits, of the Christ of his prayers and colloquies.

Thus far emphasis has been placed, in the account of the great mystics as well as the milder mysticism of ordinary devout people, upon the spiritual side—the sense of intimate communion with God. This is the aim of mysticism, always. But

what of the more startling phenomena in the experiences of many of the great mystics? This leads us to the subject of Ecstasy.

V—*Ecstasy*

In the lives of the great mystics, after the process of "purgation" began to near completion, and ideas and impulses in conflict with the Alter had become largely expelled or subjugated, there came times when the mystic found his mind spontaneously moving upon another plane. Such states might be immediately preceded by voluntary concentration of the mind upon a fixed object or idea of religious devotion, and so be self-induced, or they might come on without effort or expectation. The general characteristics of the ecstatic state, are, as Dr. Cutten says, "concentration of attention on one dominant idea or object, loss of normal self-control, insensibility to external impressions, and intense emotional excitement," 22. Ecstacy is usually highly joyful; and there is subsequent memory of the events or visions experienced, at least in a general way. The state passes, after a while, leaving the mystic somewhat fatigued; but with a memory that is often precious, and it may have a lasting effect in raising the level of his character.

Ecstasy may be a condition of intense inward mental activity accompanied by outward calm, in which the mystic is in intimate or even rapturous communion with God, Christ, the Blessed Virgin or a Saint. Or the ecstasy may be more violent in its manifestations, and the person may sing, shout, or dance.

During ecstasy there is less than ordinary sensibility to external impressions, especially in the more extreme trance like forms. Respiration and circulation may be partly checked. Vision and hearing may be somewhat impeded. The ordinary sensations of pressure and equilibrium may be lost, so that the ecstatic may feel that his body has been lifted from the ground and that he is walking in the air; or that he is out of the body altogether. There may be little or no sensibility to pain. This last explains the apparent indifference of many of the martyrs who sometimes even manifested joy when tortured. "Stephen's face shone like that of an angel while he received the stones from the enraged multitude; Rogers, a fellow-worker with Tyndale, died bathing his hands in the flame as though it were cold water; and Lawrence, a deacon

of Rome, was laid upon a grid iron; with a smile, he said, 'Turn me, I am roasted on one side,' and died without a cry or moan of pain, as calmly as if lying on a bed of down," 23.

Visions are often experienced during ecstasy. Imagined events are *seen*, intuitively, with the eyes of the mind, as if they were actually witnessed. Professor Pratt thinks that, while the illusion in such cases may be complete and constitute a genuine hallucination, it is more frequently the case that ecstatic visions are merely "pseudo-hallucinations" in which the subject even at the time knows that they are subjective. Sometimes, indeed, visions are no more than unusually vivid memories of former experiences, 24. In view of the spiritual exercises engaged in by the mystics, in which they endeavor to bring images of persons and events as vividly as possible before the imagination, it can readily be understood that they may occasionally so well succeed in making these images vivid that they partially or even wholly mistake these products of their conscious and subconscious imagination for objective events.

Saint Julian of Norwich had visions of Christ both while he was scourged and while he was dying. More attractive to the modern reader, though, is the vision in which she says that God "brought our blessed Lady to my understanding. I saw her ghostly, in bodily likeness; a simple maid and a meek, young of age and little waxen above a child, in the stature that she was when she conceived. Also God shewed in part the wisdom and truth of her soul; wherein I understood the reverent beholding in which she beheld her God and Maker, marvelling with great reverence that He would be born of her that was a simple creature of His making. And this wisdom and truth; a knowing the greatness of her Maker and the littleness of herself that was made, caused her to say full meekly to Gabriel: *Lo me, God's hand maid!* In this sight I understood soothly that she is more than all that God made beneath her in worthiness and grace; for above her is nothing that is made but the blessed Manhood of Christ, as to my sight," 25.

Visions are very common in the literature of nearly all religions. In this simple vision of Saint Julian we can discover the fundamental principles underlying them all. Images that have developed in the subconsciousness are suddenly flashed into the focus of conscious attention. Saint Julian had probably often thought of the little hand maiden of the Lord

as she must have appeared at the time of the Annunciation; she now saw her as before she had imagined her.

Visions may be experienced by a group of persons at the same time, especially if they are in an excited mental condition, bordering upon ecstasy. Many soldiers during a battle are in such a state. "The ancients supposed that they saw their deities, Castor and Pollux, fighting in the van for their encouragement; the heathen Scandinavians beheld the Choosers of the Slain, and Christians were no less easily led to recognize the warlike St. George and St. James in the front of the strife, showing the way to conquest. It will be remembered that St. George was seen on the walls of Jerusalem by the army of the Crusaders, who did not doubt the reality of the suggested vision," 26. Preceding the fall of Constantinople in 1453, many had visions of the Virgin Mary appearing upon the walls of the city, and were led to hope that she would not allow it to be captured by the Turks. How such collective visions occurred is rendered clearer by a well authenticated case in France in quite recent times. In 1889 in a country district, Marie Magoutier, eleven years of age and of a nervous and imaginative temperament, saw a figure of the Virgin Mary in a hole in a wall in a country place. She told her playmates of her experience, and soon the news spread through the countryside like wild fire. Many visited the spot, more than fifteen hundred on August 11, 1889. Of these, a considerable number, after prayer and concentrated effort, were vouchsafed the blessing of seeing the Blessed Virgin; and some of them experienced ecstacy, 27. In the light of this incident, it can be readily understood how a highly imaginative person may see a vision, and pass on the contagion to others. The French clergy did not encourage the movement just mentioned, and it soon subsided. Similarly, the leaders of Christian Science did not encourage the expectation that visions of Mrs. Eddy would be experienced after her death, 28; had they followed an opposite policy, it is quite conceivable that such visions might have become fairly common, and that the resurrection of Mrs. Eddy might in time have become an established tradition of their church.

In ecstatic states doctrines and other abstract principles, accepted but not well comprehended by the mystic, have often appeared clear to him by a kind of inward feeling and understanding. Doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the

like, are instances. Faith in these doctrines is often greatly strengthened as a result, although the mystic, after his experience, can advance no new arguments. But he has "seen" and he has "felt."

Among other ecstatic phenomena may be mentioned glossolalia and stigmatisation. The former, in which one ecstatic in a revival bursts forth into a meaningless broth of syllables, which are assumed to be words of a foreign language, and are interpreted by another member of the congregation, under the guidance of the Spirit, is still occasionally found in revivals in the United States, 29. The latter consists in the manifestation, presumed to be a work of divine grace, upon the body of the ecstatic of wounds corresponding to those of Christ. The case of St. Francis of Assisi (†1226) is the first on record, if we decide that the words of St. Paul were not meant literally. St. Catherine of Siena and others received this favor subsequent to St. Francis. There have been well authenticated cases in recent times, 30. Both of these phenomena are attributed by modern psychologists to suggestion and the influence of the subconscious.

VI—*Inspiration*

We speak of a poet or artist as "inspired." By this we mean that the man has been able to catch the significance of what others have thought or felt dimly and confusedly, and to give it an expression which carries conviction and affords satisfaction. The genius is the interpreter of his age.

It is, indeed, frequently the case that an artist's creative work is in part done subconsciously. He feels impelled to write or to paint or to compose by some influence that he does not recognize as his own personality. Yet all that he produces is the fruit of his previous studies and efforts, of what he knows and the technique he has acquired. The public cares not at all whether what he produces has come to his mind in an ecstatic frenzy or as the outcome of calm deliberation. It is judged good or bad in either event, according to its merit, measured by the canons and taste of the time,—whether or not it gives an expression to the values which the age seeks and appreciates.

Professor Ames has pointed out that the inspiration of the ancient Hebrew prophets was similar in principle, 31. Each of them was in touch with the currents of social and political life of their times; they were in contact with the masses of the

people, they knew what was going on at court, and they knew the dangers that threatened their country from the great empires that surrounded them. They grieved at the prevailing political and social injustices and moral corruption. They knew, too, the traditional customs and ideals of the religion of Yahweh. Moreover, the great writing prophets, like modern schools of art, possessed a literature, a technique, an atmosphere. As the prophet pondered over the problems of the times, a solution sometimes flashed into his mind, doubtless from the subconsciousness. It seemed to come from outside of himself. So he proclaimed his message with the prefatory words, "The word of Yahweh came unto me" or "Thus saith Yahweh." We may feel sure that if his message carried conviction, it was not so much on the ground that he had received it in ecstasy as because it was right and reasonable, and brought conviction to the consciences of his listeners; its value was measured not so much by the psychological processes by which it was experienced, as by its ethical significance.

The principle is the same in the inspirations of the New Testament writers and of later saints. The canon of the New Testament consists of those books which the ancient Catholic Church found most helpful in interpreting the Christ and the early Christian experience. Each of these books is the interpretation which its author, out of the experience of the age, was able to make of the events and doctrines with which he deals. The saints sometimes spoke and wrote in ecstasy when upheavals from the subconscious supplied the driving power and content of their messages; and sometimes they wrote in calm deliberation employing their ordinary conscious faculties. In either event the saint reflected the spirit of the time; or rather, of course, he interpreted it, bringing out the best that was in it, in some measure rising above it, but not altogether escaping its limitations. And he was revered as a saint because of the moral and religious value of his message as appraised by the critical intelligence of his own and subsequent generations.

In no age has alleged inspiration been received merely as such; it has always been compared with authoritative standards. In the history of Christianity, there have been periods of high mystical enthusiasm when the restraint upon the prophets was comparatively slight. Such was the case with the early church; and such has been the case with numerous mystical movements that have subsequently risen from time to time. But in every

such instance standards soon had to be recognized; either some basis of authority and evaluation was found, or else the movement collapsed because of its increasing extravagances. A writer (32) so friendly to mysticism as Professor Rufus M. Jones apparently recognizes this fact, though he (as the author thinks, unwarrantably) regrets it; so enthusiastic a champion of mysticism as Miss Underhill (33) says: "In this, as in all the other and lesser arts which have been developed by the race, education consists largely in a humble willingness to submit to the discipline, and profit by the lessons of the past . . . here as elsewhere man cannot safely divorce his personal history from that of the race. The best and truest experience does not come to the eccentric and individual pilgrim whose intuitions are his only law; but rather to him who submits personal intuition to the guidance afforded by the general history of the mystic type."

VII—*When Are Mystical States Normal?*

Into the difficult question whether and when mystical states should be classified as normal from a *medical* standpoint, a layman is not competent to enter. It will only be possible here to suggest the following as a simple working criterion—psychiatrists, of course, have better and more technical tests:—*As a result of his mystical experience, is the person in better or in worse health, physically and mentally?* There surely can be no doubt that the pious devotion of ordinary earnest Christian and Jewish men and women, characterized above as the "middle mysticism," is beneficial both mentally and physically, and is thoroughly sane and normal. Every practising physician, surely, would welcome and encourage it among any of his patients thus disposed. In the cases of the more pronounced types of mysticism, such as those of the "great mystics," the application of this criterion would probably sometimes furnish an affirmative answer; but in very many cases, if not the majority, it would certainly be in the negative. Few, if any, medical men would encourage any one, who might ask their advice, to cultivate ecstacies, visions, glossolalia, and stigmatisation; and in taking an unfavorable attitude toward the cultivation of these extraordinary phenomena, the physicians have many of the saints on their side, 34.

From a moral and religious standpoint a similar criterion is available. *Whatever mystical experiences tend to strengthen*

the character of the person, and to render him more successful in realizing for himself and for others the ends of life recognized by the best thought of his age are normal. Whatever mystical experiences tend in the opposite direction are abnormal. Or, if closer approximation to the definition of religion set forth in this book is desired, the criterion might be stated: *Whatever mystical experiences tend to promote the conservation of socially recognized values are normal; whatever mystical experiences tend to hinder the conservation of socially recognized values are abnormal.*

Applying these criteria, the milder type of mysticism is certainly both religiously and morally desirable. Our age needs more men and women who pray, and who lead lives in which the presence of God manifests itself in acts of piety and love. The moral values of personal righteousness, equity, and charity, need to be cultivated through the mystical process of projecting them into an Alter, and then, through intimate communion with this Alter, attended by the sense of His presence, making them integral constituents of human lives. The same is true of the more recently socially recognized values, —equality of opportunity, including more widely diffused educational privileges as well as economic justice, the rights of women and children, willingness on the part of both capitalists and workmen to confer and to seek to gain each other's point of view. In a word, more of that humility and charity that Christianity and Judaism have always inculcated, ought first to be freshly applied to the problems of our age, and then mystically projected into the Alter of twentieth century worship, and in consequence of such worship to become dynamic in the lives of the people of our generation.

Does our age need mystics of the more pronounced type? This is less certain. Antonio Fogazzaro in *Il Santo* has attempted to portray a saint similar to those of old, living and operating under modern conditions. To one reader, at least, the career of such a saint seems an anachronism. Beautiful as are the lives of some of the more mystical saints, like Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Siena, they would be out of place in a twentieth century setting. The socially recognized values of our age could not be conserved through saints like them. Yet, as it seems to the author, the America of the nineteenth century was not without its mystical saints,—such include every one who, led by the Alter of his prayers, "practised

in an eminent and heroic degree those virtues which occasion demanded, according to his condition in life, rank and circumstances" to mention the qualifications for the canonisation of a saint in the language of Benedict XIV, 35. Two such men, surely, were Abraham Lincoln and Phillips Brooks,—an unorthodox layman and a liberal clergyman. And there were many others. And, it is to be hoped, there are those who are performing the functions of mystical sainthood in our country to-day. However, they are not ecstatics, but calm and earnest men and women who are walking, as they privately believe but usually do not publicly proclaim, as they are led by the God of their prayers, whose presence sustains and upholds them.

While, therefore, mysticism of the more extreme types, such as were common during the Middle Ages and perhaps as late as the beginning of the Enlightenment period, would probably be neither normal nor desirable to-day, it does not follow that many of the great mystics were not normal. St. Francis of Assissi and the order which he established did much to purify and ennoble an age needing the spiritual reformation which they brought to it. Saint Catherine of Siena worked marvels in purifying her city, and much of Italy besides, and in bringing back great ecclesiastics—and even the papacy itself then sunk to a low ebb,—to Christian ideals that had been forgotten. While their times are not our times, and their ideals not wholly ours, it is hard to see how any fair minded student of history can fail to credit great good to the consecrated devotion to God (as they understood Him) which was the fruit of the mysticism of Ignatius Loyola and his first Jesuit followers, of George Fox and the early Quakers, and of John Bunyan and those whom his books have influenced,—to speak of no others. Whether the work of Saint Teresa and Saint John of the Cross can be equally commended, let the reader judge for himself. William James may be unduly severe when he says of Teresa, that "in the main her idea of religion seems to have been that of an endless amatory flirtation—if one may say so without irreverence—between the devotee and the deity; and apart from helping younger nuns to go in this direction by the inspiration of her example and instruction, there is absolutely no human use in her," and he may be unduly harsh when he refers to John as "a Spanish mystic who flourished—or rather who existed, for there was little that suggested

flourishing about him—in the sixteenth century," 36. Yet the reader may question from what he can recall of the conditions of Spain in the latter half of the sixteenth century, when signs of decadence were already appearing, whether the spiritual service which that country most needed from its gifted mystical children was the multiplication of convents of barefooted men and women practising the austerities of the "unmitigated" Carmelite rule. James is also unqualified in his condemnation of Saint Louis of Gonzaga, the fruits of whose saintship he finds to be pitifully petty, while those in the life of the Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque were "little else but sufferings and prayers and absences of mind and swoons and ecstasies." Yet, if the former has become "the patron saint of all young people," and the latter's vision of the Sacred Heart did much to bring into official recognition a form of devotion that has been more helpful to Roman Catholics than any other that has been introduced since the Eucharist itself, there must have been something inspiring in the lives of these last two saints as well, 37.

VIII—*Mysticism and Truth*

Mystical experiences cannot claim exemption from the same tests as other experiences. Does the deliverance of a mystic concord with what other competent observers have experienced or can experience? Is it rational and coherent in itself? Is it harmonious with what is most certain in human knowledge? If it agrees with such tests as these, it is probably either true, or symbolical of truth. The fact that a conclusion has been arrived at in ecstasy, or is pointed out in a vision, or comes as a supposed inspiration, does not make it either less or more probable than if it had been reached through more usual channels. In any case it is the deliverance of a human mind, and must be tested by the ordinary canons of common sense, science, and logic.

Like other forms of religious experience, mystical states are chiefly of value, not in the discovery of new truths, but in engendering euthusiastic devotion and consecration to values already recognized. In this respect mysticism has been of inestimable value to religion. "Where there is no vision the people perish." Where there is no mysticism, religion decays and stratifies in dead legalism, formalism, and dogmatism. But the milder form of mysticism with which this chapter began is

the best, and probably the only form that any one who is ever likely to read this book should, in the author's opinion at least, attempt to cultivate, 38.

The relation of mystical experience to God hardly needs elaboration after what has already been said regarding the relation of religious awakening and prayer to God in the two chapters immediately preceding. The two possibilities, if one believes in the existence of God, are those of an external God and of an immanent God. Whoever believes, on philosophical grounds, that there is a God, will readily accept, as in some sense coming from Him, all those mystical experiences, and those alone, which can be regarded as normal in the sense that they actually conserve socially recognized moral values. He will be particularly disposed to believe in the divine inspiration of the Bible, since it has for many centuries and in many lands been a means by which men have gained religious experiences in which their characters have been transformed and enriched.

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PART III

RELIGION AND REALITY

CHAPTER XVIII

MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY

I—*Introductory*

We have in this Part to face the question, Is Religion true? In Part I, we saw that man has, continuously from primitive times, sought to conserve his socially recognized values through actions that he believed would evoke the aid of a supernatural agency. The agency became more refined and spiritual in the course of historical evolution until it has finally become the God of present-day Judaism and Christianity. In Part II we have just seen that people to-day in processes of religious growth and of conversion, of prayer and of mystical experience, believe that they receive aid and strength from this Agency. We have now to consider whether the weight of philosophical evidence tends to confirm the belief that such a supernatural Agency actually exists in the world, or whether the philosopher should regard this belief as a subjective delusion. This question belongs to *Metaphysics*, the branch of philosophy *that endeavors to ascertain the ultimate nature of man and of reality.* While other chapters of metaphysics bear upon the question we are now to consider, it has generally been recognized since the time of Immanuel Kant (†1804), who thoroughly criticized the older arguments for God, that the strongest reasoning in favor of the existence of God is to be found in arguments based upon the acceptance of *teleology.*

The purpose of this chapter will be to consider whether or not the world as a whole is teleological, and whether the evolution of the earth, of life upon the earth, and of man, is teleological. If the preponderance of available evidence (for we shall by no means expect to find proof) is favorable to teleology, we shall have ground in subsequent chapters, for affirming that

religion in some sense is probably true, and not a subjective delusion.

Teleology (coming from *telos*, purpose or end), as here employed, is the theory that *the universe as a whole is purposeful. It has a value, a meaning. In some sense it is organic and individual.* (The terms "universe" and "world as a whole" will be used interchangeably, and always in this sense. "Earth" will be employed for the particular planet which we inhabit, never "world.") According to the teleologist, *all organisms* (including both plants and animals) *are wholes*, composed of parts that are dependent upon one another, and that co-operate for the good of the organism. In some sense *the entire universe is organic;* it is a whole composed of parts that work together for a common good. Any particular human being is an *individual*, who plans his course of action with reference to ends. In some profounder sense the whole universe is, or is directed by, an *Individual.* Such, in general, is what is meant by teleology in contemporary metaphysics. The teleologist may believe that the universal plan is eternally complete and that it is now being gradually worked out in time; or he may believe that the purposes of the universe, like those of human beings, are subject to continual growth and modification.

To believe in a purposeful world logically leads to belief in a world Purposer, a Being who plans and carries out the world purposes. So the author believes, and he supposes that most philosophical teleologists believe, in the existence of a God. To be sure, such a conclusion necessitates some philosophical boldness, and carries us outside of the field of scientific information entirely. But if the universe is purposeful and individual, it is most natural to suppose that it is subject to the guidance of a directing Mind. All of the higher organisms have minds. If the universe is in some deep sense organic, it must be superior to all limited and finite organisms, and it, too, must have a Mind. If purposes are being carried out in the world order—purposes on a vaster and grander scale than ours—they must be the purposes of a divine Mind. If the universe is, or is directed by, an Individual, that Individual must be God. Teleologists may believe in an immanent God, who is the world or the soul of the world, and that both God and the world are eternal; or they may simply affirm the presence of a progressive principle inherent in the world order; or they may

believe that God is the transcendent Creator of all things, and is eternal while other things are not. The last of these positions inclines to theism, while the first and second are pantheistic in tendency; but, as already has been remarked (in Part II) and as we shall see more clearly in the following chapter, theism and pantheism, as held by philosophers at the present time, are not so sharply antagonistic positions as in the past.

Acceptance of the teleological view of the world would accordingly, in the author's opinion at least, lead to the conclusion that in the evolution of religions man has gradually become more conscious and appreciative of a Being that truly exists. The evolution from animism to the higher spiritual religions has been the development of man's understanding of the ultimate ground of his own existence; or, as idealists sometimes express it, this evolution is the progress by which God comes to self-consciousness in the human race. In like manner, continuous religious growth, spontaneous awakenings, conversions, prayer and mystical experiences are mental states and processes through which individual men become aware of the divine Presence; or, stated idealistically, processes through which God comes to self-consciousness in the mind of an individual human being, 1.

The metaphysical theory opposed to Teleology is called *Mechanism.* This is the doctrine that *the world, taken as a whole, is not purposeful;* it is *governed by unchanging natural laws which could be described and formulated with mathematical precision if we were in possession of all the necessary data.* Certain of these laws have already been thus formulated, such as the laws of gravitation and the conservation of energy. The extreme form of the doctrine is well expressed in the words of La Place (†1827), the French astronomer who advanced the nebular hypothesis,—"We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state, and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence who for a single instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which nature is animated, and with the several positions of the beings composing it, if further his intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would be able to include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the Universe, and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes," *2.* As a matter of fact, astronomers

have formulated the motions of the various planets, and they calculate their positions at remote periods in the past and the future with mathematical precision. To the extreme mechanist the analogy suggests that everything that occurs is subject to the laws of matter and motion, which are rigid and unchanging, devoid of plan or purpose, meaning or individuality, in the teleological sense.

The mechanical theory has several arguments in its favor. The most exact natural sciences are mechanical. The laws of physics can be stated in mathematical formulae, and can be verified by experiment. The principles of chemistry admit of precise description and experimental verification. Biological principles are at present more indefinite, but many of the phenomena of life can already be reduced to physical and chemical statements. It is argued, that when biology is more developed, all vital phenomena will be thus reducible. Human conduct, whether that of individuals as studied by psychology, or of groups as studied by sociology, can all be regarded, it is maintained, as the reactions to external stimuli of an animal with an unusually complex brain and nervous system. Much human behavior can already be described in terms of nervous reflexes. Ultimately, it is urged by the philosophical mechanist, all conduct will be found to consist of nervous reflexes, which can be explained in terms of physics and chemistry. Thomas Hobbes (†1679), one of the greatest materialistic mechanists in modern times, said, "Whatever exists is matter, whatever changes is motion." Most mechanists of the present time, however, unlike Hobbes are not materialists. They usually admit that consciousness is not a form of physical matter or energy; they say that it is merely a by-product of nervous action, or an external relation that sometimes exists between nerve cells, but which occupies no important place in an account of the world as a whole.

Scientists who are mechanists urge that a mechanical explanation of phenomena is always clear-cut, and definite, capable of verification by experiment. The student in physics and chemistry can verify for himself in the laboratory the principles laid down in his text books. To an increasing extent many principles in the various branches of biology are not only matters of precise description and experiment, but are made practical use of everywhere that agriculture is carried on scientifically. As for human behavior, it can at least be sub-

jected to statistical investigation, and economic and psychological processes can often be formulated in quantitative statements and plotted in graphs. On the other hand, teleological statements are usually vague and incapable of confirmation by exact experiments.

In reply to the mechanists, scientists who use teleological methods, including the advocates of vitalism (one teleological standpoint in biology) and those who adhere to idealistic standpoints in history, sociology, psychology and ethics, maintain that the mechanical point of view utterly fails to explain many established facts, while teleological theories, though confessedly less precise, have the advantage of at least recognizing all the actual facts and of furnishing a partially satisfactory account of them.

A philosopher who is a mechanist does not think it necessary that every science at the present time should be mechanical in all its methods. To be sure such a philosopher believes that the world as a whole is fundamentally mechanical and that all the sciences will ultimately become completely mechanical in the course of their further development. But he is often willing to concede that, for the time being, in some of the less developed sciences it may be justifiable, in a provisional way, to use teleological modes of explanation. The physiologist, for instance, may occasionally find it convenient, at least for pedagogical reasons, to speak of the various bodily organs as having "purposes" which they endeavor to perform. Such manner of speech the mechanistic philosopher regards as purely provisional and figurative; the bodily functions are really mechanical processes subject to the laws of physics and chemistry, just as much as is anything that goes on in the inorganic world.

A philosopher who is a teleologist similarly is willing to concede that many sciences, or perhaps all of them even, ought to employ mechanical methods on account of their greater simplicity, accuracy, and practical usefulness. This is a question that the scientist must decide for himself. In each science it is necessary to consider the world from a single point of view; the investigator is free to make whatever assumption he finds needful, to select whatever facts he chooses to regard as lying within the domain of his science, and to describe these facts on the basis of the assumptions that he has made. The physicist, for instance, without seriously

attempting to explain the nature of space, time, matter, motion, and energy, simply takes them for granted, and upon the basis of these assumptions, he has been successful in describing a large variety of phenomena in a purely mechanical way, 3. The biologist and the psychologist may, if they prefer, follow the example of the physicist, and make what assumptions they choose as to life and consciousness, and on the basis of these assumptions they may go on to describe whatever phenomena they find themselves able to interpret along mechanistic lines. Or the biologist and the psychologist, may, if they wish to make their sciences more comprehensive in scope, instead of ignoring facts which cannot be described mechanistically, introduce teleological methods of interpretation. Thus, although the ultimate explanation of the world as a whole is teleological, it may be more practicable for many scientists to use mechanical explanations within the restricted fields of their sciences. In this connection, some teleologists call attention to the fact that the very word "mechanical" etymologically related as it is to "machine" implies a tool manufactured for a practical purpose. The mechanical methods of explanation used in the sciences are simply artificial devices—tools or machines as it were—invented by man to carry out his purposes. In other words, mechanism itself, in the view of some philosophical teleologists, is a teleological device.

It will be evident to the reader that the issue between mechanism and teleology is an unsettled question. If all the evidence were upon either side, or, if some crucial experiment or theoretical demonstration had been found that could conclusively dispose of the matter, there would be no difference of opinion on the subject to-day. To be sure, there are philosophical arguments, based upon idealism (4) that are convincing to the author, and to very many, perhaps the majority of philosophical thinkers to-day. But space does not admit of an adequate presentation of these arguments in this book, and, besides, quite a number of philosophical students to-day do not accept idealism. Without assuming idealism or any other particular philosophical theory to begin with, let us try to weigh the general drift of evidence in the various sciences, and to ascertain whether the net balance of probability inclines toward mechanism or toward teleology. In life we continually have to act upon probabilities. Very little of our knowledge about anything (outside of mathematics and formal logic at

least) is absolutely certain. If it is fairly clear that the general weight of evidence falls either in the direction of mechanism or of teleology, we ought to form our conclusions accordingly.

The great outstanding fact in the sciences to-day is that the world as we know it is the product of evolution. Whether adhering to the nebular hypothesis of La Place or to the planetesimal hypothesis of Chamberlain and Moulton, or to neither, astronomers are agreed that our solar system has evolved in accordance with physical and chemical laws. After the crust constituting the surface of the earth had passed through various geological phases, living beings appeared upon it, whose bodies were composed of protoplasm,—a development from inorganic matter which alone previously had existed. Biologists trace the descent of the various forms of plant and animal life now in existence from this original protoplasm. Comparative psychologists show with reasonable probability at what stages of animal development the various phases of consciousness made their appearance. The main facts in human social evolution—the earliest forms of human society, the beginnings of language, industry, religion and morality, as well as the course of the further development of each are now approximately established.

Suppose a scholarly visitor from another planet, say Mars, were told the history of the early development of our Earth, of its later evolution together with that of life upon it, of the appearance of man and of his history down to the present time, and were thoughtfully to review the evidence, would he conclude that the mechanists or the teleologists are right? Would he decide that this whole course of evolution has been without conscious design or purpose (other than has been effected by man himself) in accordance with natural laws? Or would he agree with Tennyson's Locksley Hall poems that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs," and that

"Many an Aeon moulded earth before her highest, man, was born,
Many an Aeon, too, may pass when earth is manless and forlorn,
Earth so huge, and yet so bounded—pools of salt, and plots of land—
Shallow skin of green and azure—chains of mountain, grains of sand!
Only That which made us, meant us to be mightier by and by,
Set the sphere of all the boundless Heavens within the human eye,
Sent the shadow of Himself, the boundless, thro' the human soul;
Boundless inward, in the atom, boundless outward, in the Whole."

II—*Inorganic Evolution*

Well, let us review the evidence. Before the appearance of life upon the earth, when only inorganic matter existed on this planet, it would at first appear that only mechanical processes could have been operative. The sciences that deal with inorganic matter—astronomy, physics, chemistry, and geology —are all strictly mechanical in their viewpoints. They find no occasion for the employment of teleological methods or theories. But can these sciences successfully account for *all* the facts, that then were in existence? Professor Lawrence J. Henderson, a biological chemist who believes that mechanistic methods should be employed in science, answers this question in the negative. Before there was life upon the earth's surface, there existed in the earth and its atmosphere, in large quantities, the very elements (oxygen, hydrogen and carbon) and compounds (water and carbonic acid) that were best fitted to favor the appearance of life. Organisms to survive must exchange matter and energy with their environment. "There are no other compounds which share more than a small part of the qualities of fitness (for life) of water and carbonic acid; no other elements which share those of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen," 5. Nor is there any known explanation why these particular elements and compounds happily were present, rather than others. "There is, in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds, water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due cause uniquely favorable to the organic mechanism. These are no mere accidents; an explanation is to seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand," 6. This consideration, together with others, such as the inability of mechanistic science to account for ultimates like matter, energy, and life, leads Professor Henderson to believe in an "order of nature" that must be teleological. "It is evident that a perfect mechanistic description of a house may be conceived. Within the world of physical science the whole process is logically complete without consideration of the

architect's design and purpose." Yet, of course, the architect's design and purpose were determining factors in the building of the house. It is at least conceivable that a tendency similar to that of the architect's design may be working steadily through the whole process of cosmic evolution, 7. Nature must always be regarded from two complementary points of view, both of which are true,—mechanism and teleology, 8.

Professor Henderson has argued that combinations of chemical elements and compounds existed, prior to the emergence of life, which were admirably fitted for life, that, out of the millions of various combinations that were mathematically possible, this one was the most favorable. Such a happy combination of circumstances can not be merely a matter of chance. There must be a reason for it. There is no known or conceivable mechanical reason. Therefore we must assume teleology. Teleology, however, for Professor Henderson, is not a scientific explanation; it is extra-scientific, and, like the architect's planning of the house, it does not belong in the account of things that a physical science furnishes. None the less, teleology is a fundamental characteristic of the order of nature, 9.

It may be urged, however, against such an argument as this, that perhaps the existence of the combination of factors most favorable to life, prior to its appearance, is not peculiar to the history of the Earth. Possibly this combination may exist everywhere in the universe. Well, suppose it does? If this could be shown to be true, it would further strengthen the evidence for teleology; for, on this assumption, everywhere in the universe, when planets cool and crusts form on them, the combination of elements most favorable for the emergence of life is present. This would be an argument for universal teleology. But some one may offer another objection. He may say, "For life, as we know it upon the Earth, carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, water and carbonic acid, in the proportions in which they exist here, are the most favorable combination. But, in planets with different constitutions, may there not be life of wholly different sorts from any that we know? Given such a planet as the Earth, with a certain chemical combination a correlative kind of life A evolves; given some other planet with the chemical combination b, a correlative type of life B evolves; and in yet another planet the chemical combination c gives rise to a third form of life, C. Everywhere the form of life appears for which the already existing chemical combin-

ation is most favorable, a-A, b-B, c-C, and so on. Never does B appear in connection with a or C in connection with b. Would not this be universal mechanism?" The teleologist could rejoin: "Hardly. Such a condition would be one of universal teleology! Such a universe would be indeed the best of possible worlds! Everywhere matter would give rise to the form of life most fitted for existence in conjunction with it." Unluckily for the interests of teleology, however, this supposition which can be so readily turned into an argument for teleology, appears improbable to scientists. Physiological chemists are unable to conceive of any metabolism for which a different chemical combination would be nearly so favorable as that which we know upon the Earth.

The objection seems to be stated in a somewhat different form by Professor Durant Drake, who says, "instead of marvelling, for example, that the earth's atmosphere should have just the right proportion of oxygen, carbonic acid gas, etc., to maintain the organic life which exists on its surface, we can point out that organic life has come to be of such a nature as to utilize precisely such proportions of gases because it has crept into existence under these conditions. On another planet, where much more CO_2 exists, living forms, if any have there come into existence, will be of such a nature as to thrive on a greater proportion of that gas." When Professor Drake here speaks of the possibility that "life has crept into existence" in other planets under other conditions, his metaphor is ambiguous. Does he mean that life evolves out of the matter already in existence on the planet? If so, he has been answered in the preceding paragraph. But his language seems to suggest that "life" is something different from matter, which "creeps into existence" wherever it finds a favorable environment. If this is what he means, "life" is something different from matter, and uses matter for its purposes when it can. Wherever in the universe it can succeed in doing this, life, in this case a teleological principle, becomes dominant.

Such a theory of life has been brilliantly championed by Professor Henri Bergson, one of the most renowned philosophers of our time, 10. He calls attention to the fact that all life, plant and animal alike, depends upon the expenditure, in the various vital processes, of energy that has previously been stored up in digestion. Animals either directly or indirectly derive their sustenance from plants. The latter gather in the

energy that makes their own life and that of animals possible, through the chlorophyllian function, a process which consists in using solar energy to fix the carbon of carbonic acid. The life process thus suggests the analogy of a mill run by water power, which involves the expenditure of energy that has previously been extracted from the fall of water in a stream. All that is essential for the life process to go on in any solar system is for solar energy to be stored. Instead of carbon other elements may serve this purpose in other solar systems. The result, of course, would be living forms without any analogy to those we know, with different anatomy and physiology; indeed, it is even conceivable that life may be present in an environment of matter not yet solidified, as in a nebula. All that is necessary is to assume that energy descends the incline indicated by Carnot's law of entropy (the second law of thermodynamics) and that some way of storing up this energy can be found; in other words, life is probably in existence "in all the worlds suspended from all the stars." Bergson, however, assumes, in order to make this possible, that everywhere there is an impetus of life *(l'élan vital)* which is not material at all, and that this impetus actively selects and stores the energy that makes the life of organisms possible. Whereas Professor Bergson conceives matter as mechanical, he places in the universe in opposition to matter the vital impulse, which is psychical, and teleological, in the sense in which the latter term is employed in this book, 11. The evolution of life and the production of the various species is due to the selective activity of this impulse. The latter is "essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can." On the earth it has been most successful in producing man, having been blocked in the other directions in which it has moved, 12.

We may therefore conclude that mechanism has been successful in its account of cosmic evolution at the expense of ignoring some of the factors in operation. From the standpoint of scientific problems mechanistic scientists may have been right in ignoring these factors. The fact remains that they have ignored them. Whoever desires to give a philosophical account of the evolution of the world as a whole can ignore no factor that has been operative in this evolution. He, therefore, is forced to choose between recognizing a teleological principle in the order of nature, as Professor Henderson does, or going still further, and assuming with Professor Berg-

son a psychical element in evolution that operates in interaction with matter, and achieves its purposes in the evolution of life. Either alternative gives a place to teleology. So far as the author is able to see there is no escape between these two alternatives, in a philosophical system that accepts any scientific account of cosmic evolution as descriptive of ultimate Reality.

To be sure, there are certain philosophers who deny that the cosmic evolution of the mechanistic scientists is in any sense a true description of ultimate Reality. Such writers do not usually question the fact that there has been cosmic evolution but they point out that the mechanical sciences are built upon the acceptance of conceptions of matter, motion, energy, space, time, and causation that are full of logical contradicions and inconsistencies. They argue that these conceptions cannot be literally true; they are arbitrary devices of thought useful only for certain practical purposes, and they leave out more than they include. An account of evolution uncritically built upon such conceptions is therefore quite misleading. Philosophers who assume this attitude often—the author believes usually—either profess to be agnostics (as Herbert Spencer) but really hold views that logically lead to belief in teleology and God (as John Fiske showed to be true of Spencer's philosophy) or else are avowed teleologists (as Josiah Royce, Hugo Münsterberg, Professor James Ward, Professor W. R. Sorley, Professor Émile Boutroux, and Professor Mary W. Calkins.)

III—*Are Organisms Mechanistic or Teleological?*

The next great step in the evolution of the earth that concerns the philosophical student is the appearance of life. Can living beings be understood mechanistically or must they be interpreted teleologically? Here, again, we must keep clearly in mind what the issue really is, so far as it concerns a philosophical interpretation of the world. The mechanistic philosopher maintains that mechanism can be relied upon, at least with the further development of science, to give a full account of the nature of the organism in all its aspects; teleology is superfluous and untrue. The teleological philosopher, on the contrary, maintains that life has a teleological side which is really more fundamental than the mechanistic side. Whether, however, teleology should be employed as a working conception in

the biological laboratory, or whether biologists should use mechanistic methods exclusively, because of their greater accuracy and definiteness in experimental observations, is a question for the biologists themselves to decide; the teleological philosopher simply maintains that the biologist must choose between giving a partial account of life on a mechanistic basis and a fuller account that includes its teleological features.

There are numerous arguments in favor of a mechanistic conception of life. In the first place, organisms obey the same physical laws, and they are composed of the same chemical elements that are found in inorganic nature. To be sure, there are chemical combinations that are found only in living organisms, and persist only during life; but so vigorous an antimechanist as Dr. J. S. Haldane admits that "there is no reason for believing that any ultimate difficulty will be experienced in artificially forming any of the chemical substances which have been discovered, or are ever likely to be discovered, within the body," 13. "Another fundamental fact is that the whole of the energy which is liberated in the body, whether as heat, mechanical work, or in other forms, can be traced to sources outside the body," 14. Mechanists urge that in all biological investigations either structure or activity are being investigated, and that in the organism no structure or activity can be found that is not physical and chemical. The history of modern physiology is claimed by mechanists to show uninterrupted progress in the successful application of physical and chemical methods to physiological problems; a vast amount of physical and chemical knowledge regarding the nature of life has been accumulated, 15.

The organism, however, as the teleologist points out, possesses a variety of unique features. Each organ is dependent on the others, and is what it is because they are what they are; the parts of a living being, whether plant or animal, belong in a system with one another, such as we do not find in the inorganic world. The mechanist, in reply to this argument, is likely to remark, "Machines possess this whole and part relation. Take a watch, for instance. Each wheel and spring belongs in a system with the others, has its particular function to perform, and finds its significance in the meaning of the watch as a whole, an instrument to register time. Organisms, therefore, are simply machines. To be sure, they are unusually complicated and efficient machines; but machines they are, none

the less," 16. The teleologist here rejoins, "True, to some extent organisms are like machines. But this is because machines are, in part, teleological. There are always two ways of looking at a machine. You can examine each part, lever, wheel, axle or spring, and see how its action is caused by the action of some other part with which it is connected. Such an explanation is a causal or mechanistic explanation, and by means of it you can show the relation of each part of a machine to every other one. But you can also look at a machine teleologically. You can ask, what is it for? What purpose does the machine perform? And, in the light of your knowledge of the purpose of the machine as a whole, you can find out what each spring, wheel and other part contributes to this purpose. Both explanations are true; and, since they both are true, neither excludes the other. But the teleological explanation in a sense is the more fundamental, since the machine was manufactured to carry out the purposes of human beings, and would never have been brought into existence at all except for these purposes. Every machine is the embodiment in material form of a purpose which it expresses; and, if it is a successful machine, which it fulfils. If organisms really *were* machines, we should have to assume, with the old-fashioned teleologists, such as Paley, that they are all immediately created by a divine Mind to carry out His purposes, just as watches are manufactured by the watch maker to carry out his purposes."

However, the teleologist of the present time is not willing to admit that organisms are entirely like machines. He points out that organisms are teleological in many respects in which machines are not. An organism automatically exchanges matter and energy with its physical environment; and, in the case of an animal, if food is not in its immediate presence, it goes forth in search of it; so that a prospective future outcome determines its present action. Only in case of organisms does a future end control present action; in the case of machines the immediately preceding cause completely determines the following event. Moreover, if the animal cannot find his favorite food, he will accept a substitute. If some part of an organism is not too severely injured, processes of repair will at once set in; and, in the meantime, other parts will perform the functions of the injured part. In the human brain, highly specialized though it is, the extent to which such substitution of functions may take place is truly marvelous. Then, too, organisms

reproduce themselves. If we call the organism an engine, it must be as Professor J. A. Thomson has remarked, "a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing engine," 17. In some respects linotype machines and machines used for the manufacture of other machines, have been instanced by mechanists, but such comparisons are so far-fetched as scarcely to merit discussion, 18.

For the mechanist to contend as Professor Loeb does, that all these functions of the organism involve physical and chemical processes, is no reply; many philosophical teleologists are quite willing to admit this contention. Valuable as have been the researches of Professor Loeb and his school in discovering the nature of these processes, and much as they possibly may vindicate the claim that biologists should use mechanistic methods exclusively on the ground of their great simplicity, practicability, and fruitfulness in new discovery, they do not affect the philosophical aspects of the case. The philosophical teleologist can afford to admit that from one point of view every structure and function in the organism is the effect of physical and chemical causes; but he maintains that the organism also has its purposes which it carries out through its parts, and that these parts contribute to the whole. One can no more refute the teleology of an organism by showing that all its structures and processes are physical and chemical, than he could show that a building has no plan or purpose because all the material of which it is composed—bricks and mortar and lumber and nails—consists wholly of chemical elements subject to physical laws. Even the behavior of the lowliest animal organisms, such as the amoeba, stentor, and paramaecium, which Professor Loeb and his school believed could be described exclusively in mechanistic terms (such as tropisms) Professor H. S. Jennings has found to involve the same characteristics as the behavior of higher animals. The amoeba, similar as it is in appearance, by no means has the inertness of a drop of water. In its behavior may be distinguished factors comparable to the habits, reflexes and automatic activities of higher organisms. It seeks food, and endeavors to escape from its enemies, including its cannibal fellow amoebae. "All the results taken together lead to the conclusion that neither the usual movements nor the reactions of Amoeba have as yet been resolved into known physical factors. There is the same unbridged gap between the

physical effect of the stimulus and the reaction of the organism that we find in higher animals," 19.

Nor would the situation be different if Professor Loeb or one of his disciples were to succeed some time in manufacturing an organism out of chemical substances. This possibility is perhaps not wholly inconceivable, in view of their success in artificially fertilizing ova by chemical and mechanical means. Every animal or plant consists exclusively of physical matter. If the scientist can succeed in bringing together the right combinations of matter, why should he not make an organism? To be sure, this organism would have been manufactured by a human being, for a purpose. It would really be a machine, and, like every machine, it would have its teleological aspects; and it would excel all machines now in existence by possessing these characteristics of organisms which machines now do not have. And such a discovery would be pretty sure to throw light on the way in which organisms developed on the earth's surface from inorganic matter, 20.

But if we knew the manner in which life has evolved from inorganic matter,—or, in other words, the manner in which organisms that have teleological aspects have developed from particles of matter which, taken separate from the world as a whole are devoid of teleological aspects,—we should not be forced to the admission that organisms are not teleological, 21. On the other hand, we should continue to claim that there must have been some sort of immanent purposiveness in the environment as a whole, which brought together into organisms the particles of matter that, in the form of organisms, manifest teleology. When there as yet was no life on the earth, there was a teleological process going on preparatory to life, as the happy combination of elements and compounds on the earth's surface shows. This teleology went, not merely so far as to effect the right combinations of carbon, oxygen and hydrogen in water and carbonic acid, but also to effect the further happy combinations of minuter bits of matter into the first plant and animal organisms. Indeed, the teleologist may claim that the successful manufacture of organisms in biological laboratories, —and still more, a convincing explanation of how the first organisms on the earth's surface developed from the material elements then in existence,—will considerably strengthen the arguments for teleology.

We have seen that it is quite possible for the philosophical

teleologist to accept mechanism as a satisfactory working hypothesis in biology, and at the same time to maintain that life, when considered in all its aspects, must be regarded as having a teleological side. Dr. John Scott Haldane, one of the few physiologists who understands the philosophical aspects of the problem, goes further than this, and wishes to introduce the philosophical conception of the whole and part relation into biology itself. He argues that the mechanistic theories do not work well, even for biological purposes, that they totally fail to give satisfactory explanations of such organic processes as growth, reproduction, the secretory action of the kidneys and breathing. On the contrary, he believes that the whole and part conception explains these processes satisfactorily; and he credits to the acceptance of this conception important discoveries which have been made in his laboratory at Oxford regarding the process of breathing, 22.

IV—*Biological Evolution*

Mechanists have often affirmed that, marvelous as are the adaptiveness of the organism and its whole and part relations, these can, since the rise of the doctrine of evolution, be shown to have originated in a purely mechanical way. The process of evolution, in other words, is claimed by them to be purely mechanistic. Teleologists of the present time are willing to admit that, since Charles Darwin in 1859 conclusively proved that all present forms of plant and animal life have had a common ancestry, the old-fashioned conception of teleology based on the doctrine of immediate creation is impossible. But modern teleology is as much evolutionary as is modern mechanism. Let us briefly examine the more important modern theories of evolution which are claimed by mechanists to account for the development of organisms into their present forms in a manner that excludes teleology.

First, let us consider the evolutionary doctrine of Darwin himself. This may briefly be summed up under five points,—*heredity, variation, struggle for existence, natural selection* and *sexual selection.* In each generation of plants and animals, the offspring in the main inherit the characteristics of their parents,—such is the law of heredity. However, they are never completely like their parents, each individual varies slightly both from parents and from others of the same generation; this is the law of variation. The rate of reproduction in each gen-

eration is far too rapid to make it possible for all of the offspring to survive, reach maturity, and leave offspring in turn; on the contrary, the majority of eggs and young plants and animals perish in the three-fold struggle for existence that they are compelled to wage with the adverse conditions of climate and other factors in the physical environment, with other species of life, and with other members of their own species. Such is the struggle for existence. In consequence, in each generation there will survive only those particular individuals of each species whose variations are most favorable in the struggle for existence, whether affording greater strength of muscle or sharper teeth and claws, for combat, or greater fleetness of foot for flight, or more protective coloring for concealment, or what not. Most of the offspring in the next generation will inherit the favorable variations of their parents, while some of them will be so fortunate as to possess these characteristics in a further developed form, and so will survive in the struggle for existence. Thus natural selection has gone on in the past; by this wholly mechanical process, as the mechanists claim it to be, a selection has slowly taken place among plants and animals and new species in time have originated. This is just as truly a selection as that artificially effected by stock breeders; but, unlike the latter, there is no conscious purposiveness about it at all; it is as blindly mechanical a process as the manner in which drops of water fall in accordance with the law of gravitation. Sexual selection is an hypothesis advanced by Darwin to explain the brilliant plumage and songs of male birds, and ornamental features of other male animals which are apparently of no value in the struggle for survival, on the ground that the males most favored with these characteristics won out in competition with the others for the preference of the females.

When we examine these five features of Darwinism a little more closely we perceive that they are by no means decisive for mechanism. In the first place the whole theory assumes the *struggle* for existence. It assumes, in other words, that plants and animals *endeavor* to survive. To be sure, this endeavor is not conscious endeavor, in the human sense. Nevertheless, it is an endeavor to accomplish a purpose. Mere particles of inorganic matter could not struggle with each other and with the environment for existence. Plants and animals, on the contrary, do not passively follow the line of least resistance; they adapt themselves to the environment, and the parts of the plant

or animal organism adjust themselves to one another. While Darwinism is superficially mechanistic in its account of natural selection, it assumes a struggle for existence; and for an organism to struggle implies that it has a teleological side, 23. *Far from being through and through a mechanistic theory, Darwinism logically rests on teleological foundations.*

The Darwinian theory contains many other defects and difficulties. One of the most serious of these is its failure in any way to account for the origin of variations. Why do variations occur? Some mechanists try to alleviate this difficulty by calling attention to the Mendelian laws, according to which many variations in each generation appear in different individuals in accordance with the mathematical laws of choice and chance. But unless mechanists are really willing to maintain that some things in the universe actually occur by pure chance, they must admit that there are causes for variations, and that variations simply appear to us to be due to chance because we do not know what the causes are. To attribute anything to chance, is, in other words, a confession of ignorance. For the mechanist, surely, as for other scientists, every event must be assumed to have a cause. The advance of science in modern times has always been based on this assumption. Another difficulty is, that with the exception of the relatively few cases that could be brought under sexual selection, Darwinism is only able to explain *useful* variations. On the contrary, many variations have appeared and long survived in organic evolution that were not useful at all. Again, some biologists maintain the doctrine of orthogenesis, *i. e.*, that variations occur only in a few definite directions and continue in these directions; since such variations cannot be due to chance, they might be thought to suggest teleology.

Still another objection is, that if variations appear in only a few individuals in a generation, the individuals possessing them would probably mate with individuals that did not possess them, and the variations would be unlikely to be transmitted to succeeding generations; and if the same variations appeared in more than a few individuals at one time, it could not be due to chance, there would be a reason for its appearance. A further difficulty is raised by the consideration that the struggle for existence in very many, if not in the majority of cases, is over before the offspring is mature enough to profit by favorable variations. Weismann, a zealous defender of

Darwinism, has met this difficulty by assuming that the struggle for existence goes on in the embryo between various biophors and determinants. This assumption implies that the embryo, simple as it appears to the microscope, is in reality exceedingly complex. There must be something in the embryo to correspond to every difference in the adult organism that is the result of heredity. While this hypothesis is not impossible, and, indeed has been found useful in some work in plant and animal breeding, it makes heredity extremely complicated.

De Vries and his followers have suggested a modification of the Darwinian theory. Instead of new species developing from old ones by a slow and gradual accumulation of relatively slight variations, De Vries believes that the change from one species to another, when environmental and internal conditions are favorable, takes place in a single generation. Such a variation he calls a mutation. The cause of mutations, however, is left without fundamental explanation, and so this theory does not escape the charge of attributing mutations to chance.

For these reasons, together with numerous others, Darwinism cannot be claimed to have accounted in a mechanistic way for the teleological features that organisms possess, **24.**

While probably the majority of biologists are to be found among the adherents of Darwinism in its various modified forms, a considerable minority have been led to the acceptance of other positions. The oldest of these is that coming down from Lamarck (†1829). This theory has the advantage of offering explanations for the cause of variations. Variations are due to modifications in organisms caused either by the direct action of the environment, or by the activities of the organisms themselves in their use and disuse of parts, the effects being transmitted by heredity to following generations. Logical as this theory appears, it has been largely discredited by the inability of its adherents to find conclusive proof of the transmission of such modifications (called "acquired characters") in the manner assumed. While in some respects Lamarckism, as held today, is mechanistic, in others, such as the attribution of modifications to the activities of organisms themselves, it contains teleological elements. It seems too, like Darwinism, to imply a struggle for existence, on the part of organisms. On the whole, Lamarckism cannot be said to have accounted for the origin of organisms on purely mechanistic lines.

Neither Darwinism nor Lamarckism is admittedly teleological as a scientific method. The teleology in each rests merely in the assumptions on which each is based, as these are disclosed by philosophical analysis. There are a considerable number of biologists, however, who frankly wish to introduce teleological methods of explanation into the science of biology itself. Chief among these are the *Vitalists*. The most famous of the vitalists is Professor Hans Driesch, 25, who assumes as the basis of all life, in addition to its physical and chemical elements, a non-energetic immaterial force that controls and directs the development of the organism, which, reviving an expression of Aristotle's, he calls its "entelechy." He has accumulated a considerable mass of experimental evidence in favor of his theory. Pauly, Francé, and other French biologists find an inner vital force of a psychical character which directs the activities of organisms and their evolution in a teleological manner.

The objection to vitalistic theories, from a scientific standpoint, is the vagueness and indefiniteness of the vital principle assumed; such conceptions as 'entelechy,' 'vital force,' and 'vital impetus,' it is urged by mechanists, cannot be tested experimentally, and so they are not good tools for investigation. Although Darwinism and other mechanistic theories have not yet accounted for all the facts of life, they are at least clear and definite, and capable of experimental proof or disproof. However, it should be remembered that radically new theories that had appeared vague and indefinite at the outset have some times, in the later history of science, proved to be right, and with further development have become scientifically workable; while theories that had appeared clear cut and definite, but which were so because they left out some of the facts, have later been repudiated. The Copernican system of astronomy at first was vague and indefinite; the Ptolemaic system at that time was far more clear cut, definite, and scientifically workable, though it had become extremely complicated, and had to ignore some facts. In like manner, the doctrine of evolution appeared visionary to most biologists of the generation of Lamarck; careful, hard-headed scientists then believed in the fixity and immutability of species, and their immediate creation. It may be that vitalism, like heliocentricism and evolutionism, will sometime become scientifically workable, and will overthrow mechanism, which is now becoming more and more complicated, and

which, as we have seen, has to ignore some aspects of the organism. The burden of proof, however, is on the side of vitalism; and it must be remembered that it is the exception and not the rule that theories that began by being vague and visionary have proved later on to be right.

V—*Psychology*

As our Martian visitor considers the history of the evolution of our planet, he will be impressed not only with the emergence of living beings in an environment of inorganic matter, but also with the development among these living beings of *consciousness.* Animals not only adjust themselves in more ways to the changing characteristics of their environment than do plants, but higher animals, at least, seem somehow to be conscious of this environment, to receive sensations due to external stimuli, and in response to make appropriate reactions for their own self preservation and welfare. Their ability to do this is of course owing to the fact that they have nervous systems. Mechanistic psychologists make much of the dependence of consciousness upon the brain and nervous system; if parts of the brain or nervous system are injured the particular conscious processes dependent upon these parts are affected; consciousness receives no information from the outer world except through nervous action; if consciousness could initiate movements at all, it would only be able to do so through nervous action. They therefore urge that it is unlikely that consciousness initiates movements at all. Adjustments to external stimuli are effected simply through the action of the central nervous system itself; consciousness not being physical and being devoid of energy in the physical sense, really effects no changes in the molecules of the brain and nervous system.

This view was anticipated by Huxley (†1895) who said: "It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism." Consciousness is as devoid of influence upon the movement of particles in the brain, as is the steam whistle which accompanies the working of a locomotive engine upon its machinery. "The soul stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to the works, and consciousness answers to the sound which the bell gives when it is struck, 26. Certain of the more extremely mechanistic psychologists even question whether such a thing as consciousness exists at all, 27;

at any rate, to be thoroughly objective and scientific, they say, psychology must merely note and explain in terms of nervous action the behavior of animal and human organisms in their physical environment. Psychology is thus really a branch of physiology, differing from the latter chiefly by the fact that it is concerned with the reactions of organisms to stimuli external to their bodies rather than with reactions due to internal stimuli, 28.

That there is room for the study of human and animal behavior in terms of nervous action cannot be questioned, nor that this has already been of great service in our understanding of human nature and of our relation to the world in which we live. That this science can proceed along purely mechanistic lines is, however, open to question: if organisms reveal the whole and part relation, the struggle for existence, and indefinite adaptability to varying conditions, the science of behavior cannot well ignore the fact that nervous reflexes are somewhat teleological in their behavior.

Those who maintain that consciousness is a merely superfluous concomitant of nervous action are perplexed by the question, "If this be true, why does consciousness exist at all? If consciousness performs no function in the adjustment of the organism to its environment, how explain its appearance and its evolution?" Some form of awareness of external objects appears very low in the animal kingdom; from these crude beginnings, parallel to the increasing complexity of the nervous system higher forms of consciousness make their appearance. Finally, man arises, with power not only to receive sense stimulations from objects about him, and to perceive these objects with their various characteristics of size, shape, color, odor, sound, temperature and taste, but also to recall these objects in memory, to construct different objects in imagination, to compare them with one another, giving names to those that are similar, and classifying them in concepts, to make judgments about their nature, to make inferences regarding their future condition, and to conclude how to govern his own conduct accordingly. It would certainly appear that consciousness must fill some function in the economy of the organism; whatever its relation to the nervous system may be, it must perform an essential part.

If it be admitted that consciousness does perform some essential part, this latter may be variously conceived. Boldest

of all hypotheses, perhaps, is that of Professor Henri Bergson. He has shown that the facts of aphasia and other brain diseases that have often been supposed to indicate the dependence of consciousness upon the nervous system, may, in full recognition of all the known facts, be interpreted in the opposite fashion. Far from being their product, consciousness is the creator of the brain and nervous system, 29. Scarcely less radical is the doctrine of Professor William McDougall, that the soul exists in the organism in comparative independence of the body, and that many facts, even in physiological psychology, such as the passage of nerve currents over the synapses and the co-ordination of the two eyes, can only be attributed to its assistance, whereas much of the higher thought processes, like memory, imagination, reasoning, and volition, are chiefly due to the soul, 30. Such theories as these advanced by Professor Bergson and Professor McDougall are comparable to vitalistic theories in biology; they assume that a non-physical principle is in interaction with the body, and they maintain that this principle must be introduced into scientific explanations.

Without committing themselves to the position that the mind or soul or consciousness is an independent entity of some sort in interaction with brain tissues, the "functional psychologists" maintain that consciousness has evolved to assist in the self-maintenance of the organism, and that the various conscious processes must be interpreted from this standpoint, 31. The most logical attempt to distinguish the mechanistic and teleological methods in psychology, and make use of them both, of which the author knows, is that made by Hugo Münsterberg 32, who believes that psychology has the double task of explaining mental states causally, with references to the states that preceded them and the processes going on in the nervous system, and of endeavoring to understand their meaning and purpose, which alone have value and significance. Both tasks are valuable and necessary, but purposive psychology is the profounder of the two. Indeed, the mental processes of sensation, perception, and the rest are merely scientific constructions into which psychologists have artificially arranged the facts of consciousness for purposes of calculation. In reality the will is free, and not subject to the laws of causal determination which are its creation. Such a view is profoundly teleological. The same is true of Professor Mary W. Calkins' "double standpoint" in psychology, which, though recognizing

a place for a psychology with the standpoint of analysis, makes this subordinate to the psychology developed from the standpoint of the self. The self is basic for the understanding of mental life, 33.

We therefore conclude that psychologists, like the scientists that study physical nature in its inorganic and organic forms, are compelled to make a choice. They must decide between a purely mechanistic treatment that will leave out many facts, but will afford definiteness and precision in the use of laboratory methods, and a treatment, at least in part teleological, that will be more concrete and inclusive.

Our Martian visitor will conclude that mechanism is everywhere a useful, but only a partial explanation of the evolution of things upon the Earth. It explains many facts and gives admirable control over them. But only a teleological account can suggest to us why the happy combination of elements most favorable to life existed before there was life; why organisms with whole and part organisations appeared, and have been able, whether through natural selection or in some other way, to attain their present state of development; and why there finally evolved such a being as man, with his memory and reason, able to govern his present conduct by considerations of the future, and, through agriculture and industry, largely to modify the conditions of his environment, so as better to satisfy his needs. Such a continuity of development could not have taken place as a result of the action of blind and mechanical forces exclusively.

VI—*Teleology and Dysteleology*

If our Martian visitor needed further confirmation of the claim that there has been a teleological factor in evolution, he could review the history of man since he has appeared upon the earth. By means of his intelligence man has progressed constantly in his comprehension of, and mastery over the physical conditions by which he has been surrounded. To be sure, his civilization has been influenced by geographical conditions; nations who have lived on peninsulas or islands with scant areas but good natural harbors, such as the Greeks and the English, have in some respect developed differently from nations like the Americans and Russians, who made settlements on the edges of vast prairies and steppes behind slowly advancing frontiers. But, far from being the mere products of physical and econo-

mic conditions, progressive nations have always studied these conditions, and advanced by means of them, and often apparently in spite of them. In the first Part of this book we have observed some features of the remarkable evolution that has taken place in religion. Not less instructive is the history of the evolution of human social organization, of morality, of law and government, of the arts and sciences. To be sure, evolution in these different fields has not everywhere been equally rapid, and some races have not contributed to any of its phases at all, while none have advanced equally far in them all. The general tendency, however, has been for the results of progress that has taken place anywhere to be contributed ultimately to the other nations of the civilized world, and in our generation all peoples either have in some measure become civilized, or seem assured of an ultimate share in the benefits of civilization.

To be sure, there are difficulties in a teleological interpretation of evolution. There are many facts that do not appear to us to harmonize with any purposeful process. Take the physical conditions on the earth's surface. We have seen that they were marvelously favorable for the appearance of life, in comparison with other conditions that can be imagined. But can we not think of arrangements that would have been better still? There are large areas which are very poorly adapted for life—the polar regions, the deserts, the vast mountain systems. It would seem that a planet might have been possible, in accordance with physical and chemical laws, in which there would not have been so many unfavorable environments. And consider organisms themselves. In spite of their whole and part relations, they contain many imperfect arrangements. The human eye, as Helmholtz pointed out, is a crude instrument, packed with mistakes; while the vermiform appendix is a positive death trap, that man would be better off if it were not a part of his body at all! The suctorial organ of the bed bug, which is said to be a real wonder of technics, perhaps is better adapted for its purpose than most organs in the human body. Are vermin a necessary part of the teleology of nature?

The process of organic evolution contains many forbidding aspects. There has everywhere been a fierce struggle for existence; most living beings perish before their time, many as food for others. If there is a purposiveness in evolution, it is certainly chiefly concerned with the development of species, and careless of individual lives. But even species have often suc-

cumbed. Palaeontology is chiefly a history of bygone species that put up gallant struggles and long ago perished. If the history of the evolution of organisms has been, as Bergson supposes, the story of the struggle of the vital impulse to produce higher forms of life, this struggle upward has been blocked in all of the various directions in which it started, with the exception of man, and even in him, valuable goods have been lost, and intuition had to be almost completely sacrificed to intellect. Human history reveals progress to us, and this appears to us teleological. But this is in some measure because history has been written from the side of the victors. How would history appear if written, not from the standpoint of Jews, but of Canaanites, not of Greeks, but of the earlier stocks whom they enslaved, not of Romans but of Carthaginians, not of American white men, but of the Indians? Countless noble races and worthy movements have been crushed in human history—can we call this teleological? And what of earthquakes, pestilences, famines, and wars? And think of all the misery and suffering we see in the world today among good and innocent people! How many a youth or maiden, dear to parents, friends, and lover, has died prematurely! How many a young mother has been snatched from her babes, how many a father lost to his young family when most they need his protection and support!

That there is much evil in the world it is impossible to deny. But, notwithstanding the evil in it, the world order as a whole indicates preponderant purposiveness. The earth has shown itself well, though not perfectly, adapted to the evolution of life; organisms do have the whole and part relation, and other teleological features; not only is it true that those animal species have always survived that were physically fittest to fight in the struggle for existence, but also that the survivors have usually been the ones morally best fitted to leave descendants that would rise higher in the scale; those human races and individuals have been successful as a rule who had most to contribute to civilizations in their own time and to the progress of succeeding generations. Exceptions must not blind us to the general tendency; and the general tendency is clearly teleological. To be sure, the exceptions must, in a philosophical study be taken into account. There are various possible explanations. Which particular one the reader will prefer will largely depend on what particular conception of God he finds

most convincing; and accordingly consideration of the problem of evil will be postponed until Chapter XX.

VII—*What Does the World Purpose Include?*

Thus far in this chapter the nature of the purposes to be attributed to the world order has not been definitely considered. If the world and the process of evolution are purposive, what are the purposes at which they are aiming? Is it possible to answer this question? Only, of course, in part. We can follow the general course of evolution down till now, but we do not know what the future progress of man upon this earth will be. We do not know what processes of development are going on in other planets. And we do not know in what manner the achievements which man has made on the earth will be conserved after the planet shall have grown cold, and all life upon it become extinct.

This much, however, we can say. If the evolution of our earth and of its inhabitants has been teleological, man has been the most important part of this evolution. Man has advanced immeasurably beyond any of his brute competitors. This superior advance of man has been due to his reason, which marks him off from the animals. Aristotle was right in finding that the highest excellence of man consists in the exercise of his reason. So the production and further development of a rational being, able to interpret the world order, must be one of the important ends that is being carried out in this particular part of the universe. Again, the principal valuation which man is able to place upon his fellows is expressed by the moral criterion, good and bad. Kant may have overstated the case when he asserted that the *only* thing of absolute value in the world is a good will, or a good character. But such surely is the most *important* good of which we know.

To give an account of what goodness is, as thus conceived to be the most valuable thing about man and hence one of the ends of the universe, would necessitate a treatise on ethics. But in a few pages it will be possible to indicate certain of the directions in which goodness has thus far been developing among human beings on this planet.

Among the least developed races of mankind are often found some of the simple virtues—some degree at least of truth telling, hospitality, marital fidelity and respect for property rights. There is no organized authority to enforce these and whatever

other duties and rights are recognized by tradition and custom, and violations are punished by the vengeance which their instinctive anger prompts those who are injured to seek. Among races a little higher developed the clan appears with a loosely defined organization of families. A man's relatives begin to resent an injury done him, and to assist him in seeking vengeance. To preserve order between warring families, as well as to prevent sacral offenses thought to menace the clan as a whole, some organized executive and judicial authority makes its appearance. Thus far, social organization is based chiefly on family ties, real or legendary.

But, as increased population, improvement in the use of weapons, and other motives, incite to more frequent warfare, the centralized authority of the war chief becomes that of an hereditary king, and in due course, the various social classes of royalty, nobility, commons, and serfs or slaves become differentiated. Private property increases and the cleavage between rich and poor appears. Regularly established courts and judges and written laws come in; priests, liturgies, temples, medicine men, magic further develop; and possibly the beginnings of science, or at least better industrial processes are found. Later on one kingdom proves constantly victorious in war, subjugates its neighbors, and evolves into a great empire. Under this empire commerce and culture extend through the wide areas that have been brought under a common rule. While the authority of conquerors first rests on brute force, soon this force is likely to become transmuted into some sort of authority, resting at first chiefly on religious teachings like the divine right of the king and the duty of obedience to him as the representative of the gods; but later, as his rule proves to be of actual benefit to his subjects, the authority of the kingly government rests on more clearly moral ground. Ultimately either through revolutions or through gradual evolution, government passes into the hands of the people, and the moral rights and duties of citizens become recognized in the manner in which we conceive them in modern democratic states.

In the early stages moral rights and duties are chiefly applicable only within the local group; strangers have few rights. Later, all of one's nation are recognized to have both moral and legal claims upon one, but other nations are still held in low esteem; as is illustrated by the attitude of ancient Jews to Gentiles, of ancient Greeks to Barbarians. In the ancient

world, however, with the rise of the world empires of Alexander and the Romans all men came to be regarded as equal in moral and legal rights, and Stoics and Christians alike proclaimed the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. In the modern world, in part as a result of our heritage of Stoic and Christian teaching, no doubt, moral obligations are theoretically believed to hold between all human beings of all nations, and the various peoples of the modern world are struggling to work out conceptions of world citizenship, and to find some device, like a league or association of nations, that will prove capable of enforcing these ideals.

Such have been some of the general features in the course of the moral evolution that has taken place among men. Its threads are intertwined with the threads of the development of social organization, government, law, industry, religion, and philosophy, all of which morality has influenced, and by all of which it has been influenced. Moral evolution has progressed by no means along a straight course; it has followed devious windings and turnings. At some times and in some respects ethical conceptions have been in the lead of actual conduct, in other periods and in other ways men have often practised better than they have preached. Only when we survey the course of moral evolution over long periods, say a thousand years at a time, are we assured that advance has been real. But no reasonable man can hesitate to say that both in theory and practice ancient Hebrews, Greeks and Romans were far in advance, both of savages and of the ancient civilizations such as those of Egypt and Babylonia, that preceded them. And there is no doubt that modern civilized nations have advanced further still.

To reduce the course of moral evolution to an adequate formula is difficult, perhaps impossible. That there has been genuine progress, the author believes, can be made clear if the history of moral development is tested by any of the standards most favored by writers of ethics, such as increase of happiness, the perfection of character, self-realization, the promotion of all values, and the like. An excellent summary is that given by Professor L. T. Hobhouse, from whose *Morals in Evolution*, most of the details in the foregoing account have been derived:—"If, then, the whole course of history, or say, rather physical, biological, and social evolution, is to be summed up in this—that it is a process wherein mind grows from the humblest of beginnings to an adult vigor, in which it can—as in

the creed of humanity it does—conceive the idea of directing its own course, mastering the conditions external and internal of its exercise, if this is a true account of evolution—and it is the account to which positive science points—then we cannot say that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reality that is disclosed to us. We can hardly suppose such a process accidental or quite peculiar to the conditions of this earth. At any rate, as far as the widest synthesis of our experience goes, it shows us Reality as the movement towards self-realization of a mind appearing under rigidly limited conditions of physical organization in countless organisms, and aiming for the first time at a partial unity in the consciousness of a common humanity with a common aim," 34.

Other writers on comparative ethics have indicated other aspects of moral evolution. Though Professor Edward Westemarck's great work is centered more upon the beginnings of moral development than its outcome in the higher civilizations, he indicates the manner in which the altruistic sentiment has widened and deepened; and he assures us of the certainty in light of the laws of moral evolution derived from a study of the past, that altruism will continue to expand and that the notion of human brotherhood will receive increased support from the actual feelings of mankind, 35.

Professor Alexander Sutherland has impressively traced the evolution of the moral sentiment down from the maternal instinct in animals to its heightened development at the present time, 36. Professor William McDougall has indicated the psychology of the process by which, in the human being, the instincts and emotions which he has in common with the higher animals have become organized, directed and controlled in sentiments, and how these sentiments come to constitute a self, which in the best men at least, is actuated by the ideal of a perfected or completely moral life, 37.

The accounts of the historians of morality make it clear that there has been a gradual evolution of human beings with impulses to mutual helpfulness and service and the attainment of a common humanity, in which each individual seeks the good of the whole, and in which the welfare of each individual is conserved by society as a whole. Of course this outcome has by no means been fully achieved; the horrors of the great war painfully indicate the present moral imperfections of man; but in theory and in practice, as the ages pass, it is coming about. This, then, is

one of the ends of the universe—the evolution of moral beings upon the earth. To this extent we may therefore say that *this is a moral universe*, that is, it is *a universe that recognizes and seeks to achieve moral ends. A teleological universe must be a moral universe.* The reader should take notice of this conclusion. Much follows from it. We may conclude with reasonable probability that such a universe as ours, since it is a teleological universe in which purposes are achieved, and a moral universe in which moral values are appreciated and realized, is a universe that includes morality in its ultimate ends and purposes. In such a universe we have ground to hope that *whatever is just and morally desirable will ultimately come to pass.* Several important arguments regarding God and immortality which we shall study in the following chapters rest on the assumption that this is a moral universe,—an assumption which, while admittedly by no means demonstrated, appears to be based on reasonable probability.

Are there not other purposes in the evolution of man besides the attainment of moral ends? Well, it should be understood that "moral ends" and "moral purposes," as the terms are used by the author, are not intended merely to include the fulfilment of duty (to which rigorists in ethics like Kant largely restrict morality, a fact that tends to make morality often sound harsh to popular ears today) but also to include all that makes for a larger and fuller life, for the perfection of man on all sides of his nature,—in other words the Greek conception at its best, but broadened to include the love of all mankind within its scope. The moral ideal ought to include the development of beautiful souls joined to beautiful bodies, and consecrated to the search for all forms of the true, the good and the beautiful. The end of human evolution, in other words, should be understood to imply the development of humanity in all its valuable aspects. Whether we call all of these aspects moral, or whether to moral values more narrowly conceived, we add values of truth and beauty, is largely a matter of definition. At any rate, the author hopes that the reader is convinced that the weight of probability inclines to the conclusion that we are living in a universe that is both teleological and moral, and that includes within its scope the highest advancement of humanity, 38.

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CHAPTER XIX

EVIDENCE OF GOD

We are now ready to face the central questions in the whole philosophy of religion, those concerning the existence and nature of God. If it can be shown to be reasonably probable that there exists a God who favors the ultimate triumph of moral values, the philosophical study in which we have been engaged can be brought to largely affirmative conclusions regarding the truth and worth of religion. But if the weight of probability should prove to be unfavorable, or to be so slight as to warrant no conclusions, the outcome would be quite different. Religions, to be sure, are possible that do not affirm belief in a God; outlines of such beliefs have been seriously advanced in our own time, 1. But the scope of confidence that man can gain, either in himself or in the universe, through such religions, is restricted. If the preponderance of evidence for the existence of God appears fairly strong, it will not be necessary to enter into a consideration of such religions. It will in that case be enough, within the limits of this volume, to trace in later chapters some of the consequences that follow from acceptance of God.

I—*The Conception of God is Symbolical and Anthropomorphic*

Before proceeding further, one point needs to be made clear. If there be a God, all human conceptions of Him must be regarded as symbolical, not as exactly representative of Him. Even if one thinks of a simple class concept, like 'man,' 'dog,' 'house,' it is quite impossible to call to consciousness at any moment all that the word means to one. Psychologists say that what any one does under such circumstances is to recall some bit of sensuous imagery, which serves to represent or symbolize what the idea means. Still less is it possible to form adequate representations in our minds at any time of what we mean by 'liberty,' 'justice,' 'science,' 'democracy.' To arouse patriotism nations find it necessary to adopt flags. A flag is a symbol. Taken literally a national flag is only a bit of brightly colored

bunting; but vast libraries of history and constitutional law only imperfectly express what the flag symbolizes. No scholar, however learned, at any instant can recall everything that his country means to him. In times of emergency, he, like the plain man, must give his devotion to the Flag. Of course we believe that there *are* real values that the flag symbolizes; we believe in our constitution and in the values that it assures to us. Men would not die for the flag if they did not treasure these values. But it usually suffices to think of the flag, and not of the values themselves.

In the sciences symbols are used in a different way. Here the appeal is not to sentiment, but to reflection. It is necessary to find some effective manner of symbolizing experimental data, and getting control over them for future investigation. The atom and the electron are such symbols. Nobody ever saw them, or ever will see them. They serve for the purposes of the exact sciences at the present time, but no thoughtful scientist doubts that these conceptions will be greatly amplified and corrected with the further advance of knowledge.

The conception of God is symbolical in both of these respects. *As used in religious worship*, it serves to center men's devotion upon a Being with whom men can feel themselves in sympathy. The God of Judaism and Christianity is thought of as Father —a term full of tender suggestiveness. Any one who reflects upon the matter will realize, however, that the conception is not meant to be taken literally. The imagery of Father is merely intended to bring into the worshipper's consciousness the sentiments which he ought to feel toward God. The use of such a symbol is justifiable if there really is a Being toward whom man ought to feel such sentiments as a child feels toward his father; otherwise not. *As used in philosophy*, the conception of God is employed, not for purposes of sentiment and devotion, but in the endeavor to understand the universe, and man's relation to it. The symbols of physics are justifiable, because through them man is enabled to some extent to understand and control physical conditions. The symbol of God is justifiable in philosophy, provided that through it man is better able to understand and to adapt himself to the world in which he lives; otherwise not.

Let no one be concerned if he is told that the notion of God is *anthropomorphic*, i. e., that in this conception man has projected a representation of himself. Of course the notion is an-

thropomorphic. So is the theory of atoms, for that matter, so are other scientific conceptions. In such concepts as the atom, the ether and the electron, scientists have imagined something existing in the external world that corresponds to some of the characteristics of human sensations of pressure, strain, and resistance. In the conception of God, man has imagined something in reality corresponding to certain characteristics of human personality. The physical scientist is right in his anthropomorphism because of his successful employment of his symbols in his investigations. Can the philosopher of religion show that the symbol of God is successful in the interpretation of the world and of human experience? If so, his anthropomorphism is also justified. Anthropomorphism is only wrong when it leads to erroneous consequences. The crude forms of early Hebrew anthropomorphism, which pictured God as taking a walk in a garden in the cool of the day, and as absurdly given to fits of anger and jealousy led to erroneous consequences. Still, the early Hebrew notion of God was probably as workable as any notion that existed in the natural science of that time, or for long afterward. It is no more reasonable to condemn present ideas of God on the ground of their anthropomorphism, or because they were preceded in earlier ages by cruder anthropomorphisms, than it would be to condemn present scientific conceptions for similar reasons.

II—*Arguments for the Existence of God*

Before discussing arguments for the existence of God, let us first be clear in our minds precisely what needs to be established. What is meant by God? An exact definition of God is obviously impossible. Human knowledge is too restricted for that. The motive of this section of the present chapter is much more modest. It is to seek a reply to the following problem:—"Is there sufficient evidence to render reasonably probable the existence of a Being of such a nature that the evolution of religions, which we studied in Part I, and the types of religious experience, which we studied in Part II, may be regarded as something more than merely subjective delusions? Is it likely that through such religions and in such types of experience men have, however imperfectly, come into touch with a Being who exists, not merely as an Alter in human consciousness, but in Reality?"

As we saw in Chapter XVI, such a Being may be regarded

either as an external or as an immanent God. In considering the evidence for the *existence* of God in this chapter, arguments that favor either or both of these conceptions will be presented. Not until we come to consider the *nature* of God in the following chapter will it be necessary to discriminate between them.

1—*Teleological and Evolutionary Arguments*

As the preceding chapter will have suggested, the author regards the strongest argument for the existence of God to be the teleological argument. If the evidence in that chapter convinced the reader that the weight of probability inclines in favor of a teleological and a moral universe, included among whose purposes is the development of man as a moral being, he ought to find little difficulty with the question of the existence of God. That there is a God of some sort seems almost an inevitable consequence of believing that the world order is purposive in its development. For, wherever we see the evidences of purpose, we are inclined to assume a purposer. If the world order is purposive, this seems to imply a world Purposer. This does not necessarily mean that the world has had a Creator; it is not necessary to believe that there ever was a time when there was no world, and that God afterwards made the world out of chaos, or out of nothing. So far as the argument of the book has yet proceeded, the reader is free to accept or reject the doctrine of Creation. The teleological evidence merely indicates the probable existence of a Mind that is, at least in considerable measure, in control of the world process—enough so to account for the amount of teleology apparent in it.

The only alternative to the acceptance of some sort of God would be to say that the world process is only *blindly* teleological, not consciously so. Let us imagine an advocate of this alternative speaking. "Plants are teleological to a limited extent; the fact that they are unconscious does not prevent them from being teleological, though they are quite unaware of the fact. Much of the teleology in animals, and, for that matter, in our own bodies also, goes on without the aid of consciousness. Suppose, then, that we admit that the evolution of the various forms of plant and animal species has been purposive; need we assume the presence in this evolution of a Mind,—of any being that in any sense could be called God? And still less do we need to assume consciousness of any sort to have been

present in the earth before the appearance of life, although some sort of teleology was present in the fitness of the environment for life. No, the world order may to some extent be teleological, but consciousness only appears in animal organisms, and only reaches its highest development so far as we know, in man. Admitting that the world order is teleological, it does not follow that the world as a whole has a Mind."

It is for the reader to decide which interpretation of teleology appears to him the more reasonable. Proof here is impossible; we can only select the more probable of the two alternatives. Let us consider each of them as an interpretation of the world process. (1) If we say that the latter has gone on without a God, we are obliged to assume that inorganic matter itself contains some kind of inherent purposiveness which gives rise to a favorable environment, and later expresses itself in organisms. Organisms become increasingly purposive, in the higher animals a little of this purposiveness becomes conscious, and, finally man emerges with memory, imagination, and reason. Man accordingly possesses more purposiveness than anything else in the universe of which we have any knowledge. (2) If, taking the other alternative, we assume that the universe as a whole has a Mind, we can say that the general course of the evolution of the earth from start to finish has been the development of the purposes of this Mind. From the earliest gaseous state of the primitive nebula till now, a divine Mind has been operating here, as well as elsewhere, in the universe. The happy combination of elements favorable for the appearance of life, the slow and toiling ascent from the lowliest forms until the dawn of reason in man, and the more rapid progress of man in human institutions, have all been the gradual development of the purposes of an intelligent Mind. Does it appear conceivable that this impressive evolution could have gone on without the guidance of a conscious Mind whose intelligence is immeasurably superior to that of man?

It would be easy here to introduce rhetorical arguments, to quote poetry, or otherwise to make an emotional or sentimental appeal for the position favored by the author. But that might seem like begging the question or ignoring the issue. Let the reader face the two alternatives and choose for himself. As a matter of pure probability and intrinsic reasonableness, is it not a great deal more thinkable that the evolution of a teleological and moral universe has been attended by a conscious

Mind than that it has gone on simply of itself without such a Mind?

The reasoning in Chapter XIII may be regarded as another evolutionary argument for the existence of God. For if the Christian religion can be regarded as most successful of all religions (with the possible exception of the Jewish religion for the Jews themselves,—a religion that is at one with Christianity in its belief in a God) in the conservation of values, and if this religion is the present outcome of an evolution in which man has been in constant effort to adjust himself to his environment since primitive times, and if it is probable that the future evolution of religion will be a future evolution of Christianity,—then *is it not highly probable that the God of Christianity is symbolical of something that really exists in the universe*, and is it not highly improbable that the God of Christianity is a mere figment of human fancy?

2—Arguments Based on Religious Experience

If the evidence from teleology in favor of a God could receive further support by some other class of evidence, it would be considerably strengthened. Can such evidence be found? Well, if there be a God, who markedly directs the course of evolution toward moral ends, inclusive of man, we should expect men to have become aware of Him from time to time, should we not?

Abundant assertions of such experiences are to be found in the religious literature of all ages. In Part I, we found a gradual evolution in the conceptions of the agency through which spiritual values are conserved, until the Agency became thought of as God. This is empirical evidence of a Being, of which men have believed themselves to be conscious, and this conception has evolved in logical clearness and moral worth with the increasing intelligence of the nations who have had these experiences. In Part II we studied types of religious experience from the standpoints of the individuals who underwent them. We found individual human experiences of continuous growth, spontaneous awakenings, conversion, prayer, and mysticism, all of which appear valuable and genuine to those who have undergone them.

When we consider the great voice of testimony to the experience of God that has come down the ages from men of every race, nation, and religion, and when we consider the mul-

titude of people in every walk of life today who feel comforted and sustained by the presence of God, can we regard this evidence as negligible? The fact that adherents of all faiths have had these experiences, is a difficulty only for the man who believes that his religion is the only true one. For the philosophical student who believes that there is some degree of truth in every religion, the testimony of one religious worshipper to the blessings that the Christian or Jewish God has vouchsafed him, that of another to his experience of the favors of Allah, and that of a third, that his vocation in life has been revealed to him by Gitchie Manitou, are all affirmative and mutually confirmatory. None of these experiences, of course, is infallible, all are to be critically tested; but all contain truth and are imperfect manifestations of an ineffable Being that has been symbolized with varying degrees of accuracy, in all times and in all ages.

To many of us, no doubt, the empirical argument appears strongest when some one whom we personally know and revere —some good man or woman the strength and helpfulness of whose personal character has been a source of moral benefit to us and to others—tells us (or better, does not need to tell us) that the experience of God has been the support of his or her life. Every one has known such people, and profoundly respected them, and considered it a privilege to have come within their influence. Stronger than any reasoned argument, will appear to many the evidence that such lives afford. It cannot be that these people have been deluded—that the God who has been the inspiration of their lives, and through their lives, of ours—is merely a product of their imaginations! The truth cannot be less than good people suppose it to be; for instance, if their horizons are limited, and they have not learned charity to those of different faiths than their own, and each speaks in the language of his own creed, it is not that these creeds are wholly false, but that the God that they seek to interpret is more inclusive than any creed, or all creeds put together, 2.

3—*Moral Arguments*

At the close of the preceding chapter, the conclusion was reached that this is a moral universe, and the reader was warned that important arguments regarding God and immortality rest on this conclusion. Three such arguments for God, two of

which are also arguments for immortality, now demand our consideration.

(1)—*A Moral Universe Implies a God*

If we commend the action of another man as "good," or if we condemn it as "bad," we imply that this man is a conscious being, sane and intelligent, able to pass judgments on what should be done, and to make a choice. To be a moral being, and to be morally responsible, and so to act in a manner that is either morally praiseworthy or blamable, implies consciousness, reasoning power, choice, and volition. Insane people and infants are not morally responsible because they lack these qualifications. Still less can we think of animals, plants, or inanimate objects as in any sense moral.

From this analogy it follows that to the extent that this is *a moral universe*,—that is, *a universe aiming at ends which include the development of man as a moral being*,—it must be a universe that is guided in its course by a Being that is conscious, that is rational, and that wills the ultimate triumph of what is good. To the extent that "moral" as used in its wider sense may be said to include ends of truth and beauty, these too can only be thought to be ends of a universe that is under the guidance of such a Being.

A study of the history of any of the moral achievements of mankind suggests that there must have been in operation the mind and will of a Being greater than men. In any critical period of history, what statesman has fully grasped the meaning of what he was doing? What man among the builders of Athens conceived the full significance of what Athens was becoming and contributing to the world before Thucidydes as an historian, looking backward upon what had been accomplished, was able to make the brilliant interpretation which he has given us as Pericles' funeral oration? Did Julius Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon, or at any time in his life, or did any of his contemporaries, grasp what the founding of the Roman Empire was to mean to the world? To take illustrations from the history of our own country. How far did Washington understand what the republic he and his contemporaries were struggling to bring into existence was to mean to the world, either during the winter at Valley Forge, or the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, or even his admin-

istration as President? When Lincoln, through the darker periods of the Civil War—or the brighter ones for that matter—was struggling to preserve the union, and to win the freedom of the slaves, did he appreciate the full significance of what he was doing? Perhaps he did when he delivered the Gettysburg address, you say; but that was after the turning point of the war had passed, 3. Take a more recent illustration. During the course of the Great War, what statesman, especially in the earlier years, was awake to the moral significance of the conflict? Who has correctly measured it, even now? The moral experience of mankind, though always full of imperfections and inconsistencies, is more profound and more sublime than any of the interpretations that poet, statesman, or scholar are able to formulate. This is true, not only of the morality achieved through war and political movements, but as well of the advances of law, art, literature, science, religion, of all forms of human activity. It is safe to say that neither Raphael nor Michaelangelo, Shakespeare nor Goethe, Darwin nor Pasteur, grasped the full significance of what they were doing. No saint nor theologian has penetrated the depths of religious experience. In all the achievements of human experience, the fathers have built better than they knew. Can we believe that no Intelligence greater than human intelligence has been operative in these developments? Was it possible for mankind in so many fields to develop ends which no individual man at the time but very imperfectly understood? Can we suppose that the purposes of a moral universe are not grasped by any mind in it, until finite minds like ours slowly begin to appreciate these purposes after they have largely been accomplished? Must we not rather suppose that there has been a divine Mind immanent in the processes by which the achievements of mankind have been accomplished, and that human interpreters of history, law, art, literature, science, and religion are gaining self consciousness of the thoughts of this God? 4.

(2)—*The Consciousness of Duty Implies a God*

If we examine what we recognize to be our duty, we realize that it is far more than we are able to accomplish. Nothing short of absolute perfection and holiness is enjoined upon man by the New Testament; and, apart from all sacred books, every intelligent man who is honest with himself will have to admit that he ought to be absolutely pure and righteous in his every

thought, word, and deed, and that he ought to make the most of every opportunity that comes his way either to be of service to others or to further his own higher advancement. Yet what man has ever been fully faithful to the duties that he owed himself, to say nothing of the claims of others upon him? And the more conscientious a person is, the more he makes a success of his vocation in life, the greater and more numerous are the responsibilities that become his, and the more impossible does fulfilment become! The really good man is, of all men, most painfully aware of his own failures and shortcomings. When, at last, a man's life draws towards its close, and his strength declines, it seems to him that he was only beginning to be able to do his best and accomplish most, and his life to be something of value in the world. In a moral universe, these years of preparation cannot be without meaning for the future. In a moral universe man must be free to do his duty! How could anything be a duty if one could not perform it! The very fact that an infinite duty confronts man which he is forced to acknowledge is a guarantee that he can perform it. "Du kannst denn du sollst," as Kant said; or in the lines of Emerson;—

> "So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near is God to man,
> When duty whispers low, *Thou must,*
> The youth replies, *I can.*"

But the demands of moral obligation cannot be fulfilled in this life. There must therefore be a future life. However, a future life of limited duration would not answer. In such a life, as one further advanced in efficiency and service, his unfulfilled duty would still further and further widen out before him. Man must therefore be immortal, and continually progress toward the accomplishment of a duty that as constantly increases. Man has an infinite task to perform, and it will take him all eternity to fulfil it. But such an eternal progress in the direction of an ever receding goal hardly seems to us like accomplishment. It can only be so regarded from the standpoint of an eternal Mind, an intelligence to whom past, present and future are an "everlasting Now." Even to our finite minds, a brief succession of events, lasting a few seconds, appears to take place in a moment, to be *now.* To an Intelligence, who both knows the future and is able to grasp all future, present, and past events in a single span of time, the

eternal progress of man in the direction of perfect fulfilment of duty would itself be accomplishment. To such a Being, therefore, man would actually succeed in performing his duty. Moreover, such a Being, with an infinite Mind, would see things as they really are. Such an infinite progress would in reality be as it appears to such a Mind, a fulfilment. It is not such a Being, but we, with our limited intelligence, who are deceived by an imperfect understanding of the nature of time.

Therefore, if moral obligation or duty, really is what it appears to be, a command to be absolutely just and holy, to accomplish to the full all our possibilities of service, and to realize all our capacities to the utmost, it means that man is immortal and that there is a God. In the experience of the call of duty man has a precious assurance of endless life and of divine support. A lazy soul might be discouraged at the prospect of an endless task, and become pessimistic, but more active spirits must rejoice. For the rewards in life come, not in the mere having of things or the gaining of goals, but in the joy of work and the consciousness of accomplishment. To the right minded man, therefore, there is every reason for joy in the consciousness that his task is infinite, and that in this task he is accomplishing the work that God has given him to do, 5.

(3)—*The Happiness Argument*

In a completely moral universe, it would seem that possession of happiness ought to be proportionate to fidelity to duty. Although few persons probably think that considerations of one's personal happiness should serve as the sole standard of duty, almost everyone believes that those who do their duty in life, as faithfully as they can, deserve to be happy. However, no one needs wide experience to be aware that virtuous people often suffer unmerited misfortune of all kinds, while wicked men often undeservedly prosper. It is accordingly urged that there must be a future existence in which the wrongs of this world are righted, and virtue and vice receive their deserts. Moreover, as there is no inevitable necessity that connects the attainment of virtue with happiness in this life, the mere continuation of these in another life would not guarantee the ultimate fulfilment of justice. Consequently there must be a God who as Judge, by an act of arbitrary volition ultimately will effect a union between virtue and happiness. Thus an

argument both for God and a future life are afforded by the consideration of the serious disparity between virtue and happiness which we see everywhere about us.

This argument is offered to the reader for whatever he may think it worth. Frankly speaking, the author does not consider it nearly so convincing as either of the other two moral arguments that have been mentioned, neither of which is in any way dependent upon this one. Both of the other arguments can be employed either for an external or for an immanent God. This argument has weight chiefly with believers in an external God; it would be difficult to state it in terms of divine immanence. This argument, too, suggests less developed ethical rewards to the doers of good. Virtue, it might seem, is its own reward. Moreover, this argument has to assume a *completely* moral universe. The other arguments which we have considered merely have to maintain that the universe strives *toward* teleological and moral ends; they are not necessarily committed to the claim that it *invariably attains* them. There is much in the world that appears contrary to teleology and moral purposiveness. If this is a universe in which good is only gradually coming to prevail, the evils and injustices of the world may be indications that the world is not perfect.

It must accordingly be confessed that this argument is not without its difficulties. However, it would appear to have cogency for those who believe that the universe is absolutely, and not merely approximately just, in its constitution—such a universe must assuredly be governed by an absolutely powerful and righteous God. It may also be observed that the conception that every action must ultimately be rewarded according to its merits, in a future life if not in this, has appealed to many of the profound moral thinkers of the world. We have seen its expression in the thought of India in the law of Karma. The idea exerted a powerful influence in ancient Egypt, corrupted though it was with magical conceptions in the *Book of the Dead.* Plato maintained the conception, and partly through his influence there passed into Jewish as well as into Christian thought the principle that conduct must be rewarded according to its merits in a future life by the judgment of God.

In addition to the foregoing arguments for the existence of God, there are other arguments advanced by philosophers of particular schools which have considerable influence. It will of course be impossible to notice all of these arguments,

or all of the various schools. The three schools of philosophy that have most influence today, at least in the English speaking world, are the idealists, the pragmatists, and the new realists.

4—*Idealistic Arguments*

It will be impossible to do justice to the idealistic arguments for God in an introductory volume that is not devoted almost exclusively to the exposition of some system of idealism. Certain idealistic arguments can only be hinted at here, and references given to standard authorities for those who care to read further.

There are numerous forms of idealism. There are two general types current today, of which most contemporary systems are varieties. These are known as Mentalism and Speculative Idealism. (They are sometimes respectively called "Subjective" and "Objective" Idealism; but these designations are unfair, and tend to create a prejudice in favor of the latter.)

(1)—*Mentalism*

George Berkeley (†1753) in two brilliant youthful essays (6) that remain superior in merit as literature to any other technical philosophical writings in the English language, argued that reality wholly consists of ideas that pass through minds, and of the minds that know these ideas. Wherever you perceive any object, say an apple, you are aware of the apple and of yourself as perceiving it. Modern scientists already had distinguished between the *primary* qualities that really exist in things—such as shape, size, solidity, motion, and number,—and *secondary* qualities — like color, sound, odor, taste, and temperature—that do not in reality exist in the outer world, but only in our minds. Berkeley showed that the same objections apply to the supposition that the primary qualities exist independent of minds that hold in the case of the secondary qualities. Both kinds of qualities vary at different times, and give rise to illusions. Analyze any object whatever, say an apple, and you will find that it wholly consists of different sensations of color, taste, odor, solidity, temperature, etc. It is really mental in its constitution. Now some of our ideas are due to the activity of our own minds,—those of fancy—such ideas we have created and can alter at will. Other of our ideas —those that constitute the outer world of real things, as we

say,—we perceive through our senses, involuntarily. To what cause shall we attribute these involuntary ideas? Are they due to matter, as materialists and atheists say,—something that nobody ever perceived? Is it not far more reasonable to attribute our ideas of the external world to a Mind somewhat like our own? Such ideas are due to *something* external to our own experience—either material or mental. It is more reasonable to attribute them to the known than to the unknown, to another Mind than to matter. And since we all experience a common world, composed of the same objects, the same Mind must be the common cause of all our ideas of the external world. The so-called uniformity of nature is the regular manner in which God imparts the same ideas under the same conditions. There is no matter; what we call matter is the system of ideas which God imparts to us all in a uniform way.

This form of idealism, which has possibly been stated a little more consistently than Berkeley put it himself, is now sometimes called *Mentalism.* Those who hold it today usually modify it by accepting Kant's doctrine that the mind in a sense constitutes the objects which it perceives. Modern psychology is claimed to be confirmative of Kant's position on this point. In perceiving any object, the various sensations belong in a whole and constitute an object, and this object is interpreted in the light of past experience. As one looks at an apple across the room one surely perceives it as solid and as having a certain taste, as if he were actually handling and tasting it; his mind interprets his sensations of vision in the light of his past experience, and this interpretation is part of the immediate perception of an object.

In like manner every object of the outer world that we experience has been made an object by the construction of our minds. But not of *our* minds only. We live in a social world. Other persons experience the same objects as we. If two persons dispute about the nature of an object, they are not disputing about their own personal, subjective impressions about the object, they are disputing about what they think that the object really is. So we evidently live in a common world; the objects that your and my minds have constructed must agree. If they do not appear to do so, one of us is in error. But this means that you and I somehow share in the experience of a common mind,—God. If we did not share in the thoughts

of such a common mind we could not agree with one another, we could not even disagree. As separate individuals you and I never perceive any of the contents of each other's minds; we can only perceive each other's bodies. We can never get inside each other's minds at all. Yet we do communicate; we are able to disagree, and if we are fairly reasonable and good natured folk, we can sometimes even agree with each other. Consequently it must be that in reality our minds are not sundered as in appearance they seem to be. In reality we share, however imperfectly, in the mind of God. The assumption of God is therefore necessary in order to explain the possibility of common knowledge on the part of different individuals, 7.

The conception of God is also necessary to account for mutual sympathy and understanding, for common recognition of standards of goodness, truth, and beauty, and for united effort in the formation and realization of common ideals. Mentalism, in its contemporary forms, does not claim that inorganic nature exists merely as ideas in the minds of individuals, as Berkeley thought, but that it consists of individuals who are conscious but whose inner life and consciousness are so wholly different from ours that we cannot communicate with them,—a fact which explains why we imagine them to be without consciousness at all, 8.

(2)—*Speculative Idealism*

Speculative idealism (9) which has its ancestry in Hegel (†1831),—unlike mentalism, with which it is often confused even by its advocates—does not maintain that everything, as a separate object, is either conscious (or sub-conscious) or an idea in some conscious mind. Many things, taken by themselves, are not alive or conscious at all; in fact, this is true of the great bulk of the material of which the world consists. For the purposes of such a science as physics it is quite proper to study the material aspects of all objects in exclusion from the other aspects that some objects also have; this is one plane of existence. For other purposes, material objects must be regarded from the plane of chemistry; viewed on this plane more qualities of objects are disclosed. Biology discloses more characteristics still, of such objects that appear on its plane. Animals that are conscious belong on the psychological plane, also. And some objects are also to be found on the planes of aesthetics, ethics, and so on. Each plane is an aspect of

reality, and true so far as it goes; none is the whole truth.

Moreover each level takes on additional significance when its connection with other levels is considered. Nothing—not even the entire material side of the universe—can be fully understood when taken by itself. Everything has to be studied in the light of the whole to which it belongs. The inorganic universe, as studied by astronomy, physics, chemistry and geology, is only one side of the whole of Reality. It belongs in a whole which includes organisms. Neither inorganic nor organic nature is a complete system; each implies the other. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the rest of the universe in separation from man with his awareness of secondary qualities, with his ability to reason, with his insights into goodness and beauty. That man cannot be understood apart from the earthly environment in which he has appeared, everyone will admit. The speculative idealists maintain that the opposite is equally true. The meaning of the earthly environment cannot be understood apart from man. Man is organic to the world; through man the world reasons, appreciates its values of beauty and morality, and other of its meanings, and so comes to consciousness of itself.

Now, if we think of the world as a whole as thus having meaning, that each part of it is in a system with the rest, that man, and the values man recognizes and appreciates, are a significant part of this whole, we are led logically to a belief in God. The world as a whole, on this view, is a system; it is infinite and self-determined, since there is nothing outside of the whole universe that could limit or condition it in any way. In this sense the world as a whole is Absolute—i. e., unconditioned, infinite, self-determined, self-sufficient. In the Absolute, as thus conceived, everything has its place. In it all the different planes of existence, described by the different sciences, have their ultimate meaning and value. The Absolute is the only *complete* Individual or Person, since to be an individual and to have personality mean to be self-determined, and not to be the product of external conditions and circumstances. Since spiritual values, such as goodness, truth, and beauty, do exist in man, and he is an organic part of the world, these values have their place in the Absolute. All that is valuable in the universe is conserved in the Absolute.

The God of religious worship has to be conceived in a more intimate and human way than the philosopher describes the

Absolute; the God of religion is, however, a closer approximation to the Absolute than is any other partial conception of it, far closer than any of the conceptions with which sciences deal. Religious worship is therefore justified, especially if God is conceived as immanent. In the opinion of the author, all the forms of prayer which were found to be efficacious in Chapter XVI, together with the milder form of mysticism described in Chapter XVII, and the various forms of awakening of the religious sentiment studied in Chapter XV, may be interpreted by the religious believer who accepts speculative idealism as different ways in which a man becomes self-conscious of the Absolute in the imagery of his own religious faith.

Speculative idealism thus approaches the problem of God in its own way. It claims that it would be impossible to prove the existence of God by a series of propositions, such as those in a geometrical theorem, or by a resort to causal reasoning, such as saying that since everything has a cause prior to it, there ultimately must be a First Cause that causes everything else, but is itself uncaused. For this type of philosophy there can be no self-evident axiom or postulate which can be taken for granted, and from which the existence of God can be proved. The axiom itself would have to be proved in its turn, and so on infinitely. And you can never find a cause which must not be regarded as the effect of something else; the child is quite right in asking in objection to such reasoning, "Who made God?" One must not ask for the logical grounds or causes of things; or *how* they came into existence, if one wishes to be a speculative philosopher. That is putting the question the wrong way. One must, on the contrary, ask *why* things are, what are they for, what is their meaning, their value, their significance.

Study the nature of anything whatsoever, what it means, what its relations are to other things, and you will ultimately perceive that it belongs in a systematic self-determining, spiritual whole,—the Absolute. The truth of speculative philosophy is shown, so its adherents claim, by its internal consistency as an account of the world as a whole, its comprehensiveness and its coherence. The system fits together, it is reasonable, and therefore it is convincing. Hindu mythology said that the earth was supported on the back of an elephant, and that the elephant was held up by a tortoise, but it could not explain what kept the tortoise from falling. That was the

wrong mode of explanation. Modern astronomers say that the earth is held in its orbit by the other celestial bodies and that it assists in keeping each of them in its position as well. No heavenly body is at the bottom and holds the others up; they all belong in a self-maintaining system. So it is with the speculative philosophy; it is a coherent whole, and the truth of each detail in the system is seen in the light of the system in its entirety. To know anything thoroughly means to see it in relation to Reality as a whole, which includes God. The position is well expressed in Tennyson's lines:

> "Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies,
> I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but *if* I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is."

5—*Pragmatic Arguments.*

The majority of philosophers in Great Britain and America today as elsewhere in the world, are probably in one or another sense, idealists. Two movements in opposition to idealism have arisen, however, during the past generation, each of which has numerous adherents. These are Pragmatism and the New Realism. Pragmatism, slightly the elder of the two in point of time, is a doctrine of peculiar interest to Americans, for the reason that it originated in the United States. This doctrine, which was made famous by William James, is based chiefly on two fundamental positions, a *method* of investigation, and a theory of the *nature* of truth. The method of investigation is, that any idea, belief, theory, hypothesis or doctrine should be tested by the practical consequences that follow from accepting it and acting upon it. This has come to be known as the "pragmatic test" of truth. If a theory is true, it will work out in practice; if it cannot be made to work practically, it is not true. James, who occasionally made rather reckless statements, sometimes gave the impression that according to pragmatism, any idea whatever that brings satisfactory consequences is true. If the maid can make her mistress believe that the cat broke the tea cup, it is true that the cat broke it. If it gives men more pleasant emotions to believe that there is a God, why there is one. James, of course, did not mean to assert such absurdities as these. What careful pragmatists

mean to assert as constituting what Professor D. C. Macintosh discriminatingly calls "essential pragmatism," 10, is that the *supreme test* of the truth of a proposition is observation of the practical consequences that logically follow from its acceptance; it is verified, if action upon it is followed by the consequences that could reasonably be expected to follow. This, known as the "pragmatic test" of truth, is agreed by most philosophers of all schools to be *a* good, practical test of truth; but only pragmatists make it *the* final and supreme test.

The pragmatistic theory of the *nature* of truth is far more radical. This Professor Macintosh calls "hyper-pragmatism," 11. This doctrine is, that truth is not merely tested by, but *actually consists* of, the practical consequences that follow from the acceptance of a proposition when these are what would be logically expected.

As we are concerned with arguments for the existence of God, and not with the merits of Pragmatism in general, it will be impossible here to enter into a discussion of the merits of the doctrine of the *nature* of truth affirmed by "hyper-pragmatism," nor of the doctrine of "essential pragmatism" that the pragmatic method is the supreme method of investigating truth. The argument for God, now to be stated, merely employs the pragmatic method, which nearly every one admits to be at least one good, practical method of investigation.

The hypothesis of God (not in the sense of speculative idealism which James rejected, possibly because he never fully understood it, but in the sense of an external God) James found to meet the pragmatic test successfully. His study of the various forms of religious experience,—continuous growth ("healthy-mindedness" as he called it), conversion, saintliness, and mysticism—led him to conclude that "*the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come*, a positive content of religious experience which it seems to me, *is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.*" He quotes, with apparent approval, the assertion of W. C. Brownell that "the influence of the Holy Spirit, exquisitely called the Comforter, is a matter of actual experience, as solid a reality as that of electro-magnetism." To act on the hypothesis of God thus does work, and its validity is confirmed in the actual experience of the believer, 12.

This pragmatic argument, based upon the fact that the acceptance of God leads to desirable consequences in the life

of the individual, James presented in an ingenious form in one of his earliest essays, "Reflex Action and Theism," an argument for belief in God as a personal power, "which not only makes for righteousness, but means it and recognizes us." "Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living *thou*, with whom the whole man may have dealings," 13. Such a belief leads to the quickening of human powers, and furthers their development. Other beliefs as to the nature of the universe, such as atheistic materialism and the sort of pantheism that makes God indifferent to distinctions between good and evil, weaken man's resolution. There can be no question that belief in the right sort of a God stimulates man to do his best.

Is it possible to restate James' last mentioned argument for such a Being, without basing it upon the hyper-pragmatistic theory of the *nature* of truth? In the author's opinion, Yes. Man is placed in a real environment, not an imaginary one. If there were no Being in man's environment, to which the conception of God in some measure corresponded, man would not best succeed in adjusting himself to his environment by belief in God; such a belief in that case would be entirely quixotic in its effects on human conduct. But the opposite is the fact. Therefore, there is a God. To be sure, our idea of God may not be very adequate. It may be as imperfect as the conceptions which we might imagine that the tiny inhabitants of a pool of water have of us. But every philosophical believer in God is ready to admit that our conceptions of Him are symbolical. The fact that the conception does work in human experience, that it does enable men to conform to the requirements of the world in which they are placed, and to achieve a fuller life, is evidence for the contention that the conception is not an illusion, but that, however inadequate it may be, it is at least symbolical of ultimate reality.

While, in the author's opinion at least, the drift of pragmatism is in the direction of belief in God, it must be admitted that a decided antagonism to teleological arguments of every kind, and a complete and almost ominous silence on the subject of God are characteristic of writings of certain prominent pragmatists. However, the author knows of no pragmatist who has explicitly rejected the belief in God in his writings.

14. Certain pragmatists write in a manner that sometimes seems to adherents of other schools to imply that in their opinion God is purely a projection from human experience and needs, and in no sense exists independently. The author is not certain, however, that such pragmatists are correctly understood by their non-pragmatistic readers and critics. Pragmatists who deny that there is any reality, whatever, outside of experience cannot be expected to affirm the existence of God outside of experience. When such a pragmatist earnestly affirms the necessity, validity, and constant growth of the conception of God *within* experience, he attributes to God as much, and very likely more, validity than he assigns to any other conception. He is therefore consistent in advising the layman to pray and to cultivate other forms of religious experience in the confidence that they are valid in the sense that other beliefs are valid, 15.

6—*The New Realism and God*

The new realism has been making rapid strides, during the two decades of its existence, among professional philosophers. Few of its representatives have as yet made popular statements of their beliefs; and, as a rule, each new technical treatise by a new realist discloses the fact that his opinions on many subjects have greatly altered since his last publication. No doubt this is an indication of healthy growth. But it renders the attempt to make the new realism clear to a beginner almost hopeless, especially in regard to belief in God and other matters of religious faith,—topics on which comparatively few of the school have as yet definitely committed themselves.

Naïve realism is the view of the plain man, who supposes that objects exist independent of him, regardless of whether any one perceives them or in any way thinks of them. The apple exists, and is red, slightly sour, sweet, and solid, whether any mind in the universe takes notice of it or not. Scientific realism maintains that the primary qualities of matter exist independent of human minds; for it the apple of the plain man becomes atoms and molecules in motion, or electric charges. The new realists are not quite certain whether to side with the naïve or the scientific realist; they would like to show, if possible, that both are in some sense right. Numbers, and all mathematical and logical principles, exist independent of minds, and of all events that go on in the world process; they subsist

as eternal essences or entities. 7 plus 5 equals 12 whether any one knows it, or thinks of it, or not. The same is true of the higher numbers that no one yet has ever counted, and of the undiscovered fields of higher mathematics. Whether moral axioms also (like those of justice, benevolence and equity) subsist eternally, apart from minds, is a disputed point among the new realists themselves. The philosophical position to which the new realism is completely in opposition is mentalism. It is opposed to the pragmatists upon the nature of truth; and, since the eternal essences are valid independent of time, the pragmatic test of truth interests it little. In opposition to speculative idealism, the new realists affirm the doctrine of the "externality of relations." For the speculative idealist, reality is an organic whole, and nothing can be understood completely without taking into account its relations to everything else; this is the "internality of relations." On the contrary, the new realist defends analysis, and believes that he can isolate an object and study it by itself; its relations to other things are external. For instance, if you take a book down from the shelf and place it upon the table, it is the same book; its relations to shelf and table are external and do not affect its real nature. Consciousness, too, is external; objects can pass in and out of all minds unaltered.

As will be observed, the issues with which the new realism has chiefly been concerned bear no obvious relation to religious beliefs. Consequently it is probably merely a matter of chance that certain initiators of the movement happened to be antagonistic to religious beliefs of the traditional sort. For instance, while Mr. Bertrand Russell, one of the most famous of the school, restricts religion to the limited sphere permitted by scientific materialism, 16. this position, as Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé points out, has "no point of contact whatever with his Realism in theory of knowledge," 17. Professor R. W. Sellars, 18, an American writer who in many respects is to be classified with the new realists, does not bring the conception of God into his description of the "humanist's religion" which he advocates.

Professor E. G. Spaulding, on the other hand, believes in God. In his opinion, for the new realism, "God is the totality of values;" He is "justice and truth and beauty, both as these are 'above' our world and as they are *in* it;" "He is thus both transcendent and immanent," 19. Professor Spaulding af-

firms his belief in "a Power for good that works not only side by side with man, but also *in him and through him, flowering in that freedom which is given to his reason to get at truth, to his emotions* to love the beautiful, the good, and the true, and detest the ugly, the evil, and the false, and *to his will and manhood to engage in the struggle*," 20. Professor S. Alexander, whose Gifford Lectures, entitled *Space, Time and Deity* is the most complete metaphysical treatise that has yet been published by a new realist, arrives at the affirmation of the existence of God, with most of the philosophical attributes usually recognized. Whether his reasoning on matters of religion will be acceptable to the younger and more radical neo-realists remains to be seen.

It can at least be affirmed that the new realists are not materialists or mechanists. Some of them are eloquent in asserting that we can and should devote ourselves wholeheartedly to endeavors for the betterment of humanity, and that we live in a universe where moral aims are attainable. The argument of Professor Hobhouse, in his *Development and Purpose* (21) may be expected to have weight with the new realists, who have much in common with him. As a matter of fact, this argument does seen to have impressed Professor R. B. Perry, 22, in whose writings the claims of religion are taken into consideration, 23, but who has not yet made it certain whether and to what extent he is ready to give the belief in God a place in his metaphysical system. Some of the great figures in the history of philosophy, with which the new realism has most in common, like Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Leibnitz and Reid have been defenders, of the belief in God.

III—*Arguments Against Belief in God*

The chief objections to belief in God come either from the side of Atheism, which maintains that there is no God, or of Agnosticism, which maintains that the question of the existence of God is impossible of solution. Sometimes arguments are advanced by writers who do not clearly decide whether they prefer agnosticism or atheism, or some conception of God that would practically exclude worship of Him.

1—*Atheistic Arguments*

Arguments for mechanism, or for a teleology without a God, are really arguments for atheism. These have already been considered, 24, as has also the contention that the conception of

God should be rejected because it is anthropomorphic. These are the chief arguments for atheism. A classical defence of atheism is Baron Holbach's (†1789) *System of Nature.* Its arguments are largely directed against crude conceptions of God now happily obsolete among cultivated people, an outcome which the modern world no doubt owes to this writer and to other sturdy "infidels" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

One of Holbach's contentions, however, really is among the strongest common sense arguments for atheism, though strangely enough we do not often hear it today. It might be paraphrased somewhat like this. "If there really were a God, we should have no doubt upon the subject at all. Such a Being as God is thought to be, all wise and powerful, who expects men to believe in Him, would certainly have made Himself known to men in some absolutely unmistakable manner, and not merely by the mode of improbable miracles and revelations which are unconvincing to most thoughtful men. If God exists, why has He not declared Himself?" It must be admitted that there is a serious difficulty here. Kant's answer to this objection is a consequence of his doctrine that the main value of human life is the good will, that is, character and fidelity to duty. If men knew the existence of God beyond question, they would automatically do what He requires, as mere puppets, out of fear of Him, and they could develop no regard for duty and character for their own sakes. Expressed a little differently, we might say that probably the main reason for the existence of mankind is the expression in finite beings of character, and that this is better secured by faith in a Supreme Being than by certain knowledge of Him. A different and perhaps a better reply to Holbach would be to say that God actually has revealed Himself to men, in the gradual experience of the race as we have observed the evolution of the idea of God in Part I, and in the private experiences of individuals, such as we studied in Part II. God actually reveals Himself to man as rapidly as man's developing intelligence has rendered possible.

The further objection, that if there were a God, He would have created men perfect at once, and given them a perfect knowledge of Himself, can only be advanced against the conception of a creator God, and does not hold against other conceptions of the nature of God.

2—Agnostic Arguments

Agnosticism does not deny that there is a God; it merely denies our ability to find out whether there is one.

One of the most brilliant presentations of Agnosticism in modern times is that advanced by Herbert Spencer in the First Part of his *First Principles*. All human knowledge, he urges, is relative. The ultimate scientific conceptions, such as space, time, cause, effect, matter and motion, are all relative to the human point of view, and full of contradictions if taken in any absolute sense. Ultimate religious ideas also are unattainable. There are only three ways of explaining the origin of the world,—atheism, pantheism, and theism. If, with atheism, we suppose that the universe is self-existent, we have explained nothing about its nature. If, with pantheism, we believe that the universe is self-creative, we are unable to state the character of this creation; we have explained nothing. If, with theism, we believe that the universe was created by an external Agency, we find ourselves unable to explain where the materials came from that were used by the Creator; nor how the Creator Himself came into existence. The ultimate ground of all existence is therefore Unknown and Unknowable.

But when we go on to examine the Second part of the *First Principles*, and the other volumes of his *Synthetic Philosophy*, we find Spencer giving a truly remarkable account of the law of evolution, a law which describes the development of the heavenly bodies, of the earth's crust, of plant and animal life, of the human mind, of human ethics, religion, and society. He assures us that we may reckon with confidence in the continuance, for a long period into the future, of this process by which human life is advancing in length and breadth, in other words, in which human moral values are destined to triumph to such an extent that egoism and altruism, and duty and pleasure will at last coincide, and everybody will spontaneously do what he ought to do, 25.

The critical reader is bound to ask, "If this marvelous process of evolution is a fundamental law of the universe and of man, and if this evolution somehow arises from and is dependent upon, the Unknown and Unknowable, are we so entirely ignorant of the latter after all? We at least know how the Unknown and Unknowable is manifested in evolution, and that this manifestation makes for good." It is not a great step,

and it appears a perfectly logical one, that John Fiske, an enthusiastic disciple of Spencer, took when he called the Unknown and Unknowable the "Power that makes for Righteousness,"—in other words, God, 26. Fiske was accordingly able to amend the Spencerian philosophy so as to make room for all the knowledge of God that is required to meet the genuine needs of religion.

There remains, however, one difficulty in Spencer's philosophy, his view of dissolution and the astronomical conception of evolution on which this view is based. Presently the earth will grow cold. Life upon it will gradually disappear, and ultimately become extinct. Finally the earth itself will collide with other heavenly bodies, and its matter will be resolved into nebulous gases again. What, under these circumstances, will have become of the alleged "Power that makes for Righteousness?"

This difficulty is real, but not impossible of solution. Take the facts at their worst. Suppose man were utterly to disappear. It would still have been true that he had once lived, and attained morally valuable ends. There are hundreds of thousands of years ahead of man on the earth before his destruction will come by natural causes. When we consider what has been accomplished already within the few thousand years of history, and how rapid human progress has been during the past three or four centuries, imagination fails when it tries to think of what man will yet accomplish on the earth. Will that not have been worth while? Does it not reveal a teleological Power in evolution, even if this Power is unable or unwilling to preserve the achievements of man forever? So, taken at its worst, these facts do not render the existence of God doubtful, but merely human immortality.

But a more favorable outcome is quite conceivable. The purposive Mind of the universe will outlive the crash of worlds and be present in the evolution of future celestial systems. Indeed, astronomers believe that the heavens reveal solar systems in all stages of evolution and dissolution. Cells are constantly dying and being replaced in the living human organism; if the entire universe is organic, should the analogy not lead us to expect similar waste and repair in the body of God? If God is eternal, we men and our moral and other values will persist forever in His mind; we, too, shall persist in His consciousness; it may be that we shall be immortal in God.

To be sure, you may say, this is all speculation. Any theories on such subjects must be speculative. But it is also speculative to say that human values must perish when the earth grows cold. Which of the two guesses is the more probable? Well, if the general weight of evidence is really in favor of a teleological and a moral universe, is it not more probable that in such a universe the great achievements that occur during the evolution of the earth, and the similar achievements that we conjecture occur on other planets are not lost? In a universe that is purposive to the extent that we know ours to be, must not such values in some sense be eternally conserved?

IV—*The "Right to Believe" Argument, Faith*

Perhaps the answer to agnosticism that has just been given may appear to leave a rejoinder open to the agnostic. We might imagine him saying:—"Any conjectures on matters of this sort, about which we know so little, are unwarranted. Your very concessions show how extremely speculative any theory on the matter must be. Better be honest, and confess that though you have found several arguments in favor of God that have some plausibility, they are by no means conclusive, and that it is better to agree that all questions regarding the ultimate nature of the universe, including the existence of God, are to man at present, and so far as we can judge probably always will be, unanswerable." An excellent rebuttal to the agnostic on this point is furnished by the "right to believe" argument of William James.

As is often the case with a popular and somewhat impressionistic philosopher, James in some respects overstated this argument, and laid himself open to attack upon assertions to which his position did not necessarily commit him. Instead, therefore, of reproducing James' argument as a whole, for which the reader is referred to his famous essay, 27, the author will here in his own language give what he believes to be a part of the fundamental truth in James' doctrine of "the right to believe" in God.

Let us concede to the agnostics that the existence of God has not, and in the present state of human knowledge, cannot be proved. None of the arguments which have been reviewed

in the present chapter affords absolutely conclusive evidence. It would have been easy to discredit every one of them, if taken by itself. A child can destroy a strong cable, by severing each of its separate fibres, one by one. Yet each of the arguments indicates *some* evidence in favor of the existence of God. Suppose, however, that the reader, like the author, believes that all of these arguments, taken together, after due allowance has been made for the difficulties, establish a decided weight of probability in favor of the existence of God. What then should a man believe? Put it this way; either there is a God or there is not a God. The weight of evidence, though not conclusive, is in favor of the existence of God. Under these circumstances should a man believe in God, or should he suspend judgment in the matter? Should a man become an agnostic, or should he maintain, with such modifications as his study and reflection prompt, adherence to the God of the Christian or Jewish faith in which he has been brought up?

This is, you see, a practical question. It is, indeed, a moral question. Is it *right* to believe, on mere probability, what we do not know? If the question were not one of great moment, it would clearly be foolish to commit oneself to an uncertain proposition. But this is a momentous question. The way in which it is decided will considerably modify one's attitude towards life. If one can believe that the whole world order is, at least to a great extent, under the guidance and control of a Power that makes for Righteousness, and who is accessible in private prayer and public worship, one will have a source of assurance, comfort and support upon which he can rely in the responsibilities of life. The man who walks through life with the aid of the Great Companion surely ought to be, and usually is, a wiser, stronger, and better man than one who has to rely solely upon his own efforts and those of his fellowmen. Has a man a *right* to such a belief, however, in view of its uncertainty?

Now, if a man believed that the weight of evidence lay *against* the belief in God, we should certainly have to reply, that he has no such right. To be dishonest with oneself in such a matter, to try to hypnotize oneself into believing what one does not believe would be intellectual dishonesty and moral cowardice. We ought to honor the manly courage of the skeptics and agnostics in all ages who have refused to consent to self-deception and, often subject to contumely and even actual persecu-

tion, have gone through life without the sustaining support of prayer and sacraments.

But if a man believes that the weight of evidence, considered rationally, and without regard to his own preferences or prejudices in the matter, is in favor of a God, but is not absolutely conclusive, has he a right to believe in God?

There can be but one answer to the question. He certainly has this right. Indeed, in many of the affairs of life we are constantly obliged to act on such probabilities. What man or woman ever married, who was absolutely certain that the marriage would prove a happy one? Who ever made a fortune who did not run some risk of losses in his investments? What successful business house could go through a day's transactions without running risk of making some mistakes and possibly serious ones? How often in the history of science itself men have walked by faith, have believed in, and devoted a large part of their whole lives to investigations based upon hypotheses of which they were not absolutely certain! Darwin's career will serve as an illustration. After he returned from his voyage he tells us he was haunted by the notion of evolution, an idea to which the facts that he had observed in South America strikingly pointed, although he was long unable to form any logical conception of how such a process as evolution could have taken place. Few Christian saints have walked more courageously by faith, and not by sight, than did he, an invalid, in frequent suffering, for years patiently collecting evidence in favor of a theory that, for all he certainly knew, might prove to be wholly false. Unless one believes that people should never marry, or succeed in business, or make scientific discoveries, one cannot say that it is not right to act on beliefs that seem fairly probable, although they are by no means proved. And it can be as right to act in regard to religion, in the same manner as in other fields where momentous decisions have to be made upon probable but not conclusive evidence.

Furthermore, there are cases where belief in a probable fact helps to make the fact a reality. If two people, when they decide to marry, resolutely believe in each other, their marriage is far more likely to be happy than if they maintain an attitude of "honest doubt" of each other. Our great West was settled successfully because the pioneers firmly believed in the future of the country. Darwin would never have succeeded in establishing the truth of evolution if he had not believed in it.

Belief in the existence of God obviously could not bring such a Being into existence if there be none. But *if* there be a God, belief in Him may well bring about two desirable results. First, it may lead to the discovery of evidence one would not observe otherwise, as continually occurs in science when an hypothesis is adopted tentatively. Secondly, it may help to make God a Reality in one's own life experience, and so coöperate in bringing about the purposes of God, if these purposes include the attainment by man of consciousness of Him, and human coöperation with Him in the achievement of moral values. Of course one must first find the weight of evidence clearly in favor of a supposed fact before he should adopt it in the hope that his belief will help either to bring it about, or to establish its truth. If a woman were to marry a confirmed drunkard, her belief in him might not avail to render the marriage a happy one. Our Western pioneers could not have developed the fertile fields which they passed on to the present generation if they had tried to farm blue sky. It is obviously foolish to base any important decision on pure speculation. But where the evidence is reasonably good, and the prospects of reward are great, it really seems foolish *not* to believe.

And may we not go a step further? Sometimes is it not merely a right, but also an actual *duty* to believe, and to act upon a belief in cases where only probability, and not absolute certainty can be had? An excessively cautious officer of a corporation may fail in his duty to the stockholders by losing good business opportunities for them as truly as one who rashly invested their funds without making a careful preliminary investigation. A man may conceivably owe it to a woman, whom he loves and whom he has taught to care for him, to give her the chance to accept him, although no man can be *absolutely* certain in advance that the marriage would prove a happy one. Similarly, a woman conceivably might fail in her duty, both to a man and to herself, by refusing him on account of excessive doubts.

If the evidence in favor of God seems reasonably probable, and if a man knows that the acceptance of this belief, and action upon it, will enable him to be a better man, to achieve a nobler life for himself, and to be of more service to others, than would otherwise be possible, is it not his *duty* to believe? Is it right for a man to refuse the enrichment that might come to his life through consecration to God, and the aid he may

give others and receive from them by participating in the public worship of the church or synagogue in which he has been brought up, or which for other reasons he finds will be of most service to him, or in which he can be of most service to others?

The author does not wish to press this argument too strongly. It is, of course, a matter of private conscience. Where absolute proof is unattainable, everyone must weigh the evidence for himself. Like marriage, it is a personal matter, which no one can decide for any one else. It is what in ethics is called a case of imperfect obligation. And, as in all cases of imperfect ethical obligation, it is every one's duty to exercise perfect respect and tolerance for those who decide differently in the matter from oneself. Those who identify themselves with church or synagogue should respect those who do not. And those who remain outside of religious organizations should remember that in our modern society it is quite as wrong, and quite as easy, for an atheist or agnostic to be a fanatical bigot as it is for a believer in God.

It ought to be clear without further discussion what the thoughtful modern believer in God should understand by Faith. He does not accept the small boy's definition, "Faith is believing, 'cos you want to, what you know ain't so." He cannot, with Tertullian, believe in absurdities—*credo quia absurdum;* nor can he with Pascal, affirm that there are such things as "reasons of the heart" which cannot be intellectually tested; he cannot, even, with Locke, believe that there are truths that, though not inconsistent with reason, yet are "above reason" and have their truth validated by revelation. While he regards his acceptance of God as a "venture of faith," he did not make it on more uncertain evidence than many of the other important decisions of his life. After having made this decision and acted upon it, he has found his confidence in its correctness strengthened by his further experience. He does not believe that this is due to shutting his eyes to the uncertainty of the evidence, but to the fact that further events have been on the whole what belief in God would have led him to expect. False hypotheses as a rule do not work when put into practice. This hypothesis, he finds, does work in his own experience, and in that of other religious people with whom he is associated. He, therefore, believes that it is true. And this is all that he means by Faith.

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Numerous references, of both elementary and advanced character, are given in the Notes to this Chapter.

CHAPTER XX

THE NATURE OF GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

I—*Introductory*

We are now ready to consider theories regarding the nature of God. Whether the relation of God to man be conceived to be immanent or external, a satisfactory theory of the nature of God must be able to meet three requirements. (1) God must be so conceived that it can be held that it is through His agency that prayer and other religious experiences are rendered efficacious in the various ways that we saw in Part II, that, as a matter of fact, they are efficacious. (2) Since it is maintained that man receives aid from God, it must be that God is good, a power that makes for righteousness in the universe, just and benevolent in His treatment of man. The presence of *physical* and *moral* evil in the world must be reconciled with the supposed goodness of God. By *physical* evil is meant the effects of natural conditions adverse to man, conditions that produce floods and drouth, lightning, earthquakes, famines, diseases, and other calamities that fall indifferently upon good men and bad men alike. By *moral* evil is meant sin and its consequences, which often afflict the innocent together with the guilty. (3) A God who in some sense is thought to be directing the course of events in the universe and to come to the assistance of man through his religious experiences must be extremely powerful. How is His supreme powerfulness to be reconciled with the freedom of the human will? Or is human freedom an illusion? If the latter question is answered affirmatively, in what sense can man be morally responsible for his actions?

In the present chapter we shall be concerned with the first two of these questions, leaving the third to the following chapter. We shall begin by considering the answers given by two rival tendencies of thought which it will be convenient to call "traditional theism" and "traditional pantheism," 1, after which we shall notice the views of several philosophers of our own time.

II—*Traditional Theism*

In its older Christian forms, traditional theism taught that once there was a time when nothing existed but God, and that He decided to create the heavens and earth, which He proceeded to do in the manner set forth in the opening chapters of Genesis. He created man in His own image out of the dust of the ground and breathed in him a living soul. Man was then innocent, knowing neither good nor evil. Tempted by the Devil, an angel who had previously rebelled against God, man disobeyed the divine command, and sin entered the human race. Because of sin God condemned all mankind to everlasting punishment: but later on, out of compassion, He sent his only begotten Son down to earth, who assumed the form of a man in the person of Jesus Christ, and satisfied divine justice by dying for mankind upon the cross. All men who come to hear of Jesus Christ, and who accept Him as their Saviour in the manner that He has prescribed, will be saved from everlasting punishment. After His resurrection from the dead, Christ ascended into Heaven, from whence He shall come at the end of the earth, and judge living men, and all the dead who shall then have risen from their graves. Those whom He accepts shall live in eternal bliss with Him in Heaven, while the remainder of mankind shall burn in Hell forever. Heaven, Earth, Hell, and (except for Protestants after the Reformation and except, according to the Protestant contention, for primitive Christians) Purgatory, were definitely located by the astronomy of the times. There was much that was ethically inspiring in this faith, due to the fact that good men focussed their attention on its finer features, such as the love of God for them, and their redemption through the love and suffering of Christ. Many good people in countless ages in the past, as well as today, have been impelled to their noblest efforts through it. Its finest poetical expressions were furnished, in the Catholic interpretation, by Dante, and in the Protestant, by Milton.

Traditional theism attributed the efficacy of prayer and other forms of religious experience to the miraculous interference of God in the world's events. Before the growth of modern natural science, the theist was not forced to accept the uniformity of nature. He believed man to be surrounded by numerous good and evil spirits, and that they, as well as God, continually set aside the course of natural events. He found

no difficulty in believing that God had actually once caused the sun to stand still in the sky until the Israelites could gain a complete victory over their enemies, and that on another occasion, He caused a man to ride up into Heaven in a chariot of fire.

However, aside from scientific objections, traditional theism was always open to many difficulties. Why did God exist all alone by Himself, from all eternity, before He decided to make a world? What change took place in Him to lead Him to create the world when He did? More serious were the difficulties with the problem of evil. If, as was believed, God was all wise, all good, and all powerful, why did He create a world full of physical ills, and of sin and suffering? When He created man, did He not foresee that man would sin? If He did not, He could not have been omniscient; and if He did, how can He be exonerated from responsibility for the fall of man? Adam and Eve are depicted in Genesis as mere children, not knowing the difference between good and evil. The heinous sin that they committed merely consisted in eating forbidden fruit! For this God is said to have inflicted an everlasting punishment, not only upon them, but upon their remotest descendants. How can anybody attribute to a just and loving God judgments so harsh and disproportionate to the character of an offense, that if they had been rendered by any man he would abhor him as a vindictive tyrant? The cruelty of God, according to the old theistic conception, has been passionately portrayed in English poetry by Byron in *Cain*, and by Shelley in *Queen Mab*. In reply to the charge that their view really makes God responsible for the wrong doing of man, theistic theologians often said that God created man good and innocent, with a free will and that man later wilfully abused his freedom by disobeying his Maker. This view, however, appears to admit that God's power has become curtailed since His creation of the world. He has been compelled to face the insurrection of His creatures.

The old-fashioned theistic theologians were never able to escape from such dilemmas as this: If God be all wise and powerful, He must have willed all that has come to pass, including human sinfulness, and the other evils and imperfections in the universe. But if He willed all these evils and imperfections, He cannot be all wise and powerful. We cannot here review the many subtle and refined arguments by which a way

out of this dilemma was sought. Historians have pointed out similar difficulties in Jewish and Moslem theism.

III—*The Older Pantheism*

Opposed to the theistic conception of a Creator God, there frequently appeared in Christian and Jewish thought the unorthodox conception of *pantheism.* This doctrine identifies God with the world in its totality—all things, taken together, are God. This was the position, as we saw in Chapter VII, of philosophical Brahmanism. Various Biblical passages have been interpreted in favor of this view, notably such as "the kingdom of God is within you," and the imagery of the vine and the branches in the fifteenth chapter of the fourth Gospel, as well as expressions here and there in the writings of St. Paul. Pantheism has always been a favorite view with mystics of all religions. The fundamental life principle in you and me and all things is God; we are all one in Him; there is really no difference between us,—that is the truth in the figurative saying that we are all brothers and God is our heavenly Father. There was much that is poetically attractive in the old pantheism. It made for sweetness, sympathy and tolerance. For it, God was love more consistently than for the old theism which portrayed God too often as an angry and vengeful Judge. It could escape some of the harshness of Genesis by interpreting the account allegorically. But, where the old theism tended toward bigotry, the old pantheism erred on the side of excessive tolerance. Since all things are God, good and evil, truth and error, are all alike divine. God is both the slayer and the slain. He is the doubter and the doubt as well as the devout worshipper and his hymn of praise, as is shown in Emerson's little poem, *Brahma.* If objection be made to this tendency to submerge all things in God, and make God favor both good and evil, the pantheist could take refuge in the negative side of his doctrine, and say that God, being Infinite, is beyond all human conceptions; He is neither good nor bad, neither true nor false; of Him we can say only that He is, and that no human attribute applies to Him. To identify oneself with God is, then, from the human standpoint apparently to pass into nothingness; God is all, therefore He is nothing that we can perceive or conceive.

Such pantheism had even more serious faults than its theistic

rival; it could not satisfactorily serve the function of religion in the conservation of values. It only escaped the narrowness and animosities of theism by a vision of gentle loveliness that made everything satisfactory as it is, since all is God, and since no human values have significance for Him at all. "Resist not evil" was likely to become a precept of lazy acquiescence in things as they are; and it was easy to find a quiet retreat from participation in the world's battles, and enjoy a vision of the ineffable.

However, we must not give an unjust impression. Many a mystical saint who has believed himself and all men identical with God has taught the world lessons of kindness and charity, and how to recognize the divine possibilities for good that exist in every man. Less concerned than theism to effect miraculous changes in the external world, pantheism taught that the real struggle and the real victory are to be won in the human soul itself. To realize the divine presence both within one's soul and in those of one's fellowmen and to maintain one's life on this plane is the main achievement of prayer. In such experiences one attains immortality here and now. Pantheism served as a corrective to theism; neither was the whole truth, each had excellences that the other lacked. Most adherents of religion have, in their thinking and in their living, unconsciously combined the two philosophies, with results that were saner and more wholesome than either view taken by itself would have afforded.

IV—*Modern Philosophical Theism and Pantheism*

As religious thought has been gradually assimilating the teachings of modern science, theism and pantheism have been tending to converge. With the acceptance of the Copernican astronomy, it became impossible for theism to place God upon a throne in any particular locality in the universe; it became clear that if He is anywhere, He must be everywhere. Heaven and Hell had to be thought of as states rather then as places. With the prevalence of the doctrine of evolution, other theistic conceptions had to be greatly modified. It became difficult in astronomy to think that the universe ever had a beginning; its various portions pass through cycles or phases, but it must always have existed, and it always will exist. If God is its Creator, the theist was forced to conclude that He could not have created it in some particular period in the past; He must

be eternally creating it. As the different biological species were found to have developed at different times from other species in accordance with natural laws, it was seen that if God be credited with their creation, He must have been creating them gradually through the processes of evolution. God, in other words, is everywhere in the universe, eternally creating. Such a theism is little different from pantheism. The various processes of nature have for it become identified with the action of God.

Modern pantheism, on its side, has been unwilling to concede that there is, for God, no difference between good and evil, truth and error. To be sure, our human expressions are inadequate, when applied to God. Good and evil have a different significance for Him than for us. And God is everywhere, in all things. But all things do not have *equal* value for Him, nor is He equally revealed in them all. We speak of one photograph of a friend as good, another as bad; yet both are *truthful* likenesses; the camera never lies. But one likeness reveals more of the friend's personality than the other; the expression is more characteristic, as we say; the significance of the man is more adequately revealed by it. So it is of the various things in the world. The modern pantheist cannot agree with Pope that God is as perfectly revealed "in a hair as in a heart." Hoar and frost indeed "glorify God;" but the lowliest plant with its characteristics as an organism expresses the immanent divine teleology in more respects; the simplest conscious animal expresses them more fully than any plant; the most primitive savage more than any animal; good men more than bad men; and, for the Christian pantheist, Jesus far more than any other man. So, while all things in the universe have a place and a value, and all are expressions of God, they do not all have equal value.

The views which have thus far been attributed to modern theism and pantheism are hardly incompatible. In fact it is often difficult today to determine whether a writer really is a theist or a pantheist. Probably no philosophical theist today believes that there ever was a time in which there was no world, and that God then created it out of nothing; and no western pantheist thinks that God is indifferent to distinctions between good and evil. The 'creative evolution' of the present-day theist cannot be much different from the 'immanent teleology' of a contemporary pantheist.

Abandoning, therefore, any further attempt formally to distinguish between theism and pantheism, let us review certain typical positions that have recently been advanced regarding the nature of God. It will be convenient to center the discussion about the views of William James and Josiah Royce, probably the two most famous American philosophers who have developed their thought along these lines in recent years. They both stand for positions that are compromises between historic theism and historic pantheism. Both are too modern to be traditionally orthodox. James' philosophy of religion inclines more to the side of theism and an external God, while Royce is more on the side of pantheism and an immanent God. There are two advantages, for our purposes, in giving particular attention to these two philosophers. In the first place, the views of both can readily be approached from the psychological side which has been reviewed in Part II; and secondly, both express themselves with great lucidity and literary attractiveness. The reader who is beginning his study of the philosophy of religion will find it practicable and profitable to continue his study with the writings of either or both of these philosophers.

V—*James' Conception of an External God*

James was profoundly interested in the religious experiences of individual men and women of all epochs and creeds. In the investigation of such personal experiences he believed it possible to get closest to reality. At the end of his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, which contains a careful review of a large collection of such experiences, gathered from autobiographical and other sources, James concludes that in them all, despite the greatest differences in creeds and other outlooks upon life, there are common elements. These are: (1) an *uneasiness*, due to a sense of something being wrong about the person; followed by (2) a *solution*, due to a sense of being saved from the wrongness, by having made proper connection with something with which he can keep in working touch, and so save himself, even when all his lower being seems to have gone to wreck. A new life opens to him, and he has a sense of union with an external and superior helping power. Psychologically interpreted, this influx of new life clearly comes into consciousness from the subconscious self; the conscious person is continuous with a "wider self" through which saving experiences come.

Thus far, the testimony of all religious experiences is unan-

imous. James feels no doubt that he has been able to furnish the correct psychological explanation. What is beyond this "wider self," however, is the point of divergence between the adherents of different religions; on this, the testimony of Stoics, Buddhists, Vedantists, and Christians is extremely diverse. However, James believes that the facts make it at least highly probable that through this "wider self" the individual comes in contact with an "unseen region" of the universe. Through this "unseen region" work is actually done upon our finite personality, and we are turned into new men. It is therefore a real world, and one to which we belong in a more intimate sense than to the visible world, "for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world." The "unseen world" is therefore a reality. "God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God," 2.

James refuses in this book to specify in detail the characteristics of God. He is not even willing to decide whether he believes in one God, or in a sort of philosophical polytheism. But he is certain that the conception of God as he has accepted it, is sufficient to enable men to pray with the conviction that the strength that they receive from prayer is from a Superior Being not themselves, and to be similarly assured regarding their other religious experiences such as conversion, continuous growth, and mysticism. He believes that "the practical needs and experiences of religion" are "sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals."

In his other works James gives further details of his conception of God. For James, God, or the superhuman consciousness, "however vast it may be, has itself an external environment, and consequently is finite." He believes that there is a God, "but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once," 3. "God has an environment, He is in time, and works out a history just like ourselves." James was led to believe in the finitude of God, probably under the influence of the thought of John Stuart Mill, 4, to whom he dedicated his *Pragmatism*, and whom he greatly admired. Like Mill, the problem of evil seemed to James soluble only on this assump-

tion. Evil is in the world, as a great and terrible fact; any one who is a "tough minded" empiricist and willing to face the facts cannot fail to recognize it. It is futile with "tender minded" rationalists to shut our eyes to its presence, or to try to explain it away by saying that it is only an appearance or a human illusion, that for God it does not exist or else that to the divine Mind evil is transferred into some beautiful harmony of which we are not aware and in which we do not participate. "In this real world of sweat and dirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is 'noble,' that ought to count as a prescription against its truth, and as a philosophic disqualification. The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman. His menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the empyrean," 5. God, for James, "lives in the very dirt of private fact." The presence of evil in the world can only be explained on the assumption of a good God, if we believe that God is finite in power or knowledge and so has thus far been unable to prevent it. But there is hope that eventually evil will be overcome and turned to good, especially if we and other creatures assist God in bringing this about. "God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of his very being from our fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life means, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight,—as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulness, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears. For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted," 6. "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below . . . may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?" 7.

God, then, for James is finite; and the world is imperfect and sinful. But God is a conscious and a moral being, and we have the opportunity to coöperate with Him for the salvation of the world. If we are faithful, we can be sure that He will be faithful, and there is every reason to hope (though, to be sure, not absolute certainty, but a good fighting chance is all we need)

that we and He together will be victorious. The thought of James here, as Professor Flournoy has pointed out, is similar to that expressed in the words of the Apostle,—"We are laborers together with God," 8.

The advantages and disadvantages of James' conception of God are evident. It appeals to our red blood. We have a God who is on our side, who is accessible to us in religious experience and who will help us; and together with Him we have a good chance to make a finer and better world. On the other hand, the future is not absolutely assured, and to many the real function of religion is to give such assurance. "The victory for which morality fights is for religion already, or rather, eternally, won; and it is the assurance of this victory which inspires the finite subject with courage and confidence in his individual struggle," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, 9. James might reply that his view does give us a reasonable amount of assurance in view of the past progress that human history records, and of our own private religious experiences. A more serious objection, as it seems to the author, is one that he has already pointed out (see page 281 above) that the hypothesis of an external God has to be incorporated into the science of psychology, and so be made operative upon a plane where it does not seem properly to belong.

VI—*Other Theories of a Limited God*

The objection to James' conception of God just mentioned, has been avoided, the author believes, by Professor L. T. Hobhouse. In some respects his conclusions regarding God are similar to those of James, though his philosophical system as a whole is radically different. The history of the evolution of individual minds in the universe appears to imply "a Mind that is not limited to a single physical organism." The existence of a Purpose, so far as our experience and reasoning powers go, implies a Mind commensurate with that Purpose. So, if there is a purpose running through the world as a whole, and Professor Hobhouse thinks that the evidence points that way, "there is a Mind of which the world-purpose is the object." Such a Mind must be a permanent and central factor in the universe, in short, God. But this Mind, or God, is neither the whole of things nor an Omnipotent Creator; nor is it an Omnipotent Providence. It is only a factor in the whole of things.

Evil exists in the world. The extent of evil is "the measure of the incompleteness of the order actually achieved by Mind in the world," 10. Physical evil is the outcome of blind mechanical forces in the world which have not yet been brought under control. Moral evil is due to the partial ends that individuals, families, and classes of society selfishly pursue without regard to their effect upon others. These evils are gradually being overcome by an advancing humanity, in which God is incarnated. "This slowly wrought out dominance of mind in things is the central fact of evolution. . . It gives a meaning to human effort, as neither the pawn of an overruling Providence nor the sport of blind force. It is a message of hope to the world, of suffering lessened and strife assuaged, not by fleeing from reason to the bosom of faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by that collective wisdom, ... which is all that we directly know of the Divine," 11.

Professor Hobhouse in his philosophy makes no place at all for James' recognition of impulse, mysticism, and other non-rational factors. He does not permit us to believe that the increasing rational control of things is due to an external God acting upon the subconscious. For him God apparently must be immanent in the human mind, and especially in the human reason, and to operate through the logical processes. Professor Hobhouse is extremely guarded in venturing any further statements regarding the nature of God. It is quite possible, the author believes, to accept this interpretation of evolution and of the relation of God to man, and to make one further assertion which, so far as he knows, Professor Hobhouse has not himself made,—viz: that in prayer and other forms of religious experience (at least those of a more rational and intellectual character) man becomes aware of God and is strengthened by Him for the performance of his tasks, 12.

Another contemporary philosopher who believes in a limited God is Dr. Hastings Rashdall. He also is led to this conclusion by reason of the evil that is in the world. Dr. Rashdall conceives of God as alone eternal; all other beings owe their existence to Him. So God has willed and is responsible for the world as it is. The evil in the world is so great that we cannot believe the world, as it now is, to have been willed for its own sake by a perfectly good and rational Being, such as is God. The present world must therefore have been willed as a means to some future end. It would be unjust for man to have been

brought into existence merely in preparation for this future good unless he were to share in it; so man must be immortal. God has willed this universe as it now is, because it is the best that seems possible to Him, to whose mind all the possibilities of things are known. The ethical perfection of God is beyond question. His limitations cannot be on the side of His goodness; they must be on the side of His power. There must be eternal necessities that are part of His own eternal nature. These prevent Him from willing a universe in which all the good that will ultimately be gained in this universe might have been gained without the evil that now exists. God is responsible for the evil that men do, but not in such a way as to clear men of full responsibility for their own actions; indeed, in a sense, man alone is the author of evil, for he alone wills evil otherwise than as a means to the ultimate good. Dr. Rashdall's grounds for believing in the existence of God are chiefly the moral arguments, (which he states in a very convincing manner in connection with his ethical system as a whole), and the arguments that follow from mentalism.

That the doctrine of a finite God does not necessarily imply pragmatism or other standpoints peculiar to James is evident from the fact that this doctrine is also held by Professor Hobhouse, a realist, and by Dr. Rashdall, who calls himself a "theistic idealist." Both of these thinkers are at wide variance with James in their philosophical standpoints, and with each other. Yet the presence of evil has forced all three to the conception of a God that is limited in power. The example of Dr. Rashdall, a clergyman who adds to profound philosophical scholarship a deep understanding of and sympathy with, the needs of the human heart on the religious side, ought to assure any student that if his study of the problem of evil leads him to conclude that God is limited in power, he need not lose his religious faith and devotion to God on that account, 13.

Some of the other pragmatists have accepted James' doctrine of a finite God, and have in some respects developed the conception further, though it must be confessed, they have more often done so in connection with their attacks upon idealism than in a constructive manner. The most original and suggestive developments of the idea of a limited God in the literature of Pragmatism by writers other than James are probably to be found in the writings of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, 14.

VII—*Royce's Conception of an Immanent God*

Many idealistic philosophers of the past generation in Great Britain and America have held the conception of an immanent God. The God of religion is thought to be, either the universe taken in its entirety as an organic whole, or the Mind of the universe as a whole, or the closest approximation to such an Absolute that it is possible for religion to employ for its practical human needs. Josiah Royce's brilliant conception of God is in most respects typical of this group, and it furnishes a sharp contrast to the notion of a limited God which we have just been considering. As Royce's work was chiefly done before the issue between mentalism and speculative idealism had become so sharply defined as it is today, his conception contains features peculiar to each, and not entirely consistent with one another. Taken all in all, however, Royce's conception of God is probably the most readily grasped, and for religious purposes, the most practically workable that has been furnished by representatives of mentalism or speculative idealism.

Like James, Royce was keenly interested in religious phenomena from a psychological standpoint, and like him, he was deeply impressed with the problem furnished by the presence of physical and moral evil. However his idealistic philosophy, and the fact that his psychological interests were chiefly on the side of social psychology, led him to a conception of God and a solution of the problem of evil that were radically different.

Royce was at once impressed with the uniqueness of individuals and with the dependence of individuals upon one another in the social order. Our minds are so constituted that it is impossible for any of us to share directly in the consciousness of another person; I can see your body, but I cannot perceive your thoughts, nor you any of mine. On the moral side, too, each of us is unique; each has his own interests, talents, obligations and loyalties, and each of us must completely respect the personalities of others. Yet for all this uniqueness of our consciousness on the cognitive, as well as on the emotional and volitional sides, we belong in a social world and are dependent upon one another. Upon these considerations Royce bases his arguments for the existence of God. Along the lines of mentalism, he argues that the world must either be mental, such that minds can know it, or else it must be unknowable. After refuting the claims of agnosticism, he maintains that since the world

is knowable it must be actually known to an all embracing Mind or Self, *i. e.*, God. The fact that you and I can perceive the same object and agree—or for that matter disagree—about its characteristics, indicates that we are not really each shut up in his own isolated consciousness, but that we are members of a common Self (*i. e.*, God). We are related to each other in this common Self, in a manner somewhat analogous to that in which our ideas are related to one another in our own minds. In our own minds we often find different ideas in disagreement with one another; when this is the case, they can be corrected in the light of the completer knowledge we can recall from memory and attain by reasoning; in other words, each idea is validated and corrected by ourselves. In a similar way we are elements in agreement or disagreement with the other contents of God's mind. On the moral side, too, each of us has his own personality and his own talents and duties; he must find the objects and causes which evoke his loyalty and be faithful to them. These loyalties he will find lead him ever on into larger loyalties, until they constitute a system that includes his relationships to all his fellow human beings and to the universe as a whole, and so give him the place it is his duty to fill in the purposes of God. The fact of the mental isolation and moral uniqueness of every human being on the one hand, with the fact that his knowledge and his duties bring him into organic relationship with other human beings and with the physical universe on the other, lead to the conclusion that the universe as a whole must be an organic whole, unified in the knowledge and will of an Absolute Mind.

God, for Royce, is accordingly an Absolute Mind that knows, feels, and wills the whole universe in its entirety. He variously describes Him as "the Logos," the "Problem Solver," the "World Interpreter," and the all inclusive "Self," — all terms that imply that it is through Him that we share in the understanding and appreciation of the meaning and purposes of a common world. God is both in time and He is eternal. He perceives, feels and wills the various events that we experience following one another in time in our own consciousness; in this sense He is in time like ourselves. On the other hand, he perceives the entire succession of events in time all together at once, as a *totum simul*, and in this sense He is eternal. Analogous to the divine experience, is the manner in which one who understands music can experience as in an artistic whole the various

notes in a symphony; they indeed follow one another in time as the selection is rendered by the orchestra, yet in a sense they all belong together in a whole so that the last and the first are appreciated together. Unless the notes actually were experienced as following one another in time they could not also be perceived and felt as constituting an artistic whole. God experiences the Universe in time as we do, and immanent in us, in fact; and also He experiences it eternally as a completed whole. His experience of it in its eternal completeness and perfection could not occur if it were not for the fact that He also experiences its succession in time in ourselves and the other finite minds of the universe. In fact, His mind is constituted by the finite minds of the universe, and yet is a complete whole; much as our minds are constituted by our successive ideas, and yet embrace these ideas in the completed wholes that constitute our personalities or selves.

From this follows Royce's solution of the problem of evil. Just as there have to be strident notes in a symphony to make possible its harmony as a whole, so there must be evil in the world, both physical and moral, in order that it may be overcome in the universal harmony. Without the evil, the good could not triumph. This doctrine is not one of quietism or Oriental resignation. It calls upon all of us to endeavor to coöperate in the world purposes, both by way of intellectual understanding, and emotional appreciation, and service in the active duties of life, and so to make ourselves one with the Absolute. Moral responsibility and the sharp distinction between right and wrong are insisted upon. The life of the good man is eternally approved in the divine mind; the deeds of the sinful man, while turned to good ultimately in the world order, are eternally reprobated.

The doctrine that evil deeds are turned into good in the harmony of the whole, while in a sense they still remain evil and are reprobated, furnished one of the leading motives in Royce's interpretation of Christianity. Essential to any religion, or any associated life at all, is mutual confidence and loyalty. All sin is, in a sense, treason or disloyalty to the moral community. The betrayal of Judas and the denial of Peter were instances of such disloyalty. These had to be overcome and confidence restored through an atoning deed that would reunite the community and restore its devotion to its leader. This is the significance of the death of Christ as the Church was enabled to

interpret it. Why did the evil deeds have to take place? Would not the world have been better without them? No, Royce would answer. Only in this way would the atoning deeds be rendered possible, and the increased and intensified devotion of the members of the Church to one another. The suffering and death of the Master were essential; not otherwise could the early Church have attained its high spiritual plane of mutual love and devotion and passed on its ideal to future ages. Not only in the history of Christianity, but in the universe everywhere, moral evil is ultimately turned through heroic deeds, often involving suffering and sacrifice, to a more perfect harmony than would otherwise have been possible.

Various objections have been raised against Royce's philosophy of religion. It has been urged that if the world is all one in the Absolute, why do many of its features appear so heterogenous and conflicting to us? The answer is that we are finite and our limited ken does not afford a complete understanding of the pattern of the whole. Objections to the mentalism and panpsychism involved in Royce's account could, the author thinks, be met by purging the general account of these elements, which are not indispensable. For the argument for the existence of God based on the social character of our knowledge and the isolation of our finite selves could be substituted the organic and teleological arguments of speculative idealism.

More serious are the moral objections. Is it morally just to think of God as willing a universe, which, indeed, is all harmonious and glorious to His infinite mind, but at our expense? Is it right that we should suffer all the horrors of the world in order that He may enjoy a universal harmony? In his earlier works Royce assures us that this is right, because God suffers in our suffering and shares it with us. "Were not the Logos our own fulfillment, were he a remote god, were he not our own selves in unity, were he foreign to the harm and to the foolishness of our chaotic lives, we should indeed look to him in vain; for *then* his eternal peace would be indifference and cruelty, his perfection would be our despair, his loftiness would be our remote and dismal helplessness. But he is ours, and we are his. He is pierced and wounded for us and in us. Our defeats are his: and yet, above time, triumphant in the sacred glory of an insight that looks before and after through the endless ages and the innumerable worlds, he somehow finds amidst all these horrors of time his peace, and so ours. 'My

peace,' he says, 'I give unto you; not as the world giveth, give I unto you.' This, then at last, is the true realization of the rapt wonder that the mystics sought. What in time is hopelessly lost, is attained for him in his eternity," 15. While Royce here is very eloquent, he does not seem quite convincing. It sounds as if he were saying that God suffers when we do in order that He may rejoice when we do not. Such a philosophy ought really to indicate how a man may share in the joy that comes to God from his suffering. Robert Browning saw the answer to this difficulty better than Royce and stated it in the following stanza from *Abt Vogler*:

> "All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good, shall exist;
> Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power
> Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist
> When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.
> The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard,
> The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky,
> Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;
> Enough that he heard once: we shall hear it by-and-by."

Attention is called to the last line, particularly. If finite beings are in some sense participating in the eternal mind of God, it is their destiny to enjoy the eternal symphony too; the world order is vindicated. It is a pleasure to add, that although Royce nowhere in his writings, so far as the author has been able to discover, shows any indication that he realized that the most serious objection to his solution of the problem of evil can be met by the simple postulation of an immortality in which man can become sufficiently identified with God to gain such an insight, occasional passages in his later works suggest that he, as a matter of fact, actually did believe in precisely such a form of immortality. Royce's view of immortality will be discussed in Chapter XXII.

The conception of God advocated by Royce, in the opinion of the author at least, satisfactorily validates prayer and other forms of religious experience in the respects in which in Part II we found them actually to be efficacious. In these experiences, if we accept Royce's conception of God, we can say that the individual identifies himself with the thought and will of God. If it is in some degree through gaining the viewpoint of God, the universal Self, that we are able to communicate with each other and know a common world, and if it is through our identity with Him that we can unite in common loyalties, and if it is through our common social experience in the Church

that we have learned to know and appreciate Christ, then surely we must conclude that it is through God that we gain the spiritual reinforcement and other benefits afforded us in our religious experiences, 16.

VIII—*God and Absolute Idealism*

Royce is generally classified as an absolute idealist, though he puts more emphasis on feeling and will than is ordinarily characteristic of this type of philosophy. It must be admitted that the views of certain of the other absolute idealists— not all of them— are less favorable to religion than those of Royce. For instance, it is sometimes asserted that the God of religion and the Absolute of this kind of philosophy are not identical. The Absolute is then the term given to the Being that is the all inclusive Reality of the world as a whole. All finite beings are "appearances," partial bits of Reality that are true so far as they go, but are full of incoherencies and contradictions when assumed to be true in any ultimate sense. All human experience is of these appearances, which differ in the degree to which they approximate Reality. Religion is the very highest of these appearances, with the possible exception of philosophy. Still, religion is an appearance, and not Reality itself. And religion worships God, not the Absolute. For the Absolute, there can be no such thing as a purpose or a want, or a succession in time, or the distinction between good and evil, or a will; for all such distinctions imply limitations in the mind that experiences them, something to be attained that is not yet possessed. These limitations, to be sure, are painfully present in the life of man, with his finite intelligence, and to some extent he carries these limitations over into his religious conception of God; which, indeed, he probably has to do, in order that through God he may find aid and assurance in overcoming his difficulties. So the idea of a God, who has purposes and overcomes evil by good and comes to human aid, as conceived by religion, is only a finite and human conception formed on the level of appearances, and is not absolutely true.

At first glance, acceptance of a philosophy that regards God in this way must appear incompatible with continued practice of religion. It must be admitted that such a conception of God in distinction from the Absolute is far less satisfactory for religion than Royce's position. However, it must be remembered that writers of this type concede that

religion moves on one of the very highest orders of appearance; that it is closer to Reality than the natural sciences, and that the conceptions with which religion deals possess a higher degree of truth than those of science. Now it certainly seems to follow that if men are justified in bridge building in observing the principles of dynamics—principles based upon a lower order of appearance—they are also justified in addressing their prayers to God—a conception based on a higher order of appearance. (In saying this it is assumed that these prayers are of the forms found to be efficacious from a psychological standpoint, as analyzed in Chapter XVI). For practical purposes such a Being as God can be regarded as existing. The author accordingly believes that there is no reason to conclude that the acceptance of these conceptions of God and the Absolute logically render unjustified the belief of the followers of religion in the presence of God in their religious experiences. It seems clearly to follow from this philosophy that, so long as one thinks and acts on the plane of every day life—the plane of appearance on which all of us pass most of our time, and all but metaphysicians the whole of it—one is justified in such religious beliefs and practices as psychological science finds efficacious, 17.

IX—*The Author's Opinions*

Attractive in many ways as is the theory of a God whose relation to the individual in religious experiences is external, the author personally rejects this view, as he feels that the scientific objections to it are too great. He is as strongly prejudiced against the employment of God as an hypothesis to explain facts in the psychology of religion as in any other science. (Cf. page 281 above). He therefore favors the conception of an immanent God, who is present in human consciousness in religious experiences, but who is not perceived in a manner in any way analogous to that in which we perceive external objects. We are aware of our own selves as organizing factors within our consciousness, not as sensations having reference to parts of our organisms or to external objects. The same is true of God. Like the self, God's relation to us is an internal relation; we find Him within us.

While Royce's theory, if the postulate of immortality is made an integral feature of it, may dispose of the problem of evil theoretically, somehow it does not seem quite convincing. On

this point, William James, Professor Hobhouse and Dr. Rashdall are more satisfactory. When we consider how great the imperfections of the world are, and remember that they furnish a difficulty in any case for a teleological explanation, it seems more in accordance with the facts not to claim that the world as a whole is perfect, but merely that there is a teleological principle in it, that tends to be increasingly but not invariably successful.

To be sure, much that appears to us to be physical evil is really for man's good. Civilization has thrived most in the temperate zones where man has had difficulties to encounter, and not in the localities where temperature and soil afford him no problems at all. And many apparent moral evils are not absolutely so. Human vices can often be shown to be due to the survival of once valuable mental traits under new conditions where they are bad, but where as evolution goes on they are bound in time to be eradicated. The author believes that this is true of alcoholism—for in primitive conditions only mild intoxicants were known, were not very plentiful, and in promoting conviviality and good will brought peace and harmony within the social group; of excessive sexual propensities—for in earlier times with a greater death rate more births were necessary, and besides, even today, to sex energy sublimated (*i. e.*, turned into other channels), we owe much of our literature, art, music, and intellectual and athletic activity generally; and of gambling—for primitive man had to risk his life constantly in search for food and conflict with his enemies, and he who was willing to venture nothing could gain nothing. And so in many other human frailties—pugnacity leading to war, greed and avarice leading to exploitation and profiteering, vain self display leading to prodigal extravagance and wastefulness, envy and jealousy of the more successful leading to the fostering of class consciousness and demands for the dictatorship of the proletariat—it would be possible to discover human qualities that with intelligent guidance and further evolution will develop into positive virtues.

But such considerations do not suggest a world of artistic harmony in which these apparent evils are merely moments in a temporal succession that in its eternal wholeness is perfection to an Absolute Mind. They rather seem to indicate a universe that is gradually growing better under the guidance of a Power that is working for righteousness through the

activity of human minds and human wills. With the inspiration of this immanent God working within them, men are rapidly mastering the harsh conditions of their physical environment, gradually achieving mutual love and justice in social organizations, and slowly but surely rising to finer heights of individual character.

No doubt the Divine Power immanent within us, with a wider time span than ours, can see the course of this progress more fully than we, and to such a Being very much that seems unmitigated evil to us is seen to be tending ultimately in the direction of good. In a future life we may hope to share in this larger insight.

To the service of this God we owe our fullest loyalty. As we seek our own highest development as individuals and the good of our families and friends, of our churches, our cities, our nation, and humanity, we are serving Him. For we, as individuals and as a race, are an organic part of the universe, and the only part with which we come into contact that is capable of forming rational and moral ends. It is only through us human beings (so far as we can judge) that the rational and moral ends of God can be realized upon this particular planet. Ours is a grave responsibility, and a splendid opportunity. The closer our intimacy with Him, the more wholehearted will be our consecration to our tasks, and the stronger will be our wills. Wherefore let us run with courage the race that is set before us, looking unto Him as the author and finisher of our faith.

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} See *Notes* to this Chapter.

CHAPTER XXI

GOD AND HUMAN FREEDOM

This chapter will have for its purpose the consideration of the last of the three requirements which we have seen (1) that any satisfactory theory of the nature of God must be able to meet. If in prayer and other religious experiences man receives the support of a Being so powerful as the directing force in the purposive development of the universe must be, how is the fact of His great power to be reconciled with the freedom of the human will, and the moral responsibility of man?

I—*Traditional Theism*

For traditional theism, with its doctrine that an omnipotent God created man along with the rest of the universe, this problem took the form of showing how, if God is omnipotent, man's will can be free, so that he is morally responsible for what he does. Christian theists offered various solutions. An extreme position was that of John Calvin and his followers, 2. They insisted unqualifiedly upon the absolute omnipotence and omniscience of God, and were willing to accept the consequence that man's every action was foreseen and willed by God when He created the world, and that it pleased God to decree that certain men whom He elected of His own good pleasure, without any merit on their part whatever, should be impelled by the irresistible grace of God to accept Christ and be saved, whereas the rest of mankind were similarly doomed by divine decree not to receive the salvation of Christ and, as a consequence, to suffer the pangs of Hell forever.

The more rigid Calvinists (supralapsarians) went so far as to say that God decreed the sin and fall of man as a means to the ultimate salvation of the elect; the moderate Calvinists (infralapsarians) said that God did not foreordain, but merely permitted the fall of mankind. Calvinists of both types were relentlessly logical in deducing and accepting the consequences of the doctrines of divine creation, omnipotence, and omniscience. At the same time they always insisted that man fell of

his own free will, and that God is in no manner blameworthy for his fall and present sinful condition. To reconcile the absolutely sovereign power of God with these last assertions, Calvinistic theologians set forth elaborate arguments that were more subtle than convincing.

In opposition to the Calvinists the Arminians (2) were willing to restrict somewhat the absolute sovereignty of God, in order to give fuller recognition to the freedom of the human will. God, in creating mankind, elected some to salvation and others to reprobation, but only because He foresaw their final faith or disbelief. Every man, of his own free choice accepts or rejects the grace freely offered through the atonement of Christ to all. God has given man this freedom of choice, and He in no way determines his actions. Man's personal responsibility is complete. Still, even on this view, to save the divine omniscience, it had to be admitted that God knew, when He created mankind, which men would fall and which would not. Calvinism and Arminianism represent the two opposite poles between which other Protestant solutions of the problem of freedom range.

The official position of the Roman Catholic Church has been in some respects non-committal, allowing liberty of interpretation to the different theological schools within the Church. However, the doctrine of St. Augustine that God has given to all men *sufficient* grace to permit them to accept of the salvation of Christ, but that he has only afforded *efficacious* grace to His elect, is in some form or other generally agreed upon. As against certain Jansenist heresies, the orthodox Catholic systems maintain, "each in its own peculiar way, that sufficient grace is truly and really sufficient, so that it is intrinsically possible to obey it, although in fact, man never follows its inspiration, and also that it is intrinsically possible not to obey the impulse of efficacious grace; although such a disobedience will never occur *de facto*," 3.

The difficulties that the old theism has had with these problems, have evidently been accentuated by its insistence on the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable nature of a God that is all powerful, all wise, and all good, and who has created all things. The difficulties persist, however, to some degree in any doctrine that maintains the absolute and eternal perfection of God in all respects, no matter if He be regarded as *eternally* creating the universe instead of having created it at a definite period

in time, or even if He be thought of, not as Creator, but simply as the Absolute Mind constituting the rational principle of the world order as a whole. Can these difficulties be solved at all? Is it useless to waste time upon them? Or is it only worth while to discuss them as a pastime, as Milton suggests:—

> "Others apart sat on a hill retired,
> In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
> Of providence, foreknowledge, will and fate,
> Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
> And found no end, in wandering mazes lost." 4.

One mistake that the old theologies made was to attack these problems at the wrong end, to begin with fixed conceptions of God, and from these to deduce the consequences for human beings. Now we know a great deal more about human experience than we do about the nature of God. We can with some degree of confidence analyze the human consciousness and observe the facts there. Surely, knowing far less of God, we should not be warranted in formulating a theory about His nature and His relation to the human will that is not in complete agreement with our conclusions regarding the human moral consciousness. Let us, therefore, (1) from the standpoint of ethics, consider what principles can be derived from generally accepted moral conceptions, and see what conclusions about the human will necessarily follow. (2) Next, let us estimate the significance of these conclusions in the light of psychology and the natural sciences. (3) Having thus ascertained what human freedom appears to be in our conscious experience as interpreted by ethics, psychology, and natural science, we shall be prepared to consider what conceptions of the nature of God will best accord with it. We shall thus be arguing from the known, or at least, the relatively certain, to the less known and more uncertain; an order of investigation that surely is more philosophical and convincing than the deductive procedure of traditional dogmatic theism.

II—*Freedom in Ethics*

Ethical science is simply a careful examination of the moral judgments of mankind, and of the fundamental principles and implications that underlie them. The author submits the following statements as descriptive of the moral opinions usually held, or at least implied, in our judgments of our own moral conduct and that of other men. (1) If an adult human being is sane, he is morally responsible for what he does. A child is

responsible so far as he is mature enough to understand the significance of his actions. In judging the conduct of any one, due allowance must be made for his ignorance of circumstances; and, if he has acted impetuously and under extreme provocation this must be taken into account. Charity is called for also in passing upon persons handicapped by a bad heredity, or upbringing in a vicious environment. But the general principle holds that everyone deserves moral approval and condemnation for his conduct, *i. e.*, for all actions that are the result of the normal operation of his mental processes. In moral judgments of our own conduct and that of others, we assume that men are free to the extent that their actions are the outcome of the processes of sane minds acting under ordinary conditions. Not only our criminal law, but all the judgments of social approval and condemnation that we pass upon ourselves and others proceed on this basis. This sort of freedom it will be convenient to designate as *Psychological Freedom.*

(2) In another sense, no one is *really free* when he acts wrongly. Theologians have been correct in speaking of "the bondage of sin," and moralists of "the slavery of vice." In this sense, no man is free when he yields to an impelling temptation, and does what he knows to be wrong. To be free is to act in accordance with one's true nature as a man, to be loyal to one's ideals, to realize to the full one's capacities. As man is a social being, this means that his freedom is ordinarily found in adapting himself to the social order about him, and realizing his capacities within it, by making his contribution to the common good and receiving in return the aid and good will of others. In some circumstances, however, a man may identify himself with, and so seek his freedom in, a social order that from his point of view is superior to that immediately about him. A professional man or scientific investigator may prefer the approval of his fellow specialists who alone can understand and evaluate what he is doing. The Stoics thought of themselves as "citizens of the universe," and the early Christians found their citizenship "in heaven."

Freedom in this sense is every one's *right*, meaning that everyone has a claim upon the social order for a fair opportunity to make the most of himself in service of the common good. But this kind of freedom, after all, is something that one must achieve for oneself. A man gains freedom in successful work in his profession; as he becomes efficient in serving others he

serves himself. In a similar way he gains freedom in the family as a good husband and father: in the state, as a good citizen who exercises a deserved influence with his fellow citizens and wins their confidence; in the church or synagogue, as a participant in and contributor to its spiritual life and its consecration to God. In this sense no one, of course, is absolutely free; for every individual has moral imperfections of some kind or other, and no social order is perfect in either the ideals that it sets before its members or the opportunities it is able to afford them for self-realization. But to the extent that individual men and groups of men are successful in achieving moral worth, they are free. This type of freedom we may call *Ethical Freedom.*

Now is it not reasonable to suppose that our moral judgments probably correctly interpret human freedom and human responsibility? Society has developed on the basis of these assumptions. They underlie our laws and institutions. They form the basis of our personal estimates of our own conduct and of other men. These judgments meet the pragmatic test; they have worked. Society, by acting upon them, has been able to maintain order, to afford opportunity for men to coöperate with one another, and for civilization to advance. Man could hardly have been successful if in his moral judgments he had been acting upon delusions regarding his own nature and capacities. It therefore follows that psychologists and natural scientists must recognize psychological freedom and moral responsibility as descriptive of the will of the ordinary human being, and ethical freedom as an ideal of which man is not only able to conceive but also to make more or less successful efforts to attain. These, then, are facts which a reasonable psychology cannot challenge, but must accept and interpret.

III—*Psychology and the Natural Sciences*

Most of the actions that a person performs in the course of a day are mere matters of routine; they do not involve deliberation and choice. They therefore do not raise the question of the freedom of the will. All psychologists are agreed that nine-tenths of conscious human actions can be accounted for in accordance with the laws of reflex action, instinct, and habit. It is only in respect to the comparatively few instances in which conscious selection is made between two or more possible acts that the problem enters.

If then, our acts are ever undetermined, it is in cases where conflicting ideas are present in the mind at the same time. Now suppose two such conflicting ideas are present—say going to the movie show *versus* staying in one's room and studying —which will be acted upon? This, psychologists tell us, is a question of attention. If, when the thought of the movie enters consciousness, the idea of tomorrow's recitation slips out of attention altogether, one will forthwith start for the movie theatre. If, on the contrary, attractive as the thought of the movie is, and dry and disagreeable as is tomorrow's logic lesson, in the end thoughts of the unpleasant consequences of failure in the recitation, and of the importance of the course in logic as a part of one's liberal education hold the attention exclusively, all thought of the movies may slip out of consciousness entirely, and one may become completely absorbed in the treatise on logic.

The question resolves itself, accordingly, into a question of the nature of attention. In most cases, attention is *spontaneous*, as it moves without effort from one topic to another. However, in some instances, attention wavers between two objects; in these cases a conscious *voluntary effort* may be exercised in favor of one of them. If the effort is successful, one may no longer be disturbed by the playing of a mandolin in the next room, or by subsequent thoughts of the movie show, and the principles of logic become all absorbing; there is no longer a conflict of ideas and impulses, and *voluntary* attention has been replaced by *spontaneous* attention. If the effort is unsuccessful, one may presently become oblivious of the logic lesson and become absorbed in the mandolin music, or find oneself walking down stairs on the way to the movie theatre; in this case *involuntary* attention has given place to spontaneous attention. Or attention may fluctuate; by effort one attends to the logic for a few moments, and then his attention is again diverted by the rival idea; by effort it is again concentrated upon the logic, only again to wander. Experimental psychologists say that voluntary attention is possible only for a few seconds at a time; the topic must then unfold itself and claim spontaneous attention or the mind will wander. It is obvious that the successfulness of effort on any given occasion will depend to a considerable extent upon past choices. One who in the past has kept before his mind the purposes of a college education does not have a serious struggle to study when he

ought to do so; one who has previously succumbed to every pleasing distraction finds it almost impossible to concentrate his attention upon any difficult intellectual task.

The issue between psychologists who are *determinists* and those who are *indeterminists* is whether, in cases of effort and conscious choice, the person's decision is *absolutely* or *only in large measure* determined by the constitution of his mind and nervous system and his past choices; the determinists believing that it is absolutely determined, while the indeterminists think that there enters an element of chance, so that the person's free choice, undetermined by the past, is able to tip the scales between two nearly balanced motives. This free choice is exercised during the few seconds of voluntary attention. By consistently, in every case of conflict between nearly balanced motives, deciding in favor of virtue one man may ultimately become a moral hero of invincible will, whereas another who invariably succumbs to temptations may ultimately become weak and dissolute.

Psychologists admit that it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to devise experiments that will absolutely settle this question. Never will it be possible to calculate the precise amount of nervous energy stored up in the various brain cells, and decide whether a subsequent action is a mathematical resultant, or whether an almost infinitesimally small unphysical force has entered in, and played a decisive rôle. So preference must be given to whichever theory appears most reasonable. William James (5) decided in favor of indeterminism; he believed that the phenomenon of effort involves a novel factor that enters into conscious processes and that cannot be accounted for by psychology. Professor William McDougall has taken issue with James, and contends that the presence of effort can probably be attributed to the operation of sentiments that have developed about the self in accordance with psychological principles, which he describes.

The fact that the natural sciences everywhere maintain the doctrine of uniform and necessary causation has led most psychologists to favor determinism. They wish psychology to become as exact as natural sciences now are. To admit an undetermined factor appears to them utterly contrary to the spirit of science. However, not all philosophers, not even all of them who are most familiar with the natural sciences, are willing to agree unqualifiedly to the absolute uniformity of nat-

ural laws. James believes that an element of chance enters not only into human volition, but also into the very nature of the universe,—a doctrine that he called "tychism," 7.

Professor James Ward, another philosopher well grounded in science, in his *Realm of Ends* has called attention to the fact that the statistician in the field of economics is able to tabulate averages that appear to be constant, although he knows that the conditions that give his averages vary considerably among the different individual cases. In the natural sciences, on the other hand, the peculiar conditions that underlie particular cases are unknown to him, so he assumes absolute uniformity. So Professor Ward believes in a certain amount of "contingency" in nature. It is indeed possible to claim that the absolute uniformity of nature is an unproved assumption, which, though justifiable for the purposes of natural sciences, is not absolutely true. Such laws as inertia and gravity do not literally describe the facts as we actually see them before us in every day life; they can only be made to work out in the artificial conditions of the laboratory; they are formulations of the tendencies that matter assumes on the average. Statistics show that about so many people die every year of each of various diseases, that about so many are born, about so many marry, and so on. Yet the circumstances surrounding each death, birth and marriage are more or less distinctive. The so-called uniformities of the exact sciences are of the same general character, and ignore the differences. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller points out that in physical and chemical experiments, millions of atoms are being dealt with at the same time. "The least speck visible under the microscope is composed of atoms by the million. Consequently the regularity we observe may very well be that of an average." If individual atoms exercise choice we should never be able to observe it; dealing as we must only with millions at a time we could only observe general averages, 8.

So Professor Ward and Dr. Schiller, like James, believe that there is a contingent element in nature. The future is never absolutely determined by the past: that is why prophecy is so difficult. Once an event has taken place, either in the life of a nation or of a great man, historians and biographers can set to work and explain the causes why the event occurred in precisely the way that it did. But historians and biographers, able though they are to point out factors that will influence

the future decision of a nation or a man, can seldom *predict* events with certainty: that is because a contingent element, always enters human affairs; this is the element of choice and free will. Only *after* the event, when the choice has been made, is it possible to look at it retrospectively and argue that it was bound to happen in that way.

We see, then, that while the tendency both in psychology and in natural science is in favor of absolute uniformity of laws and determinism, the opposite position is perfectly tenable, so far as present knowledge goes, and that it is held by some authorities of high repute.

IV—*Determinism and Indeterminism*

Undoubtedly the chief influences that have led many thinkers to favor indeterminism have been ethical considerations. We constantly assume psychological freedom and moral responsibility. Nothing can be more certain than that these exist. To believe the contrary would subvert morality; it would lead men to think that they could never act otherwise than they do, that they are mere creatures of necessity. It is right to hold men morally responsible for their deeds, just because they could have acted otherwise if they had chosen to do so. If we punish wrongdoers by law when necessary, and by the condemnation of public opinion when that is enough, they will remember, and act differently next time. Others who are tempted will be deterred by fear of like punishments. Every young man is the architect of his own fortune, and by his separate choices makes his character what it ultimately becomes when by middle life he is more largely a creature of habit.

The author believes that he has given a brief, but so far as it goes, an accurate statement of what indeterminists really mean by their doctrine. They do not deny that a man's actions are for the most part determined by his present character, or that the latter is the result of his past life. Caricatures of the position, made by its opponents, often misrepresent it. Thus James complains that John Fiske caricatures indeterminism when he says, if it were true, that in the case of a murder we should have no more reason for suspecting the worst enemy than the best friend of the murdered man, that the mother might strangle her first born child, and the miser cast his treas-

ure into the sea. Fiske, here, James says, does not distinguish between the "possibles which really tempt a man and those which tempt him not at all. Free will [*i. e.*, indeterminism] like psychology, deals with the former alternatives exclusively," 9. What James means, of course, is that any man's character is sufficiently fixed by his past so that some possible courses of action will not tempt him at all, whereas his character in other respects is not absolutely fixed and different alternatives do appeal to him, between which he is actually free to make a choice. According to the way his choices are made his character becomes set, and the plane from which future choices can be made will be different.

While ethical considerations are thought by many psychologists and philosophers to favor indeterminism, probably the majority are determinists. Moral responsibility and psychological freedom, they say, are entirely compatible with determinism, because it is your own personality that determines your actions, 10. This frees determinism from the objections to fatalism, which is altogether different. You are your personality; it is impossible to distinguish between you and yourself. On the other hand, it is objected that according to the indeterminist view, it is not you, yourself, your personality as you know yourself and as others know you, that altogether determines what you do. There intrudes some strange, unaccountable element of chance, that inclines the beam and makes the choice between nearly equally balanced motives; this element cannot be your character, the outgrowth of your past conduct—for your character, the indeterminist admits, is fixed when a given action is performed—but some weird outside force that is unaccountable. It seems absurd that *you* should be held responsible for this unaccountable factor that is *not* yourself; to punish you for its actions could only be actuated by immoral anger, since no one can predict how this punishment will affect this unknown factor in the future. Just so far as an unknown element is admitted into the process of volition, moral responsibility is weakened. On the other hand, if, as the determinist claims, a man's conduct is wholly the outcome of his own character, he can rightly be judged and praised or condemned. A just requital will have a salutary effect upon his character, and improve his conduct for the future. The determinist father might say to his small son, "I know you couldn't help running away from school today, but I am going to give you such a good

whipping that the memory of it will prevent you from feeling any inclination to run away next time." In a similar way the punishments of the state (in humane institutions where some measure of self government is allowed the inmates) should so reform the personalities of wrong doers that when they are discharged they will be good citizens.

One of the reasons why determinism has appeared objectionable to many is due, it is urged, to a misunderstanding of what it really means. It is necessary to recognize the distinction between *mechanical* determination and *teleological* determination. Inorganic objects are mechanically determined. A particle of matter is bound to move in a certain direction as a resultant of physical forces. Now, as we saw in Chapter XVIII, even the behavior of plants and lowly animals is determined largely by the whole and part relation; even their actions are not wholly due to mechanical determination. In case of man, who can remember, imagine, and reason, considerations of past experience and future possibilities play a part in the mental processes that effect his decisions; his choices are by no means mechanical. They are teleological. His purposes determine his conduct. These purposes have developed from his past decisions; and on them as a basis his future plans and ideals will develop. Man is not like a clod. His conduct is not a mere resultant of the physical forces surrounding him at the moment in space. Thoughts of past experiences in distant places, purposes whose fruition will not come until a later time in a different environment may influence a man in his decisions. A man may have in thought the conditions that will surround his family years after he will be in his grave, as he makes his testament; a statesman may plan for future generations of his nation; the purpose of the founder of a religious movement may include all mankind in ages to come.

The determinist therefore urges that to say that a man's actions are determined by the contents of his consciousness, including his moral purposes and ideals, sufficiently recognizes psychological freedom and moral responsibility, and gives a satisfactory basis for ethics. He maintains that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to introduce any factor into the process that cannot be rationally explained and scientifically accounted for.

The reader is free to make his choice between indeterminism and determinism. Both recognize the principles of psycholog-

ical freedom and moral responsibility, though their explanations are somewhat different. Both are compatible with what was said regarding ethical freedom. We are now ready to return to considerations of the nature of God in relation to human freedom, 11.

V—*Indeterminism and God*

Following the precedent of the previous chapter, we shall center the discussion of the nature of God in relation to human freedom about the philosophical positions of William James and Josiah Royce who will respectively serve as representatives of indeterminism and determinism.

James, as we have seen, believed in a finite God, with whom we ought to coöperate, and he believed that if we do so, we shall be able to make the universe better. It seemed to James that if the universe really were already perfect and complete in an absolute and eternal sense, to the mind of God, that there would be nothing of consequence for us to do. On the contrary, he earnestly believed that there is much in the world for us to do, and that the facts of psychological freedom and moral responsibility, necessarily imply that the universe is imperfect and incomplete. We are free to coöperate with God or not as we choose, in the indeterministic sense; the choice is before us, with the implied opportunity and responsibility.

This opposition is logically connected with two other features of James' philosophy, *pluralism* and *tychism*. Most philosophers have always been *monists*, and have believed that the world is one, a coherent and organized whole, whose processes go on in accordance with uniform and rational principles, and whose parts are closely connected and interrelated from whatever standpoint one can consider them. Monists in consequence are determinists. When monists have believed in a God, whether as external to finite individuals, or as immanent in them, or both, they have thought of the uniform and rational principles of the world order as expressions of the divine Mind or Will. James, however, believed that such conceptions make man a mere puppet of cosmic processes, with no opportunity to exercise any personal choice or initiative of his own. Monistic philosophies, he thought, are paralyzing to human faith and enthusiasm, and lead to passive acquiescence in things as they are, combined perhaps with narcotising assurance that

all, as it is, is for the best in an eternal harmony enjoyed by God.

In opposition to monism, therefore, James was a *pluralist*, and believed that the universe consists of countless individual persons and things. These, to be sure, are interrelated so as to constitute a world that is one in several respects: *e. g.*, as a subject of discourse, we can talk of "the universe;" it is continuous in space and time; it is subject to continuous lines of influence, like gravity and heat conduction; men are conjoined in a vast network of acquaintanceship, and an enormous number of things in the world serve a common purpose. But the acquaintanceship is incomplete; not everyone knows everyone else; and there are frequent clashes of purposes and conflicting interests in the world. Aesthetic union, like teleological union, is also quite incomplete. The world is imperfectly unified. Our freedom affords us the opportunity to assist in making it better organized and more harmonious than it now is.

By *tychism*, James meant that there actually enters an element of chance or novelty, both in our own minds and in the universe. For James the mind of an individual is a "stream of consciousness" in which, as in a river, the contents are in constant change. In conscious choices made with effort a novel factor, undetermined by one's past life, enters in and effects the decision; in the universe as a whole, the decisions of finite wills are a novel element, also, unconditioned in any way by the rest of the world. "Our sense of 'freedom' supposes that some things at least are decided here and now, that the passing moment may contain some novelty, be an original starting point of events, and not merely transmit a push from somewhere else," 12. James never worked out his doctrines of pluralism, tychism, and meliorism fully, in their relation with his conception of a finite God, but they all clearly imply that God has no absolute control over the conflicting factors in the universe, nor over the unconditional novelties that keep appearing, but that the universe is plastic, and can be rendered better than it now is by the united efforts of God and men.

A passage by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller offers an indeterministic explanation why the processes of nature appear to us to proceed by mechanical necessity instead of as the free acts of God. Individual human beings overcome faults and meet difficulties by habits formed of their free choice. These habits become matters of routine. Man is freer, however, by having formed

them. They enable him to give his attention to other choices. Now God, as a Being higher and more perfect than man, is doubtless more often than man able to meet His ends by habits He has already formed, methods of routine, which He by employing is more free than He would be without them. These methods of divine action, which accordingly appear to us uniform and regular are readily mistaken by us for mechanical necessity, 13.

Other pluralistic defenders of the conception of God usually are reluctant to press His finitude so far as James does, or to admit, to as large an extent at least, that the universe contains collisions between warring elements and personalities. Professor Ward, for instance, would not. He indeed concedes that there must be a certain amount of contingency in the world in order to make it a truly advancing and developing universe, in which men have freedom of initiative, and to satisfy these requirements he is willing to limit the complete foreknowledge of God. God would not really be so great as He is, if He did not allow free agencies to exist along with Him. A divine creative love could not be satisfied with creatures that acted like machines. God had to create men as free agents. "But it does not follow that with a world of such free agents God will always or ever be liable to surprises. It implies that he will always be interested; indeed he could not be a God of love if he were not." Yet the continuity between the actual and the possible and his complete knowledge of both make his main purpose secure; to use Martineau's words, "we cannot defeat his aim, but can only vary the track," 14. This reminds one of James' earlier view, when he made the famous comparison of God to an expert chess player engaged in a game with a novice. "The expert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee what any one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the *possible* moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory," 15.

The motive that actuates interpretations of the relation between God and men along the lines of pluralism and indeterminism is to assure man freedom of choice and moral responsibility. Such interpretations differ with one another in the degree to which they find it necessary to assume that God is limited, in order to make room for human uniqueness, freedom, and initiative. If such an interpretation were to limit the

power of God to so great an extent that His ability to assist men would appear so slight that men would lose confidence in the efficacy of divine assistance through prayer and other forms of religious experience, this would be disastrous to religious faith. But none of the interpretations of the indeterminists to which reference has been made go so far as that. Consequently there appears to be no serious objection to indeterminism, so far as the needs of a liberal *religious* faith are concerned.

On *philosophical* grounds, however, pluralistic and indeterministic interpretations of the relationship between God and men are open to serious difficulties. Indeterminism is claimed by its opponents to be unable to locate moral responsibility for the individual will when this is attributed to something that is not the person's own character. James' type of pluralism is likewise charged with being unable to locate the factors in the universe that can bring about more perfect harmony and coöperation between the different parts of the universe, including God and men, when it attributes these factors to caprice, chance, or to something else that is unexplainable and irrational. Such a pluralism as Professor Ward's, (which does not so largely limit the knowledge and power of God, as that of James) assures us that God will realize His own ends ultimately, whatever we do. If that is the case, it may be asked, what does our slight freedom amount to, anyway? How does such a view afford any real advantage over complete determinism? To the extent that pluralistic systems recognize the power, wisdom and knowledge of God and the presence of uniform principles of causation, purpose, and harmony in the universe they approach monism, with its advantages and objections. Whether these criticisms outweigh the advantages in pluralism and indeterminism with respect to this problem, the reader can decide for himself, after he has considered the rival position represented by Royce, 16.

VI—*Royce's Conception of Freedom and the Absolute*

As we saw in the preceding chapter, for Royce the universe is experienced by the Absolute Mind, (1) as a series of events that follow one another in time in the experiences of the various finite beings, and (2) on account of an all embracing time span, as an eternally completed and absolutely perfect and harmonious whole. Each finite self—such as yours or mine—

is unique; it has a value of its own for the Absolute, and the perfection of the whole which He experiences is a resultant of the contributions furnished by each such self; just as in a musical composition the harmony of the whole is a resultant of the various separate notes. So each of us has a value and a purpose that is peculiar, and gives worth to our individuality. God eternally wills the universe as a whole; He therefore wills each of us as an essential and valuable part of this whole. We therefore in our separate personalities share in this whole. Our ethical freedom consists in consciously identifying ourselves with this whole, that is, with the purposes of the Absolute. If we refuse so to identify ourselves with God, we shall do no harm to Him, or His universal harmony; He will in some manner atone for our evil deeds and turn them into good from the eternal point of view; in fact, in a sense He has already done so, since His perception and valuation of the world order is eternal. For us, however, and other human beings acting and living in the temporal order, our evil acts of disloyalty bring suffering, and prevent the attainment of ethical freedom. Our true nature is expressed only in conformity to the divine will, which is our will, too, since we are parts of the universal purpose, but if in our ignorance we fail to perceive that only in His service is perfect freedom found, we do not gain ethical freedom.

The emphasis in Royce's account is on ethical freedom, as an ideal to be realized by being faithful to our tasks, by being loyal to those causes to which we are peculiarly fitted to be of service, and by so coming in some measure to appreciate, within the limits of our finitude, the universal harmony to which we are contributing. Royce's treatment implies that we are *psychologically* free, in that our actions are determined by our own mental processes, and that we are morally responsible for them. Failure to recognize where duty lies and the path toward ethical freedom is due to lack of attention to the duties and opportunities that lie immediately before us, and we are morally blamable for this lack of attention, 17. Royce's thought here is quite along the line of the Christian conception that only in the service of God is perfect freedom to be found, and of Tennyson's "Our wills are ours to make them Thine," 18.

To be sure, Royce says that only in the eternal mind of God is this ideal of the unique value and freedom of each individual fully realized. For us, it must be purely an ideal. As finite

individuals in time our selves are subject to external conditions, —heredity, physical and social environment. So, in time, the finite self appears as "a product, a result, a determined creature of destiny," 19. Except in so far "as your life becomes for you your own way of viewing your relation to the whole, and of actively expressing your own ideal regarding this relation," your life is derived from external conditions. But this, "*your own way of expressing God's will is* not derived. It is yourself. And it is yours because God worketh in you," 20. In so far as we consciously identify ourselves with the divine purpose, we are free; otherwise not.

Royce is thus a determinist, in so far as events in the temporal order are concerned, while at the same time he implies that by attention to the calls of duty and loyalty and by consciousness of our unique worth as individuals we can in some measure rise above the temporal order and identify ourselves with the eternal, and thus become conscious of our freedom. This is not gained, however, through a form of mysticism implying detachment or retreat from social relationships, but through active service and devotion to the tasks in life which we are peculiarly fitted to fill. "The unity of the world is not an ocean in which we are lost, but a life which is, and which needs all our lives in one," 21. In the various ethical religions of the world, certain facts are portrayed, "which may be called the creed of the Absolute Religion," and which Royce gives in italics toward the close of his *Philosophy of Loyalty*, 22: "*First the rational unity and goodness of the world—life; next, its true but invisible nearness to us, despite our ignorance; further, its fulness of meaning despite our barrenness of present experience; and yet more, its interest in our personal destiny as moral beings; and finally, the certainty that, through our actual human loyalty, we come, like* Moses, face to face with the true will of the world, as a man speaks to his friend," 23.

VII—*The Author's Opinions*

There are several propositions which, it seems to the author, a theory of the freedom of the human will in relation to the divine will should recognize. These are: (1) Psychological freedom and moral responsibility are unquestionable facts of human experience. (2) Ethical freedom is a workable ideal, which men can in large measure make a reality by

their efforts. (3) Acceptance of such a God as is affirmed by modern Christian and Jewish thought, whether liberal or conservative, implies that the ethical freedom of a human being is gained by conscious coöperation with the will of God. Only in His service can there be perfect freedom. (4) It is an outstanding fact in human experience that the will of no human being at the present time is completely consistent and coherent; even men with the strongest characters experience at times within themselves struggles between conflicting impulses. (5) The wills of no group of human beings are completely in accord, whether these persons constitute a family, a church, a city, or a nation. The social will of any group is subject to struggles between conflicting elements. (6) The will of no group of human beings works in perfect harmony with the wills of other groups. (7) Ethical freedom, therefore, whether of any individual human being, or any group of human beings, has not yet been completely realized. At the same time, the history of moral and social evolution, as well as the study of individual and social psychology, make it evident that increasing coherence and unity of purpose are being effected both in the wills of individuals and in those of groups of mankind, 24.

As has been indicated in previous chapters, the telelogical and other evidence seems to the author to suggest, not a *completely* purposive universe, but one in which there is an *increasing* amount of purposiveness in the order of nature and evolution. This appears to indicate the presence of a Purposer, (*i. e.*, God) immeasurably greater than ourselves, but still finite, who is gradually overcoming limitations and achieving ends. In the evolution of the earth, the divinely directed teleological process has resulted in the appearance of men, rational beings who consciously form purposes of their own and succeed in some measure in carrying them out. Men, being consciously teleological, may in this respect be said to be incarnations of God, to be formed in the image of God; this enables them to coöperate consciously in His purposes. As Royce suggests, this coöperation is effected by men being loyal to the ideals that they are able to form—ideals that of course must be social.

The will of the human being is subject to what has been called teleological determinism—*i. e.*, while it is the outcome of heredity and physical and social environment, it also forms and achieves ends through the employment of memory, imag-

ination, and reasoning, so that its determination is quite different from the mechanical determination of material objects.

The purposes and will of no human being are wholly consistent with one another, nor with those of other human beings. That is another way of saying that ethical freedom is an ideal which has not yet been perfectly attained, either by individuals or by the social order. But every individual man gains increasing ethical freedom to the extent that his purposes become united into a consistent plan of life; and social groups are gradually learning through better forms of association—in families, churches and synagogues, cities, nations, international agreements, etc.—to bring their purposes together into a more nearly unified whole. The teleological evidence, when balanced with that for dysteleology, suggests that the situation of God is similar, though of course, on an immeasurably more exalted plane. We can hardly suppose that the purposes of God are fully worked out in His own mind; doubtless they are gradually becoming better organized and perfected. Nor has He yet succeeded in gaining the complete coöperation and undivided loyalty of the other conscious beings in the universe. As men grow in moral and religious insight, their wills are becoming better harmonized with God's will. We, as conscious rational beings, are a partial expression of the purposing efforts of God. Through our coöperation He hopes to achieve great ends. To some extent He doubtless can use us against our consent, and in some ways He can atone for our misdeeds, as Royce suggests. But He can use us to much better advantage for our ultimate good which is one with His own, if we commit our ways to Him in complete loyalty to the ideals that we have thus far learned to know. We already enjoy psychological freedom and moral responsibility. Through identification of our wills with His will, *i. e.*, through loyalty to our tasks and opportunities—we can gain ethical freedom.

Whether the author's view should be classified as a form of determinism or of indeterminism, let others decide. The author merely insists that it is *not* indeterminism in so far as the latter recognizes chance or contingency in either the human will, the divine will, or physical nature; and that it is not mechanical determination or predestination, or fatalism of any sort. The author maintains that growth is made possible by the teleological determination which he believes to be characteristic both of the human will and of the divine will. The future is an en-

largement of the past, both for us and for God. This is a "melioristic universe" to use James' phrase, for all the rationally conscious beings in it. Our wills are not at present completely determined by the will of God. Our wills are too often painfully at variance both with our selves, and those of other men, to be completely determined by a Universal Will. Perhaps God voluntarily limited Himself in the evolution of men with wills partially independent of His will, because He foresaw that He could accomplish more through coöperation of such beings. Possibly there was no other way in which He could bring men into existence in a universe that is only partially under His control.

The author supposes that his view should be classified as pluralistic rather than monistic. He is not ready to affirm, however, that a pluralistic universe is ideally better than a monistic one; possibly so, possibly not. Perhaps, as James at times seems to have thought, the universe is gradually evolving into a teleological unity. Perhaps it will ultimately become what Royce believed it to be now. But there is too much evil in our human experience—both physical and moral—and the wills that we know clash altogether too often and too fiercely, to give us hope that the Roycean conception will become reality for countless aeons to come. And it is by no means certain that we ought to desire that Royce's Absolute should ever become a reality. Perhaps it will be better that, throughout all the aeons of aeons, there should be an increasing growth of purposes, and such development may forever (as now) involve conflicts between clashing wills. A universe of static perfection might grow stale for God and men alike. Struggles terminating in the attainment of ever higher planes of coöperation, justice, love, and beauty, may forever take place in a universe destined never wholly to become, but eternally to progress toward, absolute perfection.

VIII—*Conclusion*

It will be well to summarize briefly the outcome of this and the preceding chapter. Part II has already shown us that prayer and the other religious experiences are efficacious (within the limits there indicated). The net result of the evidence in Chapter XIX is favorable to the belief that in some sense there actually is a God operative in these experiences. The existence of evil raises no insuperable difficulty to belief in God;

it can be explained in different ways, according to which conception of the nature of God is accepted. The same is true of the freedom of the human will. Entirely apart from questions about God, the ethical experience of everyday life obliges us to conclude that psychological freedom and moral responsibility are facts, and that ethical freedom is a workable and partially attainable ideal. These conclusions can be interpreted fairly successfully, alike by theories of determinism and indeterminism, monism and pluralism. None of these theories, to be sure, explain all the difficulties completely. But all explain them sufficiently, so that one can conclude that, whichever of them is nearest to truth, there is no reason to doubt our personal freedom and responsibility. Nor is there reason to doubt our power to receive aid from God in prayer and other religious experiences in the endeavor to live loyally for Him, to be of service to others, and to realize our own capacities.

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*William McDougall, *Social Psychology,* Chapter IX.
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*F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism,* Chapter XVIII. *Riddles of the Sphinx,* revised edition, *Appendix.*

Other elementary and advanced references will be found in the Notes to this Chapter.

CHAPTER XXII
IMMORTALITY

THERE are certain respects in which the continued existence of human personalities is a well known fact, and a fact of the greatest importance. Discussion of the problem of immortality in these respects in which its existence is not certainly known, and at most must be a postulate, has unduly drawn attention away from the forms of immortality of which we have absolute knowledge, and which ought to afford us great comfort and inspiration. Before entering into consideration of the speculative forms of immortality let us first take notice of those regarding which there can be no doubt whatever.

I—*Immortality as a Known Fact*

First, let us note *Biological Immortality.* Numerous as are the biological theories of the nature and laws of heredity, one does not need to be a biologist to know that children inherit the physical and mental traits of their parents and other ancestors. Whoever leaves physical descendants is assured that many of his own characteristics and those of his family stock will be preserved. It is comforting to see reappear many of the physical features of one's dead parents,—the eyes, it may be of one's beloved mother, the characteristic smile of one's revered father, and along with them, perhaps, to recognize one's own stubbornness and sense of humor, and to know that in one's children will be continued the traits of the family which one loves, and of which one is proud to be a member. In one's children, too, are liable to recur the family defects and weaknesses, physical and mental. While this may in some cases be a ground for anxiety, there is always the comforting thought that the availability of better scientific modes of treatment makes the inheritance of physical defects less menacing than in the past, while one's own experience will aid in deciding how to deal with them, as well as with dangerous mental and moral weaknesses. The experience of the parent, too, is of value in assisting the child to make the most of the good qualities that he has inherited. So, taken altogether, the hope of an

immortality in one's offspring furnishes one of the finest as well as most powerful incentives to marriage. This prospect, too, induces thoughtfulness on the part of young men and women, who realize the privilege and responsibility of this sort of immortality, and determines them so to order their own lives to ensure the inheritance of clean, vigorous minds and bodies by their descendants. Biological immortality, as thus far described, is an unquestionable fact, whatever may be the truth of the various biological theories of heredity in detail. Among the latter, that of Weismann, maintaining the continuity of the germ plasm, which is transmitted from one generation to another, has led to philosophical speculations. The most daring of these is that of Bergson, who thinks of life as "like a current passing from germ to germ through the medium of a developed organism," so that there is a continuous progress of immortal life in the germs, "an invisible progress, on which each visible organism rides during the short interval of time given it to live," 1.

Another known fact may be named *Spiritual,* or *Social Immortality.* In this sense, great men never die. Class rooms in courses in Greek philosophy are not liable, at least in this country, to be overcrowded. Yet it can be said that the thoughts and personality of Plato through his writings are today being studied by more young men in the world every year than ever assembled during his lifetime to hear him lecture in the Academy at Athens. More people today witness the plays of Shakespeare in the theatre, and study the thoughts of this myriad minded poet in classes and in private reading, than ever came in any way into contact with his personality during his lifetime. Nor do thinkers like these merely influence those who consciously come into contact with their writings. It would be impossible to calculate their influence upon countless human beings who have never even heard their names. It is not too much to say that such men are more alive today, in the influence that their personalities are exerting in the world, than when they lived in the flesh. Still more is this true of the great founders of the world's religions. Think of the lives consecrated every year to walk in the eight fold path of the Buddha, and of the souls who every day devoutly engage in prayer when they hear the summons from the mosques of Mohammed! And what is recorded in the Acts of the Apostles and the books that follow it in our Bibles, and in the witness of Christ borne by all the

saints, apostles, prophets and martyrs of succeeding centuries but what Jesus has continued both to do and to teach in the world since the end of his brief life in the flesh?

This principle holds true, not only of the great ones in history, whose names are remembered, but of humbler folk as well. The village Hampdens who withstood the local tyrants, the Cromwells who did not shed their country's blood, and the mute inglorious Miltons, too, are immortal. Though their bodies rest in the country churchyard, and their names may no more be deciphered on the tombstones, the principles and values for which they stood continue to live and exercise an influence in the community. Colleges and universities revere the memories of their founders and presidents, but no freshman or laboratory assistant or janitor who did his part faithfully while he was connected with such an institution and so exerted a modest influence upon the men about him, but has helped to keep pure the traditions of loyalty and service, which are after all the main things in education. Such men, too, survive in the undying life of alma mater. Not only does Washington live in America and Garibaldi in Italy, but every humble private soldier who shared in their heroic efforts for national independence.

One comforting thought about this kind of immortality is, that it is principally the good in men that survives. Funeral sermons are rightly eulogies; what will be remembered, what are still living and bound to exert an influence are the good, kind deeds of a man who has died. Even before the earth receives his body, a man's meannesses and littlenesses are virtually forgotten by those who love him. This principle holds true of the great, as well. What if some investigator digs up some facts in the private life of a Franklin, and even of a Washington, that are discreditable? These are not the immortal elements in these men's lives; far less worthy men were freer from such faults. What the world has come to revere in these men, and to cherish, is all of them that counts today as a living force in human events; anything else about them may well be allowed to perish utterly from human memory and thought. Even the monsters in human history—the Neroes and Domitians and Borgias—are doing good, not evil, in the world today. No one is tempted to emulate their vices. They are doing a good work in serving as awful examples to be avoided. Many a young prince in European royal families has probably

been more carefully reared, and has consequently developed into a better man because of them. So the Mark Antony of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* is entirely wrong; it is the good that men do which lives after them, while the evil is interred with their bones.

The thought of social immortality should be a great comfort and an inspiration. Those in bereavement should consider that their lost ones are continuing to live in them, in their conscious memories, in their ideals, and in their actions. Would you keep alive the friend whom you have lost? Think of him often; be as he would have you be; carry out his plans; be true to his principles. Realize that, so far as this world and its human associations are concerned, our lost ones can only continue to live in us. This is saddening, yes; but it is a comfort to know that they do live in us, if we will let them; and it is an inspiration to keep them living forces in the world. It is surely a more faithful service to them to keep them alive in this way than to abandon oneself to futile and corroding grief.

A similar comfort and inspiration is open to men associated in groups, such as families, churches, nations. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews expresses this thought. After recounting in his remarkable eleventh chapter the heroic deeds that the ancestral heroes of his people had done in faith, he concludes: "And these all, having had witness borne to them through their faith, received not the promise God having provided some better thing concerning us, that *apart from us they should not be made perfect.*" In other words, only as the present generation achieves the ideal of faith, can the hopes and aspirations of the former generations be realized, and they "be made perfect." No finer appeal to loyalty can be made; only through our fidelity to our duties, can our parents, the fathers of our country, and the witnesses of our religion in times past, continue to live, and to achieve the high purposes to which they were devoted. Only through us can they be made perfect. Ours, then is a sacred duty and a high privilege.

Do you desire immortality for yourself? Remember this: *Every person acquires just as much spiritual immortality as he deserves;* spiritual immortality is something automatically assured to one. Make friends; be true to them. Stand for high ideals. Be constructive in your life. Plan to marry, if it is practicable. A parent has unusual opportunities, spirit-

ually as well as biologically, to transmit what is good in him. But if this is impracticable, remember that the teacher, too, has great opportunities; in fact, in every walk in life—the lawyer, the physician, the business man, the mechanic, the unskilled laborer—everyone can make his life a constructive influence that will continue long after his body has rotted away in the grave.

II—*Conditions of Immortality as a Postulate*

The reader by this time is probably asking, "Is what you have called 'immortality as a fact,' and classified as 'biological' and 'spiritual' immortality all that is open to man? Have we no ground to believe in personal immortality, *i. e.*, that our friends and we shall persist beyond the grave, not merely in the minds and memories of others, but that our personal existence will in some sense continue, as it were, in our own right?" Yes, we have ground to believe in, and to hope for personal immortality, although the grounds only furnish probability, and not absolute proof.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to caution the reader that the expression "personal immortality" is used by various writers in different senses. As employed in this chapter it will include, as will become clear in the course of the exposition:—(1) immortality as a separate individual; (2) immortality merged in God (or the Absolute) as the supreme Person or Individual; (3) an attempted combination of the two. This usage is wholly arbitrary on the part of the writer. He needs some term to designate all the three types of immortality which require consideration at this point, and this term will answer as well as any.

The arguments for personal immortality, thus understood, are chiefly moral arguments. In a moral universe, such immortality seems logically to be implied. But arguments on this line must necessarily rest upon two assumptions, which must be examined. First, it must be evident that continued existence after death is a *scientific*, (that is, chiefly a *psychological*) *possibility*. If it were simply inconceivable and impossible, in view of our scientific knowledge, there would be no room to postulate it on moral grounds. It is not necessary that we have positive scientific evidence *in favor* of such immortality; but the weight of scientific evidence must not at any rate be *against* it. Secondly, the continued existence of the

individual after death must be *morally desirable.* No form of immortality that would be morally undesirable, that would, if it were assumed to exist, render God and the universe less moral and less good than they would be without it can be assumed on moral grounds. We can only recognize moral arguments for a morally desirable kind of immortality. Before we shall be ready either to review arguments for personal immortality as a postulate, or to speculate upon the character of such a state of existence, we must accordingly consider the two preliminary questions:—*Is personal immortality scientifically possible?* and *Is personal immortality morally desirable?*

III—*Is Continued Existence After Death Scientifically Possible?*

On first thought, the scientific reader, especially if his specialty is either biology or psychology, may possibly feel impelled to answer this question with a decided negative. Consciousness, everywhere that we find evidence of its existence, at least in a developed form, seems absolutely dependent upon a brain and nervous system. In the case of man, consciousness only appears after birth, and only develops as coördinations are formed in the cells of the brain. A slight cortical injury may render a person totally blind, or deaf, or unable to recall the meaning of printed or spoken words, depending upon what specific area is damaged. More general injuries to the brain may deprive a person of his sanity, or of his bodily life altogether. Is it reasonable to suppose that his consciousness, which only appears when his brain has reached a certain development, and continues to be dependent upon the normal functioning of brain cells, can survive the destruction of the brain at death?

Well, as William James has pointed out, there are different senses in which consciousness may be conceived to be a function of the brain. The conclusion that consciousness cannot survive the destruction of the brain assumes that the function is *productive,* in the sense in which we say that steam is a function of the tea-kettle, light of the electric circuit, and power of the moving waterfall.

But in the world of physical nature there are other kinds of functions besides productive functions. For instance, there are *transmissive* functions, as in the case of a colored glass, a prism, or a refracting lens, which do not produce the light, but transmit its rays in modified forms. Similarly the keys

of an organ have only a transmissive function; they open the various pipes successively, and let the wind in the air-chest escape in various ways. But the air is not engendered in the organ.

James points out that it is quite conceivable that the relation of the mind to the brain might be either one of these kinds of functions. All that the scientific facts show is bare concomitant variation, *i. e.*, that when the brain activities change in one way, consciousness changes in another. *To say that the function is productive is to engage in metaphysical speculation just as much as to say that it is transmissive.* There are no facts known to psychology or physiology that are not compatible with the transmission theory, while a number of psychological conceptions fit into this theory particularly well. Among the latter is that of the "threshold," which can be conceived as rising and falling as the physical obstructions in the brain to the transmission of consciousness grow greater or less. The transmission theory better explains the forms of religious experience, such as conversion and prayer, in which it seems "as if a power without, quite different from the ordinary action of the senses, or of the sense-led mind, came into their life, as if the latter suddenly opened into that greater life in which it has its source. . . All such experiences, quite paradoxical and meaningless on the production theory, fall very naturally into place (on the transmission theory). We need only suppose the continuity of our consciousness with a mother sea to allow for exceptional waves occasionally pouring over the dam," 2. James did not intend to imply that personal identity disappears with death, and that the individual is merged into a "mother sea" that includes others indistinguishably; on the contrary, he says that "the mental world behind the veil" may be conceived "in as individualistic a form as one pleases," so that one "shall never in *saecula saeculorum* cease to be able to say to himself, 'I am the same personal being who in old times upon the earth had those experiences,' " 3.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller has pointed out other facts that fit better into the transmissive than the productive theory. The loss or impairment of consciousness that follows brain injuries is often after an interval followed by a restoration of the lost functions which are now performed by other areas in the cortex. Such facts best accord with the transmission theory, which can say that what was injured was the machinery by which the

manifestation of consciousness was rendered possible, and that, later on, consciousness became able from the uninjured parts to make a mechanism capable of acting as a substitute for the lost parts, 4.

Somewhat similar in many respects to the transmission theory of James and Dr. Schiller, is the doctrine of Professor Bergson, as given in his *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution.* He regards the brain as the instrument of action by which the mind carries out its purposes. He reviews the literature of aphasia and reasons that the facts accord better with his doctrine. He claims that apparent breaks in memory can also best be explained on the assumption that simply the brain mechanism for making use of these memories has broken down, 5.

Critical readers may remark that although James, Schiller, and Bergson, must be credited with careful study of the scientific evidence they are after all primarily philosophical theorists. To such the corroborative testimony of Dr. J. A. Hadfield, a practising surgeon in the British Navy, may be welcome. His own observation and experience, both with cases from ordinary civilian life and those of shell shock and other disorders suffered by soldiers, convince him that the mind, both normally and still more under hypnotic conditions, exercises so much control over neural and other bodily processes as to indicate that it is no mere product of the brain. Indeed, the facts indicate an increasing tendency on the part of the mind to assert its control and independence, and at least suggest "the possibility of its becoming entirely liberated from the body, and continuing to live disembodied and free" after death, 6.

Professor William McDougall, the physiological and social psychologist, maintains that there are many psychological facts that cannot be explained by what we, following James, have called the production theory, nor even by the transmission theory. These facts include such concrete but technical experimental investigations as his own work in the coördination of the eyes in binocular vision, and more general considerations such as the impossibility of neural correlates for meanings and values, the unity of consciousness and personality, the unique qualities of sensations, the sequence of sensation by feelings and emotions, conation and effort, memory and reasoning, — all processes alien in quality and behavior to

bodily processes. The cause of such phenomena, Professor McDougall maintains, must be the *soul*—not conceived in the old-fashioned manner as a simple substance, but—a being that possesses or is, the sum of definite capacities to produce sensations, feelings, meanings, memories, conations, and judgments, in interaction with the body. Such a soul conceivably might survive the body at death, 7.

Such conceptions as those of James, Dr. Schiller, Professor Bergson, Dr. Hadfield, and Professor McDougall concerning the relation between the mind and the body make it possible that the minds or souls of men persist after death as distinct individual beings. If experimental evidence could be found, their existence might be scientifically established. The British and American Societies of Psychical Research—organizations including in their active membership persons of the highest standing, as scientists, scholars, and statesmen—have been endeavoring for some years to find out whether such evidence exists. They have carefully investigated the claims of clairvoyants, spiritualistic mediums and like folk, who allege that they are able to communicate with the dead. While the vast majority of these persons have been found to be frauds, there are a few who are undoubtedly entirely honest, at any rate in their normal waking states, whatever may be true of them under trance conditions. The evidence that has been accumulated has proved on the whole convincing to so eminent a scientist as Sir Oliver Lodge, 8.

Those interested should read some of this material, as published in the *Proceedings of the Society of Psychical Research.* Most confidence is usually placed, by those who believe that the existence of spirits has been established, in the reports of correspondence purporting to be from the same spirit, but transmitted by different mediums. If this material does not establish the existence of spirits, but does establish *telepathy, i. e.*, "the communication of mind with mind by means other than the recognized channels of sense," as a number of eminent authorities including Professor McDougall (9) have concluded, it is damaging to the production theory, since the hypothesis of telepathy implies that the mind has powers that cannot readily be regarded as the product of physical forces. Acceptance of telepathy, therefore, is favorable to belief in the existence of the mind in independence of the body.

The vast majority of scientific psychologists, however, have

been unable to find anything in this material that cannot be attributed to fraud, to mere coincidence, or to sub-conscious processes, and accordingly believe in *neither* spiritism nor telepathy, regarding the evidence for either of them as of little weight. The reader should be warned that those psychical researchers who do accept spiritism and telepathy admit that the great majority of professional mediums, clairvoyants and fortune tellers are rascals. It is agreed by all responsible authorities on the subject that for the present, investigation should be confined to competent specialists. The ordinary layman ought to keep away from *séances* of all sorts, if he wishes to save his money and to preserve a sane attitude toward life, 10.

Perhaps the reader has found the evidence thus far considered, sufficient to indicate that it is quite possible so far as present scientific knowledge goes, that the individual's mind may persist in independence of his body. Immortality in other words, may appear to be scientifically possible. Thus far in this section the type of immortality which we have been contemplating is that of separate individual minds, persisting in independence of one another, as is the case in our present life. To be sure, the transmission theory need not be interpreted so as to imply this. It may be taken to signify that individuals do not persist as such but lose their separate character and become parts of a universal Mind or Will—which may, if we wish, be thought of as God.

This latter supposition is compatible with the doctrine held by many psychologists, that consciousness is not a separate something that is in interaction with the body, but that its processes are in some sense *parallel* to those of the brain. According to *psycho-physical parallelism*, there is always a nervous process concomitant with a mental process. You see me look at a book, take it up, and read in it, and then lay it down again on the table. What you perceive in my behavior is wholly physical. A scientific description of it would be made from *your* standpoint. You could say that an image of the book was reflected on the retinae of my eyes, that nerve currents ran up from the eyes to the occipital lobes in the cortex, that reactions in other cortical centers were next evoked, from which a current ran down from the motor brain areas to my hand and the book was picked up. Parallel with all this, however, was the process as *I* felt it in my consciousness. I perceived the book, it suggested some interesting question to my

mind, I felt an impulse to pick it up, and did so. I *felt* the process from within—that was consciousness; you *observed* it from without—that was a physical process. The two series of events are parallel.

It might at first appear that psycho-physical parallelism necessarily implies that consciousness must cease when neural action ceases. The two are concomitant in life, the former cannot continue without the latter. However, this does not necessarily follow. To suppose that there are two series of processes, a mental series and a physical series, and that the mental never appears except in connection with the physical, though it is neither the cause nor the effect of the physical, may be advantageous for procedure in psychological investigations. It makes it possible to study either series by itself, leaving the other out of account, and psychology can concern itself exclusively with the conscious series, and physiology with the mental series. Each series thus has a homogeneous material to work upon. But advantageous and justifiable as such an hypothesis may be as a methodological assumption for these sciences, it does not answer the requirements of philosophy, which cannot well affirm that there actually are two unrelated but completely parallel series of events. Parallelists in psychology, therefore, when they become philosophers are obliged to find some other explanation. They may say that the two concomitant mental and physical series are after all really the same events viewed from the inside and the outside; if a parallelist holds this view, and at the same time believes that there is a universal parallelism between mind and matter, *i. e.*, panpsychism—he may believe that when the matter of the body is dissolved in death, but not actually destroyed, since matter is indestructible, the mind also persists in the mind of God. Some parallelists, like Fechner and Paulsen, have even thought that the relative independence of the individual's mind is preserved under these conditions, 11.

Other parallelists regard the construction of the two series, mental and physical, as a wholly artificial procedure, justifiable for the purposes of science, but untrue of reality. Hugo Münsterberg was a parallelist who looked at the matter thus. "To honor science means to respect its limitations: science is not and cannot be, and ought never to try to be, an expression of ultimate reality. When science seeks to be a philo-

sophy, it not only oversteps its rights, but weakens its own positions. . . Science is an instrument constructed by human will in the service of human purposes. It is a valuable, reliable, and indispensable instrument; but it is, like any instrument, an artificial construction; which has meaning only in view of its purpose." To achieve the practical purposes of science it is necessary to substitute for the real world an artificial world of causes and effects that follow one another in time. While this construction serves our real life, it remains "an artificial construction whose right and value do not go beyond the purpose for which it was fabricated." No science can say anything about ourselves, who make the sciences. In reality we are free, and only in our own practical interests have we constructed the sciences. The real life as a system of interrelated "will attitudes" is beyond time, independent of life and death, and immortal in the Absolute, 12.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that immortality of some sort, in which the contents of the individual's consciousness are preserved after death, is possible, so far as present scientific knowledge goes. If this conclusion is sound, we shall expect to find in agreement with it the majority of scientists, at least of those who have considered the question broadly, with some regard to the place of science in a philosophical view of the world. And this, the author believes, is the real outcome of a very carefully prepared questionnaire which Professor James H. Leuba has submitted to numerous physicists, biologists, historians, sociologists, and psychologists in this country, although Professor Leuba might be reluctant to admit it, 13. The questions which Professor Leuba asked these men had reference to *personal* immortality, conceived more narrowly than in this chapter, so that those who believe in the type of immortality held by Münsterberg would have to be classed in the negative. Of those who replied to the questionnaire, about one-half believed in personal immortality (as narrowly defined in the questionnaire) and the majority of the rest were in doubt. In an impartial manner the most eminent men in each profession were separated from the rest. Among these those who believed in personal immortality, those who disbelieved in it, and those who were in doubt each constituted about one-third of the total number, 14. Among biologists and psychologists, —men whose work brings them directly into contact with questions of the relationship between the mind and body,—the per-

centage who disbelieve in personal immortality is greater than in the case of the other groups.

It is evident that those who are in doubt whether or not there is personal immortality do not believe that it is a scientific *impossibility;* otherwise, they certainly would disbelieve in it. So it is not a misinterpretation of Professor Leuba's statistics to say that at least two-thirds of his scientists regard personal immortality as at any rate possible. The replies that Professor Leuba received from philosophers did not admit of classification, one writing that he could not answer such questions with a simple "Yes" or "No," and another that he believed in a meaning for such terms as "personal immortality" but not in the apparent meaning of the questions, while the replies of others showed that the same answers to a question could not be taken to express in all cases the same view on the subject.

So Professor Leuba's results are precisely what we should expect. Scientists are about equally divided into three groups, those who believe in personal immortality, those who disbelieve in it, and those who are in doubt upon the subject. Biologists and psychologists probably are more skeptical than the rest, because the subject suggests to their minds the dubious results of psychical research. Philosophers, who alone have given this subject consideration on all sides, cannot express by a simple "Yes," "No" or "Am in doubt" whether they believe in "personal immortality;" like the author, it all depends on what is meant by "personal immortality" and it would take at least one chapter in a book to make their position clear. This outcome which the author has attributed to Professor's Leuba's investigations is all the more significant because Professor Leuba certainly was not endeavoring to make out a case for personal immortality, in which he strongly disbelieves himself. He interprets his statistics to show that a majority of scientists do not believe in personal immortality—a conclusion at which he arrives by including those in doubt among those who do not believe in it. Of course, in a way, this is justifiable; a man in doubt upon a proposition may be said in a sense, *not to believe* in it; but it is equally true to say that he *does not disbelieve* in it, that is, he admits its *possibility.*

IV—*What Kind of Personal Immortality is Morally Desirable?*

As has been seen, all that can be claimed for personal immortality on scientific grounds is its possibility. The deciding

arguments for it must be found elsewhere. Since the time of Kant, most philosophers believe that the strongest of these are the moral arguments. These are based on the prior assumption that this is at bottom a moral universe,—a universe in which moral ends are achieved and moral values are conserved. In such a universe the kind of personal immortality that would exist would of course be a *morally* desirable kind. By a morally desirable kind is not meant necessarily a kind that we may fancy that we should find agreeable, but a kind that appears to us *morally* right and just, so that the universe would be of less moral worth without such immortality than with it.

In the first place, a future life that would be morally desirable must be one in which the state of the good man will be bound to be forever morally better than it now is. If a future existence were conceived to be subject to the "wheel of birth," so that a good man in his next life might be tempted and fall, and in subsequent rebirths be reduced to a lower condition than he now is, immortality would be horrible to contemplate and morally undesirable. Some means of escape from rebirth would then have to be sought, such as Brahmanism and Buddhism profess to offer. Nor could a morally desirable universe be governed by Nietzche's law of "eternal recurrence," in which the present life must sometime be exactly repeated. Few men or women probably would care to lead their present lives over again if given the choice between so doing and annihilation; certainly none would desire to do so if they would be afforded no opportunity to profit by present experience and so to improve upon the choices that they have made in the present life. Few plays are worth seeing twice, and few books are worth rereading; the exceptions are due to the chance to gain further insight and profit from what had previously escaped attention. No life could be worth reliving unless the repetition would be an improvement.

So a future life that would be morally desirable must be a life in which, for the good man, there must either be the *actual attainment* of perfection, or *assured progress* in its direction. There must be no danger of standing still or slipping backward; better absolute annihilation than either of those! The "perseverance of the saints" is a dogma attached to the postulate of a morally desirable immortality. Moreover, in the future life individual personalities must in some sense be conserved, or perhaps it would be better to say, what is of value

in them must endure. In the future life what is strong and beautiful and true and in a fine way distinctive in a good man must survive. Whether the individual should persist as a *separate* soul, or whether he should become an integral part of God's mind and memory and will, is yet to be considered. But, at any event, his immortality must *at least* be personal; it may be superpersonal.

Such are some of the general features of a personal immortality that can be regarded as morally desirable. It would appear necessary that it would be an outcome on a higher moral plane, of the achievements in one's present career. It would also appear desirable, if possible, that in it there should be conscious memory of the present life, a sense of continuity that would not be lost in the attainment of the larger life, intercourse with friends, and all the other higher goods of which we can conceive. If the reader can confidently believe that the universe is *absolutely* teleological and moral, he ought to feel certain that the future life will afford full conservation and enhancement of everything that is morally desirable in this life, wrought to its highest consummation. But if, like the author, his faith does not fly so high, and he can merely believe that this is a universe in which teleological and moral ends are only gradually becoming dominant, he may not expect so much, and may have to content himself with believing that the most essential values are conserved. As a minimum, the immortality that is morally desirable must, in the words of Lowes Dickinson, be "one in which a continuity of experience analogous to that which we are aware of here is carried on after death, the essence of that life being the continuous unfolding, no doubt through stress and conflict, of those potentialities of good of which we are aware here as the most significant part of ourselves," 15.

V—*Arguments for Personal Immortality as a Postulate*

The arguments for the postulation of personal immortality have already been anticipated in preceding chapters. We have seen that if this is a teleological universe, one of the cosmic purposes must be the higher development of man upon this planet. This higher development of man, we saw too, on the assumption that this is a moral universe, must include his moral development. And a teleological universe would pretty certainly be a moral universe, as moral ends are the highest ends of which we know, 16. If, then, there is a teleological and moral

evolution going on in the universe that has had as one of its results the appearance of good men with rational powers and moral insight, it would seem that the personalities of these men (or of the good elements in the personalities of all men) would survive death. The personality of a good man is the most valuable thing of which we know. If such personalities can survive death and continue to develop and to be of service, the universe is richer in value than if these personalities are bound to perish.

Of two conceivable universes, one in which good personalities can merely persist in biological and spiritual immortality but must otherwise pass away, and one in which these good personalities are forever conserved, the latter is infinitely the better, and as a teleological and moral universe, the more successful. In an *absolutely* teleological and moral universe, personal immortality of good men, or of the good elements in all men, is a necessary feature; in a universe in which the teleological principle is coming increasingly to prevail, and moral ends are being accomplished, such immortality is clearly a most highly desirable end, and one that has been realized if God has been able to bring it about. If God be Absolute, such immortality is in some sense assured; if God be finite, such immortality is certainly an end that He desires for those who are likest Him, and which in all probability He is able to assure to them.

Whatever may be the purposes of God in the universe as a whole, the retention in Himself—or with Himself—of the highest products of each planet must be among them. Whether this retention is eternal or in time, and whether and in what sense it involves the persistence of separate souls, are matters of detail for later consideration. But retention of some sort appears to be necessarily implied in an absolutely teleological and moral universe, and probable in a universe in which teleology and morality are becoming increasingly dominant.

Further moral arguments for personal immortality, as we saw in Chapter XIX, follow from considerations of the meaning of duty and the relation that morally ought to prevail between the fulfilment of duty and the obtainment of happiness, 17.

VI—*Types of Immortality as a Postulate*

If we may now regard personal immortality as morally desirable, and conclude to believe in it as at least a probable

postulate, in what sort of personal immortality shall we believe? (1) Shall we believe in personal immortality of individuals as separate souls? (2) Shall we prefer the view that the personalities of individuals are somehow conserved in the mind and will of the World Soul or God? (3) Or is some combination of the two conceptions preferable to either taken by itself?

In considering such possibilities as these, we are of course entering into a domain of pure speculation. We are therefore justified in exercising our imaginations to the utmost. In attempting to conceive of a state of life that we believe to be a vast advance upon our present state we can be sure that our imaginations are far too likely to fail to do justice to its characteristics. How difficult it is to predict conditions here on earth a generation in advance! How greatly have those failed to anticipate present conditions who made the attempt a generation ago! And their failures were chiefly due to lack of imagination,—to inability to realize what great changes might come. When we attempt to conceive of a state of existence immeasurably different from and superior to the present, our imaginations, though given free rein, must fail to picture the reality adequately.

"And when I fain would sing them,
My spirit fails and faints,
And vainly would it image
The assembly of the Saints.

. . . . . .

Thy loveliness oppresses
All human thought and heart;
And none, O peace, O Zion,
Can sing thee as thou art!" 18.

However, in considering the possibilities of the future life, it is not our function as philosophical students to endeavor to rival the visions of the mystical poets. There are two criteria that we must constantly employ. (1) Since we are consenting to believe in personal immortality as probable on moral grounds, we should regard that type of immortality as most probable that appears to us most fully to meet moral requirements. The *most morally desirable type of immortality* which we can imagine is, in other words, the closest approximation, at which we can arrive, to the kind that actually exists. (2) The details in our view of immortality must be *logically consistent* with one another, and with our other philosophical opinions.

With these criteria in mind, and remembering not to be afraid to give rein to our imaginations, let us consider the three possibilities mentioned.

(1)—*Continued Existence as a Separate Soul*

On this view, each individual would continue to exist separate from other individuals in the future, just as he does now. Unless the dubious doctrine of the pre-existence of individual souls prior to this life be combined with this view (19) we must suppose that new individuals are constantly coming into existence at birth. The number of separate souls in the universe must therefore continually be upon the increase. The universe must be a constantly enlarging society. These souls, too, must be continually advancing; for, unless their perpetual progress be assured, this type of immortality would not be morally desirable, and could not occur in a teleological and moral universe. This conception of immortality would accord with the theories upon the relationship between the mind and the body advanced by William James, Professor Bergson, and Professor McDougall, which we have observed. There are no serious scientific objections to this view. To say that there would not be room enough in space to hold so many souls, is not a serious objection; since it could be urged that space, as well as time, matter, motion, cause, effect, and all other ordinary scientific conceptions are merely teleological devices or instruments adopted by our minds for limited purposes, and that they do not literally apply to the world as it actually exists. After death the souls would find themselves in a universe more vast than we can conceive with our limited categories.

> "For tho' from out our bourne of Time and Place
> The flood may bear me far."

Two objections to this theory may need to be noticed. First, it might be objected, as James points out, (20) that such a host of undesirable souls would persist eternally—all the Hottentots and Australians that have been, and ever shall be, and all the Chinamen! A few chosen specimens of such races surely would be enough to be preserved. "Life is a good thing on a reasonably copious scale; but the very heavens themselves, and the cosmic times and spaces, would stand aghast, we think, at the notion of preserving eternally such an ever-swelling plethora and glut of it." So we conclude that we had rather not be

immortal ourselves, than to have to participate in an immortality shared by an inconceivably huge horde of such creatures. James says, in reply, that we must believe that this is a democratic universe in which our paltry exclusions play no regulative part, that God on the theistic view has "so inexhaustible a capacity for love that his call and need is for a literally endless accumulation of created lives," and on the pantheistic view, that through "so many diversified channels of expression, the eternal Spirit of the Universe affirms and realizes its own infinite life." Another point that could be made in reply is that in a future life on an inconceivably higher moral and spiritual plane than this—the only possibility that would be morally desirable—there would be no souls that would in that state be Chinese or Hottentots as we know them here—nor Americans or Europeans either. The white man would not be disgusted at the savagery of the black fellow or the alien standards of the Chinese, nor would the latter have occasion to fear the ruthless cruelty and exploitation of white men. The souls of all human beings would have advanced to a degree in comparison with which the present differences in culture between the various races on earth—differences due to only a few thousand years in terrestrial history at most—would be totally negligible.

The other objection may be stated thus. "On this argument why ought one not to assume that animals are immortal also?" It may be replied that it is indeed quite conceivable that animal souls, too, progress into higher forms of perfection in the next world, as well as we. Why not? They, too, may be necessary for the varied expression of the Infinite Life, or the inexhaustible love of God; and they, too, there will live on a higher plane of existence than here. A slight moral argument for animal immortality may be urged. Should even a worm be cloven in vain, or merely subserve another's good? If sparrows do not fall to the ground without the Heavenly Father's notice, must their souls not endure, and they, too, be given opportunity for future advancement? On the contrary, it must be admitted that the moral arguments are not so strong for animal as for human immortality. Only man has reason and a moral consciousness. The values conserved by the immortality of animals would be of less consequence for the universe. On psychological grounds, too, animal immortality appears less probable. An animal's mind does not rise superior to its

environment, and assume control of it to the same extent as a man's; it seems less likely that the consciousness of an animal can survive the shock of death and the dissolution of its body.

The chief moral arguments in favor of this type of immortality (the persistence of separate souls) may be briefly stated. It assures the persistence of the individual, with his unique traits and talents. Continuity with this life is most clear and complete on this view. Recognition of friends is rendered probable. The fulfilment of moral tasks and the gaining of happiness by the same individual who has labored, and achieved and suffered here is made certain. Fulfilment of duty, self-development, love, happiness,—all the distinctive moral values —appear to us most realizable in a society of separate individual souls working together for common ends and sharing common joys,—and burdens, too, perhaps. Existence as a separate soul, perhaps it should be added, is the type of immortality to which the data furnished by psychical research, would point, if accepted as evidence.

(2)—*Continued Existence in God*

According to the conception which we must next consider, the separate existence of the individual in time ends with his death. When the spirit returns to God who gave it, its temporal career as an individual is ended. It continues biologically and spiritually to live in other finite beings, to be sure. It also lives in the mind of the Infinite, where the memory of its life endures eternally. This conception of immortality has been held by many philosophers and mystics. To attain consciousness in this life, of such identity with the Infinite, and so even now to rise above time and live in eternity, has been the effort of many of the great religious thinkers of India, as well as of Plotinus, Spinoza, and many another spiritually minded philosopher in the Occident.

It must be admitted that there is much that is morally attractive in some of the Oriental versions of this conception, in which the individual is exhorted to tenderness and affection for all things as fundamentally one with himself, and in which he is promised liberation from his finite limitations and moral as well as physical weaknesses through absorption in God or the Universe. However, such a state of absorption often seems repellent to the Occidental mind; it is too much like annihilation, or at best, eternal stagnation. No Nirvana of eternal rest and

quiet can evoke a sympathetic response in our active natures. Spinoza's conception of the "intellectual love of God," (21) by which man may learn to be free from passions, ever to return good for evil, and to rejoice in a calm acquiescence induced by a steadfast regard of all things from the standpoint of eternity, is not wholly satisfactory, either.

But there is no need to regard the state of immortality in God as one of such absolute quiescence. It has been regarded by such philosophers as Fichte (22) and Münsterberg (23) as one of unceasing activity; the whole course of things in the Universe is the expression of His unceasing will. To be one with God may therefore mean to share in the consciousness of this eternal Will. Even if the Absolute be conceived with emphasis on cognition rather than volition, the Universal Mind is by no means one of torpor, it is the mind of the universe as a whole, perceived in all its relations in their systematic unity. To be one with such a God or Absolute would by no means imply a state of quiescence, but rather one of eternally creative intellectual activity, 24.

Sometimes the objection is raised against this form of immortality, that it is impersonal. In reply, defenders can ask, "What is it to be a person? When we speak of anyone as having a strong or a weak personality, what do we mean? The strong personality possesses breadth of knowledge, of sympathy, of capacities for action. The more a person understands, the more he can do, the more self-reliant he is, the more his decisions are determined by his own choices intelligently made, the more he masters the conditions of his environment instead of being forced to act by the pressure of external conditions, the stronger, we say, is his personality. The stubborn, stupid, narrow minded individual has a small personality, and so has the instable fellow who has no steadfast purposes and is carried along by the drift of the tide. The more inclusive a man's purposes, the broader his sympathies, the deeper his understanding, the more nearly complete is his personality. It follows that in the whole universe there is just one absolutely complete and all sufficient Person or Individual, and that is the one universal Mind that includes all finite thoughts and purposes in an eternally completed whole. To become identified with such a Person is not to lose one's own personality, but to achieve it and to perfect it. As separate individuals, we are bound to be finite, limited in our capacities to understand and to do, restricted by an

environment that is external to us and which we can only in part master and make subservient to ourselves. To be one with God or the Absolute is in some sense to gain infinite Personality; to find all our wants satisfied, all our questions answered, to gain eternal completion."

In fact, some advocates of this conception of immortality argue that to desire continued existence as a separate soul, in preference to such identification with the one complete Person, is to be small and selfish, to prefer a narrowed outlook to a wide one, limited sympathies and prejudices to universal love, petty purposes to world purposes. The most splendid destiny we could hope for others or desire for ourselves is to become one with God. Far from being impersonal, this type of immortality is the only kind that is truly personal; or perhaps one had better say it is superpersonal, since it includes within itself all that we ordinarily mean by personality, and more besides.

Possibly, in the effort to envisage this kind of immortality, some will find help in an analogy from pathological psychology, although the analogy is necessarily very imperfect, and must not be pushed too far. Dr. Morton Prince, in his *Dissociation of a Personality*, tells us how, in restoring integral life to Miss Beauchamp, it became necessary to coördinate all the separate personalities into which her mind had become broken. He regretted that to accomplish this end it became necessary to suppress one personality, "Sally," that was very attractive in many ways. Yet, if the author understands the account correctly, after Miss Beauchamp's memory had become fully reunited, she was able to recall all the actions and thoughts of all the separate personalities into which her mind had at one time been sundered. "Sally," though no longer a separate, limited personality, sometimes in rivalry and antagonism to other limited personalities, lived in the after life of Miss Beauchamp. The latter could remember all she had ever thought and done as Sally. In this larger life Sally's limitations were overcome and yet she lived on in sympathy with and understanding of what had been the other fragments of a severed personality. Neither Sally nor any of her rivals had been really a human person; yet none of them realized their defects, nor that only by becoming merged into a single consciousness could they achieve the normal conditions of a human personality.

As separate personalities they had to die, in order that they might achieve a fuller personality.

So it is with us. To save our lives we must lose them. As separate souls we must die; to find our lives in God we must lose them as separate individuals; only thus can we achieve real Individuality and Personality. May not God eternally remember all the separate careers of all the separate souls, who are now sundered from Him, but whose destiny it is to become ultimately united with Him forever? Each separate soul shall become one with all the rest in God. What is it now to love a friend? Is it not to have common joys, common understandings, common purposes and aspirations? What bliss it will be in all eternity for all our thoughts and desires to become merged in a common Mind! For reasons that we do not now understand, the World Soul, to complete His purposes, has had to become partly broken up into a lot of separate souls, each only a fragment of His Personality, with its part to perform for the good of the universe as a whole. But when the task of each of these separate souls is completed, and its debt of separate existence paid, what more heavenly reward can it have than to return home again to God, and in identity with Him to think and plan and will and enjoy the universe to all eternity! How more completely could "the chief end of man" be fulfilled!

The moral advantages in this type of immortality have been indicated. From a scientific standpoint, it escapes the difficulties involved in supposing that the soul of man is a separate substance of some sort or other now in interaction with his body, and able to survive severance from it at death. Just as at death the individual's body loses its identity, yet the matter of which it is composed persists, his consciousness also ceases its career as a separate individual but persists as a part of the universal Mind.

(3)—*Attempted Combination of Separateness with Immortality in God*

There remains another objection to the theory of immortality in God that should now be indicated. If individual souls simply became memories in the mind of God, has not something been lost, after all? Love can only exist between separate individuals. It is rather absurd to speak of one of a person's thoughts loving another of them. Is not an eternity in the Absolute, where we are only thoughts in a common mind, rather

a lonely and forlorn destiny, after all? If it were possible somehow to conceive of a form of immortality in God in which individuals should persist, and yet be different,—in which they should comprehend and will and enjoy the world order, and yet be distinct from one another, too, and so love one another and constitute a society, would not that be much better? In such an immortality we would know our friends; while sharing a common world and a common life, each should after all mirror the universe in his own particular way, and be himself. "Mechthild of Magdeburg, and after her Dante, saw Deity as a flame or river of fire that filled the Universe; and the 'deified' souls of the saints as ardent sparks therein, ablaze with that fire, one thing with it, yet distinct," 25. Is it possible to work out a philosophical conception of immortality which at the same time would identify all finite souls with God, and also afford to each a distinct individuality?

Among the absolute idealists Royce perhaps has made the most earnest effort to effect this combination. In his Ingersoll Address, entitled the *Conception of Immortality*, he strongly insists upon the unique and distinctive worth of each human being. No one of us can take the place of another. In a friend or a lover there are unique qualities of value which exist in no one else. Yet it is impossible to define or to describe these qualities adequately; for when we attempt to do so we are obliged to make use of general terms that apply to types of classes, and overlook the uniqueness itself. So in our present life we cannot define or describe what we mean by a finite individual. No biographer or historian ever has adequately defined or described Abraham Lincoln or any other man in so far as he was a unique individual; and no one ever will. Yet we know that there are such individuals, and that their unique individuality is most valuable and precious to those who appreciate them. We can at least say that the individuality of the finite being is always of great value; and that each such person expresses a purpose. As finite persons our purposes are never fully realized in this life; our attempts to carry out any purpose always lead us on into wider relations with other persons and into larger purposes. The completion of purposes in an absolute sense would have to mean identification with God, as the Absolute, in whom there is a unity of entirely completed purposes; only He is an entirely whole Individual. It is clear, therefore, that our ultimate destiny must be to attain a closer

union with God than we now possess. "A will satisfied has in God's whole life found its goal, and seeks no other." Yet this does not mean that it is our destiny after death to be absorbed in God, so as to lose our present identity. The very fact that we are now unique, though finite, indicates that we constitute values or purposes that are integral parts of God's complete purpose. If the whole is a complete fulfillment of purpose, then every fact in the world occupies its unique place. We therefore conceive eternal existence in God in such a way that our distinctness and uniqueness as individuals are none the less maintained.

How the uniqueness of the finite individual is to be preserved, Royce endeavored to set forth more explicitly in the closing lectures of the *World and the Individual.* His treatment there is often obscure, and raises the suspicion that it may not have been entirely clear in his own mind. The finite individual, however, he maintains, is immortal in various senses. He persists in the eternal time span of God as an individual with a purpose and value; this truth, which is not perceived in the finite consciousness of a human being in this life, will be clear to the larger individual which one will become in the future life. The apparent death of a human being is only an incident in the life of a larger individual Self; this larger Self continues, it remains in individual contrast with the rest of the world, and the same is true of the human being who is a necessary phase of this Self. A human being is an ethical self, that is, a person with a moral purpose, a duty, to perform, which is infinite and can never be fulfilled in time; this fulfillment comes in the place that it occupies in the eternally fulfilled social life of the Absolute. Royce tries to make his meaning clearer by mathematical analogies. The various collections of whole numbers can be arranged in different series, so that, while each collection is infinite, it is unlike every other, and yet all are interrelated. So each individual Self persists in the Absolute, unique, and yet in communication with the others. "Our result is this: Despite God's absolute unity, we as individuals, preserve and attain our unique lives and meanings, and are not lost in the very life that sustains us, and that needs us as its expression. This life is real through us all; and we are real through our union with that life," 26.

This is certainly a resolute attempt to afford a unique immortality to the individual soul, which yet exists after death

only in a God who is eternally perfect and complete. Those who are unpersuaded will think that no more genuinely individual immortality has been gained by it, than by other presentations of immortality in God. According to critics of Royce's last book, the *Problem of Christianity*, he there succeeds better in maintaining the separateness of individual souls and their social union in the Church, but at the cost of making God seem scarcely more than a name for the collective life. Royce believed that the two books are in harmony with each other; we know God through society, and gain our very individuality and personality through society also.

(4)—*The Author's Opinions*

The author is greatly attracted by Royce's attempt to afford separate immortality to individuals and yet to make them one with God in the future life. He believes that Royce has not fully met the difficulties, but that along this line future thought on Immortality can profitably proceed. However, unlike Royce, he does not believe in a perfectly completed universe present in an eternal time span to the mind of God.

The author, as has been explained in previous chapters, believes God to be finite, and the universe to be developing in time. He believes in an immortality in the mind of this finite God, in which our separate identities will continue. The moral postulates seem to sanction belief that somehow our finite individualities shall thus persist, while it seems both more morally desirable and less open to the difficulties suggested by science, to suppose that we shall live in God, as distinct and unique aspects of His personality rather than in separation from Him as we now are.

What the author favors, then, is an immortality in which separate individuals shall persist, know one another, and enjoy a mutual society; but that this existence shall be in God, and not as souls separated from Him and from one another by physical bodies as is now the case. This immortality would be a life on an immeasurably higher moral and spiritual plane than any of which we now can conceive; in this sense it may be called a state of bliss. But in an imperfect and growing universe, immortality in a finite God cannot be free from pains and sorrows, from evils to be overcome. We shall share in all the good that God knows; we shall also share in sorrow at the evil which He also knows and is endeavoring to overcome; united

with Him in knowledge, affection, and volition, we shall fight with Him in the cosmic battles and rejoice with Him in His and our victories.

VII—*Salvation and Damnation*

Have the theological notions of salvation and damnation, which have come down to us from the past, any significance for philosophical theories of immortality today? Well, we can neither regard the description of the harps and golden pavements and pearly gates nor that of the fire and brimstone as literal truths. If true at all, it must be in a symbolical sense. And the idea of an angry God and cruel devils taking delight in the torture of the lost is impossible for us. God must be at least as loving and humane as we are, and we are morally above taking such delight. Nor could modern ethics regard such punishments as "eternal justice" in view of present knowledge of the evolution of moral conceptions.

Still these doctrines, on all the theories of personal immortality that we have been considering, are not without significance.

(1) If the hypothesis of an immortality of separate souls be accepted, it would be logical to suppose that each soul will begin its next existence in circumstances consequent upon its life here. The inevitable natural consequences of right doing here will afford development and opportunity in the next life; of wrong doing, the reverse. In the vision of Er in Plato's *Republic*, the souls are free to select their own careers in their next lives before becoming reincarnated. No God punishes or rewards them by making the selection for them. But each soul chooses in accordance with its own character; it is attracted to whatever its past life has led it to appreciate. The law of *karma* in philosophical Brahmanism and Buddhism makes one's next existence, whether better or worse than the present, the just and inevitable consummation of past conduct. And John of Patmos was told by the angel, "He that is unrighteous, let him do unrighteousness still; and he that is filthy, let him be made filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him do righteousness still: and he that is holy, let him be made holy still," 27. This is not a judicial decree handed down from above; it is merely a natural law that each should be what his past life has made him.

Consider the case of two students now in college. Suppose

that one of them does faithful work in his studies and makes a brilliant record, while the other wastes his time in idleness or dissipation, or allows himself to become so absorbed in athletics or other student activities that he has no time to obtain a real education. After graduation, the faithful student will begin the next stage in his life under better advantages, and he will be capable of larger things than the other student,—supposing of course, that their natural abilities were approximately equal when they entered college. And this is no judgment imposed on the two students by an angry God. It is like the choices made in the vision of Er, or the law of *karma*, or the angel's saying in the last chapter of *Revelation*. Yet, of course, a man who has made a poor record in college may awaken when he gets out into the world, and with effort he can in some measure retrieve the ground he has lost. He is not absolutely condemned to mediocrity for the rest of his life on account of the mistakes he made in college, though he will probably never enjoy the culture that a liberal education might have afforded him.

This is not in conflict with acceptance of some aspects, at least of the doctrine of atonement. A repentant sinner becomes a different self because of the atoning deed of his Saviour, both in this life and in the next. He is truly saved. But for this to take place, he must sincerely repent of his wrong doing, and voluntarily make the atonement his very own, and so be converted.

(2) If the hypothesis of immortality in God be preferred, this, too, affords a meaning to the notions of salvation and damnation. Who desires to live eternally in the mind of God as a bad memory, as an evil life whose wicked deeds had somehow to be atoned for and turned into good by the sacrifice and suffering of others? What more horrible damnation could there be then eternally to exist in the mind of God as a Nero, or a Judas Iscariot or a Benedict Arnold! Such souls in a sense would be forgiven—like the strident notes in the symphony, they contribute to the harmony of the whole — they would be one in the universal Mind with the heroes and saints and martyrs, but how utterly different the rôles that they must forever play in that eternal life!

VIII—*The Author's Opinions on Salvation and Damnation*

If a selection of features from these two views be combined

with the hypothesis of a finite God, as favored by the author, the conceptions of salvation and damnation will also retain significance. To be "in Heaven" may mean the consciousness that one's life on earth has harmonized with the general plans of God, so that one in consequence has become capable of sharing more completely in an understanding and appreciation of His life with its triumphs and sorrows. To be "in Hell" would be a state of self-reproach and mortification because one perceives that one's earthly life has through one's own fault been a reverse or an impediment to the onward progress of the universe that God is seeking to effect, which has had to be retrieved and made good by others, and to feel oneself unworthy and incapable of entering into intimate communion with God and with other souls.

To be "in Purgatory" might mean that in consequence of one's shame, sorrow, and repentance one has the opportunity to help to retrieve one's failures in some way, or to undo the evils that have come to the world's progress through one's own fault. One would thus have the privilege of oneself making good, or of assisting to make good, the consequence of one's wrong doing, instead of suffering the humiliation of helplessly witnessing one's failures wholly atoned for by others. Possibly the soul "in Purgatory" might have the chance to become again reincarnated in a physical body, and thus be given another trial in a life led under bodily conditions in which to prove himself worthy of a higher state of existence in God.

Perhaps it may be hoped that no one shall forever remain in the state of "Hell," but through repentance ultimately enter that of "Purgatory." At all events divine justice must signify that every one shall ultimately attain to as high a place in the universe as he can fill. Promotions shall strictly be upon a merit basis. There shall be no retribution for past misdeeds except in the incapacity for higher service that these necessarily cause, in reforming punishments and in opportunities to make good the harm caused by past failures.

IX—*Conclusion*

The solid ground on the subject of immortality is that outlined at the opening of the chapter under the caption of "Immortality as a Fact." This is assured. This no man can take from us. Faith is not needed to believe in it. It affords immeasurable solace to sorrowing souls, and furnishes a powerful incentive to lives of service.

But those who have faith and imagination can venture further, and get additional comfort and inspiration in believing in "Immortality as a Postulate." The entire consideration of this latter has been highly speculative and imaginative. Discussion of such matters must be so, if it is to be fruitful at all. Those who forever keep their eyes on the ground can never see the stars. Only a daringly speculative philosophy that does not hesitate to employ analogies, where there are few facts on which to reason, can suggest the possibilities open to us if we accept some type of personal immortality as a postulate.

Every man who chooses to believe in immortality as a postulate should accept whatever view of it can meet these three tests: (1) strict accordance with the facts known to science that in any way bear upon the subject; (2) satisfaction of the implications of a universe that is at least partially teleological and moral; (3) logical consistency with his other philosophical beliefs. Let everyone accept and be guided in his life by whatever conceptions of immortality, after candid and thoughtful reflection, seem to him most fully to meet these tests. And, whatever may be his conclusions, in detail, he will decide that, in an ultimate sense, the Socrates of Plato's *Apology* is right in affirming that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death."

REFERENCES

*William James, *Human Immortality.*
*Lowes Dickinson, *Is Immortality Desirable?*
*Hugo Münsterberg, *The Eternal Life.*
*John Fiske, *Life Everlasting.*
*G. T. Fechner, *Life After Death.*
*B. H. Streeter, *et al., Concerning Immortality.*
*James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* Chapter XI.
*Josiah Royce, *The Conception of Immortality.*
*E. C. Wilm, *The Problem of Religion,* Chap. VI.
*Durant Drake, *Problems of Religion,* Chap. XXIV.
Plato, *Phaedo.*
Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason.*
Other technical references will be found in Notes to the Chapter.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. For those who wish to begin their study with these lowliest races, presumably most like primitive man, the author would suggest starting with Wilhelm Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology* (trans.) chap. I; and W. J. Sollas, *Ancient Head Hunters and Their Modern Representatives.*

2. É. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (trans.) pp. 91, f.

3. Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia,* p. 18.

4. *Idem,* p. 25.

5. *Idem,* p. 223.

6. *Idem,* pp. 271, f.

7. A good summary of the various facts and theories of totemism will be found in Professor Crawford Howell Toy's *Introduction to the History of Religions,* chap. V. The best theoretical discussion is probably that by Professor Lévy-Bruhl, *Fonctions mentales dans les races inférieures,* which is largely based upon Australian totemism.

8. Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia,* p. 326.

9. Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia,* p. 11.

10. É. Durkheim, *Op. cit.,* Book II, Chapters VI, VII.

11. This is probably too dimly conceived for the question to occur to the native whether one or many such forces are operative in the different ceremonies. The whole conception is too hazy for him to have numerical or other clearly defined attributes.

12. Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia,* pp. 124-126; 265, 337, f.

13. Dr. R. R. Marett, (*The Threshold of Religion,* chap. VI) advances the interesting theory that gods, when they do appear, are an evolution from the 'bull-roarer.' This appears too simple to serve as a complete explanation of the origin of deities; but it may indicate one of the factors operative in this evolution.

14. A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia,* pp. 500, f; 506, f.

15. *Idem,* pp. 741, f.

16. Spencer and Gillen, *idem,* pp. 280, f.

17. B. Malinowski, "The Economic Aspect of the Intichiuma Ceremonies," (published in English in the *Festskrift tillegnad Edvard Westermarck,* Helsingfors, 1912) pp. 81-108.

CHAPTER III

1. W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas.*

2. Irving King, The Development of Religion, pp. 238, 241.

3. Professor L. Lévy-Bruhl (*Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*) certainly has at least shown that savages do not employ logical categories as effectively as we do, though he may have overstated his thesis. cf. W. K. Wright, "The Genesis of the Categories" in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,* vol. X (1913) pp. 645-657.

4. R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians,* pp. 118, ff.

5. *Idem,* pp. 125, f.

6. These have been taken from the numerous illustrations given by Dr. Marett (*The Threshold of Religion*) and Professor King (*op. cit.*)
7. R. R. Marett, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
8. See p. 14 above.

CHAPTER IV

1. John Roscoe, *The Baganda,* an account of their native customs and beliefs. London, 1911. For those who would like to compare with the Baganda another savage people whose religion has reached a somewhat comparable stage of development, and has also been reported with scientific accuracy, the author recommends *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo* by Charles Hose and William McDougall, London, 1912.
2. Roscoe, *op. cit.* p. 279.
3. *Idem,* p. 283.
4. *Ibid,* p. 284.
5. *Idem,* p. 338.
6. *Idem,* p. 344.
7. William McDougall, *Social Psychology,* pp. 288-293.

CHAPTER V

1. Cf. my paper, "The Relation of the Psychology of Religion to the Philosophy of Religion," *Philosophical Review,* XXVII, especially pp. 141-143, giving criticisms of Professor Ames, Professor Coe and Professor Watson in this connection. A similar position to mine is held by Professor J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* Chapter I. A fuller explanation of the expression "socially recognized" will be found in my paper, "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology,* XVI, pp. 389 ff, where are indicated the reasons for its choice rather than the more vague "social values." This is in order to allow full recognition to the contributions of such writers as W. Robertson Smith, Irving King, C. H. Cooley, and J. Mark Baldwin, on the one hand, and at the same time to guard against "the exaggeration of the social" which Professor Warner Fite has exposed in a paper of that title (*Journal of Philosophy,* IV, 393, ff, as well as in his *Individualism*).

2. Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, "The Desires of the Self-Conscious," *Journal of Philosophy,* etc., IV, pp. 29-39.

3. G. A. Coe, "Religious Value," *Journal of Philosophy,* etc., 1908, p. 253.

4. J. H. Leuba, "The Contents of the Religious Consciousness," *Monist,* XI, pp. 536-573.

5. J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough,* vol. I, pp. 139-166, gives numerous instances.

6. This definition was originally set forth in an article published in the *American Journal of Theology,* vol. XVI (1912), pp. 385-409. It was immediately criticized by Professor James H. Leuba (same journal and volume, pp. 642-645). I trust that in the present chapter I have removed the ambiguities that provoked two of Professor Leuba's criticisms. Within "conservation" of values, I include the quantitative increase of values. The "feeling of dependence" upon the agency excludes dependence upon forces believed to be merely physical and mechanical. I claim to have succeeded in showing the difference and the relationship between magic and religion, though here my position is different from that of Professor Leuba.

I admit that many of Professor A. C. Watson's criticisms of my definition ("The Logic of Religion," *American Journal of Theology,* vol. XX, 1916, pp. 92-95; 244-248) are justified. But I cannot see that he has improved matters with his definition of religion as "a social attitude

toward the non-human environment." (1) He fails to make any clear-cut distinction, or statement of relationship, between the religious and certain other social attitudes toward the non-human environment, such as the aesthetic. (2) His definition is needlessly abstract in failing to state the end of religion—which I claim to be the conservation of socially recognized values. In this respect he is even farther from the "concrete universal" than I. (3) He does not bring out the fact that the values of religion often are more concerned with the adjustment of individuals to one another than to their non-human environment. However, Professor Watson's attempt to define religion is one of the best that has been made in recent years.

Professor G. A. Coe (*Psychology of Religion,* pp. 62, f.) criticizes my definition on two grounds. (1) It limits the values involved in religious consciousness to those already socially recognized; this does not allow for the work of the prophet, who dissents from socially recognized values and makes appeal to what he regards as a higher standard. In reply I would say that the Hebrew prophets, whom I suppose he has chiefly in mind, were endeavoring to secure the conservation of values already recognized (if not acted upon) by groups within the nation, and that the prophets believed to be values for which Yahweh and his religion in its pristine purity had stood. I do not mean to imply that the "socially recognized" values of religion are always *dominant* in the practises of a nation—I fear that they rarely are—but only that they are socially recognized by groups, perhaps minority groups, as morally right and desirable. Moreover, the Hebrew case is exceptional. In our time, nobody surely hopes for the promotion of novel social movements by the churches and synagogues; all we expect of them is that they will instil loyalty to the moral principles of our fathers, and ultimately give their support to such proposed reforms as shall previously have stood the fire of criticism, and made considerable headway. There almost always are people in secular life far better qualified to initiate a novel social movement than a clergyman or other primarily religious worker.

(2) Professor Coe objects to my finding the differentia of religion in the means whereby certain ends are sought, and not in the ends themselves. This is true. But I claim that it is impossible otherwise to find a differentia for religion. Professor Coe himself admits that religion does not introduce any new value (p. 70). He believes that it is "an operation upon or within all our appreciations" (*ibid.*); "an immanent movement within our valuations" (p. 72). Well, so it is. But so is Ethical Culture. The logical conclusion from Professor Coe's conception would be, that all attempts at moral or social synthesis are religious. But if I follow him, Professor Coe means to limit religion (after it has become differentiated and passed beyond its primordial beginnings) to those attempts at synthesis that imply faith in some kind of a divine order. Well, then, why does he not say so, and make this faith the differentia of religion?

7. Mary H. Kingsley, *West African Studies.*
8. A. G. Leonard, *The Lower Niger and Its Tribes.*
9. J. H. Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion. A Psychological Study of Religion,* pp. 4-7; 57-69.
10. These illustrations have mostly been borrowed from L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution.* Part II, chapter I.
11. In this explanation, as well as for the illustrations, the author is largely indebted to Irving King, *The Development of Religion,* pp. 179, ff.
12. W. G. Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 25.
13. W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites,* 2d. ed., p. 59.

14. This distinction between mediate and immediate interest is stated by Professor John Dewey, *Interest as Related to Will,* pp. 15, ff. (Chicago University Press, 1903).

15. *Op. cit. cf. note* 6, above.

16. C. E. Seashore, "The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion," *American Journal of Theology,* April, 1910.

17. Chapter XIV, section VI, pp. 229, 230.

CHAPTER VI

1. E. S. Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience,* p. 117.

2. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures,* Chapter II, and *passim.*

3. Spencer and Gillen, *The Natives of Central Australia,* p. 338.

4. *Idem,* see Index under *Iruntarinia.*

5. James B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 312.

6. J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough,* 2d. ed., vol. I, p. 156.

7. Chapter IV of this book (page 32).

8. The account in this section in some respects follows Professor James H. Leuba's *A Psychological Study of Religion,* Chapters IV-VI, to which the reader is referred.

9. J. G. Frazer, *op. cit.,* p. 64.

10. *Idem,* p. 68.

11. Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion,* p. 3.

12. This section is chiefly indebted to Professor L. R. Farnell's "The Evolution of Prayer" in his *Evolution of Religion,* from which most of the illustrations are taken.

13. Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* vol. II, p. 331.

14. Charles A. Eastman, *The Soul of an Indian,* pp. 6-8; cf. pp. 45-47.

CHAPTER VII

1. The dates given in this chapter are quite arbitrary. The authorities differ widely. If the reader will fix in his mind the order in which the periods came, that is all that matters for the purposes of this book.

2. Edward Washburn Hopkins, *The Religions of India,* p. 179; cf. *Sata-patha-Brâhmana,* ii 2, 2, 6; 4, 3, 14. (*Sacred Books of the East,* vol. XII, pp. 309, f; 374).

3. *Sata-pataha-Brâhmana,* II, 2, 2, 8-14 (*Sacred Books of the East,* vol. XII, p. 310).

4. E. W. Hopkins, *op. cit.,* p. 180.

5. *Brihadaranyaka—Upanishad,* IV, 4, 6. Quoted from George Foot Moore, *History of Religions,* vol. I, p. 276.

6. Paul Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (trans.) p. 49.

7. L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution,* 3d. ed., p. 474.

8. James Bissett Pratt, *India and Its Faiths,* pp. 14, 16, 56 f; 66, 176, and *passim.*

CHAPTER VIII

1. See page 79 above.

2. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated in Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism,* p. 31.

3. In the *Treatise of Human Nature.*

4. *Dhammapada,* p. 92, secs. 396, 399, 406, 407, cited from Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution,* 3d. ed., p. 485.

5. *Tevigga Sutta,* in *Buddhist Suttas* translated by Rhys Davids, p. 201.

6. *Proceedings of the World's Parliament of Religions,* vol. II, pp. 876, f. (Held in Chicago in 1893).

7. Paul Dahlke, *Buddhist Essays,* (Eng. trans.) p. 343. This author

says that Burman laymen are beginning to start schools and to engage in other forms of missionary effort, in the endeavor to preserve their ancestral faith from the encroachments of Christianity.

8. "Then again all beings, O Sâriputra, ought to make fervent prayer for that Buddha country. And why? Because they come together there with such excellent men. Beings are not born in that Buddha country of the Tathâgata Amitâyus [i. e., Amida] as a reward of good works performed in this present life. No, whatever son or daughter of a family shall hear the name of the blessed Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, and having heard it, shall keep it in mind, and with thoughts undisturbed shall keep it in mind for one, two, three, four, five, six or seven nights,—when that son or daughter comes to die, then that Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, surrounded by an assembly of disciples and followed by a host of Bodhisattvas, will stand before them at the hour of death, and they will depart this life with tranquil minds. After their death they will be born in the world of the same Amitâyus, the Tathâgata." (The Smaller Sukhâvatî—vyûha, § 10, in *Sacred Books of the East,* vol. XLIX). As Sanskrit originals have been found, the Amida conception must have originated in India, though its Protestant-like form may be a later Chinese and Japanese development.

9. G. F. Moore,—*History of Religions,* vol. I, pp. 140, 141.

10. *Fifty Years of New Japan,* edited by Count Okuma, vol. II, p. 75.

CHAPTER IX

1. L. R. Farnell, *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion,* p. 33.

2. Arthur Fairbanks, *A Handbook of Greek Religion,* pp. 120, ff.

3. De Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (trans.) p. 44. A longer quotation appears on page 259 of this book.

4. W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People,* chapter IV.

5. L. R. Farnell, *op. cit.,* pp. 56, f.

6. G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence,* vol. II, pp. 251-259.

7. L. R. Farnell, *op. cit.,* p. 65.

8. *Idem,* p. 69.

9. Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion.*

10. C. H. Moore, *Religious Thought of the Greeks,* pp. 27, f.

11. Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion,* p. 80, and *passim.*

CHAPTER X

1. Spinoza, the greatest philosopher of Jewish race, cannot on the religious side be reckoned a Jew. He contributed nothing to the religion, to which he early became an apostate. For an interesting account of the philosophy of Maimonides, see Professor Isaac Husik's *History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy;* for his place in the development of Jewish theology, see Dr. K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology,* pp. 22-27, 307-309, 386-388 and *passim.*

2. Joshua VII.

3. Exodus XX, 5.

4. Numbers XIV, 11-20.

5. Judges IV 3, 17-22, V 24-27.

6. II Samuel XXIV 1, 15-17. According to the book of I Chronicles (written later) it is Satan who prompts David to take the census (XXI, 1).

7. Genesis III, 8.

8. Genesis VIII, 20-22.

9. Genesis XVIII 1-8.

10. Amos II, 6.

11. Amos IV, 1.
12. Hosea IV, 1, f.
13. Micah II.
14. Isaiah III, XXVIII.
15. Jeremiah XIX 5; XXXII 35; I Kings XIV 24; XV 12. II Kings XXIII 7. Exodus XXII 28; Ezekiel XX 25. cf. H. P. Smith, *The Religion of Israel,* pp. 70-72; 87-89. The denunciations are found constantly. Cf. Amos V 21; Hosea X 1; Isaiah I 11, 12.
16. Amos V, 14, 24. Here, and in other cases where the quotations differ from the American Revised Version, they are taken from H. P. Smith, *Religion of Israel,* whose account has largely been followed here.
17. Micah VI 8.
18. Isaiah I 16, f.
19. This evolution was probably not complete prior to the exile, but the tendency had long previously been in that direction.
20. Jeremiah XXXI 29, 30. Ezekiel XVIII.
21. *E. g.,* XXIII, XXVII, XXVIII, XXXIV, XL, XLVI, LXIII, XCI, etc.
22. Ezekiel XXIII, 1-9.
23. Ezekiel XXXVI 20-28.
24. Deuteronomy VI, 4-9.
25. The "ten commandments" in the version of Exodus XX.
26. *E. g.,* Psalms CXIX; XIX, 7-11; XXXVII, 31; LXXVIII; XCIV, 21; CV, 45. Cf. the works of Kohler, Joseph, and Levine in the list of References to this chapter.
27. Haggai II 20-23. Zechariah VI, 9-15; cf. IV, 1-10.
28. Chapters XXX and XXXI.
29. Micah V, 1-3.
30. Cf. Isaiah IV, 2-5; XI, 1-10; XXXII, 1. f; XXXIII 17, 21.
31. Chapters XL-LXVI.
32. Isaiah XLIX, 6.
33. See Chapter XV, section VII.

CHAPTER XI

1. The chief exceptions are Arthur Drews (*Christusmythe, Hat Jesus gelebt? Witnesses to the Historicity of Jesus*) and William Benjamin Smith (*Der vorchristliche Jesus, Ecce Homo* (Eng. trans.) For a discussion and refutation of these radicals, cf. Shirley Jackson Case, *The Historicity of Jesus.*
2. Zechariah IX, 9.
3. The Gospel accounts show that Jesus did not incite his followers to military rebellion, and that his whole attitude was one of passive non-resistance. "Blasphemy" against the Jewish religion was not treason against Roman law. The claim to be the Messiah in a purely spiritual sense, could hardly have been seriously objectionable from a Roman point of view. However, if this claim implied that the followers of Jesus though meek and non-resistant, were privately confident that sooner or later, and perhaps very soon, Yahweh would miraculously overthrow the Roman government and establish their Master on the throne of David, one can see that Romans might regard the claim as treasonable, and believe that the movement, if not at once crushed, would develop into another fanatical uprising. Professor Richard W. Husband (*The Prosecution of Jesus*) believes that the trial of Jesus was regular, according to Roman law, that Pilate was obliged to find Jesus technically guilty of treason as legally defined, and so to condemn him when the Jewish council insisted on prosecuting him. Not believing Jesus guilty except in a pure-

ly technical sense, Pilate in vain tried to persuade the Jewish leaders not to push their prosecution of Jesus.

4. Matthew I. Luke I-III. Two ingenious attempts to reconcile the two different genealogies with orthodox claims have been made by the Reverend William H. Bates, D. D., "A Study in the Genealogy of Jesus," *Bibliotheca Sacra,* vol. LXXIV (1917) pp. 321-329, and the Reverend H. W. Magoun, "The Two Genealogies of Jesus," *Bibliotheca Sacra,* LXXII (1915) pp. 34-48.

5. See Chapter X, pp. 143-146.

6. Acts IX, 1-30; I Corinthians XV, 8-10.

7. Gal. II, 20; Phil. I, 21; Gal. VI, 17 cf. II. Cor. IV, 10, 16; Rom. VIII, 2.

8. Gal. IV, 19; Eph. III, 14-19.

9. Acts XV, 1-29. The entire epistle to the Galatians powerfully sets forth the Pauline position on this subject.

10. Contrast I Thess. IV, 13—V. 11 and II Thess. I, 4-12 with Romans VIII, 18-25; XIII, 11, f; I Cor. IV, 5; VI, 2, 3; VII 29-31, and yet more, with Eph. II, 7; Phil. I, 21-24; II Tim. IV, 6-8. (The order in which the epistles were written was probably about as follows: The earliest were I and II *Thessalonians.* To the middle of Paul's career belong *Galatians,* I and II *Corinthians,* and *Romans.* Among his last epistles are *Phillipians, Ephesians,* and *Philemon.* If I and II *Timothy, Titus* and *Colossians* were written by Paul himself, they are also late; at any rate they are Pauline. The epistle to the *Hebrews* was not written by Paul, and is not Pauline).

11. Acts XV, 1-29.

12. Matthew XVI, 18, 19; John XXI, 15-17. In addition to these passages, Roman Catholic writers make much of the fact that Peter's name is always mentioned first in the lists of apostles (Matt. X, 2; Mark III, 16; Luke VI, 14; Acts I, 13); that he was the first of them to perform a miracle (Acts III); the first to make Gentile converts (Acts X), and that when he decided what should be done the other apostles concurred (Acts I, 15-26 and XV, 1-30). Protestants think that these passages at most indicate that Peter was the leader of the group, not their ruler; and that James, the brother (Matt. XIII, 55) of Jesus, rather than Peter, made the decision in Acts XV, and appeared in the rôle of the head of the church so far as there was one. The next step in the Roman Catholic argument is to establish that Peter was the first bishop of Rome. "Babylon" from which I Peter was written (V, 13) is interpreted by them to refer to Rome, and John XXI, 18, 19, to Peter's martyrdom there. "Clement, the fourth Bishop of Rome, who is mentioned in terms of praise by St. Paul, St. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, who died in 105; Irenaeus, Origen, St. Jerome, Eusebius, the great historian, and other eminent writers, testify to St. Peter's residence in Rome; while no ancient ecclesiastical writer has ever contradicted the statement," says Cardinal Gibbons (*The Faith of the Fathers,* p. 131). Protestants observe that this evidence is slender, and at best, scarcely goes back of the second century. Modern critical historians think of Peter rather as a Palestinian Jewish Christian than as the founder of a Christian church in the capital of the Gentile world; they do not see how he could have been in Rome while Paul was writing his epistles from there; but they admit the possibility that he may have been there a short time and met with martyrdom under Nero.

13. Throughout the history of the church, the book of *Revelation* has been most often questioned. Its place in the canon has certainly led to the unfortunate result that visionaries have kept looking for the imminent arrival of the end of the world. *Jude* has also been questioned; it has seemed to some not very Christlike in its attitude to Christians with different the-

ological beliefs from its author. *James* and II *Peter* have often been questioned in both ancient and modern times. Some of the ancients wished to include the *Shepherd of Hermas* and the *Apocalypse of Peter* in the canon. The epistles of *Clement, Ignatius,* and *Barnabas* were written early in the second century, and the sources of the *Didache* may belong to the first century. These non-canonical books are all now readily accessible both in Greek and English, in the *Apostolic Fathers* in the *Loeb Classical Library.*

14. I Cor. XI, 17-34.

15. James Henry Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine,* p. 381.

16. W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy,* tr. by J. H. Tufts, Part III, No. 22. The mysticism of St. Augustine will be indicated in Chapter XVII.

17. See Windelband, *op. cit.* p. 391. Cf. p. 186 below.

18. See Chapter XVII, section III.

CHAPTER XII

1. Comparisons of this sort are frequently made by American Roman Catholic apologists.

2. John M. Mecklin, *An Introduction to Social Ethics.*

3. The name Anabaptists ("rebaptizers") was attached to them by their opponents because, not believing in infant baptism, they required persons who had been baptised in infancy in other communions to be baptised again on uniting with their churches.

4. After due allowance has been made for the fact that the word "enthusiasm" has changed somewhat in significance since the eighteenth century (see *Murray's* and the *Century* dictionaries), my statement remains well within the truth. Cf. J. H. Overton, *A History of the English Church. From the Accession of George I to the End of the Eighteenth Century.* Index, under "enthusiasm."

5. The great authorities for the period are W. E. H. Lecky's *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* and Leslie Stephen's *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* Cf. Canon J. H. Overton, *op. cit.* A concise summary of the spirit of the age will be found in James H. Tufts' *The Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in the British Ethics of the Eighteenth Century,* pages 1-5.

6. Cf. E. Hershey Sneath, *The Mind of Tennyson.*

7. Browning never understood philosophy thoroughly. That, I believe, is one cause of his obscurity of expression, which is even more pronounced than usual when philosophical thought is implied in his poetry. However, the point of view of short poems like *Abt Vogler* and *Rabbi Ben Ezra* is unmistakably that of Hegelian or Neo-Hegelian absolute idealism. I think that this is also true of Sordello; but who can be sure what this poem means? The *Ring and the Book* is neo-Hegelian in spirit; the truth is the whole, and can only be arrived at by considering the situation successively in all of its aspects, which complement, supplement, and interpenetrate, and are *aufgehoben* as the poem proceeds. Cf. Sir Henry Jones, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher.*

8. W. J. Tucker, *et* al., *Progressive Orthodoxy;* W. J. Tucker, *My Generation.*

CHAPTER XIII

1. Cf. T. R. Glover, *Conflict of Religions in the Roman Empire,* pp. 118, f.; *The Jesus of History,* pp. 47-50; 55, f.

2. Cf. E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience,* pp. 188-190.

3. Professor Hobhouse points out that this emphasis on an ethical

change of heart is common to both Buddhism and Christianity, *Morals in Evolution,* third edition, pp. 484, 515.

4. Colossians, II, 6.

5. Galatians IV, 9; Romans VIII, 9-11; Ephesians, III, 17-19; I Corinthians VI, 17.

6. John III, 7.

7. John IV, 14.

8. John XV, 1, 4, 9.

9. John XVII, 21, 23; cf. I, John II, 5, 6, 28; V. 20.

10. Paul teaches the subjection of women in such passages as Ephesians V, 22-33. Other passages in the New Testament dealing with marriage, divorce, the position of women, and the respective merits of marriage and celibacy are: Matthew V, 31, f; X 35-37; XIX, 3-12; XXII, 23-30. Mark X, 2-12; XII, 19-25. Luke XVI, 18; XX, 27-35. Romans VII, 1-4. I Corinthians VI, 12-20; VII; XI, 1-16. Ephesians V, 22;—VI, 4. Galatians III, 28. Colossians III, 18-21. I Timothy II, 9-15; III, 1-13; V, 1-16. Hebrews XIII, 4. I Peter III, 1-8. Revelation XIV, 4.

11. This, at least, is true except for the last two centuries of the middle ages, when the church was in a general condition of decay. The books of Henry Charles Lea (*Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy; History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences;* etc.) can easily be read in a wrong perspective. They might, as a report of the conditions in the times, almost be compared with William T. Stead's *If Christ Came to Chicago,* as an account of American moral conditions in the closing years of the last century.

12. The fact that a few credulous and reactionary Protestants and Roman Catholics continue to publish and to believe idle gossip and malicious lies about one another need not qualify what I have said.

13. This statement would hold true, even if the few extreme higher critics should eventually prove to be right in affirming that we know little or nothing of the historic Jesus of Nazareth. To whatever extent the Jesus Christ whom the Church has been following ever since the synoptic Gospels have existed in their present form is an historic personage or an ideal projected out of the experience of the church, he remains the most effective means (for Gentiles at least) to gain an understanding of God, and to receive dynamic strength from Him. Man could not have formed such an ideal as Jesus Christ, unless God were at least as good as he. (Cf. Douglas C. Macintosh "Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?" *American Journal of Theology,* XV (1911) pp. 362-372; XVI (1912) pp. 106-110).

14. That Christianity has not always been perfect in its moral history need disturb no one. No Christian denomination has ever claimed to be perfect in its conduct. (The Roman Catholic claim of papal infallibility applies only to dogma, as we have seen). All that the most ardent Christian apologist needs to claim is that organized Christianity has, on the whole, notwithstanding blemishes, been the greatest uplifting moral force in Europe, (and in the lands settled by Europeans) during the last two thousand years. Cf. the References to this Chapter given under the heading "Christianity and Moral Evolution." The authors cited are thoroughly objective historians, whose least fault is bias toward Christianity.

CHAPTER XIV

1. It is believed that this chapter will be intelligible to the reader who has no previous acquaintance with psychology. Such readers, however, if they wish to get a better background for the study of religion will find some elementary text helpful. Among the briefer presentations with whose

general standpoint this chapter is in agreement are Professor William McDougall's little books, *"Physiological Psychology"* and *"Psychology,"* and Professor James Rowland Angell's *Introduction to Modern Psychology.* The reader will also find much of value in William James' *Psychology, Briefer Course,* especially Chapters VIII, X-XII, XXIII-XXVI.

The author in this chapter is chiefly indebted to Professor William McDougall's *Social Psychology,* and Dr. Morton Prince's *The Unconscious.* Cf. also the author's papers, "Instinct and Sentiment in Religion" and "The Evolution of Values from Instincts" published respectively in volumes XXV (1916) and XXIV (1915) of the *Philosophical Review,* and "McDougall's Social Psychology in the Light of Recent Discussion" in the *Journal of Philosophy,* XVIII (1921).

2. Morton Prince, *The Unconscious,* pages 52-59.

3. Besides *The Unconscious,* the author has got much light on the subconscious from Dr. Prince's *The Differentiation of a Personality,* and various articles in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology.* The best short discussions for the student of the psychology of religion are James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* Chapter III, Professor George A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion,* Chapter XII, Dr. George Barton Cutten, *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity.* (Cf. Index under "Subconsciousness.")

4. Professor McDougall, in his *Social Psychology,* gives separate names to the instinct as a whole (e. g., pugnacity) and its specific emotion (e. g., anger). For the sake of brevity a single name is here given to both instinct and emotion.

5. This illustration is given by Professor Graham Wallas, *The Great Society,* Chapter VIII. Professor Wallas gives an effective criticism of the exaggerated employment of imitation, suggestion, and sympathy.

6. This illustration is given by Professor McDougall, *Social Psychology,* p. 78.

7. These three points are adapted from Professor C. H. Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order.*

8. Cf. Professor E. D. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion.* (Index, under "Age").

CHAPTER XV

1. E. S. Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience,* pp. 211-213.

2. E. D. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion,* pp. 188-184. Italics in original, on p. 194.

3. James Sully, *Studies of Childhood,* p. 127, Cf. pp. 120-132, 506-513.

4. G. A. Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals,* p. 219.

5. John Fiske, *The Idea of God,* p. 116.

6. George E. Dawson, *The Child and His Religion,* pp. 36-46.

7. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* p. 191.

8. Cf. the celebrated discussion of "Habit," by William James, given both in his *Principles of Psychology,* and *Psychology, Briefer Course.*

9. Professor Starbuck (*op. cit.,* Chapter XXIV).

10. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* p. 87.

11. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* pp. 85-89.

12. Alexander F. Shand, *Foundations of Character,* p. 106.

13. Shand, *op. cit.,* p. 123.

14. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* p. 91.

15. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 207, footnote.

16. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* pp. 91, 114.

17. Starbuck, *op. cit.,* p. 92; cf. pp. 199-212.

18. Ames, *op. cit.,* pp. 239-244

19. James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* Chapters VII,

VIII. The quotation is from pp. 153, f.

20. Starbuck, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, f.

21. G. A. Coe, *The Spiritual Life*, Chapter III.

22. Starbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

23. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 83.

24. *Idem*, p. 165.

25. *Idem*, p. 134.

26. Notwithstanding the conscientious self-reproaches which every good man feels, and with which the writings of the saints abound.

27. Starbuck, *op. cit.*, Chapter XXIX.

28. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, lectures XI-XV. He confuses, to some extent, sanctification in general with the peculiar features of the saintliness and mysticism of the medieval saints. Sanctification, as discussed in the present chapter, seems to me different from the experiences of the medieval and other great mystics, which will be noticed in Chapter XVII.

29. Observe that I merely apply the doctrine of ideo-motor action to cases where the idea of an *action* tends to produce that action. I do not commit myself to the more sweeping claim that all ideas whatever, whether of actions or not, tend to express themselves in movements.

30. Readers who think this criticism of the revival is too severe may compare it with the discussions by Professor Ames, (*op. cit.*, Chapter, XIV), Dr. Cutten (*Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, Chapters XIII, XIV, XVIII), and Professor G. A. Coe (*Spiritual Life* and *Psychology of Religion*, Chapter X, and "Revivals" in Index). Professor Ames and Dr. Cutten, by the way, are pastors and Professor Coe is an active layman, each in a different religious denomination that has been famous for its revivalism. More sympathetic are the interpretations of William James (*Varieties of Religious Experience*) and Professor James B. Pratt (*The Religious Consciousness*, Chapter IX), neither of whom has been personally connected with a revival denomination. Perhaps the most terrific exposure of the revival, written from a psychological standpoint, is the Rev. Frederick M. Davenport's *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, a work which probably no longer represents its author's opinions, judging from his favorable report of the Billy Sunday revivals in the *Outlook*, vol. 110 (1915), pp. 311-315.

31. Starbuck, *op. cit.*, Chapter XI, William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 176 ff.

32. The beginner is advised to postpone the consideration of this question until later on. For the information of the advanced reader it is pointed out that Dr. Cutten's view will be found in his *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, pages 245, f. 255-261, 351, 355, 413-418 and *passim;* that of William James in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 511ff. The position favored by the author will be found in his paper, "The Relation of the Psychology of Religion to the Philosophy of Religion," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 134-149. A similar position is held by Professor James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, Chapter II and pp. 5-7, 445-447, 458.

CHAPTER XVI

1. The analysis, in sections I-III and V, follows, with modifications by the author, Miss Anna Louise Strong, *The Psychology of Prayer.*

2. Cf. Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chapter III.

3. Among the spiritual religions, primitive and Southern Buddhism constitute the chief exception to this statement. The "meditation," which some radicals of today would substitute for traditional prayer, appears to

be of the monologue type. The author is uncertain how to classify the prayers of Christian Scientists; their doctrines suggest the monologue type. The prayer of a Positivist, if he follows the counsel of August Comte and pictures before his mind the image of an absent wife or mother, would be of the dialogue type.

4. De Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (Eng. trans.), p. 44.

5. A psychological account of the growth of the conception of Jesus Christ in the experience of the Christian church has been strikingly set forth by President G. Stanley Hall in his *Jesus the Christ, in the Light of Psychology.* How far this book is reliable in its handling of historical and critical material is another question; at any rate, its grasp of the psychological principles involved in the process of idealization of the Christ is penetrating and profound.

6. Anna Louise Strong, *op. cit.,* p. 84.

7. *Thoughts* (translation).

8. Jowett's translation.

9. Cited from *A Book of Common Worship by the New York State Conference of Religion,* 1900.

10. Possibly this assertion is too strong, in view of the evidence furnished by Professor J. B. Pratt, (*The Religious Consciousness,* pp. 321-323 and footnotes) that naturalistic prayers are common in certain Protestant and Catholic circles numerous enough in each communion to maintain societies and to publish journals.

11. The doctrine and illustrations set forth in this section are adapted from William James, "The Energies of Men" in *Memories and Studies.*

12. G. A. Coe, *The Religion of a Mature Mind,* pp. 357, f.

13. The Emmanuel Movement in Boston is a commendable beginning at such cooperation.

14. Few popular articles on prayer are scientifically sound. An exception is "What God Has Done for Me," by the author of "Finding God in Millersville," *American Magazine,* October, 1919 (LXXXVIII), pp. 53, ff. An essay along the same lines, to which only slight exception needs to be taken is *Prayer, What it Is, and What it Does,* by the Rev. Samuel McComb, D.D. (Published by Harper Brothers, 1913.)

15. James H. Leuba, "The Contents of the Religious Consciousness," *The Monist,* Vol. XI, pp. 536-573.

16. *Psychological Bulletin,* 1907, pp. 33, ff.

17. Further evidence is given by Frank Orman Beck in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology,* vol. II, pp. 116, ff., who gives the results of a questionnaire.

18. George Barton Cutten, *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,* especially pp. 14-18; 245, f.; 257-261; 352-355.

CHAPTER XVII

1. James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* Chapter XVI.

2. *E. g.,* Psalms XVII, XXVII, XXX, XXXI, LXIII, CXVI, CXXXIX.

3. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism.*

4. Galatians I, 16-18.

5. Acts XXII, 17-22; II Corinthians XII, 2-4. Evelyn Underhill, *The Mystic Way,* p. 165.

6. Acts XIII, 1-3.

7. II Corinthians XII; Galatians II, 2; Acts XVI, 9; XVIII, 9, 10.

8. I Corinthians, XIV, 18.

9. Galatians VI, 17.

10. I Corinthians XII, 28; XIII, 2; XIV.

11. Galatians II, 20; II Corinthians IV, 6; Romans VIII, 16; Phillipians I, 21.
12. Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion,* p. 15.
13. I John IV.
14. John XIV, 20; VI, 35; X, 7; XV, 1, 5; VI, 53, f.; cf. 56.
15. John III, 11; XXI, 24.
16. A. Loisy, *Le Quatrième évangile,* p. 55; cited from E. Underhill, *The Mystic Way,* p. 240.
17. Augustine, *Confessions,* I, 1 (Pusey's translation in the Everyman Library, p. 1).
18. *Op. cit.,* p. 134.
19. George Eliot, *Mill on the Floss,* Book IV, Chapter III.
20. *Imitation of Christ,* Book I, Chapter I; Chapter XXII; Chapter VIII. (Translation.)
21. George A. Coe, "Sources of Mystical Revelation" in *Hibbert Journal,* vol. VI (1908), pp. 359-372.
22. George Barton Cutten, *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,* p. 36.
23. *Idem,* p. 341.
24. James B. Pratt, *op. cit.,* p. 403.
25. Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love,* edited by Grace Warrack, Chapter IV.
26. Cutten, *op cit.,* p. 168.
27. *Proceedings of the Society of Psychical Research,* vol. VII, pp. 100-110.
28. *The Independent,* vol. 70 (1911), pp. 104, f. *Current Literature,* vol. 52 (1912), pp. 73, f.
29. J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.,* pp. 183-187, and the references therein cited.
30. Cutten, *op. cit.,* Chapter VIII.
31. Edward Scribner Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience,* Chapter XVIII.
32. R. M. Jones, *op. cit.,* pp. 33-36; 55, f.; 78, f.; 176, f.; 194, f., and *passim.*
33. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism,* p. 359.
34. Henri Joly, *Psychology of the Saints* (trans.), Chapter III.
35. Quoted by Joly, *op. cit.,* p. 25.
36. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* pp. 347, f.; 304.
37. James, *op. cit.,* pp. 350, ff.

The non-Catholic reader should understand that the symbolism of the Sacred Heart is not intended literally. Many Protestants have derived help from a not wholly dissimilar symbolism expressed in Cowper's hymn, "There is a fountain filled with blood." The only fair test is the actual fruitfulness of such symbolisms in the lives of those who make of them.

38. For an eloquent passage in eulogy of the great mystics, the reader is referred to Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism,* pp. 514, f. On the other side there is the judgment of Mrs. Anna Robeson Burr (*Religious Confessions and Confessants*), endorsed by Professor Pratt, (*op. cit.,* pp. 467, f.) that ecstatics as a class are characterized by a "lack of creativeness and a paucity of original ideas," and that what they did accomplish was usually done in spite of their mysticism rather than because of it.

CHAPTER XVIII

1. In saying that "God comes to self-consciousness in the human race," or that He "comes to self-consciousness in the mind of an individual human being," the author does not mean to imply that God is not *already* self-conscious, both in other finite beings, and in the world as a whole, which he believes to be the case.

2. Quoted from J. E. Creighton, *An Introductory Logic,* 3d. ed., pp. 397, f.

3. It will not be necessary in this book to consider how far these statements require modification to be acceptable to advocates of the Einstein theory of relativity, as no such modifications would affect the arguments of this and later chapters.

4. Popular statements of such idealistic arguments will be found in E. C. Wilm, *Problem of Religion,* Chapters III and IV; A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World;* and Friedrich Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy,* Book I, Chapter II. Berkeley's *Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,* and Fichte's *Vocation of Man* are delightfully written classical presentations of idealism that are intelligible to the beginner.

5. Lawrence J. Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment,* p. 271. Cf. *Philosophical Review,* vol. XXVII, p. 276.

6. L. J. Henderson, *Fitness of the Environment,* p. 276. The reader who has an elementary knowledge of organic chemistry will find a strong presentation of this argument, with a wealth of scientific evidence, in this book, and also in Professor Henderson's *The Order of Nature.*

7. L. J. Henderson, *Fitness of the Environment,* p. 307.

8. L. J. Henderson, *The Order of Nature,* especially Chapter X, "The Teleological Order."

9. L. J. Henderson, *Fitness of the Environment,* pp. 66; 109, f; 263-267. Although he does not go into philosophical and religious considerations, like teleology, Professor J. W. Gregory in *The Making of the Earth* furnishes a number of illustrations that could readily be made into teleological arguments, like Professor Henderson's (cf. pp. 75-77; 128-133; 206, f.; 214, f.

10. Such theories as Bergson's cannot be adapted to the properties of matter and the process of cosmic evolution as they are now regarded by scientists, in the opinion of Professor Henderson, *Fitness of the Environment,* p. 296.

11. "Teleology," as used in this book, does not involve the "finalism" which Professor Bergson opposes, and which he calls "teleology."

12. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* translated by Mitchell, pp. 251-271.

13. J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life and Personality,* p. 2.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Jacques Loeb, *The Organism as a Whole, From a Physico-chemical Viewpoint.*

16. A strong popular presentation of this point of view is given by D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society;* N. S., vol. 18 (1917-1918), pp. 436-461.

17. J. A. Thomson, *Bible of Nature,* p. 100.

18. One of the most thoughtful considerations of the analogy between organisms and machines is that by Professor L. T. Hobhouse, (*Development and Purpose,* Part II, Chapter IV). To Professor Hobhouse's general conclusions the argument in this chapter is largely indebted.

19. H. S. Jennings, *The Behavior of Lower Organisms,* p. 234.

20. We must regard the assumption that terrestrial organisms developed from inorganic matter as inevitable, unless we either suppose that life was brought to the earth from elsewhere in the universe by a fallen meteor (or in some other equally adventitious fashion); or unless we are willing to say that the mechanistic sciences are constructions for practical purposes of so wholly unreal and artificial a nature that the very question of a scientific explanation of the origin of life is unmeaning.

21. This remark applies also to the interesting attempt to show that life has evolved from colloids. (Benjamin Moore, *The Origin and Nature of Life*).

22. J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life, and Personality.* (New York, 1914) *Organism and Environment, as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing.* (New Haven, 1917) *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* N. S., vol. XVIII, pp. 419-436. The first of the above is perhaps the best exposition of the philosophy of the organism that has been written by a scientist and is of a sufficiently elementary character to meet the requirements of a beginner.

23. Of course, the author does not mean to imply that Darwinism implies that the struggle for existence is in any sense *self-conscious,* or even in most animals a *conscious* struggle for existence. But it is a struggle—organisms do not follow passively the line of least resistance like a drop of water. They struggle to do one thing rather than another. If they made no such struggle, if they showed no preference for one condition rather than another, if their behavior were wholly a matter comparable to the laws of inertia and gravity, natural selection in the Darwinian sense could not occur at all.

24. These difficulties are pointed out, and replied to from a Darwinian standpoint by V. L. Kellogg, *Darwinism To-day.*

25. Hans Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism.*

26. T. H. Huxley, *Science and Culture and Other Essays,* pp. 245, 246.

27. The claim that "consciousness does not exist" cannot be taken literally. All that the assertion can mean, for those who make it, is that in their opinion consciousness does not exist on the same plane that other psychologists have assumed, that it is not a substance in the sense of matter, etc. Descartes, who is perhaps the founder of mechanistic physiology and psychology, knew that it is impossible to doubt the existence of consciousness, and his "cogito, ergo sum" argument at least establishes this for all time.

28. The best presentation of this doctrine, perhaps, is Professor John Broadus Watson's *Behavior,* the opening chapter of which will not be too technical for the beginner.

29. Bergson's doctrine, given in *Matter and Memory,* is too complicated to summarize here. This allusion in no sense does justice to it.

30. William McDougall, *Body and Mind.*

31. The beginner will find the various mental processes developed from the standpoint of functional psychology in President James Rowland Angell's *Psychology,* and in his *Introduction to Modern Psychology.* More advanced discussions are J. R. Angell, "The Relation of Structural and Functional Psychology" and Professor G. H. Mead's "The Definitions of the Psychical," both in the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.* A similar standpoint is held by Professor C. H. Judd, "Evolution and Consciousness" in *Psychological Review,* vol. XVII, pp. 77, ff. The point of view held by Professor L. T. Hobhouse, who has made a penetrating analysis of all the factors in mental evolution, may also be classified in a broad way as functional. (*Development and Purpose, Mind and Evolution*).

32. Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied.* The metaphysical standpoint is developed in his *Philosophie der Werte,* of which the English version is likely to be misunderstood.

33. M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology,* pages 273-282. This reference will suffice for the beginner. The advanced reader should also consult Miss Calkins' *Introduction to Psychology* and her papers in the *Journal of Philosophy,* volumes IV and V.

34. L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution,* third edition, p. 596. Cf. also his more popular *Social Evolution and Political Theory.*

35. Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* vol. II, pp. 186-228; 738-746.

36. Alexander Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.*

37. William McDougall, *Social Psychology,* especially Chapters VIII and IX.

38. Since this chapter was written there has appeared *The Grand Strategy of Evolution,* by Professor William Patten, a biologist. While Professor Patten uses terms in senses of his own, and the word "teleology" does not appear in the Index, his contention throughout is for what I have called teleology. He believes that "there is but one creative process common to all phases of evolution, inorganic, organic, mental, and social. That process is best described by the term "co-operation or mutual service," (p. 33). "The essential factors at every stage of evolution are service and rightness," (p. 59). This he illustrates by the preservation of a worm, and (on a higher and more varied plane, of course) in the life of man in society (p. 60). "We have seen that the one outstanding fact which now dominates the thoughts and acts of intelligent men is evolution, or nature growth, embracing alike all physical, organic, mental, and social phenomena in its spontaneous constructive action, and using them all alike in the consummation of its creative purpose." Man is compelled to accept "Nature's Constructive rightness as his ethical standard" and "to recognize in natural growth the expression of a creative will," (p. 412). Professor Patten has at his command a wide range of scientific evidence, and makes a powerful case, which can hardly fail to impress every scientific reader.

CHAPTER XIX

1. Such religions, in the Occident at the present time, put their emphasis upon ethics. It is a question whether they are religions at all, in the sense in which religion has been defined in Chapter V. Noteworthy are the societies of Ethical Culture and of Positivism. They are agnostic rather than atheistic. Cf. Felix Adler's *An Ethical Philosophy of Life,* and various Ethical Addresses by W. M. Salter; Frederick Harrison, *The Creed of a Layman,* and *The Philosophy of Common Sense;* J. H. Bridges, *Essays and Addresses.* Philosophical presentations of religious positions that do not assume a God are G. S. Santayana's *Reason in Religion;* R. W. Sellars' *The Next Step in Religion;* Bertrand Russell's "Free Man's Worship" (see note 16 below); and T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics;* and, of course, Auguste Comte's *Politique Positive.*

2. Cf. "The Universal Prayer," by Alexander Pope.

3. It is a disputed question whether either Lincoln or his audience at the time had an adequate conception of the importance of this address as an interpretation of the events through which they were passing.

4. Arguments of this general tenor have come down from the times of Fichte and Hegel. The beginner will get much from Fichte's *Vocation of Man* and *Nature of the Scholar.* Among more technical works of the present time, the following are to be commended: Bernard Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value,* and *Value and Destiny of the Individual;* Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy;* Hastings Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil,* Book III; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God;* and S. Alexander, *Time, Space and Deity.*

5. In stating this argument, as well as the next, the author has not deemed it neeessary to indicate precisely how far he has adopted and how far modified Kant's famous arguments. The beginner, with a little aid from his teacher, or a commentary, will be able to follow the reasoning along these lines in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and Fichte's *Way to the Blessed Life.* He can gain much also from Carlyle's chapter on "The Everlasting Now" in *Sartor Resartus.* The illustration of the "time span" is from Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual.*

6. *The Principles of Human Knowledge* and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.* Written in masterly and lucid English, they are still perhaps the best introduction to mentalism for a beginner.

7. The foregoing account follows largely the popular expositions by Josiah Royce,—viz: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, and The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,* lecture XI. Other good popular accounts will be found in E. C. Wilm's *Problem of Religion* and A. K. Rogers' *Religious Conception of the World.* The best concise statement of contemporary mentalism will be found in Miss Mary W. Calkins' presidential address, "The Personalistic Conception of Nature," *Philosophical Review,* vol. XXVIII, (1919).

8. This view, called "panpsychism," is set forth in an eloquent and lucid manner in Friedrich Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy,* pp. 87-111. A more technical presentation will be found in Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual,* vol. II, pp. 219-242.

9. The two forms of idealism have been most clearly distinguished in American philosophical literature by Professor J. E. Creighton, "Two Types of Idealism," *Philosophical Review,* vol. XXVI, pp. 514-536. Cf. Bernard Bosanquet, "Realism and Metaphysics," same volume of the *Review,* pp. 4-15, and A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God,* etc., lecture X. There is no elementary work representing this standpoint to which a beginner can be referred. Perhaps the nearest approximation is Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernle's *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.* Much help can be gained, in a comparatively untechnical form, from Professor Creighton's articles, which have appeared from time to time in the *Philosophical Review,* as well as from the Third Part of his *Introductory Logic.* The standpoint is also held by most of his pupils who have contributed to *Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton.*

10. D. C. Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge,* p. 409.

11. *Ibid.,* pp. 410, 422-431.

12. W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* page 515.

13. W. James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays,* pp. 122, 127.

14. But cf. Horace Meyer Kallen, in *Creative Intelligence,* a volume of essays edited by John Dewey. Cf. pp. 433-436, 439-445.

15. The most recent defense of religion from the point of view of pragmatism is by Dr. J. R. Geiger, *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism* (in the *Philosophic Studies* of the University of Chicago). Attention should be called to three volumes by Professor E. S. Ames, *The Divinity of Christ, The Higher Individualism,* and *The New Orthodoxy.* Chapters on religious topics will be found in the books of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, (*Riddles of the Sphinx; Humanism; Studies in Humanism*). The following books show in some respects the influence of pragmatism:—George Burnam Foster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence,* and *The Finality of the Christian Religion;* Professor Irving King, *Development of Religion* (closing chapter); Professor D. C. Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge* and *Theology as an Empirical Science.*

16. Bertrand Russell, "The Free Man's Worship" in *Philosophical Essays,* Chapter II, and also in *Mysticism and Logic,* Chapter III.

17. *Harvard Theological Review,* vol. XI (1918), p. 153. This article, "Neo-Realism and Religion," is a valuable report of the status of religion in the new realistic camp. Cf. also Professor Hoernle's article, "The Religious Aspects of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy," *Harvard Theological Review,* vol. IX (1916), pp. 157-189, and the writings by Russell therein cited.

18. R. W. Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion.*

19. E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism,* p. 517.

20. E. G. Spaulding, *op. cit.,* p. 521.

21. See Chapter XVIII, Note 18.

22. Cf. an article in the *Harvard Theological Review* (1914), pp. 391-395.

23. Chiefly in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies* and *Moral Economy.*

24. See the preceding chapter, and the discussion of teleological and evolutionary arguments in this chapter.

25. See the later chapters of Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics.*

26. The beginner will find these four short essays by John Fiske most satisfactory, especially the second of them: *The Destiny of Man; the Idea of God; Through Nature to God; Life Everlasting.* While never willing to commit himself to Fiske's theological reconstruction of his philosophy, Spencer seems to have welcomed it. (Cf. J. Fiske, *Essays Historical and Literary,* vol. II, p. 229, (first note). He certainly came to feel more kindly toward religion in his old age (Cf. Spencer's *Autobiography,* vol. II, pp. 544-549, and Hugh Elliot, *Herbert Spencer,* pp. 170, 225-228). Good popular refutations of Agnosticism will be found in President J. G. Schurman's *Agnosticism and Religion* and *Belief in God.* One of the best technical refutations is Professor James Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* A good semi-popular refutation is F. C. S. Schiller's *Riddles of the Sphinx.* The best technical defense of Agnosticism is still, probably, Herbert Spencer's *First Principles.* Popular arguments for Agnosticism will be found in the essays of T. H. Huxley, John Tyndall, W. K. Clifford, R. G. Ingersoll, and in E. Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe.*

27. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,* especially pages 1-31, 90-110. With this account should be studied *Some Problems of Philosophy,* pages 221-231, a later and more restrained argument, which he gave to his undergraduate classes at Harvard. In reading the earlier work the reader should bear in mind that James later decided that the essay ought to have been called "the Right to Believe" instead of "The Will to Believe." The chief departure I have made from James in the text is in insisting that all emotional preference ought to be eliminated and that one ought to decide dispassionately, on *purely intellectual grounds,* whether or not there is a God. In urging this I may be preaching a counsel of perfection, but every one certainly ought to make the endeavor to be intellectually dispassionate in considering such a question. And he ought to remember that people who decide *against* belief in God are quite as likely to be swayed by emotional prejudices as are those who decide *for* this belief.

CHAPTER XX

1. The terms "traditional theism" and "traditional pantheism" have been somewhat arbitrarily chosen by the author to designate two rival *tendencies* in European Christian (and, as well, the author thinks likely, Jewish) thought. The expressions themselves ("theism" and "pantheism") are used in a large variety of senses. If the reader will take the trouble to consult five or six standard reference books, he will find that many thinkers described as "theists" in one will be called "pantheists" in another. While these two tendencies, in the form in which they are described in this chapter, can be clearly traced in the history of philosophical and religious thought, it is probably true that nearly all the greatest thinkers have been influenced by both of them.

2. The references in this and the three preceding paragraphs are all to William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* Lecture XX, and Postscript.

3. William James, *A Pluralistic Universe,* pp. 310, f.; cf. p. 318.

4. *Idem.* p. 124. The views of John Stuart Mill will be found in his *Essays on Religion* and *Autobiography.* A concise summary is given in Höffding's *History of Modern Philosophy,* Vol. II, pp. 427-433.

5. William James, *Pragmatism,* pp. 72, 80.

6. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays,* p. 61.

7. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 519.

8. Theodore Flournoy, *The Philosophy of William James,* p. 165. This little book is indispensable for those who wish to study James from the religious standpoint.

9. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy,* p. 396.

10. These quotations are from the closing pages of Professor L. T. Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose.* His other most important philosophical works are *The Theory of Knowledge; Mind in Evolution;* and *Morals in Evolution.*

11. From the closing sentences in *Morals in Evolution.*

12. The nearest Professor Hobhouse has come to saying this, so far as the author knows, is in the following sentence: "Hence if the [human] mind does not directly through the religious consciousness become aware of its relation to a greater Spirit, it does have to recognize the existence of conditions appropriate to the operation of such a Spirit, and to admit in its own history a process in which such conditions are working out their natural results." (*Development and Purpose,* pp. 371, f.). Does the clause beginning with "if" express mere uncertainty, or is it to be understood as a statement of fact? For the "if" should we understand "even if," or "although it is true that"? The former alternative would bring him the more closely into agreement with the contention made by me.

13. Hastings Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* all of Book III, and particularly pages 211-246; 286-294; 335-356. Cf. his essay "Personality, Human and Divine," in *Personal Idealism* (edited by Henry Sturt). Dr. Rashdall's books are among the most helpful in existence for the Christian student who believes that an absolutely honest and fearless study of philosophy will be of more value to him in the end than the obscurantism usually found in religious books written by and for clergymen.

14. Probably Dr. F. C. S. Schiller's first book, *The Riddles of the Sphinx,* of which a new edition appeared a few years ago, is the most helpful for the beginner. His more recent thought on the subject will be found in his *Humanism, New Studies in Humanism,* and in various articles during recent years in the British philosophical and theological journals. Dr. Schiller's writing is vigorous, lively, interesting, and usually not too difficult for anyone who has acquired a little acquaintance with Philosophy.

15. Josiah Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,* pp. 470, f.

16. Josiah Royce's principal works bearing on this theme are: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,* 1885; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,* 1892; *The Conception of God* (with Howison and others), 1897; *Studies of Good and Evil,* 1898; *The World and the Individual,* 2 vols., 1900, 1901; *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 1908; *The Sources of Religious Insight,* 1912; *The Problem of Christianity,* 1913. A short and useful summary of his philosophy will be found in F. Thilly, *History of Philosophy,* pages 559-561. The student will find most of the fundamental features of Royce's philosophy of religion in either of the first two volumes mentioned above. *The Philosophy of Loyalty* and parts of the *Problem of Christianity* are the most untechnical and latest statements of his thought. *The World and the Individual* is his fullest and most systematic work.

17. In this section the author chiefly has in mind the *Appearance and Reality* of Mr. F. H. Bradley. At times the thought of Professor Bernard Bosanquet seems similar, but on the whole his attitude toward religion is more affirmative.

CHAPTER XXI

1. See page 370 above.
2. See Chapter XII, Section III.
3. E. L. van Becelaere, in an article on "Grace,—Roman Catholic" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.*
4. *Paradise Lost,* Book II, lines 557-561.
5. William James, *Principles of Psychology,* vol. II, chapter on "Will"; the principal points also in the corresponding chapter of his *Briefer Course.*
6. William McDougall, *Social Psychology,* Chapter IX.
7. Th. Flournoy, *Philosophy of William James,* Chapter VII.
8. F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism,* p. 415.
9. William James, *Principles of Psychology,* vol. II, p. 577, note.
10. Determinists allege that there are at least two important differences between determinism and fatalism. (1) For the determinist, unlike the fatalist, "we are not bound to a changeless order of conduct. The vast whole of events, linked together as we may believe in indissoluble bonds, is not a static world, but the sense of movement, change, and life. To hold that the mental sphere is through and through a determinately related sphere, no more excludes from it genuinely new experiences than a similar conception which thinking men are agreed in applying to nature, excludes new events there." (2) Fatalism ignores "the part played by the self, and is inclined to represent human life as the helpless sport of external forces. . . . Fatalism regards human destiny as fixed independently of human action; determinism regards it as fixed only in and through human choice. . . . Dependent upon a cosmic Power we all indeed are, but the fact that this Power accomplishes certain ends only in and through our thinking and willing is disregarded by fatalism." A determinism which recognizes the self as an active and potent factor in shaping human life does not "cut the nerve of moral endeavor and result in stagnation or in a hopeless surrender to circumstances" as belief in fatalism would do. W. G. Everett, *Moral Values,* pp. 363-365.
11. There are excellent discussions of freedom in various treatises on ethics. Among those on the determinist side may be recommended the chapters on the subject in the following: Professor Andrew Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles;* Friedrich Paulsen, *System of Ethics;* Professor F. Thilly, *Introduction to Ethics;* Professor W. G. Everett, *Moral Values;* and, for a more advanced treatment, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil.* Two of the best defences of indeterminism are William James' essay, "The Dilemma of Determinism" in his *The Will to Believe and Other Essays, and* Dr. F. C. S. Schiller's essay, "Freedom," published in his *Studies in Humanism.* A more advanced treatment will be found in Professor W. R. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God.*
12. *Some Problems of Philosophy,* p. 139.
13. *Studies in Humanism,* p. 413, and *passim.* This is a rather free paraphrase of what Dr. Schiller says. I desire to apologize if I have in any way misinterpreted him. In any case, the argument as I have put it seems to be a good one, from the indeterminist standpoint.
14. James Ward, *The Realm of Ends,* page 492.
15. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays,* p. 181. This view—that the ultimate destiny of things has been decided in advance, and that human freedom of initiative cannot essentially affect the outcome—seems later to have been abandoned by James in favor of the view attributed to him in earlier paragraphs of this section.
16. James' specific discussions of the freedom of the will are chiefly given in his early philosophical book *The Will to Believe and Other Essays.* Pluralism is discussed in nearly all his books: that in *Some Problems of*

Philosophy is the latest, and in many ways the best. *The Pluralistic Universe* is chiefly an appreciative interpretation of other pluralistic philosophers with whom he was in sympathy. It contains little that bears on the problem of this section. Besides Dr. Schiller's essay already cited, two papers on this general subject are given in the appendix to the new edition of his *Riddles of the Sphinx.*

17. Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual,* vol. II, pp. 352-360.
18. Josiah Royce, *ibid.,* p. 349.
19. *Idem,* p. 291.
20. *Ibid.,* p. 293.
21. Josiah Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty,* p. 395.
22. Josiah Royce, *ibid.,* p. 390.
23. The beginner might first read Josiah Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy,* pages 428-434. This passage will be clearer if Lectures X-XIII are studied in their entirety. A more advanced treatment is given in the *World and the Individual,* Vol. II, Lectures VII and VIII. Cf. also *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* Lecture VIII. Royce's treatment of the problem of freedom from the standpoint of Absolute Idealism appears to the author so admirable in every way that he has not supplemented it with the interpretations of other writers of the school. Among contemporary discussions the advanced reader is particularly referred to Bernard Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value,* Lecture IX and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual,* Lecture IV. There is a particularly fine passage in A. S. Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy,* pages 291-296. Cf. also A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics,* Book IV, Chapter IV. For a discussion of determinism from the realistic standpoint, cf. S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity,* Book III, Chapter X.
24. A suggestive discussion of group volition will be found in William McDougall's, *The Group Mind,* part II.

CHAPTER XXII

1. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* translated by Arthur Mitchell, p. 27.
2. William James, *Human Immortality,* p. 27.
3. *Idem,* pp. viii, f.
4. F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx,* revised edition, pp. 289, f. This explanation is a detail in a very suggestive chapter, in which are set forth illuminating interpretations of evoluton from a teleological standpoint, and of the relations between God and man. Though the exposition is apparently from a neo-Lamarckian standpoint, most of it could probably be rephrased so that it would accord with other biological interpretations of evolution.
5. Cf. especially *Matter and Memory* (English translation) pp. xv., 139-169; 225-232.
6. "The Mind and the Brain" in a collection of papers entitled *Concerning Immortality,* and edited by B. H. Streeter.
7. William McDougall, *Body and Mind.* The characteristics of the soul are summarized on p. 365.
8. Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Survival of Man,* p. 341.
9. William McDougall, *Body and Mind,* pp. 351, f.
10. Besides the Proceedings of the *Society of Psychical Research,* the following works are favorable to spiritism and telepathy:—James H. Hyslop, *Life After Death;* Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Survival of Man* and *Raymond;* Frank Podmore, *Modern Spiritualism;* and Frederic W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death.* A sympa-

thetic summary of the status and results of such investigations is given by W. F. Barrett, *Psychical Research* in the Home University Library series. A telling, and as the author believes, an entirely just criticism, is Amy E. Tanner's *Studies in Spiritism.* A more sympathetic critic, who is in the author's opinion not sufficiently severe, is Lily Dougall, "The Good and Evil in Spiritism" published in *Concerning Immortalty,* a volume of essays edited by B. H. Streeter. Suggestive is an article by Mathilde Weil, "Experiences of a Medium" in the *Yale Review,* Vol. IX, pp. 586-598, April, 1920. William James' final opinion will be found in "Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher" published in his *Memories and Studies.* The tricks of the ordinary professional medium are exposed by David Phelps Abbott, *Behind the Scenes With the Mediums.*

11. G. T. Fechner, *Life After Death* (English translation); and *Zend Avesta.* F. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy* (trans.) p. 243.

12. H. Münsterberg, *The Eternal Life;* cf. his *Psychology, General and Applied,* Chapter XXII.

13. James H. Leuba, *The Belief in God and Immortality.* Cf. the author's review of this book, and Professor Leuba's reply in the *Psychological Bulletin* for 1918.

14. James H. Leuba, *Belief in God and Immortality,* p. 252. Cf. the diagrams on pages 253, 255, 261, 264, and 268.

15. G. Lowes Dickinson, *Is Immortality Desirable?* p. 45.

16. Cf. Chapter XVIII, §VII, and Chapter XIX, §II-3.

17. See pp. 346-350.

18. Bernard of Cluny, translated by John Mason Neale.

19. The greatest ancient defender of the doctrine of prëexistence was Plato. One of his arguments for it is largely based on his supposition that the ability to form concepts can only be explained by recollection, and that if concepts cannot be traced to previous recollection in this life, they must be due to memories from an earlier state of existence. The simplest statement of the doctrine will be found in the *Meno.* Its more developed forms are given in the *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo.* Modern philosophers are able to explain conception without reducing it to a form of recollection; so this argument is now worthless. Another Platonic argument is based on the now discarded doctrine that the soul is a simple substance, and therefore is indestructible and eternal. A beautiful poetical statement of prëexistence is given in Wordworth's Ode on *Imitations of Immortality.* A modern philosophical defender of prëexistence is Dr. J. E. McTaggart, *Human Immortality and Pre-existence* and *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* sections 41, ff.

20. William James, *Human Immortality,* pp. 32-45.

21. Spinoza, *Ethics,* chiefly at the close of Part V.

22. J. G. Fichte, Way to the Blessed Life (published in *Fichte's Popular Works,* translation by Kroeger).

23. H. Münsterberg, *The Eternal Life;* and *The Eternal Values.* The German text of the latter is decidedly preferable, (*Philosophie der Werte*).

24. Such I take to be the view, among others, of Mr. F. H. Bradley (*Appearance and Reality,* Chapters XXVI, XXVII, *Essays on Truth and Reality,* Chapters XV, XVI) and of Professor Bernard Bosanquet (*The Value and Destiny of the Individual,* Lectures IX, X).

25. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism,* p. 503, Cf. Dante, *Paradiso,* xxx, 64.

26. Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual,* Vol. II, p. 452.

27. *Revelation,* XXII, 11, 12.

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1873-1953 Wm. Ernest Hocking

He steadfastly refused to repudiate the universe or the God who made it.

He is the foremost living exponent of Idealism — one of the least heeded, but most healing, of all philosophies. Hocking believed with all his heart "that to know that the world has a meaning is the philosophic minimum."

He rejected the pragmatist principle that "whatever works is true" but he regarded the negative statement that "whatever does not work is not true" as a valid test for any philosophy.

He believed with Plato "the ultimate Ideas are goals of which we already have an inkling, and the business of Philosophy is to bring those latent perceptions to birth, which is recalling us to our true nature."

"It is the truth that the world, like the human self, has its existence in a living purpose. It is

Idealism: Self is primary with the world adjusting to self; not that I am more important than you but the human self is more important than any other part of the world
(He interprets as he so desires) first cause
Cosmological - cause & effect; back to a cause

Realism: One who looks for objective information objectively expressed (he lets the chips fall where they will)

Nature of God.
Freedom of the will

Pragmatism: Experimentalist, flexible in his thinking.

Pragmatism - (McPherson College definition)
"If it works, it's true; if it's True, it works

True greatness
will be submissive
to the great amenities
of life.